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NATIONALISM IN TROPICAL AFRICA*

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Postwar uprisings and nationalist assertions in Tropical Africa—that part of the continent south of the Sahara and north of the Union—have directed increased attention towards the nature and implications of the awakening of the African to political consciousness. Among scholars this neglected area has long been the preserve of the scientific linguist or of the social anthropologist; only recently have American sociologists, economists, and political scientists developed an active interest in its problems.¹ As a consequence, apart from certain efforts by anthropologists to popularize their findings and insights we have been obliged to rely primarily upon the somewhat contradictory accounts of colonial governments seeking to explain imperial connections, or of African nationalists determined to achieve self-government and the good life of which national self-determination has become the symbol.² Thus, we have been placed in the uncomfortable position of having to formulate opinions and policy and to render judgments without sufficient knowledge, or, what could be worse, on the basis of evaluations provided by participants in the nationalist struggle. There is, therefore, a very real need for independent and objective research regarding the character and probable course of African nationalist development.

I. WHAT IS AFRICAN NATIONALISM?

Not the least burdensome of our tasks is the problem of correlating or distinguishing between the generally accepted political concepts elaborated with specific reference to developments in the Western World (i.e., state, nation, nationality, nationalism) and the conceptual tools developed by the Africanists. The latter have tended to feel that the traditional concepts and methods of the political scientist are unserviceable in the study of the political structure and life of pre-literate societies.³ Yet notwithstanding the importance of the

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¹ Two notable prewar exceptions were Professor Raymond Leslie Buell and Dr. Ralph J. Bunche.

² As an excellent example of the application of the insights of anthropology to the problems of political development in this area, see William R. Bascom, "West and Central Africa," in *Most of the World*, ed. Ralph Linton (New York, 1949), pp. 331–405. For a historian's appraisal, see Vernon McKay, "Nationalism in British West Africa," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 24, pp. 2–11 (March 15, 1948).

³ *African Political Systems*, eds. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (New York, 1940), pp. 4 ff. Insofar as *traditional* concepts and methods are concerned, ethnocentrism has been freely confessed by political scientists in recent self-criticism. See David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1953), pp. 33 ff.; also Report of the Inter-University

lineage, clan, or tribe; the role of the diviner, the chief, or the age-grade society; or the wide variations in the organization of power within such societies, the concept and the institution of the modern nation-state, towards the creation of which African nationalism tends to be directed, is distinctly Western in its form and content. It is as exotic to Africa as Professor Toynbee has suggested that it is to the rest of the non-European world.⁴ Nevertheless, just as the Indian National Congress has largely created an Indian nation, so African nationalists are endeavoring to mould new nations in Africa (e.g., "Ghana," "Nigeria," and "Kamerun").

On the level of abstraction at which the political scientist is accustomed to roam, a nation is not a loose catch-all term denoting a larger grouping of tribes (e.g., Zulus, Basutos, Mende, Buganda, or Hausa); rather it is a post-tribal, post-feudal terminal *community* which has emerged from the shattering forces of disintegration that characterize modernity. This does not mean that the Hausa peoples of Northern Nigeria cannot become a nation, nor does it mean that the "national" consciousness of the ordinary Hausaman must reach the level of intensity of the average Frenchman before there is a nation. It does suggest, however, that there must be a much greater awareness of a closeness of contact with "national" compatriots as well as with the "national" government.⁵ This closeness of contact on the horizontal and vertical levels has been a distinctly Western phenomenon, for the obvious reason that it is the result of modern technology.

Not only is a political scientist quite precise in his use of the concept "nation," but in poaching on the insights of the Africanists he also finds it difficult to place under the cover of "nationalism" all forms of past and present discontent and organizational development in Africa. Thus, it is believed useful at the outset to distinguish the following:

Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 641-57, at pp. 642-43 (Sept., 1953). Amongst the modernists in political science one finds the argument that the political scientist should not be rejected too readily since he has developed skills and acquired insights that might well shed new light on the political process and pattern of government of pre-literate societies after the anthropologist has exhausted his resources. Another argument, rather different, is that such societies might profitably be regarded as microcosms in which the political scientist can discern with greater clarity the essentials of government that might be obscured in the more complex Western systems. A final argument might be found in the recent psycho-cultural studies, especially in terms of their implications for policy formulation. See Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Who Gets Power and Why," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, pp. 120-34 (Oct., 1949).

⁴ Arnold Toynbee, *The World and the West* (New York, 1953), pp. 71 ff. It is difficult to accept without qualification Professor Toynbee's argument that the "national state" was a "spontaneous native growth" in Europe. One could argue that the centrally-minded, nation-building elites of emergent Asia and Africa are but the present-day counterparts of the centralizing monarchs of early modern Europe.

⁵ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism* (London, 1939), pp. 1-7; Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953), pp. 1-14.

A. Traditionalist Movements.

1. Spontaneous movements of resistance to the initial European occupation or post-pacification revolts against the imposition of new institutions, or new forms of coercion, referred to herein as "primary resistance."

2. Nativistic, mahdistic, or messianic mass movements—usually of a magico-religious character—which are psychological or emotional outlets for tensions produced by the confusions, frustrations, or socio-economic inequalities of alien rule, referred to herein as "nativism."⁶

B. Syncretistic Movements

1. Separatist religious groups, which have seceded and declared their independence from white European churches either because of the desire for religious independence or because the white clerics were intolerant regarding certain African customs; hereafter referred to as "religious separatism."⁷

2. Kinship associations, organized and led by the Western-educated and urbanized "sons abroad" for the purposes of preserving a sense of identity with the kinfolk in the bush and "brothers" in the impersonal urban center, as well as of providing vehicles for pumping modernity—including the ideas and sentiment of nationalism—into the rural areas.⁸

3. Tribal associations, organized and led by Western-educated elements—usually in collaboration with some traditionalists—who desire to resurrect, or to create for the first time, a tribal sentiment ("tribalism"), for the purpose of establishing large-scale political units, the boundaries of which will be determined by tribal affiliation (i.e., those who accept the *assumption* of common blood and kinship) and the forms of government by a syncretism of tribal and Western institutions.⁹

⁶ Nativism is here used in its broad and universal sense, as defined by the late Professor Ralph Linton: "Any conscious, organized attempt on the part of a society's members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of its culture." See his "Nativistic Movements," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 45, pp. 230-40, at p. 230 (April-June, 1943). The concept thus includes traditionalist movements in either the European or non-European world. This point is stressed because of the understandable sensitivity of many educated Africans to the root word "native," which as a result of the colonial experience tends to carry with it the connotation of inferiority. See also A. LeGrip, "Aspects Actuels de L'Islam en A.O.F.," *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, pp. 6-20 (No. 24, 1953); Katesa Schlosser, *Propheten in Afrika* (Albert Limbach Verlag, 1949).

⁷ Daniel Thwaite, *The Seething African Pot* (London, 1926), pp. 1-70; George Shepperon, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism," *Phylon*, Vol. 14, pp. 9-18 (1st Quarter, 1953); Hilda Kuper, "The Swazi Reaction to Missions," *African Studies*, Vol. 5, pp. 177-88 (Sept., 1946); Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London, 1953), pp. 269-79.

⁸ James S. Coleman, "The Role of Tribal Associations in Nigeria," Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria, April, 1952. See also *East Africa and Rhodesia*, October 5, 1951, p. 106: "Nairobi is the happy hunting ground for the organizers of tribal associations, as there are to be found in the city representatives of practically every tribe in East and Central Africa." Also K. A. Busia, *Report on a Social Survey of Takoradi-Sekondi* (Acra, Government Printer, 1950).

⁹ Most advanced amongst the Yoruba, Ibo, Ibibio, Ewe, Buganda, and Kikuyu peoples.

C. Modernist Movements

1. Economic-interest groups (labor unions, cooperative societies, professional and middle-class associations) organized and led by Western-educated elements for the purpose of advancing the material welfare and improving the socio-economic status of the members of those groups.

2. Nationalist movements, organized and led by the Westernized elite which is activated by the Western ideas of democracy, progress, the welfare state, and national self-determination, and which aspires *either*: (a) to create modern independent African nation-states possessing an internal state apparatus and external sovereignty and all of the trappings of a recognized member state of international society (e.g., Sudan, Gold Coast, Nigeria, and possibly Sierra Leone); or (b) to achieve absolute social and political equality and local autonomy within a broader Eur-African grouping (e.g., French and Portuguese Africa) or within what is manifestly a plural society (e.g., except for Uganda, the territories of British East and Central Africa).¹⁰

3. Pan-African or trans-territorial movements, organized and led by the Westernized elite, frequently in association with or under the stimulus of American Negroes or West Indians abroad, for the purposes of creating a global *racial* consciousness and unity, or of agitating for the advancement and welfare of members of the *African* race wherever they may be, or of devising plans for future nationalist activity in specific regions.¹¹

Once these very arbitrary analytical distinctions are drawn it should be stressed that none of the categories can be treated in isolation. Each of the movements is in one way or another a response to the challenge of alien rule, or of the intrusion of the disintegrating forces—and consequently the insecurity

¹⁰ The difference between the goal orientations of the two categories of movements is partly the result of the objectives of differing colonial policies (i.e., the British policy of self-government and differentiation versus the French, Portuguese, and in a qualified sense the Belgian policies of assimilation and identity) and in part the result of the presence or absence of a settled white population. Confronted with the overwhelming obstacles to the full realization of *African self-government*, African leaders in the second category tend towards the extreme either of accommodation (Union of South Africa) or of violence (Kenya). In the territories of the Central African Federation the leaders of the African Congress have tended not to define their ultimate objectives, preferring to act empirically. The strength and persistence of the autonomic drive is reflected, however, in their reported attraction to the original Gore-Brown partition plan adopted by the European Confederate party. See David Cole, "How Strong is the African National Congress," *New Commonwealth*, Vol. 27, pp. 5–10, at p. 9 (Jan. 4, 1954).

¹¹ For a variety of reasons these movements have thus far apparently accomplished little more than to dramatize their existence at infrequent *ad hoc* conferences. Until recently the initiative tended to be taken by Americans or West Indians of African descent (e.g., Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. DuBois, and George Padmore), although in the early 1920's there was a National Congress of British West Africa organized by the late Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast. Also, M. Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese, was President of the first Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919. For recent pan-African nationalist activity in British West Africa see *West Africa*, Dec. 12, 1953, p. 1165; and for British Central Africa see Colc, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

—of modernity. The recent so-called nationalism in Central Africa has been a mixture of “primary resistance” by the chiefs and traditionalists of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the nationalist agitation of the Westernized elite. Until the project of Federation became an active issue, African movements in this area were confined principally to religious separatist groups, tribal associations, or, in the case of Northern Rhodesia, labor unions.¹² On the West Coast, where nationalism is far more advanced, traditionalist and syncretistic movements have not been and are not absent. In some instances, kinship associations and separatist religious groups have been the antecedents of nationalist organizations; in others they have provided the principal organizational bases of the latter (e.g., the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons was first inaugurated as a federation mainly of kinship associations, and the African National Congress of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was the product of fusion of several African welfare societies). In certain cases unrest or protest of a nativistic flavor has been instigated by nationalists for their modernist ends; in others nationalists have claimed such uncoordinated uprisings, as well as purely economic protest movements, to be manifestations of “nationalism,” when in reality the participants were unaware of such implications.

One of the interesting differences between prewar and postwar nationalism on the West Coast of Africa is that in the former period nationalism tended to be—as Lord Lugard insisted—the esoteric pastime of the tiny educated minorities of Lagos, Accra, Freetown, and Dakar; whereas in the latter period these minorities—greatly expanded and dispersed in new urban centers throughout the interior—have made positive efforts to popularize and energize the nationalist crusade in two ways.¹³ The first has been to preach education, welfare, progress, and the ideal of self-government among the masses, largely through the nationalist press, independent African schools, and kinship and tribal associations. The aim here has been, in the words of one of their leading prophets, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, to bring about “mental emancipation” from a servile colonial mentality.¹⁴ The second method has been to tap all existing nativistic and religious tensions and economic grievances among the tradition-bound masses, as well as the grievances and aspirations of the urbanized clerks and artisans, and channel the energies thus unleashed into support of the nationalist drive. The technique here has been (1) to make nationalism, and in particular its objective of self-government, an integrating symbol in which even the most disparate goals could find identification, and (2) to politicize—one would like to say nationalize—all existing thought and associations. Until recently, many observers—including colonial administrators—tended to live in the prewar climate of opinion and therefore underestimated the power which had thus been harnessed to the nationalist machine.

In the case of the Mau Mau movement in Kenya we are confronted with a

¹² See Ian Cunnison, “The Watchtower Assembly in Central Africa,” *International Review of Missions*, Vol. 40, pp. 456–69 (Oct., 1951).

¹³ Sir F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London, 1923), pp. 83 ff.

¹⁴ *Renascent Africa* (Lagos, 1937).

complex mixture of nationalism, with a strong traditional bias on the part of the Westernized leaders, and nativism, manipulated by the leaders, on the part of the masses. Both have been generated to an especially high level of intensity as a consequence of the acute and largely unassuaged sense of frustration on the part of the Westernized elite, growing out of the very bleak outlook arising from the almost total absence, until recently, of meaningful career and prestige opportunities within either the old or the new systems, and of the masses, resulting from the land shortage and the overcrowding on the reservations. The presence of a sizable Asian "third force," which virtually monopolizes the middle-class sector, and which has been and is politically conscious, provides a new variable of no little significance in the total situation. The fact that the pattern of organization and the strategy and tactics of the Mau Mau revolt indicate a higher level of sophistication than sheer nativism would imply suggests that our analytical categories need further refinement or qualification.

A particularly striking feature of African nationalism has been the literary and cultural revival which has attended it. A renewed appreciation of and interest in "African" culture has been manifested, in most instances by the most sophisticated and acculturated Africans (e.g., Mazi Mbono Ojike's *My Africa*, Dr. J. B. Danquah's studies of the Akan peoples of the Gold Coast, Jomo Kenyatta's *Facing Mount Kenya*, Fily-Dabo Sissoko's *Les Noirs et la Culture*, Léopold Sédar Senghor's *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache*, the French African journal *Présence Africaine* edited by M. Alioune Diop, and the writings of Antoine Munongo in the Belgian Congolese journal *Jeune Afrique*).¹⁵ In some cases this cultural renaissance has had a purely tribal emphasis; in others it has taken a "neo-African" form, such as the African dress of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, nationalist leader in Nigeria. It has usually been accompanied by a quest for an African history which would in general reflect glory and dignity upon the African race and in particular instill self-confidence in the Western-educated African sensitive to the prejudiced charge that he has no history or culture. In short, there has emerged a new pride in being African. In French areas, the accent until recently has been upon French culture and literature, but there are increasing signs of a shift to African themes amongst the French African literati. The important point is that African nationalism has this cultural content, which renders more difficult any effort to separate rigidly the cultural nationalism of the urban politician from the nativism of the bush peasant.

Yet the differences are important to the student of African nationalism. Pri-

¹⁵ See Rosey E. Pool, "African Renaissance," *Phylon*, Vol. 14, pp. 5-8 (First Quarter, 1953); Albert Maurice, "Union Africaine des Arts et des Lettres," *African Affairs*, Vol. 50, pp. 233-41 (July, 1951); Alioune Diop, "Niam n'goura," *Présence Africaine* (Nov.-Dec., 1947), pp. 1-3. The cultural revival is the product of four forces: (1) reflection and introspection on the part of educated Africans, frequently those confronted with the stimulating contrasts of a foreign environment while abroad; (2) the American Negro renaissance which commenced in the 1920's; (3) encouragement and sponsorship of European governments and unofficial organizations such as the International African Institute; and (4) support of missionary societies such as the United Society for Christian Literature in the United Kingdom.

mary resistance and nativism tend to be negative and spontaneous revolts or assertions of the unacculturated masses against the disruptive and disorganizing stranger-invader. They are a reflection of a persistent desire of the masses to preserve or recreate the old by protesting against the new. Syncretism is different in that it contains an element of rationality—an urge to recapture those aspects of the old which are compatible with the new, which it recognizes as inevitable and in some respects desirable. Whereas all forms of protest are politically consequential—at least to colonial administrators—only nationalism is primarily political in that it is irrevocably committed to a positive and radical alteration of the power structure. In brief, nationalism is the terminal form of colonial protest.

Another reason for distinguishing between the various categories of assertion, which are basically differences in goal orientation, is not only to provide some basis for judging the nature of the popular support of a nationalist movement during its buildup, but also to have some means of predicting the stability and viability of the political order established by the nationalists once they achieve self-government. The governments of Pakistan, Burma, India, and Indonesia have each been plagued by internal tensions arising from what are fundamentally South Asian variants of traditionalism and tribalism. If a colonial nationalist movement comes to power atop a wave of mass protest which is primarily or even in part nativistic in character, this would have a direct bearing upon the capacity of the Westernized leaders of that movement, not only to maintain political unity and stability but also to carry out what is at the core of most of their programs—rapid modernization by a centralized bureaucratic machine. Any thorough study of the anatomy of a nationalist movement, therefore, must seek to determine the linkages and compatibilities between the goal orientations of the several forces from which that movement derives its élan and strength.

II. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

It is far easier to define and describe nationalism than it is to generalize about the factors which have contributed to its manifestation. Put most briefly, it is the end product of the profound and complex transformation which has occurred in Africa since the European intrusion. It is a commonplace that the imposition of Western technology, socio-political institutions, and ideology upon African societies has been violently disruptive of the old familistic order in that they have created new values and symbols, new techniques for the acquisition of wealth, status, and prestige, and new groups for which the old system had no place. The crucial point here is not that nationalism as a matter of fact happened to appear at a certain point in time after the “Western impact,” but rather that the transformation the latter brought about has been an indispensable precondition for the rise of nationalism. Nationalism, as distinguished from primary resistance or nativism, requires considerable gestation. A few of the constituent elements have been:

A. Economic¹⁶

1. *Change from a subsistence to a money economy.* This change, consciously encouraged by colonial governments and European enterprise in order to increase the export of primary products, introduced the cash nexus and economic individualism, altered the patterns of land tenure and capital accumulation, and, in general, widened the area of both individual prosperity and insecurity.

2. *Growth of a wage-labor force.* This development has resulted in the proletarianization of substantial numbers of Africans, which has weakened communal or lineage responsibility and rendered those concerned vulnerable to economic exploitation and grievances.

3. *Rise of a new middle class.* Laissez-faire economics and African enterprise, coupled with opportunities for university and professional education, have been factors contributing to the growth of a middle class. This class is most advanced in Senegal, the Gold Coast, and Southern Nigeria, where it has developed despite successive displacement or frustration by the intrusion of Levantines and the monopolistic practices of European firms.

B. Sociological¹⁷

1. *Urbanization.* The concentration of relatively large numbers of Africans in urban centers to meet the labor demands of European enterprise has loosened kinship ties, accelerated social communication between "detrribalized" ethnic groups, and, in general, contributed to "national" integration.

2. *Social mobility.* The European-imposed *pax* coupled with the development of communications and transport has provided the framework for travel, the growth of an internal exchange economy, and socio-political reintegration.

3. *Western education.* This has provided certain of the inhabitants of a given territory with a common lingua franca; with the knowledge and tools to acquire status and prestige and to fulfill aspirations within the new social structure; and with some of the ideas and values by which alien rule and colonialism could be attacked. It has been through Western education that the African has encountered the scientific method and the idea of progress with their activist implications, namely, an awareness of alternatives and the conviction that man can creatively master and shape his own destiny.

C. Religious and Psychological¹⁸

1. *Christian evangelization.* The conscious Europeanization pursued by

¹⁶ L. P. Mair, "The Growth of Economic Individualism in African Society," *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 33, pp. 261-73 (July, 1934); Allan McPhee, *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa* (London, 1926); G. Wilson, *An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia*, Part I (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1941). Cf. Karl Polanyi, *Origins of Our Time* (London, 1946); P. C. Lloyd, "New Economic Classes in Western Nigeria," *African Affairs*, Vol. 52, pp. 327-34 (Oct., 1953).

¹⁷ J. D. Rheinallt Jones, "The Effects of Urbanization in South and Central Africa," *African Affairs*, Vol. 52, pp. 37-44 (Jan., 1953).

¹⁸ William Bascom, "African Culture and the Missionary," *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 491-501 (No. 4, 1953).

Christian missionary societies has been a frontal assault upon traditional religious systems and moral sanctions. Moreover, the Christian doctrine of equality and human brotherhood challenged the ethical assumptions of imperialism.

2. *Neglect or frustration of Western-educated elements.* Susceptibility to psychological grievance is most acute among the more acculturated Africans. Social and economic discrimination and the stigma of inferiority and backwardness have precipitated a passionate quest for equality and modernity, and latterly self-government. Rankling memories of crude, arrogant, or insulting treatment by a European have frequently been the major wellspring of racial bitterness and uncompromising nationalism.

D. Political

1. *Eclipse of traditional authorities.* Notwithstanding the British policy of indirect rule, the European superstructure and forces of modernity have tended to weaken the traditional powers of indigenous authorities and thereby to render less meaningful pre-colonial socio-political units as objects of loyalty and attachment. There has been what Professor Daryll Forde calls a "status reversal"; that is, as a result of the acquisition by youth of Western education and a command over Western techniques in all fields, there has been ". . . an increasing transfer of command over wealth and authority to younger and socially more independent men at the expense of traditional heads. . . ." ¹⁹

2. *Forging of new "national" symbols.* The "territorialization" of Africa by the European powers has been a step in the creation of new nations, not only through the erection of boundaries within which the intensity of social communication and economic interchange has become greater than across territorial borders, but also as a consequence of the imposition of a common administrative superstructure, a common legal system, and in some instances common political institutions which have become symbols of territorial individuality. ²⁰

These are a few of the principal factors in the European presence which have contributed to the rise of nationalism. As any casual observer of African developments is aware, however, there have been and are marked areal differences in the overt manifestation of nationalism. Such striking contrasts as the militant Convention People's party of the Gold Coast, the conservative Northern People's Congress of Nigeria, the pro-French orientation of the African editors of *Présence Africaine*, the cautious African editors of *La Voix du Congolais*, and the terroristic Mau Mau of Kenya are cases in point.

There are a number of explanations for these areal variations. One relates to the degree of acculturation in an area. This is a reflection of the duration and intensity of contact with European influences. The contrast between the advanced nationalism of the British West Coast and of Senegal and the nascent

¹⁹ Daryll Forde, "The Conditions of Social Development in West Africa," *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 471-85 (No. 4, 1953).

²⁰ See R. J. Harrison Church, *Modern Colonization* (London, 1951), pp. 104 ff.; Robert Montagne, "The 'Modern State' in Africa and Asia," *The Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 5, pp. 583-602 (July, 1952).

nationalism of British and French Central Africa is partly explicable on this basis.

A second explanation lies in the absence or presence of alien settlers. On this score the settler-free British West Coast is unique when contrasted to the rest of Africa. The possibility of a total fulfillment of nationalist objectives (i.e., *African* self-government) has been a powerful psychological factor which partly explains the confident and buoyant expectancy of West Coast nationalists. On the other hand, as previously noted, the tendencies toward accommodation or terrorism in the white-settler areas is a reflection of the absence of such moderating expectancy.

Certain African groups exposed to the same forces of acculturation and the same provocation have demonstrated radically different reactions. The Kikuyu versus the Masai peoples of Kenya, the Ibo versus the Hausa peoples of Nigeria, and the Creole and Mende of Sierra Leone are cases in point. It is suggested that the dynamism, militancy, and nationalist élan of the Ibo peoples of Nigeria are rooted partly in certain indigenous Ibo culture traits (general absence of chiefs, smallness in scale and the democratic character of indigenous political organization, emphasis upon achieved status, and individualism). Much of the same might be said for the Kikuyu peoples of Kenya.

Differing colonial policies constitute another cause of these areal differences. Nationalism is predominantly a phenomenon of British Africa, and to a lesser extent of French Africa. Apart from the influence of the foregoing historical, sociological, and cultural variables, this fact, in the case of British Africa, is explained by certain unique features of British colonial policy.

It was inevitable that Britain, one of the most liberal colonial powers in Africa, should have reaped the strongest nationalist reaction. A few of the principal features of British policy which have stimulated nationalism deserve mention:

1. *Self-government as the goal of policy.* Unlike the French and Portuguese who embrace their African territories as indivisible units of the motherland, or the Belgians who until recently have been disinclined to specify the ultimate goals of policy, the British have remained indiscriminately loyal to the Durham formula.²¹ In West Africa, this has enthroned the African nationalists; in Central and East Africa, the white settlers.

2. *Emphasis upon territorial individuality.* More than any other colonial

²¹ Regarding Belgian policy, see Pierre Wigny, "Methods of Government in the Belgian Congo," *African Affairs*, Vol. 50, pp. 310-17 (Oct., 1951). Wigny remarks (p. 311) that "... Belgians are reluctant to define their colonial policy. They are proud of their first realisations, and sure of the rightness of their intentions." Since this was written, there have been some very dramatic changes in Belgian policy, especially regarding the educated elite, the potential nationalists. The great debate in Belgian colonial circles on "le statut des Congolais civilisés" was terminated by four decrees of May 17, 1952 according to which educated Congolese are assimilated to Europeans in civil law. Regarding Portuguese policy, see Marcelo Caetano, *Colonizing Traditions, Principles and Methods of the Portuguese* (Lisbon, 1951). The keynote of the policy is the "spiritual assimilation" of the Africans to a "Portuguese nation dwelling in European, African, Asiatic and Indonesian Provinces." The African *civilizado* is thus a citizen of Portugal.

power, the British have provided the institutional and conceptual framework for the emergence of nations. Decentralization of power, budgetary autonomy, the institution of territorial legislative councils and other "national" symbols—all have facilitated the conceptualization of a "nation."²²

3. *Policy on missionaries and education.* The comparative freedom granted missionaries and the laissez-faire attitude toward education, and particularly post-primary education, has distinguished and continues to distinguish British policy sharply from non-British Africa.

4. *Neglect, frustration, and antagonism of educated elite.* Not only have more British Africans been exposed to higher education, but the British government until recently remained relatively indifferent to the claims and aspirations of this class, which forms the core of the nationalist movements.

5. *Freedom of nationalist activity.* The comparative freedom of activity (speech, association, press, and travel abroad) which British Africans have enjoyed—within clearly defined limits and varying according to the presence of white settlers—has been of decisive importance. It is doubtful whether such militant nationalists as Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Dauti Yamba of the Central African Federation, could have found the same continuous freedom of movement and activity in Belgian, Portuguese, and French Africa as has been their lot in British Africa.²³

All of this suggests that African nationalism is not merely a peasant revolt. In fact, as already noted, nationalism where it is most advanced has been sparked and led by the so-called detribalized, Western-educated, middle-class intellectuals and professional Africans; by those who in terms of improved status and material standards of living have benefitted most from colonialism; in short, by those who have come closest to the Western World but have been denied entry on full terms of equality. From this comparatively affluent—but psychologically aggrieved—group have come the organizers of tribal associations, labor unions, cooperative groups, farmers' organizations, and—more recently—nationalist movements. They are the Africans whom British policy has done most to create and least to satiate.²⁴

²² Partly in response to nationalist pressures, the French Government has recently initiated certain measures of financial devolution to French West Africa. See G. Gayet, "Autonomies financières Française," *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 343-47 (No. 3, 1953). These measures may enhance the powers of the territorial assemblies to the point that the latter might ultimately become the foci for territorial nationalisms.

²³ The stringent police measures adopted recently in Kenya and Nyasaland, the special press laws which have long been in effect in British East and Central Africa, and the obstacles to nationalist activity which have existed in the Muslim areas of Northern Nigeria, do not necessarily invalidate this comparative historical generalization.

²⁴ The thesis here is that there are at least four ingredients in the psychology of colonial nationalism, and that British policy in Africa has come closest towards inculcating or providing them: (a) an awareness of the existence or possibility of alternatives to the status quo, a state of mind produced by Western education and particularly by study and travel abroad; (b) an intense desire to change the status quo; (c) a system within which the major alternative to the status quo—self-government—has the status of legitimacy; and (d) an area of relative freedom in which that legitimate alternative may be pursued.

This brief and selective treatment of a few of the factors which have contributed to the African nationalist awakening suggests certain avenues which might be profitably explored and more fully developed by subsequent research. Specifically, what is the relationship between the nature and intensity of nationalism and the degree of urbanization, the degree of commercialization of agriculture, and the size and geographical distribution of the wage-labor force and salariat? In short, what is the causal connection between "detrribalization" and nationalism? Certain aspects of such an inquiry could be subjected to statistical analysis, but the results could only be suggestive, and in some instances might be positively deceptive. In the case of urbanization, for example, the highly urbanized and acculturated Yoruba peoples of Nigeria for nearly a decade lagged far behind the Ibo peoples in nationalist vigor and élan. Ibadan, the largest urban center in tropical Africa, has been until recently one of the most politically inert towns of Nigeria. Again, in terms of the proletarianization of labor and urbanization resulting from European industrialism and commercial activity, the Belgian Congo is one of the most advanced territories, but one in which nationalism is least in evidence.²⁵ Freetown, Sierra Leone, one of the oldest non-traditional urban centers, became a haven of respectability and conservatism, being eclipsed by the less-developed Protectorate in the push towards nationalist objectives. Urbanization has been an important ingredient in the nationalist awakening, but it has been a certain type of urban development—namely the impersonal and heterogeneous "new towns"—which has occurred in conjunction with other equally decisive factors.

In the case of the relationship between the degree of commercialization of land and labor and the degree of nationalism, the figures set forth for the Gold Coast in Table I suggest either a causal connection or a parallel development. Yet in turning to similar figures for other territories—especially the Belgian Congo and Nigeria—it is clear that the relationship between commercialization and nationalism, important though it may be, must be considered and interpreted in the light of other variables.

Again, the fact that the nationalist movements have been organized and led by intellectuals and the so-called middle class suggests a relationship between nationalism and the number of Africans with higher education, the size of per capita income, the degree of the individualization of land tenure, the size of middle-class and professional groups (i.e., independent traders, produce middlemen, farmers employing labor, druggists, lorry owners, lawyers, doctors, etc.), and the degree of vertical mobility within the emergent socio-economic structure. In any event, the insights of an economist are indispensable for a complete anatomy of African nationalism.

The Christian missionaries have been blamed frequently for their ruthless assault upon native religious systems and the thoroughgoing Europeanization, conscious or implicit, in their evangelization. This has suggested the formula: missionaries = detrribalization = nationalism. Yet the postwar figures shown in

²⁵ The Belgian policy of stabilization of labor in the urban centers of the Congo, in which 83% of the men have their families with them, is one of the several factors which may help to explain this.

TABLE I. COMMERCIALIZATION AND NATIONALISM IN CERTAIN AFRICAN TERRITORIES

| Territory | Percentage of Cultivated Land Used by Africans for Commercial Production (1947-1950)* | African Wage Earners as Percentage of Total African Population (1950) † | Degree of Overt Nationalism |
|---------------|---|---|-----------------------------|
| Gold Coast | 75% | 9.0% | Advanced |
| Belgian Congo | 42 | 7.6 | None |
| Nigeria | 41 | 1.2 | Advanced |
| Uganda | 33 | 3.9 | Nascent |
| Kenya | 7 | 7.6 | Nascent |

* E. A. Keukjian, "Commercializing Influence of the Development of Exports on Indigenous Agricultural Economics in Tropical Africa," unpub. diss. (Harvard Univ., June, 1953); United Nations, Economic and Social Council (15th session). *World Economic Situation. Aspects of Economic Development in Africa*. New York, Document E/2377, March 20, 1953.

† United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs. *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa (Supplement to World Economic Report, 1949-50)*. New York, Document E/1910/Add.1 Rev.1-ST/ECA/9/Add.1, April, 1951, p. 76.

Table II do not bear out this assumption.²⁶ Missionaries have been important catalytic agents in the transformation of African societies, but the causal connection between their activities and nationalist assertion cannot be established by mere quantitative analysis. The figures in Table II hint at a possible causal relationship between preponderant Protestant evangelization and advanced nationalism (viz., Gold Coast and Nigeria) and preponderant Catholic evangelization and the absence of nationalism (viz., Portuguese Angola and the Belgian Congo). Yet this connection must be examined in the light of other relevant factors, such as the degree of control and direction extended to missionary societies by colonial governments; the freedom allowed such societies to establish schools—particularly secondary schools—and to determine the curriculum; the tolerance accorded anti-white or anti-colonial sects (e.g., the Jehovah's Witnesses are permitted in most of British Africa but proscribed in non-British

TABLE II. CHRISTIANITY AND NATIONALISM IN CERTAIN AFRICAN TERRITORIES

| Territory | Percentage of Christians to Total Population | Percentage of Protestants to All Christians | Percentage of Catholics to All Christians | Degree of Overt Nationalism |
|---------------|--|---|---|-----------------------------|
| Belgian Congo | 37% | 29% | 71% | None |
| Nyasaland | 26 | 49 | 51 | Nascent |
| Gold Coast | 15 | 58 | 42 | Advanced |
| Angola | 15 | 22 | 78 | None |
| Kenya | 10 | 51 | 49 | Nascent |
| Nigeria | 5 | 67 | 33 | Advanced |

²⁶ *World Christian Handbook* (London, 1949).

Africa); the latitude allowed African sects of a syncretistic, revivalistic, or puritanical character; the extent to which evangelical bodies have *Africanized* their church organization, the priesthood, and the propagation of the gospel; and, finally, the strength of Islam.

The corrosive influence of Western education has been a significant ingredient in the rise of nationalism. Yet the Belgian Congo claims a higher percentage of literacy than any other colonial territory in Africa.²⁷ In order to establish a relationship we must move beyond the superficial analysis of literacy statistics and ask the following questions:

1. *The nature of the curriculum.* Has it been and is it literary and based upon the model of a European grammar school, or is it practical and designed to train the student to be a good farmer, artisan, or clerk in European employ, and incidentally to limit his sophistication and contact with unsettling ideas? Is instruction conducted in the vernacular or in a European language?

2. *Opportunities for post-primary education.* Are secondary schools (particularly those operated by missionary societies or by enterprising and nationalist-minded Africans such as Eyo Ita in Nigeria or Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya) allowed to mushroom into existence, or are they carefully planned and rigidly controlled by the colonial government as to both number and curriculum? What are the opportunities for study in universities abroad? What is the latitude granted students to determine their own careers? Here we touch upon a crucial factor—in 1945, Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Lagos, Nigeria, each had more Western-type secondary schools than all of the non-British territories in Africa combined. In 1952 over 4,000 Africans from British territories were studying in universities and technical schools abroad and nearly 1,000 in territorial universities in Africa, whereas only a handful had such opportunity or inclination in Belgian and Portuguese Africa. This is in part a reflection of the existence of a larger African middle-class in British Africa, but it is also the result of the unique British attitude regarding the relationship between higher education and emergent African leadership. French policy and practice, despite differing assumptions, most closely approximate those of the British.²⁸

3. *Openings of careers for the talented.* The stability of any political or social order is determined by this factor. Is there any planned relationship between the output of the schools and opportunities for satisfying employment or

²⁷ United Nations, *Non-Self-Governing Territories*. Vol. III: *Special Study on Education*. New York, Document ST/TRI/SER.A./5/Add. 2, January, 1951.

²⁸ By decree of April 16, 1950, the *Institut des Hautes Études* was established at Dakar; and on January 1, 1952, there were 1,640 scholarship holders in continental France, of whom 572 were pursuing higher education. *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 575–83 (No. 4, 1953). On British educational policy in tropical Africa see *African Education* (Oxford: The Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office, 1953). The Belgians within the past few years have dramatically reoriented their policy regarding higher education for the Congolese. Since 1952 Congo students have been admitted to the Albert I College at Leopoldville; the first Negro University of the Congo is scheduled for opening in 1954; and recently the Belgian press has drawn attention to the admission to Louvain University of a Negro student from the Congo. *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 599–602 (No. 4, 1953).

careers? In French and Belgian Africa, colonial governments have maintained a stringent control over the supply-demand situation as between *post-primary* schools and the requirements of government and the developing economy. In British Africa there are hundreds of thousands of unemployed or underemployed "Standard VI" boys clustered in the coastal towns and urban centers of the interior.

The most potent instrument used in the propagation of nationalist ideas and racial consciousness has been the *African-owned* nationalist press. In Nigeria alone nearly 100 newspapers or periodicals have been published by Africans since the British intrusion, of which 12 dailies and 14 weeklies—all African owned—are currently in circulation. The crucial role performed in the nationalist awakening by African journalistic enterprise on the British West Coast is well known.²⁹ Until the publication of *Afrique Noire* (organ of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* of French West Africa) there was nothing in non-British Africa which even closely approximated this development. And even this journal is no match for the pungent criticism and racial consciousness one finds in the pages of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's *West African Pilot* in Nigeria.³⁰ Needless to say, the nationalist press is one of our major sources of data regarding nationalist motivation, objectives, and organization. It is not the number of newspapers published which is significant, but rather the volume of circulation and areal distribution, the news and editorial content and the nature of the appeal, the types of readers, the existence of competitive papers sponsored by colonial governments, the financial stability of the paper, and other factors which would reflect its impact and influence upon the ideas, aspirations, and activities of those literate groups predisposed towards nationalism.

These are but a few of the more important factors in the rise of nationalism which require evaluation and weighting before the student of comparative colonial nationalism can go beyond the mere description of the history and anatomy of a particular nationalist movement. There is great danger in doing a disservice to scholarly research in Africa if one generalizes on the basis of observations made and data assembled in one territory. As has been suggested, there are certain general predisposing and precipitating causes of modern nationalism which are applicable to the whole continent; yet once these are mentioned, it is necessary to examine each area of nationalist activity for that special combination of factors which explains the origin, strength, and orientation of its nationalist movement.

²⁹ Compare with the number of *African-owned-and-edited* dailies and weeklies (combined total) in the following territories: *British Africa*: Gold Coast (17), Uganda (8), Sierra Leone (7), Gambia (3); *French West Africa* (10); and none, insofar as is known, in Belgian, Portuguese, or Spanish Africa; or in Kenya, the territories of the Central African Federation, or in the Union of South Africa.

³⁰ On the other hand, there appears to be no newspaper in British West Africa comparable with the European-owned-and-edited journal of French West Africa entitled *Les Echos de l'A.O.F.*, which "week after week passionately attacks the administration. . . ." See Thomas Hodgkin, "The Metropolitan Axis," *West Africa*, January 9, 1954, at p. 6.

III. FACTORS CONDITIONING NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENT

Normally, a colonial nationalist movement directs its efforts towards the attainment of two main objectives: (1) the achievement of self-government, and (2) the creation of a cultural or political sense of nationality and unity within the boundaries of the area of the nation to be. Nationalists are obliged to adopt the second objective because imperial powers either did not or could not establish political boundaries which embraced only one self-conscious cultural unit; and certainly those powers made no conscious effort to build nations. The nationalist dilemma is that in most cases pursuit of the primary goal (self-government) lessens the likelihood of achieving the secondary goal (cultural and political unity). Put another way, the drive behind African nationalism in many instances is not the consciousness of belonging to a distinct politico-cultural unit which is seeking to protect or assert itself, but rather it is the movement of racially-conscious modernists seeking to create new political and cultural nationalities out of the heterogeneous peoples living within the artificial boundaries imposed by the European master. Their task is not only to conduct a successful political revolution and capture power, but also the painful job of national political integration. And as Professor Crane Brinton has shown, the lessons of history are that nation-building is the product of both consent and coercion, and usually the latter.³¹ It is the colonial power, of course, which has had a monopoly over the means of coercion.

The major factor conditioning the development of a particular nationalist movement, therefore, is the degree of internal politico-cultural unity, tolerance, or compatibility amongst the peoples of the area moving into its national era. Disunities can exist in a given territory for a variety of reasons:

1. Traditional pre-colonial hostilities and cultural incompatibilities such as exist between the Kikuyu and Masai peoples of Kenya, or the Ibo and the Tiv peoples of Nigeria. In some instances these have been exacerbated as a result of imperial policies; in others as a consequence of the mere fact of lumping them together and endeavoring to impose territorial uniformity.

2. Tensions between groups resulting from unevenness in development, acculturation, and the acquisition of modernity. These can be the product of original cultural differences (i.e., the variations between groups in their receptivity and adaptability to modernity—e.g., the Ibo and Hausa); historical circumstances (i.e., differences in the duration and intensity of the European impact—e.g., the Creoles of Freetown vs. the Mende peoples of the Protectorate of Sierra Leone); or of constitutional reforms pointing towards African self-government. One could argue that Ibo-Yoruba hostility in Nigeria is the product of all three factors. Just as the advance towards independence precipitated a cleavage between Muslims and Hindus in India, so has the development of nationalism and the move towards self-government in Africa brought to light a multitude of disunities. Fear of domination by the more advanced and acculturated groups—European or African—is one obvious explanation.

³¹ Crane Brinton, *From Many One* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).

3. Tensions between the Westernized elite—the nationalists—and the traditionalists and the masses. This nationalist disability has tended to be exaggerated in the past, usually by imperial spokesmen endeavoring to repudiate the nationalists or to isolate them from the traditionalists. The intensity of the cleavage varies widely according to circumstances. In several areas such as the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Western and Northern Nigeria, amongst the Kikuyu in Kenya, and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the educated nationalists and some leading traditionalists have cooperated in varying degrees.

4. Differences within the ranks of the Westernized elite. These disagreements—and one is struck by their persistence, strength, and virulence—may arise from several causes, including normal competition for power and prestige or honest differences over aims, timing, or methods to be employed in the nationalist drive. Such differences as separate Messrs. Fily-Dabo Sissoko and Mamadou Konaté in the French Sudan; Lamine Gueye and Léopold Senghor in Senegal; Felix Houphouët-Boigny and Kouame Binzème in the Ivory Coast; Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and Dr. J. B. Danquah in the Gold Coast; the Sardauna of Sokoto, Obafemi Awolowo, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in Nigeria; Eliud Mathu and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya; and Harry Nkumbula and Godwin Lewanika in Central Africa, have very materially affected the course and strength of nationalism in the territories concerned.

These nationalist disabilities are the product of a complex mixture of hard historical and cultural facts, of changes introduced and differentials created by the Western intrusion, as well as of the provocations of the nationalist drive itself. The success of any nationalist movement will in a large measure depend upon the extent to which these internal tensions are softened or dissipated. The latter will depend, in turn, upon the degree of repressive opposition, or unwitting or intentional cooperation, of colonial governments; upon the development of pan-territorial political associations, the membership of which is rooted in all ethnic groups and in which there is free vertical mobility into the "upper crust" which that membership constitutes; upon the emergence of pan-territorial economic-interest groups (e.g., middle-class associations or labor organizations); and upon many other sociological processes (out-group marriages, commonsality, etc.) which Professor Karl W. Deutsch has suggested are essential building blocks of any new national community.³²

It would be naive and unhistorical to argue that a large measure of politico-cultural integration is required—as distinguished from being desirable—in order for a nationalist movement to succeed in wresting self-government from an imperial power. Most successful colonial nationalist movements have been organized and led by small minorities which have been able either to gain the support of the masses or to capitalize upon their inertia and apathy. It would be unrealistic, however, to contemplate the success of a movement which did not have at least a minimum of unity or tolerance within the "upper crust," even

³² "The Growth of Nations," *World Politics*, Vol. 5, pp. 168–96 (Jan., 1953).

though it be of the sort displayed by the unstable truces negotiated from time to time between the Sardauna of Sokoto, Mr. Obafemi Awolowo, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the regional leaders in Nigeria.

Some of these forces contributing towards integration are measurable and provide rough indices upon which the research scholar can base predictions of the development of a particular nationalist movement. In an interesting new theory regarding the growth of nations, Professor Deutsch has suggested certain criteria which might be profitably employed in seeking to determine the prospects of success of a nationalist movement in its nation-building endeavors.³³ His central thesis is that cases of successful political integration in history show a number of patterns which seem to recur. As he puts it, a nation "is the result of the transformation of people, or of several ethnic elements, in the process of social mobilization." The prospects of success are indicated by the completeness of that transformation and the intensity of social mobilization around the symbols of the new national community. A nation is not only a subjective affirmation of will of zealous nationalists; it is also the product of the operation of powerful objective forces, several of which have been mentioned.

Thus far it has been assumed that the leaders of nationalist movements in Africa will seek to build new national communities out of the diverse human materials located within the artificial boundaries of the existing colonial territories. This was precisely what happened in Latin America (Spanish imperial provinces), in the Middle East (European and Turkish regions), and in South-east Asia (Dutch Indonesia, Burma, and in a qualified way, British India). In the case of British Africa, where nationalism is most advanced, this same tendency for nationalism to follow boundaries established by the imperial power rather than those coincident with pre-colonial socio-political groups is in evidence (e.g., Gold Coast and Nigeria). On the other hand, in many areas the situation is still relatively fluid. Togoland nationalism has been predominantly an Ewe affair, and the Ewes are a trans-territorial group stretching from the Gold Coast to Dahomey. Separatist sentiment in Northern Nigeria is an example, *par excellence*, of incomplete social mobilization. This, when coupled with growing Yoruba and Ibo self-consciousness, suggests that earlier pan-Nigerian nationalism may be eclipsed and Nigeria may ultimately become three or more states. Until the recent decision to give the Southern Cameroons greater autonomy within the emergent Federation of Nigeria, Cameroonian nationalists were wavering between remaining an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, or seceding and joining with the nationalists in the French Cameroons in an endeavor to create a Kamerun nation based upon the artificial boundaries of the short-lived German Kamerun.³⁴ In Kenya, Mau Mau and all earlier proto-nationalist movements have been predominantly Kikuyu endeavors, even though the name Kenya has been employed. In Tanganyika, the Chagga Co-

³³ *Ibid.* See also Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication* (cited in note 5), pp. 81 ff.

³⁴ *West Africa*, January 30, 1954, p. 87.

operative movement may be the basis for a Chagga separatism; and in Uganda, it is questionable whether pan-Uganda integrative forces can erase the "national" separatism implicit in the Buganda Kingdom. Again, in Central Africa, will the territorial separatism symbolized by the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland National Congresses be eclipsed by the common sentiment and institutions growing out of the new Federation?

In the case of French Africa, dissimilarities in colonial policy (i.e., assimilation and direct rule) have tended to produce a somewhat different situation. Yet since the reforms of 1946, as a result of which each of the territories of the two federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa received their own representative assemblies, territorial nationalist movements have tended to eclipse the pan-French African *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* in much the same fashion as Nigerian, Gold Coastian, and Sierra Leonian nationalist movements have replaced the earlier National Congress of British West Africa. Thus one finds the *Parti Républicain de Dahomey*, *Parti Progressiste Sudanaise*, *Union Démocratique du Tchad*, and similar organizations in each of the territories. The future "national" orientation of nationalist forces in French Africa would seem to depend upon the extent to which pan-Federation forces and institutions, such as the *Grand Conseils*, or the assimilationist forces of the French Union, such as the metropolitan parties and labor movements projected overseas, operate to retard the growth of territorial symbols and sentiment. One thing, however, seems certain: French Africa—because of the French policy of assimilation and direct rule—is less likely to encounter such movements as the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* of the Nigerian Yorubas, the Kikuyu Central Association in Kenya, and the *Bataka* movement of Uganda.

In general, it would seem that where nationalism manifests itself in considerable strength it is evidence that disintegration of the old and social mobilization around the symbols of the new order have occurred on a scale sufficient to weaken or destroy attachments and loyalties of the nationalists to pre-colonial socio-political units, either because they have been crushed and are beyond memory or because they are unattractive or manifestly unsuitable as "nations" in a modern world of nation-states. The European presence has done much towards the creation of new nations, the "national" sentiment of the nationalists being a reflection of this.

A few of the many factors which might be observed and evaluated in order to determine the probable success, as well as the territorial implications, of an African nationalist movement or nation-building endeavor are as follows:³⁵ (1) the degree of internal social mobility, economic interchange and interdependence, intermarriage and commonsality, and the intensity and level of social communication among the ethnic groups comprising a given territory; (2) the location of population clusters and "core areas," as well as of "sub-national" regions of more intense economic interchange or of cultural focus; (3) the

³⁵ For several of the concepts used here the author is indebted to the works of Professor Karl W. Deutsch, previously cited. See especially his *Nationalism and Social Communication*, pp. 15-45.

powers and functions of "sub-national" political institutions (i.e., regional, tribal, etc), and the degree of *meaningful* participation in them by the Western-educated elements; (4) the rate at which "national" institutions and activities are capable of attracting and absorbing new social strata from all ethnic groups into the "national" life (e.g., the ethnic composition of the central administrative and technical services); (5) the centrality and nationalness of educational institutions, particularly the professional schools and universities; (6) the degree of pan-territorial circulation of nationalist newspapers and literature and the extent to which these play up "national" events and personalities; (7) the differentials in the material development, per capita income and wealth, the acquisition of modern skills and knowledge, and the concentration and capacity for accumulation of capital amongst the different sub-national areas and ethnic groups;³⁶ (8) the ethnic makeup of the Western-educated categories and particularly of the active membership of nationalist or proto-nationalist groups; (9) the development and extent of usage of a trans-tribal pan-territorial language, be it English, French, Portuguese, Swahili, or Hausa; (10) the compatibility of the "detrribalized" basic personality types produced by the indigenous cultures; (11) the extent to which the territory concerned embraces total cultural groups, or, put another way, the degree to which artificial colonial boundaries have bifurcated ethnic groups whose division may be the source of later irredentism; and (12) the rapport between the Western-educated nationalist elements and the traditionalists, including the existence of nativistic tensions or economic grievances which the nationalists could manipulate or exploit in their mobilization of mass support.

Results obtained from inquiries along these lines would go far to explain the present orientation of a nationalist movement, as well as possible future trends. And yet an emphatic note of caution should be sounded: objective forces of integration and disintegration are powerful determinants in the nation-building process, but so also are subjective factors.³⁷ By all laws of geography and economics Northern Ireland should belong to Eire, and East Pakistan to the Republic of India; but they do not. By the same laws, the Gambia should belong to Senegal, French Guinea to Sierra Leone and Liberia, Mozambique to the Central African Federation, and so forth; and yet present trends suggest that such will not be the case. The principal forces currently operating to shape Africa's emergent nations are either tribalism or a nationalism following artificial imperial boundaries; and, with few exceptions, neither of these is directed

³⁶ It could be argued, for example, that apart from historical and cultural factors, the difference in the per capita income of the three regions of Nigeria (£26 for the Western Region, £16 for the Northern Region, and £23 for the Eastern Region) is of no little significance in the recent and current drive for greater regional autonomy. See A. R. Prest and I. G. Stewart, *The National Income of Nigeria*, abridged ed. (Lagos: Government Printer, 1954), pp. 14-16.

³⁷ Given suitable conditions, including a politically favorable milieu and the proper techniques, there would seem to be no reason why subjective factors such as loyalties, attitudes, and attachments to national or "sub-national" symbols, could not to some extent be measured.

towards the creation of political units which the geographer or economist would classify as ideal. In this respect, of course, Africa is not unique.

The foregoing raises the crucial question of whether it is possible for the peoples of Africa—in their own interest—to avoid the balkanization implicit in the full application of the national principle to their continent. So long as the rest of the world is organized according to that principle, and so long as the national idea universally embodies aspirations which cannot be satisfied by other forms of human organization, the answer would seem to be in the negative. The quest for racial equality and acceptance is as important an ingredient in the African revolt as is the desire to determine one's own destiny. Rightly or wrongly, self-government within the confines of the sovereign nation-state has become the supreme symbol of the equality of peoples. The only possible alternative would be broader Eur-African political groupings or self-governing plural societies in which emergent African leaders could play what they would feel to be an equal role. In the light of the persistence of national self-determination as a symbol, and particularly in view of the growing strength and contagion of African nationalism, the future of such multi-racial experiments will depend in a large measure upon the rapidity with which European governments and leaders provide for such a role.

IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH INTO AFRICAN NATIONALISM

There is perhaps no other type of research venture capable of evoking stronger feeling than an inquiry into colonial nationalism. The word "nationalism" in a colonial milieu has tended to be treated as the equivalent of sedition, or even treason. And this for good reason: by definition colonial nationalists are seeking to bring about a radical alteration in the power structure; namely, to evict the imperial power and to enthrone themselves. From the moment it makes its presence known, therefore, a nationalist movement is, in effect, engaged in a civil war with the colonial administration, the constitutionality of its methods varying according to the liberality of the colonial regime and the moderation of the nationalist leaders.

As regards colonial officialdom, an American undertaking a study of African nationalism is handicapped by the fact that in a large measure the African nationalist awakening is the product of American influences. Since the turn of the century, American Negro religious sects have contributed no little to religious secessionism, particularly in South and West Africa. The Garveyism of the early 1920's had an influence among sophisticated Africans which has tended to be overlooked or minimized. Since 1919 a growing number of American Negro intellectuals have taken an increasingly militant stand on African colonialism. Anti-imperialist sentiment in the United States, especially during the Second World War, was the source of considerable inspiration and delight to budding African nationalists, as well as the cause of no little acrimony between wartime allies. The Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and public statements by Mr. Willkie and President Roosevelt have bulked large in post-

war African nationalist literature. The most important American contribution, however, has been the impact of our culture upon African students who have studied in America. Many of the important pioneers in the African awakening were profoundly affected by their American experience. Of this group the late Dr. J. E. K. Aggrey and Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah from the Gold Coast, and Professor Eyo Ita and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe from Nigeria are the most prominent and best known. During the Second World War the number of African students in America was less than 25; since 1945 it has increased to over 500. With few exceptions these students have been and are strong nationalists, many of them having become leaders upon their return to Africa. In the eyes of colonial officialdom, therefore, an American inquiry into nationalism tends to raise certain doubts.

There has been a tendency in the past for American visitors making quick tours of Africa to rely mainly upon the white colonial administration for an appraisal of nationalist sentiment and activity. This is unfortunate in many respects. In the first place, it is most likely that any information bearing on nationalism is locked up in classified files. Secondly, most colonial administrators have tended to be anti-nationalists, even though many in British West Africa have adapted themselves to working with nationalists towards a mutually agreed goal of effective self-government. Their evaluation of nationalism is bound to be colored by their preconceptions and vested interests or by their honest fears regarding the welfare of the bush peasant, for whom they tend to have a preference and a strong paternal affection. Thirdly, circumstances have tended to place them too close to events or too far removed from the people. Their growing preoccupation with headquarters administration and development schemes, the social impediments—created frequently by the presence of white wives and families—to effective and continuous contact with the masses, and the almost total lack of rapport or confidence between nationalists and administrators, have given the latter many blind spots. Their past miscalculations of nationalist strength and trends tend to confirm this. In short, instead of being used as informants, a role they are not anxious to perform, they should be objects of study. Their fears, their adjustments, and their efforts to suppress, retard, manipulate, or encourage nationalism are all relevant in a complete study of the many interacting factors present in a nationalist situation.

Unlike the field anthropologist, who consciously seeks to work among the traditionalists, the student of political nationalism is concerned mainly with the attitudes, activities, and status of the nationalist-minded Western-educated *elite*. Here one is in a world very different from that of officialdom or the traditionalists. It is a world of great idealism, crusading zeal, and high resolve, as well as one of suspicion, hyper-sensitivity, and exaggeration. It has its careerists and opportunists, and its chronic nonconformists; but it also has its emergent statesmen, its enterprising industrialists, and its distinguished scholars. Only here can one get a partial glimpse into the depth of nationalist feeling, the sources of inspiration and ideas, and the key elements in nationalist motivation.

Yet there are distinct limitations to the interview technique, not the least important of which is the possession of a white skin. Moreover, a colonial nationalist movement must have its *arcana* as well as its propaganda.

In the quest for knowledge regarding African nationalism, the most fruitful as well as unprovocative avenues to explore are those already indicated in earlier sections. African nationalism is something more than the activities of a few disgruntled journalists and frustrated intellectuals to whom Lord Lugard referred in his *Dual Mandate*. It is the inevitable end product of the impact of Western imperialism and modernity upon African societies; it is also the inevitable assertion by the Africans of their desire to shape their own destiny. Imperial systems are disintegrating, new nation-states are emerging, and new forms of political organization transcending the national state are under experiment. These political aspects of African nationalism, however, are but the surface symptoms of a great ferment about which we know very little. The study and analysis of the many complex factors in this unfolding drama provide not only a stimulating challenge to the social sciences, but also a compelling invitation to greater interdisciplinary cooperation.