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First Globalization

The Eurasian Exchange, 1500–1800

Geoffrey C. Gunn

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Preface

First Globalization offers a reappraisal of binary East-West history, including both the Orientalist critique and the work of the "Asian values" school. Where incorporation has come to define the making of a European-centered world system, we are concerned here with the cultural exchanges and symmetries across the Eurasian landmass in the course of centuries before the rise to dominance of the West. The "Eurasian exchange," in our definition, involves complex crossovers of ideas, languages, and philosophies that engaged and transformed Europe and Asia in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the era of the discoveries. But just as Europe impacted on new worlds, so, reflexively, did the revelation of Asia change Europe irrevocably.

European knowledge of eastern lands reached back to Ptolemy and the Greeks, but the new discoveries pioneered by the Iberians awakened both wonderment and prejudice. Such was reflected in the Jesuit school, in the front line of East-West ideological contest a century before the arrival of the Dutch and English chartered companies. Nevertheless, European Enlightenment, as borne by the English, Dutch, French, and other navigators and traders, passed beyond mere self-interested curiosity to laying the scientific basis of European empire. Ineluctably, as the examples of modern Macau, the Philippines, East Timor, and many other sites reveal, the first wave of globalization introduced new exchanges, hybrid forms, and especially creolized cultures.

As a thematic or nonlinear history, this work offers an alternative frame of reference to a vast geocultural zone outside the established categories of modern nation-state and region. Drawing on cultural, linguistic, geo-

graphical, and social studies, utilizing an array of world historical texts, we seek to break down the inherent bias and boundaries of both national and imperial history. Rather than taking the asymmetric development of East and West for granted, rather than accepting European exceptionalism as a given, we demonstrate that ultimate European hegemony was in many ways contingent on three centuries of intellectual negotiation and ideological contestation with the East.

Acknowledgments

Having commenced work on this text in 1998, little did I know that I would be caught up in the sometimes violent events leading to the birth of a new nation, East Timor. My intermittent work in East Timor with the United Nations Transitional Administration in 2000–2001 slowed the pace of writing but in the process undoubtedly enriched it.

Looking further back, the book builds on three of my recently published "regional world histories," namely, *Encountering Macau* (1997), *Timor Lorosae: 500 Years* (1999), and *Nagasaki in the Asian Bullion Trade Networks* (1999).

Further back, I simply highlight a youthful life traveling the Afroeurasia world, not only crisscrossing the Persian and Afghanistan deserts and plateaus and other "terrestrial" silk roads but more than once plying the "Sinbad route" through the China seas, the archipelago, along the two coasts of India and Sri Lanka, westward across the Indian Ocean to Dar es Salaam, and through the Red Sea from Massawa to the Gulf of Aquaba, feats almost unimaginable in present times. All the more luck to have held teaching positions in, respectively, the Arab (North Africa), Chinese (Singapore), Malay (Brunei), Indochinese (Laos), and Japanese worlds. My deepest appreciation to my wife Chieko and son Kenji for sharing this adventure and experience.

Needless to say, teaching Asia-oriented courses to students in Asia in general has also offered a new dimension on the Eurasia exchange. I particularly appreciate my Nagasaki University seminar class of 2000–2002 on whose ears the basic concepts of this book were first tested, otherwise

known as the class who insisted on accompanying me "on mission" to East Timor in the spring of 2001.

Research for this book was achieved almost exclusively in libraries in Nagasaki, Macau, and Dili (East Timor), and I extend my thanks to librarians and archivists in those places.

Especially, I am indebted to commissioning editor Mark Selden for extreme patience, skillful editing, and a rare mastery of the metageography and historical-cultural issues encompassed in this book. More than that, Mark came close across many pages to collaborating on certain issues and themes. Driving even harder after an appropriate first meeting in the cultural crossroads of the lovely Okinawan islands, to my mild consternation he suggested yet another chapter. Similarly, I thank Susan McEachern and Alden Perkins of Rowman & Littlefield, who supervised final editing and questions of style, along with Bruce R. Owens, who critically copyedited the entire manuscript.

In dedicating this book to the East Timorese people and their nation's victory, I am mindful of their unconscionable suffering at the hands of outsiders and the debt owed to them by most of the rest of the world.

Glossary

A = Arabic; C = Chinese; D = Dutch; F = French; I = Indonesian; J = Japanese; K = Korean; L = Latin; M = Malay; P = Portuguese; S = Spanish; Sa = Sanskrit; Ta = Tagalog; Te = Tetum; Th = Thai; V = Vietnamese

amok (M)—murderous frenzy attributed to Malays
anito (Ta)—spirit, soul of dead
Asia Extrema (L)—Far East
Aurea Chersoesus (L)—Golden Peninsula
azulejos (P)—hand-painted ceramic tiles

Baba (M)—Malayanized Chinese
bairro (P)—district
bandores (P)—Renaissance musical instrument resembling a guitar
bastinado (P)—split bamboo baton used to punish criminals in China
baybayin (Ta)—Tagalog writing system
bolo (P)—Portuguese cake
bombacha (P, S)—baggy pantaloon trousers
bongiois (J)—personal servant of the governor
byobu (J)—screen

cangue (F)—from (P) canga; wooden frame placed around neck of criminals in China
carroza (S)—float
carta (P)—card, map, or letter
castella (P)—*see* kasutera

Cathay—China
chaomuang (Th)—lord of the realm
chef de suco (P)—head of district
ching (C)—canonical books
cho nom (V)—Sino-Vietnamese ideograms
Cipangu—Japan
cofraida (S)—Catholic religious procession
confreira (P)—Catholic religious procession
conquista (S, P)—the conquest
conquistadores (S)—(Iberian) conquerors
crioloes (S)—local (Latin America)-born Spanish
crioulo (P)—creole language

daimyo (J)—Japanese feudal lord
Darul Islam (A)—world of Islam
deva raja (Sa)—god king
dobashi (J)—two languages, interpreter
dunia Melayu (M)—Malay world

Edo—former name for Tokyo
emaki-mono (J)—picture scroll portraits
Estado da India (P)—lit. state of India; Portuguese political-economic trading empire in the Asia region

fado (P)—Portuguese musical form
feng shui (C)—lit. wind and water, geomancy
festa (P)—festival
fidalgo (P)—aristocrat
filhos de terra (P)—sons of the soil

gamba (P)—violin
gentio (P)—nonbeliever
gyogi-zu (J)—Japanese maps formed from oval shapes representing provinces

haj (A)—Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca
hanafuda (J)—flower cards
han'gul (K)—Korean alphabet
hiragana (J)—Japanese syllabary
hojas volantes (S)—lit. flying pages, news bulletins

illustrados (P)—educated
India Meridional (L)—southern India

India Orientalis (L)—east of India
Indios (S)—natives of the Philippines
inimigo (P)—enemy
intramura (S)—within the walls of the fortress
iroha karuta (J)—ABC cards

jefumi (J)—figure treading
jurubassa (M)—lit. language specialist, translator

kakure (J)—lit. hidden, underground Christians
kana (J)—*see* hiragana; katakana
kanji (J)—Chinese character
Kannon (Kuan Yin)—goddess of mercy
karuta (J)—playing card
kasutera (P)—castella, cake from Castelo
katakana (J)—Japanese syllabary used for loanwords
katana (J), (P), (Te)—knife
keroncong (I)—genre of Indonesian music influenced by Portuguese melodies
kling (M)—people of Indian descent
kraak (D)—lit. carrack (tableware)
kudit (Ta)—diacritical mark
kurofune (J)—lit. black ships, Portuguese ships

ladinos (S)—bilingual Filipinos
Larantuqueiros (P)—mixed-race people from Larantuca on Flores island in the Indonesian archipelago
lingua (L, P)—language; interpreter
lingua Macaista (P)—language of the Macanese
livres de cartes (F)—lit. book of maps

Macaense (Macanese) (P)—mixed Portuguese-Asian residing in Macau
Makista (P)—Portuguese creole of Macau
mappa mundi (L)—world map
mappe monde (F)—world map
mestiço (P)—mixed race
mestizen (D)—mixed race
mestizo (S)—mixed race
miso (J)—soybean food derivative

Nanban (J)—southern barbarian
negara (M)—state

Nihon-machi (J)—Japan towns
nuoc nam (V)—fermented fish sauce

orang kaya (M)—lit. rich man or noble
orbis terrarum (L)—terrestrial globe

Panca Sila (Sa, I)—five principles
patung (M)—statue
payson (S)—passion
pedras (P)—stones or rock mountains
pesta (I)—festival derived from festa (P)
portolan—from Italian *portolano*; charts derived from empirical observation of mariners

quoc ngu (V)—lit. national language, Vietnamese Latin script

raja (M)—king
Rangaku (J)—Dutch learning
Reduction (S)—Jesuit-controlled Indian reservations in Paraguay and Uruguay
reina (P)—queen
relation (P)—letter missive
retabulos (P)—altar piece, decorated panel
roja (J)—jail
romaji (J)—Romanized Japanese script
roteiro (P)—travel directions

sakoku (J)—closed country
santos (S)—saint
Serani (M)—Christian
syair (M)—epic poem

Tatary—region in Asia (and Europe)
Terra Australis Incognita (L)—lit. unknown land of Australia
tofu (J)—soybean food derivative
topasse—term describing mixed Portuguese-Asian descendants
tranquiera (P)—palisade, stockade

Ukio-e (J)—woodblock print
ummat (A, M)—community of believers in Islam
uta karuta (J)—poem cards

VOC (D)—Dutch East India Company

waiguo (C)—foreign countries

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Introduction

Global studies of the "Rise of the West" now acknowledge the importance of developments in key zones of Asia, especially East Asia. In this new argument, Asia, not Europe, held center stage in the world economy for most of early modern history. The leading proponents of this view are Andre Gunder Frank, *Re-Orient* (1998); R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed* (1997); and Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence* (2000), who contend that Europe and East Asia attained comparable levels of development between 1500 and 1800. The debate continues, especially as to the question of European exceptionalism in the making of the modern world system. Eurocentricity, postcolonial critical theory, and accidental or optional European domination are all raised in this discussion. Taking the spatial bounds of this inquiry as the broad sweep of what is best evoked in the term "Eurasia," *First Globalization* seeks to explore the interplay of cultures commensurate with the European discoveries and expansion. This we term the "Eurasian exchange."

While globalization[1] today is generally associated with processes of economic incorporation and an emerging worldwide consumer culture, in this book we shift the terrain to the world of ideas and culture in order to address a range of questions. How, since the age of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, did ideas travel, both eastward and westward, and who were the prime agents of dissemination? In other words, how were mutually alien or variant ideas and philosophies received, transacted, translated, and even canonized in text and image? Why, in the first wave of globalization, were some peoples and civilizations more receptive to new ideas and exchanges, some selective, and some downright hostile? Alongside

the plunder associated with the Columbian exchange and the obvious benefits accruing to Europe from the early trade in Asian exotics, including the lucrative Asian bullion trade (Flynn 1996; Frank 1998; Gunn 1999a), can we also explain the great divergence between West and East on the route to modernity as a result of an unequal intellectual exchange during the crucial centuries of the first globalization? Having acquired knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, and crucial navigational information from the Arabs, did early modern Europe already have an edge over the Orient in the production and reproduction of knowledge? But if, as shown in the following pages, the first Europeans in the East were awestruck by the civilizations they encountered, why in these centuries did not a reverse revolution in the acceptance of new ideas and scientific paradigms occur throughout Asia?

FIRST GLOBALIZATION

This book traces the epoch of first globalization as it touched the maritime vector of the Eurasian landmass. Just as late Renaissance Europe expanded its mercantile and military sway over literally a New World, so its ideas and values entered a contested terrain, both at home and abroad. At home, the new discoveries challenged the tenets of medievalism, albeit not Euro-Christian-centrism. In Asian lands, the messages—both religious and secular—plied by missionaries and traders received a mixed reception, at times even outright rejection. In its late medieval heyday, European cosmography upheld a holistic view of the world and the universe, its physical description, and order. While cosmography—defined in Webster's dictionary as "the science that deals with the constitution of the whole order of nature"—came to be challenged and subordinated by the new philosophy of Enlightenment skepticism and rejection of the irrational, we may well ask, How did a resurgent Europe seek to intellectually accommodate civilizations outside the familiar?

In tracing the rise of a European canon on Asia, we are not merely recording the image of Asia in Europe or even Asia in the "making of Europe" (cf. Lach 1969). To the contrary, we defend the thesis that the accumulation of knowledge of Asia in Europe not only offered the ideological empowerment and legitimation for future military and commercial hegemony in Africa and the Americas but also developed—reflexively—out of that grand project of control and conquest. European precocity led to European primacy. But while our method is also generalizable to Africa and the Americas, we recall that in the first European interactions with the tribute-trading systems of India and China, systems that extended across the Indian Ocean world and embraced East and Southeast Asia, European

interlopers on the Asian mainland met their peers in civilization, military prowess, and science. Early European interactions with Asian empires, we shall argue, went beyond mere physical conquest (although there was plenty of that) and often took the form of didactic exchanges, philosophical conversation, and argument. *First Globalization* seeks to herald three centuries of mental struggle to accommodate the new discoveries within the ambit of the various, albeit evolving, European religious and philosophical establishments.

The contrast between Europe's rapacious Columbian exchange and the Eurasian exchange, we argue, offers certain oblique differences in approach as much as outcomes. The broad-scale decimation of populations and cultures in Central and South America that occurred within generations of the arrival of the first conquistadores was not repeated in Asia. Where the Iberians looted and enslaved at the sources of silver and gold in the Americas, in Asia the Europeans entered elaborate and mannered trading networks on their best behavior, meaning that they could not summarily destroy or subjugate at will. Neither was Asia demographically transformed as was the New World of the Americas by the Atlantic trade in African slaves and the creation of settler colonies. Whereas the Europeans laid waste by disease much of the Americas, with important exceptions, Asia was spared this scourge.

To be sure, the Asian peripheries were transformed by miscegenation, creolization, genocide, or some combination thereof. At least that was the fate of the indigenous populations of the Molucca or Spice Islands of Ambon and Banda in the Indonesian archipelago. It was also the fate of the Chamorro people of the remote Pacific islands of the Marianas astride the famous Mexico–Manila galleon route. Lacking a centralized state system, the Philippine islands also fell into the pattern, with the important caveat that the demographic outcome was markedly different. Other zones, such as the sandalwood-trading circuits of Flores and Timor island, also within the Indonesian archipelago, were tested by centuries of indigenous resistance against European interlopers, only succumbing with the advent of steam-powered gunboats.

Piratical acts and local skirmishes aside, the epoch of the first globalization in Asia preceded "pacification" and colonial settlement with contact restricted to a relatively small, albeit influential, group of officials, soldiers, missionaries, merchants, adventurers, and others dispersed through a string of isolated ports and maritime strong points. True, the Iberians sought to outflank or destroy Arab or Arabized trading networks from the Indian Ocean to the China Sea, yet the conquest of the three great centers of Asian civilization—respectively, India, China, and Japan—was not seriously entertained, short-lived Spanish designs on China (and Japan) excepted. In placing the Eurasian exchange at the fore of our study,

at the same time we cannot be seen as standing apart from contemporaneous developments in Africa and the Americas, especially as the Europeans themselves rode at the crest of the wave of a truly global commerce and cultural exchange.

ORIENTAL TEXTS AND THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN CANON

But in privileging European texts and accounts of Asia, have we not "Orientalized" the colonial (actually precolonial) "other," as Edward Said (1978) has cautioned? In any case, should not such an obvious Eurocentricity be interpolated with reference to indigenous Asian texts?[2] As Chakraborti (1994, viii), an Indian economic historian of Anglo-Mughal relations has written, while Muslim scholars, mainly Arab, Persian, and Turkish, recorded events, they failed to produce historical epics, and, with few exceptions, their attention was not drawn to economic historiography. "They were more interested in politico-religious aspects." Rather, "it was the European historiographers especially the English traveler and merchant-adventurers [who] have meticulously recorded the contemporary conditions and events of trade and commerce in India." It might also be objected that states sharing Chinese bureaucratic traditions, including Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, also assiduously collected data on population, trade, taxes, households, and so on. This is certainly true, but little entered the public domain, much less the intelligence of contemporary European reporters. Writing in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia,* John Legge (2000, 2) observes that Vietnamese dynastic historians aside, indigenous chronicles from Southeast Asia performed largely "moral functions." Historian Anthony Reid clarifies that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is the earliest epoch for which a substantial body of indigenous writing survives in Southeast Asia. But while such texts are essential for an understanding of ideology, law, religion, and the ceremonial, he contends, for the life of ordinary people we must turn to the first generation of European visitors, even in preference to accounts of Chinese, Arabs, and other Asians who lacked "the same astonished interest in the life-style of the people they encountered" (Reid 1988, xv–xvi).

To strike a position, we must allow that the European tradition of recording, archiving, and publishing not only made public to an expanding literate audience the observations of wide-eyed travelers but also, as analyzed in chapter 1, produced a veritable canon of travel literature. Cultural studies helps us understand how representations of knowledge, print, and graphics, as in the case of maps, are much less coherent and ordered and much more contestatory than presupposed by the traditional

archiving of facts and the application of systematics (cf. Edney 1997, 16–17). In this light, we must acknowledge that, whatever their intrinsic interest, the European reports are not exact copies of reality. We could say the same of the Asian traveler accounts with the rider that, as cultural products of different civilizations, they answered different needs. But a tradition of collection and study of Asian documents also developed in Europe. Entering translation into European languages by the late eighteenth century, Chinese, Japanese, Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian, Malay, and other Asian-language texts all came to be creatively interpreted by Enlightenment philosophers importantly entering the debate at home as to the nature of clericalism and the ideal form of government. From the Asian side, late Tokugawa Japan was an outstanding example of a bureaucracy that also sought to archive, document, translate, and apply knowledge gained from Europe.

The truth is, however, that translations of major works of Asian literature, philosophy, and holy books lagged by centuries. Very few non-European accounts entered the late medieval European canon. But where they do, we should be conscious of them. From St. Francis Xavier on, missionary accounts, whatever their biases and blind spots, not only prove to be reliable witnesses; they also bequeath rare late Renaissance to early Enlightenment views of Mughal India, Ming China, and early Tokugawa Japan. Outstanding was Jesuit Luis Fróis (1994), writing on Japan in 1585, who easily meets Reid's test of "astonished interest," one matched also with literary style. As the example of Fróis offers, antiquity may be as much merit as demerit, especially as earlier-arriving Europeans sometimes lacked the prejudice of subsequent generations of European visitors, especially where (as in Japan) they had overstayed their visit. Again, we would have to answer on a case-by-case basis, but it is also true, as elaborated here, that innovations in printing and publishing evolved rapidly in this age.

With time (indeed, short time), histories of the Portuguese in Asia began to appear in Europe, inevitably followed by Dutch, French, and English counterparts. As historiographies, we may well ask, What value can be ascribed to these works of national and religious prejudice? To some extent there is no substitute for these histories, especially where the original documentary sources relating to the early discovery voyages entered the realm of state secrecy, therefore defying reproduction, at least in their time, or are simply missing. But, on the other hand, where the great European travel collections are available, lending themselves to deconstruction, then we agree that they are useful, even indispensable, to the modern researcher.

A final caution awaits, what Ana Paula Laborinho (1993, 141) has termed the rise or rather the trap of exoticism: "not so much a description

of a reality as the formulation of an ideal which gains increasing light and color the more distant [and] inaccessible it is." Such an alternative geographical or imagined place thus becomes the stuff of European travel writing. The rise of exoticism and its critique returns us full circle to Said's objection and a postmodernist critique of an Orientalizing mind-set. While the transition from report, to narrative, to exoticizing the "other" might not always have been watertight, we nevertheless seek in these texts to maximize Laborinho's sense of their "surprise of civilization." For all these reasons, we draw the line in our inquiry at the late eighteenth century not as watertight but in order to establish the temporal boundaries of late Renaissance to early Enlightenment precocity.

EUROCENTRICITY VERSUS THE EURASIAN EXCHANGE

The Eurocentricity debate has also engaged practitioners of history from a global viewpoint. As James Blaut (2000, 391) posits, race and environment, as well as culture, have all been advanced over the centuries to validate Eurocentric world history. But with racial determinism long since dead, or at least no longer respectable, Eurocentric history today rests on but two legs: environment and culture. But today, just as the critique of the supposed superior cultural qualities of Europeans deepens (such as unique Western rationality), so the need for environmentalist arguments to counter this critique seems to be growing. Over a long time and to the present, he argues, the "marriage" between environmentalism and Eurocentrism has become self-serving, especially in the hands of practitioners of "popular" environmentally reductionist texts. Historically, Europeans always took it for granted that they (and Europe) were favored racially, culturally, and environmentally by a Christian God, especially alongside "nasty" tropical zones. As explained in chapter 6, one who promoted a view of climatic determinism was French Enlightenment philosopher Montesquieu, finding all kinds of moral fallibility in hotter climes. The nineteenth-century German geographer Carl Ritter, as mentioned in chapter 1, was another who fitted the environmental determinist mode.

A variation on the theme is Jack Goody's *The East in the West* (1996). No less a polemic against European exceptionalism, Goody, whose reputation has been established as an Africanist, offers homage to an integrated planet. Goody challenges the assumptions of Europe's unique institutions by mapping a world where East and West are broadly portrayed as equals, with their common roots reaching back to Mesopotamia. Offering particularly notable examples from India, Goody seeks to blur the division between the West and the "rest" by binding the historical trajectories

of Europe and Asia. In offering a materialist conception of the entire Eurasian landmass, albeit at the expense of Africa, Goody also offers a powerful critique of constructions of the Other.

Another text entering the world history canon is Robert B. Marks's *The Origins of the Modern World* (2002). As suggested by the subtitle, *A Global and Ecological Narrative*, Marks is concerned to correlate broad demographic and ecological shifts in explaining East-West parallels and divergence. Of particular interest in Marks's analysis is the varying ability of China, India, and Europe to harness New World crop imports to escape the ecological constraints of "the biological old regime." Our bias, then, is to subordinate or, at least, to situate environmental/ecological considerations within a broad social science matrix that would equally privilege culture, including material culture, allowing for a broad parity in civilizational achievements between East and West, at least within our time frame.

The new world history scholarship,[3] written in response to the recent rise of East Asia, has debated the contention that the real divergence between the West and the "rest" dates only from the eighteenth or even the early nineteenth century. Central in this debate, as mentioned, have been the texts of Andre Gunder Frank (1998), Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), and R. Bin Wong (1997). Needless to say, this argument addresses seminal questions concerning the rise of the industrial revolution in Europe, the preeminence in the global economy of Great Britain from the 1800s, and so on. But in confirming the counterpart role of, especially, China in the making of the early modern world system, the divergence literature has also provided a powerful antidote and, in the writings of Wong, an alternative to Eurocentrism. Specifically, Wong is convinced of the importance of viewing Europe from a Chinese perspective as well as the other way around. Rather than offering up a reexamination of global economic history as a reflex to the Asian economic "miracle," or, in other words, reading back from recent trends, the recent world history literature finds its lodestone in a complex set of correlated global interactions that have their origins in millennium-old world empires.[4]

First Globalization thus seeks to enter the literature on the early modern world system with a difference. While we are conscious of the globalizing forces unleashed by seaborne trade and commerce of unprecedented proportions (the stuff of economic historians), we are here concerned with the ideological and cultural contestation that accompanied the trader-missionaries and conquistadores. The other side of the coin of economic supremacy, such as was achieved in the high tide of European imperialism, this book argues, was the scientific and humanistic revolution that incubated in the medieval European courts, churches, and centers of learning. To be sure, casting aside medievalism and embracing the new Enlightenment was not an even trajectory, especially in the face of such powerful

mediating institutions as the Church and the courts. At the end of the day, we seek to demonstrate, the "divergence" was as much intellectual as it was material. Eventually, European science and technology triumphed. Indisputably, the West still maintains its edge in research and development, even if the Asia Pacific region, the world's most dynamic zone since recovery from World War II, has rapidly bridged the gap. Still, in the first age of globalization, as this book demonstrates, Eurasia was the premium global arena of intellectual contestation and exchange, especially in contrast to the lands of the New World *conquista*, suffering, variously, deracination along with cultural imperialism. The longevity of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and other Asian civilizational values suggests a major disconnect between economic exchanges and culture transfers. Nevertheless, a major theme this book addresses is the appearance of hybrid forms and cultures across the Eurasian landscape during the first wave of globalization just as cultural transfers East and West reached a new peak.

EURASIA AS REGION

Rather than offering a focused or single state-centered narrative, albeit within a regional world history perspective, such as I sought to achieve in my studies of Macau (Gunn 1997), Nagasaki (Gunn 1999a), and Timor (Gunn 1999b), *First Globalization* offers a multicentered study of the vast Eurasian world, as a second tier of analysis that would incorporate all functionally interacting regions of the globe. Highlighting the Eurasia world also draws attention to, as we reflect here, the postwar construction of region. Even today, such terms as "Near East," "Middle East," and "Far East" betray an imperial approach to European expansion that had its beginnings in the first wave of Oriental studies emerging in such European centers of learning as Leiden and Paris. Stripped of Eurocentric bias, the reconceptualization of Asia divided into West, South, and East has gained a new politically correct flavor (cf. Emmerson 1994).

Asia, both the term and the construct, we agree, has a long pedigree and, from Ptolemy down, might be considered that part of the Eurasian landmass that is not Europe. The "Southeast Asia" region was known to classical Greece and Rome as *Aurea Chersonesus*, or the "golden peninsula." For Ptolemy and Renaissance Europe, it was known as "India beyond the Ganges" or further "India" or, echoing Marco Polo, the "gold and silver islands." Ancient mariners knew this monsoon zone simply as the "land below the winds." For China, the region was glossed "Nanyang," emphasizing its southern location relative to the "Middle Kingdom." For ancient India, this was "Suvarnaduipa." Above all, as the historical and cultural patterning of this tropical zone of archipelagos and

river deltas reveals, it was a pivotal zone through which traders and ideas passed, a buffer zone between the great civilizations of India and China. As Janet L. Abu-Lughod (1989, 185–211) has explained of the "Sindbad way," long before Europeans entered the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, Muslim traders had already reached the China Sea area, just as Islam established beachheads across this vast maritime zone.

There is also an important sense that East–Southeast Asia fell into a tribute-trading zone with China, the Middle Kingdom at the center. As elaborated by Hamashita Takeshi, a Japanese historian of China, the Ming and Qing codes ranked and modified, according to circumstances, the various geographical groupings of tributaries. Such ranged from Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Ryukyu, Mongolia, Java, Mongolia, and Tibet and even came to incorporate "barbarian" traders from Europe. Hamashita describes the Chinese-based world economy as "a unified system characterized by internal tribute/tribute-trade relations with China at the center . . . an organic entity with center-periphery relations of southeast, northeast, central and northwest Asia . . . connected with the adjacent India trade area" (Hamashita 1994, cited in Frank 1998, 114). It is also true that, from Japan to Vietnam, erstwhile tributary states established their own versions of tributary or, rather, subtributary power and diplomatic relations more or less along the Chinese model. By highlighting an East–Southeast Asia regional world system, Hamashita is also countering the Wallersteinean conception of a bifurcated world where, historically, local economies are simply incorporated into a European-centered world economy (Hamashita 1994; Ikeda 1996, 52).

Even so, the Portuguese, Dutch, and English imposed their own divisioning of the region on the southern or maritime tier of Asia, usually with reference to seat of empire, whether centered locally on, respectively, Goa, Batavia, or Calcutta. For example, historian Manuel de Faria Sousa, writing at the end of the seventeenth century, divided Portuguese Asia (the so-called *Estado da India*) into seven regions in a crescent reaching from Mombassa to Liampo, the lost Portuguese outpost on the coast of China near modern Ningpo.[5]

With the establishment of Macau in 1557 and Spanish Manila in 1571, and the entry of the Dutch and English into the China Sea zone, all in pursuit of the lucrative and indispensable China trade, a new sense of bounded region emerged. This became all the more obvious with the decline of the ancient spice trade focused on the Moluccas (not even mentioned in Sousa's divisioning) and with the shift in center of gravity of trade to the Macau–Guangzhou (Canton)–Taiwan–Nagasaki–Manila axis. By the early seventeenth century, the Dutch blockade of Goa, the Dutch capture of the Moluccas and Malacca, English inroads into Indian commerce, and the eventual opening of China to European maritime trade

confirmed this shift, just as it signaled the hegemonic sequence of the northern European powers over the Iberian.

The revelation of Eurasia also awaited the production of post-Ptolemaic atlases and cartographic reproductions with increasingly accurate renditions of China, Korea, Japan, and the archipelago. *India Orientalis* thus took Cartesian form, to adopt the term used by a Dutch cartographer to denote the vast lands east of India. It is of interest that in early eighteenth-century collections, such as that of John Harris (1745), East Asia was already used to refer to the China, Japan, and the Korea area alongside the generic term "Tartary." Such enterprise in publishing and map production in the European core, we should understand, was part and parcel of what Anderson (1998) has termed the rise of "print capitalism."

THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION?

Observing the wartime origins of "Southeast Asia" and the "imagined reality" that it became only with the advent and prosecution of the Cold War, Anderson (1998, 3–8) also reflects on the sense of region in an earlier age. As an artifice, he reminds us, outsiders named this region. Victorian naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace (1869) had simply termed the region the "Malay Archipelago" in his book of the same name. John Crawfurd (1820, 1), British Resident to the Court of Yogyakarta (1811–1814, 1816) termed the European discovery of the "Indian Archipelago" "a transaction of history as recent as that of the Americas . . . [comparable] . . . even with the New World itself to which, in fact, its moral and physical state have a closer resemblance than any other portion of the globe." Even today, China contests with Vietnam ownership of large parts of the South "China" Sea on the basis of prior historical contact and interest reaching back to antiquity (Gunn 1991). In any case, Anderson observes, it was imperialism that supplied the boundaries, drawing the line through the island of New Guinea, hiving off Vietnam from the cultural orbit of the Middle Kingdom, and rupturing the millennium-long link between Ceylon/Sri Lanka and its Theravada Buddhist emulators in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos (Anderson 1998, 3–8).

Nevertheless, the intellectual construction of Southeast Asia continues. As Denys Lombard suggested in a number of publications, with rich allusion to French Annales historian Fernand Braudel, even if Southeast Asia lacked the equivalent of the Roman Empire's ability to politically unify both shores of the Mediterranean during four or five centuries, there were sufficient shared linguistic, cultural, and even political features in the region to suggest an oriental Mediterranean. Such a picture would not ignore southern China (Hainan and Taiwan included) and even Japan, especially in connecting up the agrarian and harbor cities of Southeast Asia

through western (Philippines) and eastern (Cham) maritime trade routes. Lombard (1990), in his classic study of Java, *Le Carrefour Javanais* (Javanese Crossroads), develops the theory of cultural hybridization to explain the grafting of Indian, Islamic, Sinic, and European influences on animist Java. But as with Braudel's Mediterranean, so the archipelago is defined by its connections across diverse regions. For Lombard, it is only by making use of a supranational framework, and by adopting an "integrated approach," that we can apprehend this reality (Lombard 1997, 126). Others, such as Lieberman (1990, 1995), caution that, in bounding Southeast Asia, fundamental differences exist between island and mainland Southeast Asia, underlying differential cultural and mercantile penetration.

Following the work of K. N. Chaudhuri (1985) in attempting to construct an image of the Indian Ocean in the way that Braudel (1976) achieved for the Mediterranean, Anthony Reid has likewise drawn from the method of the Annales school in his two-volume (1988, 1993) study of commerce and historical change in the "Land below the Winds." The debt to Braudel is clearly acknowledged in the first volume, where the master is praised for his ability to call on a range of disciplines, especially geography, to demonstrate the "collective destinies" of the people of a region. Reid (2000, 4–6) emphasizes the coherence of Southeast Asia as a geographical and human region, even compared with the Mediterranean.

Yet, as Wong (2001) has pointed out in a seminal essay exploring "Braudelian regions" of Asia writ large, the "Chinese Mediterranean" imposes its attention. He writes that not only was the Chinese empire more economically developed than Southeast Asia, but its political power also enjoyed an edge. In making this assertion, Wong is influenced by the writings of Hamashita (for example, 1995) on the modus operandi of the tributary trade system. He also observes that while Lombard allows a Chinese dynamic in his construction of maritime Southeast Asia, Reid presents a more autonomous region. Wong further comments that a Braudelian concept of region is less defined by a particular configuration of space than a multiplicity of bonds between peoples such as implied by a "total human experience." But whereas in Braudel's Mediterranean, Latin Christians and Turkish Muslims each retained their respective centers of gravity, Southeast Asia, as Lombard emphasized, was above all defined by its diversity and hybridity.

DEFINING THE EURASIAN MARITIME WORLD SYSTEM

Disputes over definitions of boundaries of world systems as well as the parts that constitute systems have also entered the debate among practitioners of world history. Appropriately, as a work of metageography, we

should also clarify our sense of a Eurasian maritime world system. It is now recognized that very small world systems can be brought into the analysis, as in the study of seminomadic desert tribes. The emergence of the largest tributary system ever known, that of Afroeurasia circa 500 B.C. to A.D. 1400 out of trade connections between Rome and China along the famous silk roads, raises theoretical issues related to the rise of world systems. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997, 148–86) denote a major difference between the Afroeurasian system and the Europe-centered global system that eventually emerged. Both systems were politically multicentered in the sense that no state controlled the whole system. The trade network was larger than any one state. But, in contrast to the truly global Europe-centered modern world system, the ancient Afroeurasian system comprised three noncontiguous cores linked only by the exchange of prestige goods. Afroeurasian sea links were important in this two-millennium exchange, as acknowledged by Abu-Lughod (1989, 172–73, 202, 252), but the terrestrial silk roads were the center stage of both long-distance trade and political-military conflict, especially with the Mongol ascendance.

The interruption of the terrestrial Silk Road trade by the Ottoman Turks and the quest by the Portuguese to outflank and, with the defeat of the Mamluk fleet at Diu in 1509, to ultimately choke the Arab trade in the Indian Ocean was epochal. But equally, the substitution of Portuguese for Ottoman control over shipping routes in the northern part of the Arabian Sea has profound implications for theorizing a newly bounded maritime world system. Just as the central Asian empires imploded, so the Iberian traders reenergized a vast maritime crescent reaching from Japan, the China coastal littoral, the East Indies, the two coasts of India and beyond, the African-Atlantic zone, and the European terminus. Indeed, it is tempting to say that the shift from terrestrial silk roads to the maritime zones is still playing its way out as testified by the surging economies of maritime East Asia, particularly those in the China coast region. Such historians as J. C. van Leur acknowledge the importance of early eastern trade prior to the advent of the European trading companies. Writing in Dutch but entering translation in English in the early 1960s, van Leur also went far in challenging Eurocentric approaches to the study of Asian history.[6] By redefining the boundaries of Eurasia to invoke its maritime dimension and interconnectedness within a world history perspective, we are also in line with recent research of Frank (1998) and Hamashita (1994).[7]

As Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997, 16–17) have summarized, basically two camps have emerged in world system studies: the "culturalists," who stress the homogeneity of central values in defining civilizations, and the "structuralists," who use criteria of interconnectedness rather than homogeneity. The positions among an array of world system practitioners are varied and complex, but *First Globalization* seeks to define the Eurasian maritime world system as one bounded by intersocietal networks that go beyond trade and warfare to include information, technology, and especially hybridization of cultures inside and outside the European and Chinese (Indian and Japanese) cores. Silk is a perfect example of the ambiguous status of a prestige commodity and the value it accrues across differential marketplaces, civilizations, and cultures, suggesting, in turn, important ways in which the culturalist and structuralist approaches may well be complementary. But tea, spices, and other Asian rarities entering European marketplaces support this sense of cultural complementarity. Especially, as we shall highlight here, more so than continental Asia, where powerful centralized states prevailed, the archipelagic zone of Southeast Asia, including zones of contact on the littorals of India and China, was the locus of intense European cultural and racial creolization.

No matter where we live in today's globalized world, it is worth reflecting on the origins of many of our traditions. *First Globalization* helps remind us of where we have been, mentally and materially, and just how so many of our treasured cultural icons have been, variously, imported, transacted, translated, invented, contrived or confabulated. Whether we (in Europe or Asia) are reflecting on tea culture; the habit of smoking tobacco; the act of consuming coffee, spicy food, fusion food, the "English" potato, the sweet potato, or "herbal" remedies; or on more imaginative tropes, such as sea monsters, mermaids, humanoids, science fiction, Catholic passion plays, fado music, Latin rhythms, European fashions, Chinoiserie, and Japanware, we should look back not only to Vasco da Gama and Magellan and their entourage of traders and missionaries but also to the great Arab, Chinese, and other Asian seafarers, traders, and emissaries, bearers of what we have described as the Eurasian Exchange. The East-West exchange between 1500 and 1800 was not simply a transfer of material goods and exotics such as implied in the "Columbian exchange" but in its heyday also involved intense cultural crossovers and exchanges between civilizations that changed forever the way we (in Europe and Asia) situated ourselves versus fellow humankind, the physical earth, and, indeed, the universe.

THE BOOK

Chapter 1 seeks to identify a European discovery canon, inter alia, the key texts and genres guiding the construction of European discourses on Asia in the premodern era. Chapter 2 explains how the empirical discoveries were often fantasized as literature. Chapter 3 seeks to identify how the natural world fitted the cosmology of the age. Chapter 4 expands on the theme of the mapping and geographical framing of Asia. Chapter 5

examines the role of the Catholic mission in Asia as frontline crusaders in a grand cosmological contest. Chapter 6 looks at Enlightenment views of Asian governance. In chapter 7, we investigate the various receptions of Europe by Asian civilizations. Chapter 8 looks at European perceptions of livelihoods in Asia. Chapter 9 turns to a discussion of language in the rise of European Oriental studies, and chapter 10 links the discussion with new emergent identities and the creolization of cultures. A conclusion offers a final reflection on the "Eurasian exchange."

NOTES

1. Our version of globalization should not be confused with the current popularized sense of globalized finance and production processes associated with advanced capitalism and globalized consumerism, tracing its origins back some twenty years in some versions or to the 1870s in others. Simply stated, in this book "first globalization" refers to the deepening interactions within the Afroeurasian region attendant on the expansion of Europe following the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama. We are neither propounding nor testing a theory of modernity or globalization but hold to a sense of globalization as the extension of economic, social, and cultural relations over time and space. This also includes the sets of processes affecting individuals in a truly phenomenological sense. As such, we acknowledge Anthony Giddens (1991), among his other writings.

2. For an accessible text on Arab source material, see Tibbetts (1979).

For a pioneering European work on Chinese source materials relating to Southeast Asia, see Groeneveldt (1880).

3. For a discussion, see Goldstone (1987), who also allows that his own interest is in cultural blocks on non-European progress. See also Goldstone (2002).

4. The sense of an integrated world economy from the thirteenth century is most forcefully presented in Abu-Lughod (1989), which describes a world system spanning Afroeurasia persisting through to the eighteenth century.

5. In this divisioning, according to Sousa (1695), Malacca represented the sixth and "the last place we possess in the Eastern Continent" in a subregion that comprised Bengal, Pegu, Tanassarim, and Cape Singapore. A seventh division extended from Singapore to Siam, Ligor, Cambodia, Champa, Cochin China (already so named), Macau, and the coast of China as far north as Liampo (Ningpo?). Ceylon and a fort on the island of Timor constituted extras.

In its time, British India embraced not only the vast Indian subcontinent but also Burma, Penang, Singapore, and, in a general sense, Malaya and Java when that island came under British domination during the Napoleonic Wars. All Dutch outposts in the sprawling and ethnically heterogeneous Dutch East Indies, as with Dutch outposts in Taiwan and Japan, answered first to Batavia, just as Goa served as seat of the *Estado da India* for the Portuguese in all its eastern settlements, including Macau and Timor, albeit answerable to European courts and company directors. The Spanish in Manila, in turn, answering to New Spain (Mexico), were, via the galleon trade, much more focused on a China-centered Asia.

6. Van Leur's critique of Eurocentrism is summarized in Legge (1965, 21–23).

7. In fact, such purpose was achieved by the work of Lombard and Aubin (2000), first published in Paris in 1988 as *Marchands et Hommes d'Affaires Asiatiques*. Besides exploring the links across vast space from the coast of Africa to Japan, Lombard sought in this publication to promote the view that, notwithstanding the European presence after 1500, Asian history continued according to its own rhythms.

Conclusion

While we recognize the flow of peoples, trade, and ideas across the Eurasian landmass back to antiquity, the Eurasian exchange (1500–1800), as we have described it with reference to the complex crossover of ideas, languages, and philosophies, was revolutionary in terms of its first globalization effect. Just as we found a close correlation between specific exchanges and time frame, whether late Renaissance or early Enlightenment (late Ming or early Qing from a Chinese perspective), so the Asia we have described was multipolar with respect to polity and civilization. Finding broad parity between Europe and the core Asian civilizations through most of our period, we have also raised questions as to the various receptions and impacts of European religion and science on a range of Asian civilizations and societies and, indeed, the impact of Asian civilizations on European philosophy and intellectual fashion insofar as that can be measured. This conclusion offers a summary of these exchanges, impacts, and effects.

THE EURASIA EXCHANGE

Tracking the maritime silk roads in the age of European expansion, our narrative follows close on the great Ming voyages of the late fifteenth century, cutting a swath through the coastal zones and ports in a vast crescent from the Indian to the Pacific Oceans. As we have seen, and as summarized here, it was in certain of these Asian ports and strong points that the Europeans developed beachheads that became sites of intense cultural

exchange. By contrast, we have demonstrated the awe-inspiring strengths of Asia's core areas: the great Islamic empires, including the Mughal Empire with its capitals in northern India; the Chinese Empire, including its tributary satellites; and Japan under the Pax Tokugawa. Not only was each the fount of powerful bureaucratic polities, but each supported social structures and technological achievements comparable with and often superior to that of Renaissance Europe. Given the strength and scale of the Asian core areas, it was not surprising that European interlopers first infiltrated peripheral zones, either by strength (European seaborne power held the edge with its mobile firing platforms) or through alliance. Where European missionary advance was restricted in continental situations, the Iberian formula of missionary-colonizers as applied in the Americas prevailed in more insular situations (Goa, the Philippines, the Moluccas, Timor-Flores, and even Vietnam).

Perhaps only in the Chinese mandarinate did the Europeans meet their peers, or superiors, in the production of knowledge for knowledge's sake outside strictly religious doctrine. China's civilizational legacy—including its complex bureaucracy, its social order and philosophical underpinnings, its thriving economy, its urban development, its imposing range of practical technologies, and its sheer vastness and population density—also greatly impressed the first European visitors since the age of Marco Polo. In an age before opium wars and blustering imperialists, the reception of China in Europe in the hands of Jesuit interpreters and Enlightenment thinkers was unrivaled, especially if contrasted to the ideology of the American *conquista* on the one hand and parodies of Islam on the other. From the other side (while it lasted), the reception by the Ming and Qing courts to Jesuit cosmography and Renaissance accomplishments could hardly have been bettered (setting aside delusions of mass Christian conversions). All things considered, the first major European encounter with China since the Mongol era was a relatively felicitous affair.

We do not deny the empire-building and imperialistic interventions of Euro-America over Asia that climaxed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one that built on the earlier European expansion. Surveying the impact of Europe on the Americas along with much of Africa, we can say that European weaponry and organization prevailed against less well-defended tributary and lineage systems. The lack of resilience of Amerindians to diseases borne by the conquistadores is frequently mentioned in the literature, and, indeed, the peoples of other peripheries such as Australia and the Pacific Ocean islands shared their fate. No major ideological contest confronted the Iberians and subsequently the Dutch, the British, the French, the Germans, and eventually the Americans in their conquest of the peoples of the Americas and the coasts of Africa.

In contradistinction to the conquest of the Americas, China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Mughal India, along with the Buddhist kingdoms of Ayutthaya and Pegu, adroitly managed to set the terms of the Eurasian encounter over much of the period of our inquiry: the sixteenth through the eighteenth century. The Portuguese in Macau paid rent to China and in Nagasaki offered elaborate bribes to shogunal authorities, whereas on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts of India, along with the East Indies, the European presence was more in the form of enclaves and outposts as opposed to colonies and dominions. Japan, we have viewed, was singular in managing the Eurasian exchange to its advantage, not only by keeping the Europeans at a distance but also by selectively borrowing and adapting "Western learning" to its advantage.

In Asia, the Europeans were brought to their senses by empirical observation. Cosmographic verities reaching back to the Middle Ages no longer held up in the light of new discoveries and the new geographies. The discoveries hastened the Enlightenment and buried the alchemical and obscurantist pseudosciences of medieval Europe. While the Ptolemaic and Poloean images of Eurasia died hard, the Iberian *portalan* maps and Jesuit descriptions provided irrefutable new geographical and other evidence. Even the violence of the New World *conquista* and the obscurantism surrounding the Holy Inquisition tended to set the Iberian nations further apart from Protestant Europe, as signaled by the rising political and commercial fortunes of the United Provinces free from Spanish rule. Leiden and, in turn, Paris (and London), we viewed, also emerged in this period as major centers and founts of new knowledge on the Orient.

Still, there were skeptics on both sides. The fetish for the bizarre in Europe actually drove a marketplace in imaginary utopian literature that played on prejudice associated with Christian doctrine, narrow biblical interpretation, or other pre-Copernican interpretations. The rising print technology, married to the production of images, changed the way people viewed the world. Unimaginable in this day of instant global imaging, the production of New World images in Europe between 1500 and 1800 was mediated by a relatively closed circle of engravers in the employ of bourgeois and state patrons and printers. The subject requires further research, but, excepting images of the natural world, the number of two-dimensional representations of the New World, Asia included, could be counted in the thousands only, with some countries and cultures hardly represented at all. A relatively small number of engravers and families of publishers recycled and retooled the most wooden images of Asia, oblivious to the wealth of discoveries by voyagers and travelers. Some, we have revealed, were faked or confabulated, just as literatures of the fantastic fed a titillated, rising mass public audience.

While animist Philippine society, along with the Marianas and the Moluccas, definitely fell into the Holy Iberian confrontationist mold, just as much of maritime Southeast Asia underwent a profound Islamicization in an age of civilizational contest, East Asia avoided the most debilitating

elements of the "Eurasian exchange" during the first wave of globalization, in turn allowing a different set of outcomes during the high tide of European imperialism. As we have seen, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, precisely those civilizations most closely drawn into the tributary-trade orbit of China, were resilient or selective in the way they adapted or adopted the religious or secular knowledge of Renaissance Europe. Almost without peer in the European New World, China under the early Qing was able to turn the tables on the Jesuit interlopers, assimilating their knowledge where it corrected or added to cartography or astronomical knowledge, rejecting their religion, and even offering up to Europe a powerful, awe-inspiring model of governance in the Confucian bureaucratic system.

Whereas the Spanish *conquista* of the Americas massively disrupted the pre-Columbian economies and societies, Europe's trade in Asia fired up commerce and created new demands and stimuli not only in the larger polities but also in the most unlikely peripheral formations. But where the New World went into dramatic demographic decline, Asia experienced demographic consolidation and, as alluded in chapter 8, levels of urbanization unknown in the world. Just as the Columbian exchange kicked off with the first disembarkation, so globalization's first wave brought to Asia vital new food sources, new products, and new technologies. It may be coincidental—it may be contingent on a host of ecological and cultural factors—but it happens that the zones of Asia that historically were long able to take effective measures to restrict the European military, political, and cultural advance and particularly avoided direct colonization (namely Japan, Korea, and China) have today levered themselves into regional if not global economic primacy.

ROOTS OF DIVERGENCE?

Our time frame, spanning the incorporation of the New World (1500) to the advent of the industrial revolution (1800) and the decline of the Chinese Empire, coincides with what Frank (1998, 344) singles out as the two major "inflections" of world history. Intellectual change in Europe, we have explained, was long incubating, although I am loathe to accept Eurocentric interpretations that push European exceptionalism back to earlier epochs. The roots of the divergence on the road to modernity between Europe and China, although this has not been our main theme, strike back to the early discoveries, the Columbian exchange, the rise of print media, the Copernican revolution, and the Enlightenment in general. Contra the genre of economic history reaching back to Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), this book has viewed Eurasia as the premium global arena of major intellectual exchange, the crucible where Arab and Asian knowledge came to be critically digested. Gunpowder, the art of printing, the floating compass, and the lateen sail are oft-cited examples of an early exchange to Europe's profit. All this suggests that, beginning with Renaissance Europe, the exchange with Asia was much less one-sided and far more multifaceted than is often acknowledged. This we have illustrated with reference to the Jesuit mission, not only of far-reaching importance for its intellectual contributions to early Qing China science but also in the way that newly gained knowledge of the East profoundly influenced the Enlightenment philosophes.

The rising tide of commerce in Europe consequent on the first globalization sometimes obscures the fact that change was always a condition in Asia. Stagnation was never an apt characterization for India under the Mughals, Japan under the Tokugawa, and China under the Ming and Qing, to mention only the biggest players. While entertaining the European traders, the courts of these great civilizations at first welcomed philosophical debate as much as they sought new knowledge of navigation and geographical awareness as well as access to new weapons and silver brought by the European seafarers. Closure—and apparent stagnation to the extent that this occurred in China and Japan—was more out of fear of losing control of the conditions of engagement, with the Philippines under Spanish rule as an obvious negative example frequently raised by the Tokugawa to justify the expulsion of Christian missionaries. This book adds extra weight and new dimensions to the view that cultural and philosophical interchange was incubating in the courts and ports of Asia ahead of the great epoch of imperial domination and in ways that were far healthier.

Still, intellectual involution appeared to be entrenched across the Confucian world. No spirit of skepticism entered mainstream Chinese thought by the time of the Qing. Ottoman achievements in empire building and administration were not matched by technological advance. Only late Tokugawa Japan came to emulate the spirit of European Enlightenment inquiry. By contrast, drawing on the Columbian exchange and the Eurasian exchange together, Europe emerged "enlightened" from the late Renaissance out of decadent medievalism. Ours is not an argument in defense of European exceptionalism, as we have gone to pains to emphasize the degree of mutual intellectual curiosity and crossover between East and West. Nevertheless, the Central Kingdom's rejection of the tenets of the Copernican revolution, as much as its prickly defense of Confucian and neo-Confucian orthodoxies in the face of counterevidence supplied by the new physical sciences, ultimately stymied intellectual development in the world's largest and most populous economy.

Europe, especially the northern tier, first experienced an industrial revolution. Enlightenment advances in sciences and technology, advancing on Renaissance knowledge, simply gave Europe the technological edge over

the rest of the world. The question as to why Asia lagged in technological accomplishment should not detain us here. Francesca Bray (1997) elaborates that historians of technology have imposed a master narrative that opposes "modern to traditional, active to passive, progress to stagnation, science to ignorance, West to rest, and male to female." While Bray's concerns are to explain how technologies defined women's place in Chinese society as integral to the historical process, she also offers a powerful critique of the teleological method and assumptions of Joseph Needham's multivolume *Science and Civilization in China*. As Needham demonstrated, the Central Kingdom was ahead of Europe until about 1450. For 1,000 years prior, Chinese science was simply inaccessible to Europe. Herself a Needham collaborator, Bray allows the influence of the "master" in demonstrating that the history of modern science was in fact a world history but that the failure of medieval Islam, the Incas, and even China in this interpretation confirms the master narrative that only the West was truly dynamic. Consistent with Bray's culturally textured reading of technology as a form of cultural expression, actually derived from her study of everyday life, women, and cultural history of imperial China, I have also been concerned with the manner of technological civilization confronted by the first European visitors in their encounter with Asia. While I have not explored here differential levels of technology across civilizations and we doubt the possibility of generalizing across many cultures, states, and civilizations, we are also cognizant of Bray's understanding of technology as a form of cultural expression.

To offer our own examples of technology as cultural expression, Gaspar da Cruz was full of wonderment at naval development and cannonry that he witnessed in early sixteenth-century China. Early sixteenth-century visitors to the archipelago, such as Antonio Pigafetta, were struck more by the energy of their would-be antagonists than their overall naval-military supremacy, but all European seaborne visitors to the archipelago were taken by the sheer variety of sailing craft revealing various influences, whether indigenous or hybrid Chinese, Indian, or Arabic. Augustin Beaulieu was upbeat about the naval prowess, metalwork, and craft of early seventeenth-century Aceh but entered his reservations as well. Such visitors to mid-sixteenth-century Japan as Luís Fróis were equally overwhelmed by the standard of craft and its artistic quality. Jesuit visitors were also well positioned to comment on metallurgy in Japan, wanting techniques soon borrowed from both Korea via China and the Iberians. But Japan was also one of the first points of technological transfer between East and West, from Portuguese firearms to medicine to European learning, as well as being a major source and conduit for European curiosity on East Asia.

Because the Japanese were demonstrably fast learners in military skills and other sciences, it is tempting to speak of a Japanese "exceptionalism" with its roots in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But the complexity of the question of technological levels, technological diffusion, and cultural context is also addressed from another angle by Fróis (1994, 114), who remarked, "Chez nous, il ya des moulins mus par le vent, l'eau ou des bêtes, au Japon, tous ce qui moulu se fait avec les roues manuelles poussée à la force des bras" (In our land, there are windmills moved by the wind, water, or beasts, in Japan, all that is ground by wheels is done by manual force).

Japan's experience also affords lessons for the divergence thesis. While recent historiography eschews a view of social stasis under the three-century Tokugawa "seclusion," supported by our evidence of lively cultural interchange, it is also likely that Japan's withdrawal from active participation in the Asian maritime trade during the epoch of first globalization left a commercial void that the Portuguese, Dutch, and British were bound to fill. Japan's rise to industrial behemoth from the mid-nineteenth century is often touted as a model of late industrialism. Of course, Japan's new convergence with the West also coincided with its grasp of Western learning even prior to the arrival in the mid-nineteenth century of American Commodore Perry's famous black ships. Ironically, Japan had to be persuaded to reenter the industrial world economy/world system to help itself.

THE CREOLIZATION EFFECT

The first globalization also ushered in a creolization of cultures on a global scale, especially outside the cores of the great Eurasian civilizations. While it might be argued that ancient empires across the Afroeurasian landmass had always imposed their cultures or enslaved their enemies, European seaborne expansion of the 1500s to the 1800s was sui generis. The sheer volume of exchanges in men, ideas, languages, and technologies was of a different order, just as the translations and missionizing of the conquistadores proved revolutionary. The creolization of cultures emerging out of these encounters was dramatically experienced in the zones of intense contact where European traders and missionaries congregated. Out of these multivalent exchanges (the Eurasian exchange) emerged a new hybridity of cultures around religion, language, cuisine, artistic form, costume, and racial mixing in the zones of intense European-Asian contact. Here, creole languages emerged as lingua franca alongside Portuguese as a trade language or what we allow as the first world language of consequence. As I have been at pains to emphasize, whether we live in New York, Paris, Beijing, or Tokyo, many of the cultural crossovers we take for granted today have their origins in the first globalization.

Today we observe creolizing trends throughout the world, including the United States, shaped by immigration and demographic expansion especially but not exclusively of Hispanic speakers alongside Anglo-American

culture. But the present-day fusion of cultures stemming from economic globalization should not be confused with the emergence of creole nations out of creole communities that gelled during the first two centuries of European expansion. Brazil and the Caribbean republics offer the best examples, but Asia, Goa, Macau, the Philippines, and East Timor also fit the pattern. Typically, the Asian examples have emerged from Portuguese or Spanish conquest of peripheral zones remote from the civilizational heartlands. The typical marker of conquest was conversion to Catholicism and the use of Portuguese or Spanish as the language of power along with the emergence of mixed-race communities. Such mixed-race communities could also include Chinese-native liaisons, especially in the Philippines, or, in the case of East Timor, could also include Goan-Timorese or Afro-Timorese alongside Portuguese parentage. Of our Asian examples, only the Philippines and East Timor levered themselves to independent statehood. The first prime minister of independent East Timor, Mr. Mari Alkatiri, is of Yemeni Arab-Timorese background, while the president, José "Xanana" Gusmão, is of mixed Portuguese-Timorese ancestry. More than one president of the Republic of the Philippines has acknowledged Chinese ancestry.

ENVOI ON ORIENTALISM

This study has traced the origins of Orientalism and Oriental studies to the sixteenth century. In that age, indeed to this age, Christocentrism faced down Islamocentrism, with possibly Sinocentrism forming the largest world historical tribute-collecting empire of all. While the Iberian conquests irredeemably drew the world into a common system of exchange, linked especially by long-distance sea trade, we must await a mature European Enlightenment before the connection between Orientalism and imperialism became organic.

But who was learning from whom during the first two centuries of the new global order? Had Orientalism as a totalizing ideology of domination been called into being? To be sure, from the Caribbean to the Philippines, the conquistadores imposed their languages of power, reworked native grammars, and changed native mentalities and societies forever. Such was the great transformation that only anthropology and archaeology could recover these lost worlds of preconquest America even within our time frame. In the context of the Americas, only *criollos* (Anglo-Franco-Hispanic), true creoles or *ladinos,* and liberated slaves would recover their "nationalisms," albeit within the framework of European nation-state. From Asia, we have mentioned the cases of the Philippines and, with independence in May 2002, East Timor. (In 1999, Macau acquired a fifty-year dispensation from China, ostensibly respecting Portuguese language and culture.) Few native claimants to independence, to my knowledge, repudiated their acquired language or "faith," at least at the level of nation-state, notwithstanding a plethora of nativistic challenges from Australian aborigines to the Chiapos of Mexico.

But continental Asia was a different story, as we have discussed with reference to China, India, and Japan. Here, the Jesuits and other Europeans passed through a long phase of ideological contestation, adaptation to native belief, wonderment, mystification, confabulation, and disbelief, even though the fruits of mass conversion were always elusive. Precocious cultural relativism on the part of early Enlightenment Europe helped Europe rid itself of many medieval, if not yet all, religious (and racial) prejudices. Civilization remained contested terrain to European missionaries and colonizers alike. But fantasy and allegory also helped cushion the unknown, to reinforce the old verities against an avalanche of counterevidence afforded by both the Copernican revolution and the eyewitness traveler accounts.

As I have sketched of the early expansion literature, the new cartographies, and encyclopedic church studies, an active cultural exchange was engendered from the early sixteenth century between West and East, between centers and peripheries that went beyond strict dualities. Just as Iberian agents in Asia encountered teeming metropolitan centers on a scale unimaginable in Europe, not to mention complex bureaucratic states and deeply entrenched economic networks, so these ancient civilizations were correspondingly eager to entertain the knowledge revealed by the agents of distant Europe. But in Asia, reception to heterodox ideas and philosophies depended on a host of contingent local factors. Contrary to the Orientalist orthodoxy, Japan demonstrated that the new science in the hands of a reformist literati could become the cutting edge of radical change, even if this revolution against the neo-Confucian orthodoxy was long in the making.

LESSONS OF GLOBAL HISTORY

The salutary lessons of a globalizing history is to seek unities, crossovers, and exchanges between and among competing civilizations. To be sure, at the onset of the first globalization there was much more to astonish and wonder. The world, at least the known world, revealed itself to late Renaissance Europe as a kaleidoscope of little cultures, a babel of languages, a smorgasbord of cuisines, a circus of styles and fashions, and a riot of colors and smells. It also provoked a fear of the unknown. The unknown also depended on where one stood, at least with reference to theological debates in Christian Europe. Civilizational diversity was also the norm in our time frame. Even the number of princelings and states far exceeded the roll call of the UN General Assembly. Global standards, world time,

digital communications, air travel, cosmopolitanism, cultural relativism, the modern Olympics, planet earth, and McWorld awaited the new globalism, its prophets, and its doomsayers.

We have not here sought to analyze the making of a global economy. While I have independently supplied an analysis of Japan's location within a global division of labor (1500–1800) (Gunn 1999a), the present work is simply not an economic reading of the making of the world system. Rather, we have offered Eurasia as the key world historical arena of civilizational contest and borrowings. In so doing, we are in line with Goody's (1996) sense of a holistic Eurasia, although we are not prepared to endorse the sense of Europe's accidental priority within this huge landmass of myriad states and many civilizations.

But in offering an ostensibly culturalist reading of the first globalization, have we also ignored the question of global accumulation and economic empowerment? Not at all. Rather than presenting a culturally overdetermined argument, we have presented the other side of the coin of economism reaching back to Adam Smith. Consistent with an integrated world history approach, we have argued that without the ideological superstructures of schools, churches, presses, and missionary activities, the circuits of commerce and trade reaching from Europe to Asia could not have flourished. Our thesis of Eurasian cultural metamorphoses restores Asia to its rightful civilizational equivalence or even preeminence in an era before the rise of industrialism and imperialism.

To summarize, in this book I have been concerned primarily with the making of the European or, rather, Eurasian world system as an ideological and cultural as opposed to an economistic system. By privileging the superstructure of ideas and mediating institutions in my analysis of the Eurasian world system, I have departed from both conventional Wallersteinean European world system analyses and the divergence school. Moreover, by underscoring the radical break in world history in 1500 ushered in by the European expansion, we allow the dawn of the capitalist epoch with its roots in Europe itself. But equally, drawing a line at the year 1800, we prefigure the rise of full-blown European industrial society and the age of Eurocentric imperialism. Between 1500 and 1800, I have captured a long period of metamorphosis reflecting the ebb and flow of ideas and their uneven receptions and adaptations across the vast Eurasian space. The binary East–West "Asian values" argument has always been flawed. No part of the world besides the most remote and isolated anthropological zones was outside some form of globalization and creolization of culture by the long sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The tension between cultural relativism and universalism is very much a modern-day phenomenon, but, as this book has been at pains to state, the roots go back to the era of the first globalization stemming from the Eurasian encounter.

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