Introduction to process design

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
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Agenda

Steps in Designing/Retrofitting Chemical Processes

- Assess Primitive Problem
- Process Creation
- Development of Base Case
- Detailed Process Synthesis Algorithmic Methods
- Process Controllability Assessment
- Detailed Design, Sizing, Cost Estimation, Optimization
- Construction, Start-up and Operation
- Environmental Issues
- Safety Issues
- Process schemes

Manufacture of chemical products





Origin of Design Problems

- Explorations of chemists, biochemists, and engineers in research labs
 - to satisfy the desires of customers
 - to obtain chemicals with improved properties for applications.
- ... several well-known products, like Teflon (polytetrafluoroethylene), were discovered by accident.
- an inexpensive source of a raw material(s) becomes available.
- … the engineer himself,
 - inclination that a new chemical or route to produce an existing chemical can be very profitable.

New system boundary definition

SYSTEM (from 'cradle to grave')








Stage-Gate Product Development Process

 SGPDP – Developed by Robert Cooper (2001, 2002, 2005)


Roadmap for transforming new ideas into products that satisfy customer needs - ready to be launched








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



Process Simulation – Maurizio Fermeglia


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
Product Introduction














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


Steps in Process Design





Steps in Process Design



Environmental Issues ...

Handling of toxic wastes

- 97% of hazardous waste generation by the chemicals and nuclear industry is wastewater.
 - In process design, it is essential that facilities be included to remove pollutants from waste-water streams.

Reaction pathways to reduce by-product toxicity

- As the reaction operations are determined, the toxicity of all of the chemicals, especially those recovered as byproducts, needs to be evaluated.
- Pathways involving large quantities of toxic chemicals should be replaced by alternatives, except under unusual circumstances.

Reducing and reusing wastes

 Environmental concerns place even greater emphasis on recycling, not only for unreacted chemicals, but for product and by-product chemicals, as well. (i.e., production of segregated wastes - e.g., production of composite materials and polymers).

Environmental Issues

Avoiding non-routine events

 Reduce the likelihood of accidents and spills through the reduction of transient phenomena, relying on operation at the nominal steady-state, with reliable controllers and fault-detection systems.

Design objectives, constraints and optimization

- Environmental goals often not well defined because economic objective functions involve profitability measures, whereas the value of reduced pollution is often not easily quantified economically.
- Solutions: mixed objective function ("price of reduced pollution"), or express environmental goal as "soft" or "hard" constraints.
- Environmental regulations = constraints
- Example: PSP (see next slides)


Sustainability evaluation (of a process)...


The question of Indicators 1D indicators: economical, ecological, or social; Environment 2D indicators: socio-ecological, 1D socio-economical, or economicecological; 3D indicators: all three dimensions 2D 2D of sustainability Indicators in this study: 3D Economy Four 3D Society 2D Four 1D (environment) 1D 1D Manufacturing Product Product Process Distribution Use From Martins, 2006 Raw Material Product Recycle Disposal Acquisition Fermeglia M., Longo G., Toma L., AIChE J, 2009 Environment

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PSP framework






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Sweetening natural gas by DGA absorption - base case



Natural gas, S1(CH4, CO2 and H2S) and the stream S14 (DGA solution), are sent to T-1.
 The goal of this absorption column is to separate the CH4. The products of the column are: stream S2, containing the removed CH4, and stream S3 containing water, DGA, CO2, H2S and small amounts of CH4.


S3 is heated in E-1 and sent to the second separation device, F-1. The top stream of F-1, S5 contains the remained CH4 traces.

The bottom stream, S6, is sent to the second distillation column, T-2. The top stream of the second column, S8, contains removed gases. The bottom stream, S9, is made of DGA and water.

The losses of DGA and water are supplied with S28 and S30 streams. These are mixed with S13 in M-1 and recycled back to the absorber, T-1.

From an environmental point of view, it is desired to reduce the gaseous streams, S2, S5 and S8, released in the atmosphere.


Sweetening natural gas by DGA absorption - alternative



One modification has been made, starting from the base case.


The stream, S9, coming from the bottom of the second column, T-2, was used to heat S7. In this way the heat for E-2 is supplied using some internal stream of the process

1D: Results




Safety Considerations

- Example Disaster 1 Flixborough: 1st June 1974 http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5a591f6.htm
 - 50 tons of cyclohexane were released from Nypro's KA plant (oxidation of cyclohexane) leading to release of vapor cloud and its detonation. Total loss of plant and death of 28 plant personnel.
 - Highly reactive system conversions low, with large inventory in plant. Process involved six, 20 ton stirred-tank reactors.
 - Discharge caused by
 failure of temporary pipe
 installed to replace
 cracked reactor.
 - The so-called "dog-leg" was not able to contain the operating conditions of the process (10 bar, 150 °C)



20 inch (500 mm) pipe

Safety Considerations



Safety Considerations (Cont'd)

- Example Disaster 2 Bhopal: 3rd December 1984 http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm
 - Water leakage into MIC (Methyl isocyanate) storage tank leading to boiling and release of 25 tons of toxic MIC vapor, killing more than 3,800 civilians, and injuring tens of thousands more.
 - MIC vapor released because the refrigeration system intended to cool the storage tank holding 100 tons of MIC had been shut down, the scrubber was not immediately available, and the flare was not in operation.
 - Bhopal What can we learn?
 - Avoid use of hazardous materials. Minimize stocks of hazardous materials ("what you don't have, can't leak").
 - Carry out HAZOP analysis.
 - Train operators not to ignore unusual readings.
 - Keep protective equipment in working order.
 - Control building near major hazards.

Safety Considerations (Cont'd)

- Example Disaster 3 Challenger: 28th January 1986
- http://www.onlineethics.com/moral/boisjoly/RB-intro.html
 - An O-ring seal in one of the solid booster rockets failed. A high-pressure flame plume was deflected onto the external fuel tank, leading to a massive explosion at 73 sec from lift-off, claiming the Challenger with its crew.
 - The O-ring problem was known several months before the disaster, but down-played by management, who over-rode concerns by engineers.
- Challenger What can we learn?
 - Design for safety.
 - Prevent 'management' over-ride of 'engineering' safety concerns.
 - Carry out HAZOP analysis.



Safety Issues

Flammability Limits of Liquids and Gases
 LFL and UFL (vol %) in Air at 25 oC and 1 Atm

Compound	LFL (%)	UFL (%)
Acetylene	2.5	100
Cyclohexane	1.3	8
Ethylene	2.7	36
Gasoline	1.4	7.6
Hydrogen	4.0	75

These limits can be extended for mixtures, and for elevated temperatures and pressures.

With this kind of information, the process designer makes sure that flammable mixtures do not exist in the process during startup, steady-state operation, or shut-down.

Design for Safety

Techniques to Prevent Fires and Explosions

- Inerting addition of inert dilutant to reduce the fuel concentration below the LFL
- Installation of grounding devices and anti-static devices to avoid the buildup of static electricity
- Use of explosion proof equipment
- Ensure ventilation install sprinkler systems
- Relief Devices

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

- The plant is scrutinized to identify sources of accidents or hazards.
 - Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is carried out, in which all of the possible paths to an accident are identified.
- When sufficient probability data are available, a fault tree is created and the probability of the occurrence for each potential accident computed.

Process schemes


- Block Flow Diagram (BFD): illustrative, very general
- Process Flow Diagram (PFD): technical, they allow design
 - Simplified: reports unit operations and necessary equipment
 - Quantified: add to the simplified flow diagram material and energy balances
 - **Instrumental**: add the quantified flow diagram the control systme
- Piping and Instrumentational Diagram (P&I)
 - **Main document** of the design, the PFD is enhanced and quantified:
 - Instrumentation and control system is added
 - Is a `technical photo' of the process
 - Allows to identify and recognize all units and piping of the plant

Block Flow Diagram BFD

Series of boxes labeled with the name of the operation

Streams indicated as continuum lines with arrows


- At least two sections: reaction and separation
- At least 2 streams: feed and product



Usually at least one recycle and one purge

More BFD could be generated from one patent or know-how
 The optimal one will be selected based on economical considerations

Process Flow Diagram PFD



Piping and Instrumentational Diagram P&I

Service lines are Fuel Gas 2" Sch 10 CS indicated 4" 5ch 45 CS UTILITY CONNECTIONS connecting the units that need T-101 3" Sch 40 CS the specific service 4" Seh 40 CS EMICAL SEWER NT TO FLAR Indication of: by-E-104 Insulated Pipe CS - carbon steel pass, pipes slopes, insulations, V-104 condensate drains, 4" Seh 40 CS P-102 P-102A Complex schema: E-106 clarity, sufficient * fain 45 C spacing, no 5(8 40 C5 winding paths P&I of a distillation column for toluene de-alchilation process