EMPIRE AND NATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA

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Introduction: Comparative Analysis of Empires

Nearly all comparative analyses have taken as normative the European experience of state-building from ca. 1500 to 1800 CE, when new monarchies built increasingly centralized bureaucratic machines in an environment of ceaseless military and economic competition. Charles Tilly notes that in 1500 CE there were about five hundred political units in Europe, but by 1900 there were only twenty-five.¹ The formation of the European state system is often seen as the essential foundation for the subsequent history of industrialization and global colonization in the nineteenth century. Theorists examine non-European states with reference to this benchmark to discover what essential ingredients they lacked. Instead of seeing how the non-European states functioned in their own terms, the primary focus is on what they failed to accomplish in European terms. This vocabulary of deficit informs both modern historical studies and social theories. Historians in China, especially, place paramount emphasis on the question of why China failed to have an industrial revolution. But what if we instead look at direct comparisons between two non-European empires?

We can begin by positing analogies between the structure of two agrarian empires, the Ottoman and the Qing, which derived originally from the era of conquest. Beginning as small frontier states on the periphery of larger empires, both expanded rapidly with powerful military forces, eventually capturing the center of the older empire. Both incorporated a wide range of different peoples under their rule; both had to develop new administrative structures for taxation, adjudication, and local control. We can begin by looking for basic similarities in specific arenas of social and administrative structures. There has been

it seems to me, a striking degree of convergence between the approaches to these questions taken by Ottomanists and by Qing historians.

**Convergent Historiographies**

One theme that unifies both historiographies is the rejection of the thesis of “decline.” In the Qing field, the general theme of older historical studies was the failure of China to respond adequately to Western incursions in the nineteenth century. Her repeated losses in warfare and domestic upheaval indicated that the dynastic rulers had lost the ability to govern or to innovate creatively. The collapse of the dynasty in 1911 was explained as the outcome of the inadequacy of a traditional society faced with Western modernity. Much the same framework seems to have informed the analysis of the Ottoman Empire from the seventeenth or eighteenth century forward. Nationalist historiography reinforced the tradition/modernity divide by interpreting the transition from empire to nation as going from decline to renewal. The old empires were viewed as despotist, backward, stagnant structures that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, despite several reform efforts, failed to respond to the dynamism represented by Western powers. Therefore, they inevitably collapsed in the early twentieth century, to be replaced by modern nations.

Key features of this interpretation were culturalism, linear concepts of time, and centralization as an index of progress. Culturalism views the state as the manifestation of underlying ideals generated by texts and traditions that define universal norms. The ruling elites are assumed to embrace a single coherent set of ethical norms and inherited traditions, which guide their administrative practices. The success of the state is measured by the degree to which it can guide its subjects to realize these ideals. Thus the Ottoman state is viewed as the sponsor of Islam, just as the Qing are seen as the implementors of neo-Confucian orthodoxy. A “Classical Age” is defined as the period during which state, social, and normative institutions come closest to harmony, after which a period of decline sets in. It encompasses the “flourishing age” [shengshi] of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century China and the first three centuries of Ottoman rule.¹

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A special interpretation of the origins of empire derived from these culturalist models. The “ghazi” thesis of the origins of the Ottoman state stressed the early role of the Turkish founders as warriors for Islam. For the Qing, the “Sinicization” thesis performed the same function, as it claimed that the backward Manchus abandoned any distinctive identity of their own, and adopted the superior Han Confucian culture. The Manchus thus became the “ghazi” warriors who imposed Confucian orthodoxy on their subjects. To the extent that each imperial formation is seen as being structured by specific, unique cultural ideals, meaningful comparisons between them are ruled out. Just as Herder’s insistence on the special characteristics of German folk culture led historians to focus on the particular features of each national history, turning away from the universal histories of the eighteenth century, culturalist analyses of the empires directed attention not to what they shared, but what divided them.

But recent critiques have brought the two empires closer together, by focusing on the common effects of the frontier experience. Cemal Kağan criticizes nationalist historians for “assum[ing] more or less sealed cultural identities of peoples [Turks, Greeks, Spaniards, Arabs, etc.] who have come into contact within the framework of a larger bipolar division of equally sealed civilizational identities [East/West, Muslim/Christian].” Instead he stresses the “mobility and fluidity” of identities in frontier environments and the possibility of “moving from place to place, allegiance to allegiance, and identity to identity with an ease and acceptability hard to even imagine in more settled societies.” Viewed in these terms, the borderlands of the Byzantine empire where the Ottomans originated bear a striking resemblance to the fluid conditions of Manchuria in the late sixteenth century.

Pamela Crossley likewise argues that there was no fixed “Manchu” identity at this time, but that the Manchus were created pari passu with the formation of the Qing state. “The monolithic identities of ‘Manchu,’ ‘Mongol,’ and ‘Chinese’ [Han] are not regarded as fundamentals, sources,
or building blocks of the emergent order... these identities are ideological productions of the process of imperial centralization before 1800.⁹ She particularly stresses the flexibility of the banners, the combined military-administrative and residential institution that incorporated Tungusic tribesman, Han peasants, Mongolian pastoralists, and other diverse cultural formations under a unified hierarchy. If we see both ruling elites not as univocally committed to a single religio-cultural mission, but as balancing multiple cultural formations arising from a fluctuating, mixed frontier environment, we are truer to the historical origins of both states, and we have some common ground from which to view their subsequent evolution.

Linearity is the presumption that there is only one possible path of development, and one metric of success. In this respect, classical culturalism and modern technoscientism share the same assumptions. Nations and civilizations can then be ranked by their closeness to this single standard, and their trajectory can be described as either approaching or failing to meet it. The decline paradigm fits closely within both metrics, when the empires are seen as failing both to achieve their cultural targets and to match the technoscientific level of rival imperial powers.

State centralization, in this paradigm, is often taken as the key metric of success. Strongly centralized regimes then represent the maximal achievements of the state, because it can impose its ideology and its institutions on localities and extract the resources it needs from them. More loosely controlled structures, allowing greater autonomy to localities, are viewed as inferior, because the unity of the center is lost, and its ability to defend against outside incursions is reduced. The nation state wins, in this interpretation, because it restores the necessary power of the center, backed by a new mobilization of the people to replace the sacral power of the monarch. However, the notion of a secular, democratic nation had to be introduced from outside, because the cultural values of the two imperial civilizations could not accommodate these radically different ideals.

Recent work on both empires has displayed considerable skepticism about these reigning assumptions of the traditional historiography.⁹

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⁹ For example, “It is probably unwise to think of centralization— that is, the movement toward concentration of decisive power in the hands of a single ruler— as the normal, or more vital motive in Qing political culture” (Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 158). “Many political economists and social scientists still use the degree of centralization of
Regional social and economic studies, based on archival materials, have replaced the monolithic focus on the culture of the center. We recognize that even the most powerful imperial centralizers had to conduct extended negotiations with “vernacular systems of power;”¹⁰ they sought not to eliminate all variation, but to accommodate multiple local particularities within an overarching structure. A focus on internal dynamics replaces the exclusive attention to the impact of the West. The imperial structures were not stagnant despotisms, but composed of fluid interactions among elites, administrators, and local economies and identities. Centralization could be one outcome, but was only one of several possible paths, and it did not have to be supported by foreign stimulus. On the other hand, the reform movements heralded as pre-saging the modern state look more compromised; they may have brought “despotization” that delegitimized the central state more than strengthening it.¹¹ This conclusion may apply just as well to the Tanzimat reforms of the early nineteenth century as to the Qing reforms of the late nineteenth century.

If there are multiple paths to modernity, and centralization is not the exclusive index, then the metaphor of “decline” loses its value. Analyzing the tracks of these empires becomes much more complicated, since we have no clear single metric any more. The move to regional analysis, especially, threatens to fragment our perspectives so much that we lose any coherent view at all. But regional analyses of empires need to retain the awareness of the imperial center. Despite substantial influence from the Annales long-term perspective on both fields, it has proved impossible to kick the state out entirely. Events, political and military contingencies, and even the personalities of rulers must re-enter the picture, if in a more complex way. The goal is to discover how these large

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¹⁰ Ariel Szalmanson, “Vernacular Strategies and Imperial rule in the Ottoman Middle East (1750-1850),” delivered at Shared Histories of Modernity: State Transformation in the Chinese and Ottoman Empires, workshop organized by the Kevelorack Center for Near Eastern Studies, NYU, 16-17 April 1999.

¹¹ Engin Akarlı, “A Nation-less State: Rebuilding the Ottoman State,” delivered at Shared Histories of Modernity: State Transformation in the Chinese and Ottoman Empires, workshop organized by the Kevelorack Center for Near Eastern Studies, NYU, 16-17 April 1999.
states held themselves together, and why they fell, by examining convergent and divergent ideologies and interests generated by interactions between elites, regions, the central apparatus, and the world beyond.

I suggest that frontier administration is a useful site for examining such questions of coherence and diversity in these large agrarian empires. For this paper, I distinguish the frontier regions of China as the regions encompassed by modern Manchuria, Mongolia [Outer and Inner], Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet. As areas of reduced state control, greater cultural alienation, poorer resources, and more dispersed populations, they contrast sharply with the settled agricultural regions of China Proper. They shared socio-economic characteristics with the peripheries of macro-regions as defined by G. William Skinner, but they were not part of the regular imperial administration.

The term "frontier" can have many meanings, but there are basically two traditions of analysis: the European one, which stresses the creation of fixed borders between distinct states [the French frontière], and the North American one, where frontier refers to broad regions of interaction of multiple cultures. The modern Chinese term for frontier, bianjiang, combines both meanings, as bian means a region, and jiang can mean a delimited border. In imperial China, both processes occurred concurrently with imperial expansion: the rulers came into contact with new cultural groups who intermingled with each other, and administrators began to draw lines in the sand dividing the region into demarcated zones of bureaucratic control. The eighteenth century in particular is the period when these intersecting processes are most salient. Qing incorporation of the frontiers was driven by a sequence of ideological construction at the center, military conquest in the periphery, administrative consolidation of new lands and people, and social and economic integration through migration and commercial exchange.

To begin briefly with imperial ideology: Pamela Crossley has published a brilliant exposition of the Qing emperorship as a "simultaneous expression of imperial intentions in multiple cultural frames." The

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12 For a comparable examination of the Ottoman Empire from a frontier perspective, see Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mamluk, 1540-1834 (Cambridge, 1997).


14 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 11.
“cultural null” of the imperial center represented itself as a universal language that transcended all the particular diversities of its subject peoples, and therefore reigned over all of them. By superscribing itself on the multiple forms of cultural expression within the empire’s boundaries, imperial discourse embraced all their contradictions. Crossley rejects the traditional historiography’s assertion of “Sinicization” of barbarian conquerors and its assumptions of “decline,” she draws links to the experiences of other early modern empires [including Ottomans and Romanovs]; and she outlines how imperial structures created the framework within which twentieth-century nationalists made their territorial and ethnic claims, at the same time distinguishing imperial from nationalist definitions of identity.

There is much to be learned from Crossley’s focus on the view from the court and its associated institutions of the center: the rituals, the secretariats, the emperor’s person, his kinship network, and imperially commissioned histories and genealogies. We also need, however, some perspective from the edges: how the precepts of universal rule were translated into administrative practice in the empire’s far-flung regions. We risk falling into solipsism if we look only at the central broadcasting station, without examining how its messages were received. Below, I discuss two specific examples of the implementation of policy during and after the struggle for Central Asia as described by two frontier Governor-generals. They concern the classification and movement of peoples and territories as the empire expanded its scope. In the conclusion, I discuss how these two examples of frontier expansion may generate some insights about the relationship between empire and nation.

Nian Gengyao and the incorporation of Qinghai, 1724

The present day province of Qinghai is a vast region, 743,000 square kilometers in size with a sparse population in 1990 of 4.5 million, consisting of many nationalities, including Han, Tibetans, Muslims, Mongols, Kazakhs, and Salars. Its capital, Xining, is one of China’s most culturally diverse cities, containing significant numbers of Han, Muslims, Mongolians, and Tibetans. Qinghai, meaning “Blue Lake” [Kökönör in Mongolian], is named after the great shallow lake located 150 kilo-


meters west of Xining. Between Xining and the lake is the great Tibetan monastery of Kumbum [Chinese “Ta-er-si”], home of the Panchen Lama.

During the early Qing dynasty, only Xining was part of the regular provincial administration. The region to the west, known as Xihai [“West of the lake”] was controlled by Mongolian tribes known as the Khoshots. They were recent arrivals. They had originally been part of the federation of Western Mongols, with pastures near Urumqi in Xinjiang, but in the early seventeenth century they moved southeast into Kokonor.17 Unified under the leadership of Gush Khan [d. 1656], they established themselves as an autonomous federation and extended their influence over Tibet. Gush Khan’s military support of the Fifth Dalai Lama [1617-82] enabled him to create a centralized Tibetan state with its capital in Lhasa. As an adherent of the Yellow Teaching of Lamaist Buddhism, Gush Khan aided the Dalai Lama in crushing his rivals of the Red Sect. Gush Khan’s son served as temporal administrator under the Dalai Lama, and for the rest of the seventeenth century, Khoshot Mongol Khans were the de facto power-holders in Lhasa.

During the same period, the Zunghar Mongols were consolidating their state in what is now Western Mongolia and northern Xinjiang. Batur Hungtaiji [r. 1634-53] established uncontested authority as Khan, and led military campaigns to conquer Turkestan and collect tribute from the tribes of Siberia. The new state then fell into disarray, but in 1671 Galdan [r. 1671-97] returned from his Tibetan lamasery to lead the Zunghars in a vigorous campaign of expansion to the East, which would ultimately lead him into conflict with the Manchus.

As the Manchus created their state in the northeast and prepared to take control of China, the Khoshots found it advantageous to ally themselves with the new Qing dynasty. In 1637 they formally submitted to the Qing, but this submission was more like an alliance of convenience than incorporation into an empire. Only in 1644 did the Manchus, supported by their allies among the Eastern Mongols, and the Chinese bannermen, take Beijing, driving out the Ming dynasty and beginning the reunification of China. During the seventeenth century, Qing rulers were preoccupied first with driving the loyalists of the last Ming ruler to the south, and with invading Taiwan. Then, in the 1670s, the young Kangxi emperor exerted his authority over the three autonomous feudatories of the southwest [Sanfan], held by three generals who had aided

the Manchu conquest. After provoking them into revolt, he launched a successful campaign to repress the revolt and make southwest China an integral part of the empire. The next phase of imperial expansion moved to the northwest, where Kangxi fought four military campaigns against Galdan. Although Kangxi defeated Galdan twice in crushing victories in 1690 and 1696, the Mongol leader refused to surrender. After Galdan's death in 1697, the Zunghar leaders continued to resist Qing domination.

During this time, the Khoshot Mongols dominated Tibet with Qing support, but their control would soon be shaken by rivalry with the rising Zunghar power. Latsan Khan, great-grandson of Gush Khan, struggled for power in Lhasa with the regent [Diba] for influence under the feckless Sixth Dalai Lama. The regent tried twice to poison Latsan Khan, who retaliated in 1705 by killing the regent and proclaiming himself ruler of Tibet.18 After the Zunghars invaded Tibet in 1717, killing Latsan Khan, and looting the temples of Lhasa, the Kangxi emperor sent an army, led by his fourteenth son, Yinti, which recaptured Lhasa in 1720, and drove out the Zunghars. Yinti's military successes gave him a credible claim to be the presumptive heir to the Qing throne, but when Kangxi died in 1722, it was his fourth son, Yinzhen, who took the throne as the Yongzheng emperor [r. 1723-35], while Yinti was put under house arrest.

The Qing military intervention had not resolved the numerous conflicts in Tibet between rival Tibetan nobles and Khoshot Mongolian princes. Finally, Lobzang Danjin, a grandson of Gush Khan, aimed to reunite the Khoshots and to restore their control over Tibet. The threat of Khoshot unity induced the Yongzheng emperor to send in Nian Gengyao as Fuyuan Dajiangjun [Generalissimo in charge of Pacification of Remote Regions] with his army to suppress this “rebellion.” Lobzang Danjin's army was defeated after a short period of brutal warfare in 1724, during which time Qing forces burned large lamaseries and massacred thousands of monks. Lobzang himself succeeded in escaping to the Zunghars, but his wife, son, kinsmen, and followers were all captured. At this point Nian Gengyao put forward a memorial containing thirteen items for the reconstruction and incorporation of Qinghai into the empire. Nian's comprehensive plan included provisions for military security, economic development, and administrative reform. It was designed to ensure that

18 Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, ed. Hummel, 758 and 760.
Qinghai, formerly an autonomous territory ruled by Mongolian tribes, would become a permanent part of the Qing realm.\(^9\)

Nian's proposals epitomize the process of Qing imperial formation so well that they are worth discussing in some detail. Nian began by emphasizing all the benefits that Gush Khan and his descendants had received from the Qing emperors. The first task was to determine rewards and punishments. Three princes who aided the Qing suppression received titles of nobility. “Coerced followers” [niecong] were pardoned, but the active leaders of the rebellion deserved execution. Nian explained the Qing decision carefully to an assembly of the Khoshot princes, outlining in detail the crimes of the eight ringleaders. Then he had the men dragged before the assembly and had their heads cut off, in order to “rectify the laws of the nation [guojia].”\(^{20}\)

Second came the fixing of the territories of the Mongolian tribes. Nian thought that the autonomy of the hereditary lineages of Mongols and Tibetans in Qinghai led to continual plundering and conflict. Now that the rebels had been rooted out, the Mongols would be organized into banner companies, modeled on the military-administrative units that had been the basis of the Manchu state’s formation. Their pastureland boundaries would be fixed, and the Mongol leaders would be named jasaks; commanders of the banners subject to confirmation by the Qing. Each tribe would be allocated to a separate grazing ground, following the precedents of the Eastern Mongols when they submitted to the Qing. No tribe could interfere with another tribe’s pasturelands.

The Qing also exploited divisions among the Mongols to serve imperial unification. The Khalkha, or Eastern Mongols, had submitted to the Qing in a great assembly in 1690, after Kangxi’s first defeat of Galdan. In return for Qing protection, they agreed to recognize the Qing emperor as their Khan, to be enrolled in banner companies, and to provide horses, men, and supplies to the Qing armies. Several groups of Khalkhas, however, had fled from the Zunghars to the south and instead sought protection from the Khoshots of Kokonor. Now that the Qing had taken over this region, these Khalkha had the opportunity to free themselves from Khoshot domination by accepting Qing rule. Their chiefs would become jasaks, and they could take over territory confiscated


\(^{20}\) *YZHZZ*, 3:30a.
from Lobzang Danjin’s rebels. As Nian explicitly stated, “thus we will divide the strength of the Kokonor princes, and the Khalkha princes will no longer suffer the shame of being slaves; they will become their own tribes.” These Khalkha were explicitly defined as a new tribe [butuo] and settled separately from the Khoshots in Qinghai. The multiple coexistence of different ethnic classifications aided the Qing in promoting its policies of divide and rule. Westerners knew this policy well as one of “setting barbarians against barbarians.”

Similar discriminations were applied to the Tibetans [Xifan] in Kokonor. Nian regarded them as the original inhabitants of the region, but they also provided the Qinghai Mongols with cattle, grain, and labor services. When Lobzang Danjin revolted, they joined him “in swarms,” saying “they only knew of the existence of Mongols, and knew nothing of Chinese civil administration [tingwei] or garrisons.” As Nian noted, “Now they have become obedient, but if we do not put them in order they will disperse like birds and beasts in the future.” For Nian, these Tibetans were “our common people [baixing];” “their lands are our lands; how can they serve the Qinghai princes?” They would be liberated from dependence on lamaseries and Mongol princes, their settlements would be registered, and taxes paid to Qing officials. But detailed population and tax registers would be introduced only gradually, so as not to alienate them. “Over several decades we will transform their dog and sheep natures into good people.”

Nian thus envisaged the Qinghai region as inhabited by native Tibetans, who naturally deserved to be incorporated as loyal subjects of the Qing Empire, owing duties directly to the imperial administration. This meant detaching them from their ties to lamaseries and Mongolian lords. They would become another defined population within the territory with distinct administrative characteristics. From a fluid mix of populations who owed multiple obligations to different superiors, Nian aimed to sort out single, well-defined groups who would be subordinated to only one superior authority.

Enforcing control over the local Tibetans also meant challenging the Dalai Lama’s suzerainty, by splitting up the territorial boundaries of Tibet. Two of the four Tibetan regions, Zang and Wei in Western Tibet, belonged under the Dalai Lama’s jurisdiction, but Qinghai and Kham in Eastern Tibet, because they were dominated by Gush Khan, deserved a separate classification. After Lobzang’s defeat, the Kham region was attached to the neighboring interior provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan. Nian did not regard this reorganization as taking terri-
tory away from the Dalai Lama; his "lands of incense and fire [xianghuo]" in the West remained under his control. The Qing would compensate the Dalai Lama for his loss of revenue with annual payments and the right to conduct trade at Dajianlu on the Sichuan border. This division of the Tibetan cultural region imposed by the Qing corresponds closely to its current administrative boundaries under the PRC.

Further discipline of Qinghai required severe limitations on the power of the lamaseries. These were some of the largest monastic establishments in the entire Tibetan region, containing up to three thousand monks and many interconnected buildings. They were significant centers of autonomous power, supported by dues from local Tibetans. From Nian's point of view, the lamaseries could not be authentic religious institutions, because they stored weapons, gave refuge to "criminals," and supported Lobzang Danjin's "rebellion." It was perfectly proper to burn them down and massacre their residents as rebels. Afterwards, the lamaseries would be limited in size to 300 monks, all of whom had to register with local officials and undergo twice yearly investigations. Rent payments could not go directly to the lamaseries, but had to be submitted to the government for distribution to them.

To summarize these tactics: After eliminating a minority of "rebels," the Qing administrators organized the remaining "coerced followers" into fixed "tribes" defined as territorially and administratively circumscribed units, whose leaders were regulated by the state. Different groups were intermingled so as to balance them against one another. "Natives" were distinguished from later arrivals, and multiple allegiances were replaced with one direct line of authority.

These practices of fixing boundaries, classifying peoples, and designating reliable local leadership were all key components of the Qing imperial project in the frontiers, tasks which they shared with other empires in the world. Virginia Aksan, for example, points to parallel processes of defining stable borders and sharpening classifications of peoples in the eighteenth-century Russian and Ottoman Empires. Like the

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22 "From 1699 forward... the whole bureaucratic apparatus of diplomacy in Istanbul moved to strategies of peace which involved mediation and fixed borders." [In Russia] "A new fortress line was built in the northern Caucasus, further closing the ill-defined border between Russian and nomad, between Orthodoxy and Islam" [Virginia Aksan, "Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires," *Journal of Early Modern History* 3/2 (1999)].
British in India, the Qing rulers needed to conduct ethnographic categorizations of the new regions they ruled and to fix identities in place for the convenience of registration of fiscal duties and preservation of local order. They replaced the fluctuating alliances of the autonomous nomadic society with fixed, hierarchically determined posts of authority. But the bureaucratic structure was not the same as that of the interior: it had to be adapted to the character of the frontier.

At the same time, promotion of immigration would enhance the links to the interior and create a more peaceful, settled society. Nian proposed to send 10,000 Manchu and Han settler households into Qinghai in order to “dilute the strength” of the Mongols and turn them toward stable cultivation. These were, in some ways, contradictory policies. The first aimed to untangle tribal affiliations by creating separate territorial and kinship entities under an orderly administrative structure, while the second introduced more diversity into the region, adding new peoples who could come into conflict with the indigenous inhabitants.

Trade was another crucial instrument for binding the frontier to the center. Before the conquest, as Nian saw it, the Mongols traded as they pleased, exchanging “useless hides and furs for our useful tea and cloth.” Han traders in search of profit who headed for the territory created a “spirit of wickedness” [jianxin]. Free trade relations also had allowed Lobzang to spy out conditions in the interior before he rebelled. Now trade at the frontiers would be regulated. Mongolians would be divided into three groups; each group could come to the capital on a licensed trade mission once every three years, in rotation. Over nine years, all would have a chance to trade. Regular trade at border markets was allowed twice a year. Troops would patrol the markets to ensure that no one crossed the border without permission.

These regulations anticipated similar trade regulations negotiated with the Russians in 1727, where border trade was confined to the town of Kiakhta, and tribute missions to the capital were allowed only with official permission. The Canton trade system of handling Western traders at the end of eighteenth century repeated these principles. Joseph Fletcher has shown how Central Asian precedents set the pattern for coastal treaties in the nineteenth century. China’s first “unequal treaty” settle-

23 Matthew Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India (Chicago, 1997).
24 YZHZZ, 3/32a.
ment was negotiated with the Khan of Kokand in 1835. Its provisions for extraterritoriality, merchant autonomy, and permanent resident political representatives were applied equally to the British after the Opium War in 1842. The same was true for the earlier period: the Canton trade system known to the Western coastal traders had been anticipated by these regulated trading arrangements on the Russian and Qinghai frontiers.

Finally, Nian proposed a major new construction project to create a new border along Qinghai’s northern frontier. A connected series of fortresses would in effect extend the Great Wall line of defense far out the Gansu corridor to Ganzhou and Anxi, cutting off Qinghai from contact with the Kunghars to the north. He would clear out all Mongols from this area, and bring large numbers of settlers from the interior to populate the garrison towns. Criminals sentenced to military exile would make ideal cultivators of the soil.

The Qing repression of revolt in Qinghai was brutal but not wanton. The large lamaseries were dismantled and reestablished on a limited scale, with smaller influence, but they were not eliminated. The Qing had no ideological hostility to Lamaism per se; it was concerned only with the potential for the institution to create centers of resistance. Under appropriate restraints, the monks could facilitate imperial control, especially if it was endorsed by the top of the hierarchy. By patronage and selective intervention in the Lamaist hierarchy, the Qing obtained the personal loyalty of the leading Tibetan Buddhist clerics: the Jebzondanba Hatakhda of Mongolia, the Panchen Lama, and the Dalai Lama among them. When these personal links were intact, there was no need to impose thorough administrative re-organization of the Tibetan regions.

Qinghai’s experience has uncanny parallels with current events in Tibet. We may note the appearance of rival incarnations, one backed by the orthodox hierarchy, one by the Chinese; the use of forcible intervention to impose a solution on Lhasa; and the concern to prevent lamaseries from becoming foci of resistance to state control. But Tibet’s experience also illustrates the difference between imperial and nationalist ideology. The Qing never conducted all-out ideological campaigns against Tibet’s religion; Mao’s notorious statement to the Dalai Lama that “religion is poison” would never have been used by a Qing emperor.

Qing administrators restricted lamaseries but left their leadership in place. By contrast, the Communists destroyed the landed base of Tibet’s religious hierarchy, and during the Cultural Revolution, thousands of monastic establishments were destroyed by Red Guards; monks and nuns were killed and humiliated. The Manchus inflicted only a nasty, sharp military shock on the resisting lamas, after which they allowed the institution to continue.

Except when they had their own militarily dominant empire in the seventh to ninth centuries, Tibetans have always been in the unfortunate position of choosing between unsatisfactory, violent, or indifferent protectors. Mongolian patronage did help the Dalai Lama centralize his state from the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries; but the eighteenth century Zungharian intervention in internal conflicts only left the Tibetans with the choice of one patron: the Qing emperor in Beijing. Yet after the 1720s, Tibet remained at peace under loose Qing suzerainty. Only twentieth-century nationalist upheaval led to true threats to Tibetan culture.

*The Deportation of the Turfanis*

Qing policy toward the East Turkestani oasis of Turfan provides another example of how the empire sought to impose control in the face of great logistical difficulties. Qing armies first captured the oasis from the Zunghars in 1720. This represented the first extension of Chinese control into Turkestan since the Tang dynasty, one thousand years earlier. But holding these territories proved difficult. Zunghar raids on Turfan continued, as it became clear that Turfan could not produce enough grain to support both the local population and a substantial garrison.\(^{26}\)

Tsewang Rabdan [r. 1697-1727], the Zunghar leader, attempted to carry off Turfansis to the west, because these agriculturalists could be valuable producers of grain for his state.\(^{27}\) Many Turfans instead fled to the east, appealing for protection from the Qing. But when Tsewang Rabdan retreated the next year, after some discussion, the Qing generals decided not to put a large garrison in Turfan. Even though the Kangxi emperor had embraced the Turfansis as “our people” [xomin] and vowed to protect them against Zunghar raids, his successor, Yong-

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\(^{27}\) Pingling Zhungeer Fanghu, ed. Fu Heng (Xizang Shehui Kexueyuan, 1990), 1721/6.
zheng, would not expend large military resources in the distant oasis.  

These considerations led to proposals to induce the Muslims of Turfan to move closer to the Chinese borders by offering them lands to settle around Anxi and Suzhou. Anxi was still 225 km beyond the end of the Great Wall, but 665 km closer to the border. In fact, very few Tufanis accepted the offer. Only 650 of a total population of 10,000 left the oasis for a new home, even though Qing troop withdrawals left them more vulnerable. Those who did settle in Suzhou suffered from poor harvests and mistreatment by local officials that drove them into debt. In 1731, however, when Zunghar raids resumed, there was further unrest in Turfan. The garrison now numbered 3,000, but it could not support itself, and officials had to distribute relief to the local people as well.  

General Yue Zhongqi then outlined an extremely ambitious sixteen point proposal for a massive military occupation of East Turkestan. He asked for substantial increases in troop strength, expansion of military colonies, and shipments from the interior. Thirty thousand troops in Barkul would move to Turfan and be replaced by 18,000 more men from Ningxia and the Ordos. Yue made detailed estimates of the supply demands for such a large force. He expected that clearance of lands around Turfan city could support 10,000 troops, and smaller towns in the region could support at least 5,000 more, but additional supplies of 30,000 shi of millet would have to be shipped annually from Suzhou. The expanded army also needed a total of 60,000 horses, including cavalry mounts and pack animals, 34,000 camels to carry over 60,000 shi of grain, and 200,000 sheep, while each soldier himself carried two months of rations on his back.  

Yue’s careful estimates indicated the vast scale of preparations necessary to launch a truly decisive campaign. He realized that a serious military effort would take at least three to four years, and would have to root out the Mongols from their far away nests, at the same time leaving enough troops in the oases to defend against raids. The emperor regretfully refused Yue’s requests. Although he understood how shameful it was for Yue’s garrisons to stay in defensive positions holding off nomad raids, now was not the right time for a decisive campaign.  

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30 Pingding Zhungeer Fanglue, ed. Fu Heng, 1725/4.  
31 Pingding Zhungeer Fanglue, ed. Fu Heng, 1731/2 jiaqia 1731/11.  
32 Pingding Zhungeer Fanglue, ed. Fu Heng, 1731/2 guichou.  
33 One shi of grain weighs approximately 60 kilograms.  
34 Pingding Zhungeer Fanglue, ed. Fu Heng, 1731/2 guichou.
At this juncture, Imin Kwaja, the chieftain of Turfan, besieged by the Zunghars and desperate for Qing support, began to organize a mass emigration. Repelling Zunghar attacks, in 1733-4 he led nearly the entire population of 10,000 on a long march inland, settling them in Xin Guazhou, just west of the Anxi garrison. For his efforts, he was granted the title of jasak Fuguogong [Prince who Supports the State], and his people were organized into a banner, with Imin as the banner chief, the first Turki to receive this honor. For two decades, the Turfanis lived there in poverty, as in a refugee camp, while their homelands were devastated by warfare. They were allowed to return in 1754, as the Qing prepared its final blows against the fragmented Zunghar state.

The Turfani migration toward the border was “voluntary,” in the sense that Imin’s people chose to protect themselves from Zunghar attacks by abandoning their home. But an important factor in their decision was the Qing refusal to guarantee the oasis against attack. The limitations on supplies for large garrisons in the oases of Turkestan meant that armies could not stay in one place very long; they had to either attack vigorously, or retreat. The long-term solution was to build up the productive resources of Turkestan so as to support both an expanded population and a military apparatus. This development only came after the mid-eighteenth century, when the Qing began the aggressive promotion of the settlement of Xinjiang.

This semi-voluntary population movement was only one of many other migration projects promoted by the Qing. The Qing rulers shifted not only military forces, but thousands of agrarian settlers, through coercive and material incentives, around their empire as they incorporated progressively larger territories into the state. From its origins as a “booty state” in early seventeenth century Manchuria, the Qing used deportations and mass kidnappings to build their human resource base. As Hong Taiji commented in 1643, “One is not happy enough when merely taking goods, one is only satisfied when one takes people.”

The largest state-sponsored population movement delivered civilian and military colonists to Xinjiang after the conquest of 1760. It had been inaugurated by the establishment of military colonies and the transport of criminal exiles to the region, later followed by civilian peasants and merchants from the interior. These coercive population movements served several purposes. In the early phase of expansion, they deprived

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32 Saguchi, “The Formation of the Turfan Principality under the Qing Empire.”
31 Grossley, A translucent Mirror, 99-100.
rival states of manpower. Later, they relieved agrarian pressure on poor-yielding lands of the interior, especially in the northwest. They increased agrarian productivity in Turkestan by converting grasslands to fields, constructing irrigation works, and importing new seeds and animal labor. As in Qinghai, they created a newly diverse population in the region, whose different elements could be balanced against each other so as to ensure permanent imperial control.

Symmetry

R. Bin Wong espouses the principle of symmetry in comparative analysis. If we are to view China through European eyes, we should equally view Europe through Chinese eyes. This leads him to develop new perspectives on both regions. What is a major focus of attention in one society may only be a minor key in another. Even though the repertory of human perceptions, administrative structures, or economic modes of production is finite, different forms take prominence in different places.

What happens if we apply, even crudely, the principle of symmetry to the Qing-Ottoman comparison? An Ottoman administrator looking at the Qing would find much that was strangely familiar. The Mongolian jasak confirmed lands by the Qing look very much like yurts, *summer and winter pasturelands the limits of which were determined and were entered in the imperial registers.* The “feudatories” of the early Qing [sanjian] were large-scale timars. Both were grants of large territories to provincial military rulers in return for service to the state. And coerced population movements [yügên] were prominent features of the Ottoman and Qing states. Both of these states, during times of expansion and conquest, chose analogous methods of controlling the newly incorporated populations. For administering conquered nomads, it was convenient to


18 An *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, ed. Hafis İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge, 1994). 37. Cf. Khouri, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire*, 31, on the compilation of registers as part of the “state’s policy of curtailing the movement of pastoral groups by turning them into taxable subjects within a limited geographical area.”

19 “The state’s deportation policy... played a major role in the shifts of population in the empire... As was true in the Byzantine and Iranian empires, the Ottomans, too, applied the policy of forced deportation of population in an effort to get rid of a rebellious ethnic group or to colonize a particular area important for the state” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. İnalcık and Quataert, 32.
keep their leadership intact, while supervising their mobility. Military commanders who allied with the ruling elite gained their rewards in autonomous territorial grants, at a time when regular taxation systems had not yet been established. Uprooting populations from their homes could bring them into greater dependence on the regime, and mixing them with other subject peoples provided useful leverage, preventing united resistance. These parallels may derive either from a common Central Asian heritage or from common conditions of rule in frontier regions. The Ottoman might be favorably impressed with how effectively the Qing used these institutions for imperial control.

A Qing frontier official of the eighteenth century might find the Ottomans too generous, however, in leaving substantial autonomy to frontier commanders [beyliks]. He would have in his historical memory the experience of the Tang dynasty [618-907], another dynasty with strong Central Asian connections, where the autonomy of frontier military commanders led to a major rebellion in 757 that nearly destroyed the dynasty. It was only restored to the throne with the help of another group of Central Asian nomads, the Uighurs. The Manchus, and their Chinese advisors, knew well the Tang precedents. The Ottoman perspective indicates that Kangxi's repression of the Three Feudatories rebellion in 1681 was a decisive turning point in the construction of the Qing state. By forcibly rejecting the construction of loosely autonomous fiefdoms in return for military service, he put the Qing on a new and different path, and constructed a completely new foundation for imperial identity.

_Empire and Nation: The Question of Modernity_

Inevitably, scholars of both empires must examine the relationship between imperial formations and their successor nation-states. Once again, most comparative analysis of the subject takes the European experience of state and nation formation as normative. The nation-state, in turn, represents the quintessential formation of modernity, taken to subsume mass democracy, literacy, education, technological dynamism, to

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39 Crossley, _A Translucent Mirror_, 105-108.
name only a few. Images of the Chinese and Ottoman empires as "sick men," decaying despotisms unable to adapt to the modern age, derive irresistibly from taking Europe as the model, and from assuming that modernity is a single whole, or a uniform process. But if we unbundle modernization, and look at the pieces, then there seems to be less coherence, and less obvious superiority of one society as a whole to another. In some ways, imperial policies then look precociously "modern." Qing China's welfare policies, for example [orphanages and famine relief], and price regulation with ever normal granaries, exceeded those of most European states until the mid twentieth-century. Ottoman tolerance of multiple ethnic and religious communities looks preferable to nationalist exclusions. Ariel Salzman has argued that the venality and lifetime tax farming contracts of the early modern European and Ottoman empires [malikane] "are only the uncelebrated forerunners of contemporary privatization" of state power. 10

On the other hand, some eighteenth-century developments in the Ottoman Empire look remarkably similar to those of the Qing dynasty in the nineteenth century. The ceding of control over a centralized army to provincial elites through contracts to local "state militias" directed by prosperous elites on the Ottoman frontier was echoed in the Qing policies of commissioning militia groups [tuannian] to secure local order. 11 By examining the two empires in tandem, we can raise new comparative questions and contrasts. Although there were parallel relationships of local elites to the center in elements of tax collection and military organization, the ultimate outcomes for the central state were quite different. The most striking distinction in the long run is that, despite the collapse of both empires at the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman realms were reorganized into nation states, while the Qing empire was reconstituted under a single nationalist regime.

From this perspective, it is worth examining how the Qing planted the "sprouts of nationalism" in the eighteenth century. Much of the terminology used by Qing frontier officials prefigures the classifications of twentieth-century nationalists. The term guojia [literally "state-family"] appears frequently in discussions of the northwest conquests. It is used to define the dividing line between subjects of the emperor and those

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11 Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire; Virginia Aksan, "Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires;" Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure (Cambridge, Mass., 1970).
beyond. The dividing line between "our people" [womin] and those beyond the obligation of subjection to imperial authority was evolving during the period of expansion, as the victorious armies successively brought new groups under imperial control. The completion of the Central Asian conquests in 1760, with the designation of Xinjiang ["New Frontier"], marked the culmination of this process of delimitation, creating fixed territorial limits where there had formerly been shifting personal allegiances of individual leaders to the emperor.

But contrary to Chinese historiography, the Qing did not "unify" the peoples of China under a "multinationality nation-state." What was still lacking was the concept of a fixed collective essence, rooted in ancient history. Theorists have noted the fundamental paradox of nationalist ideologies: they claim to discover the primordial essence of a people, yet the ideology itself is a quintessentially modern creation. Nationalism evokes the progressive "awakening" of a people to the recognition that they have always unconsciously shared a common fate; it is the role of intellectuals and political activists to open their people's minds so as to mobilize them in a unified movement.\(^{42}\) This faith in the unitary essence of an imagined community could not fit comfortably with the conception of a classical empire. Where the empire was tied together only at the top, by common subjection to the individual ruler, nations are tied at the bottom, by common subordination to a collective will. The most common fate of empires that confronted this contradiction was to break into component units. All except China have now done so. As the Romanov, Hapsburg, Ottoman, and Mughal domains have split into multiple national units, the process of fragmentation has not stopped, because the nationalist principle of essential unity can be applied recursively ad infinitum. Smaller minorities within the new nations then claim their own rights to autonomy or separation.

Michael Walzer points out that large empires can accommodate extreme collective cultural difference within their domains much more easily than nation states.\(^{43}\) Multinational empires, whether they are Romans, Ottomans, or the Qing, embrace multiple communities, each of whom is left relatively autonomous and treated relatively equally.


What the communities have in common is subjection to the autocratic bureaucrats and ruler at the top; they are all the same, in this respect, regardless of the size of their population or cultural power. There were no “minority peoples” in the Qing dynasty. The Manchus, who ruled the Qing, had good reason not to create the concept of “minority,” since they themselves were a small percentage of the total population. But they did accommodate difference, and even constructed diversity in the new territories. No less than five different administrative systems governed Xinjiang in the late eighteenth century. These included Mongol banners, Han settlers, Muslim begs ruling Turkic oasis agriculturalists, a variety of Manchu banners, and military colonists. It was because they were Manchus, not because they assimilated to superior Han Confucian civilization, that they could create these multiple structures of classification and administration. These barbarians did impose a kind of solution.

But under imperial rule, the price for multiculturalism is autocracy. Some commentators on the Middle East and the Balkans today evince a certain nostalgia for the early modern empires: in their own ramshackle forms of autocratic rule, they did keep their component peoples from slaughtering each other. But imperial structures belong to the past, or so it is claimed. Nation states have to be built from the bottom up, on pseudo-democratic principles of popular will, not from the top down, on pseudo-sacral religious claims to divine mandates. Nation states are founded on the presumption that all their peoples share a common history and destiny. These peoples have to voluntarily recognize that they belong to a common cultural matrix and create their political structures out of it.

Twentieth-century China inherited both the imperial claims to territory and collective self-definition, and the assumptions of national unity that claimed to derive from a linear, modernizing march of history. These two models of collective destiny do not fit together comfortably, either as historical interpretation or as subjectively lived experience. The clash between national and imperial ideologies affects all of China’s population, but it is particularly conspicuous for the non-Han minorities. Now they are no longer collaborators with imperial conquerors, or autonomous cultural formations within a variegated empire, but decidedly subordinate members of a Han-dominated polity. The imperial legacy ties them inextricably to Beijing, but the nationalist ideology accommodates them with great difficulty.

The extent to which non-Han peoples support the People’s Republican government today corresponds closely to their degree of integration
under the Qing. Manchuria, the homeland of the Manchu rulers, is solidly part of China; Outer Mongolia, the source of the most sustained resistance to Qing domination, is an independent nation; Inner Mongolia, most of whose Mongols were loyal, and even part of the Manchu conquest elite, is fairly secure, especially because its population is majority Han, a result of massive immigration since the seventeenth century. Xinjiang, conquered in the eighteenth century and more loosely administered, is rather restive; and Tibet, the most alienated region, was the least tightly controlled under the Qing. Within the Tibetan cultural realm, Qinghai and Kham [Western Sichuan], are more loyal than the population in Lhasa. Likewise, in Xinjiang, Turfan is the oasis with the most positive feelings about China, while Kashgar is the most hostile.\(^{44}\) Qing frontier administration strongly affected the strength of the ties between these regions and the center.

Taiwan, too, conquered only in the 1680s, a site of frequent rebellions in the eighteenth century, and a colony of Japan after 1895, shares with Tibet a history of sporadic, contested imperial control. Today, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet are looking for alternative definitions of cultural belonging to the straightjacket of the nineteenth-century version of nationalism. Beijing, on the other hand, endorses both racialist conceptions of cultural unity derived from the nineteenth century while carrying on many of the autocratic practices of the empire.

Both empires and nations face the question of how multiple collective identities, produced from personal memory, socialization, and mobilization, can fit together under political structures that tolerate difference, but maintain unity. The empire is the specter that haunts the modern nation. Rejected as emblematic of the dark past, it leaves its inescapable traces on the territorial and subjective claims of the modern political community. As a source of both pride and shame, it inspires inadequate histories that attempt to embrace its contradictions in a single narrative that links it seamlessly to a people’s common destiny. But its diversity cannot be suppressed. Recovering the multiple accommodations between center and locality, between state and local elites, or core and periphery, makes the story much more complex, but truer to lived experience. In the long run, national communities need genuine, not factitious histories, that are sensitive to the unavoidable pluralities of social experience.

\(^{44}\) Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road* (Columbia, 1997).