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Personal Rule

Theory and Practice in Africa

Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg

When I say "politics," . . . it not a question of the *art of governing the State for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations*. It is question of politician politics: the struggles of clans—not even [ideological] tendencies—to place well oneself, one's relatives, and one's clients in the *cursus honorum*, that is the race for preferments.

—*Leopold Sedar Senghor*

The Image of Personal Rule

Personal rule has been a compelling facet of politics at least since the time of Machiavelli. It is the image not of a ruler but of a type of rulership.¹ Personal rule is a dynamic world of political will and activity that is shaped less by institutions or impersonal social forces than by personal authorities and power; it is a world, therefore, of uncertainty, suspicion, rumor, agitation, intrigue, and sometimes fear, as well as of stratagem, diplomacy, conspiracy, dependency, reward, and threat. In other words, personal rule is a distinctive type of political system in which the rivalries and struggles of powerful and wilful men, rather than impersonal institutions, ideologies, public policies, or class interests, are fundamental in shaping political life. Indicators of personal regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are coups, plots, factionalism, purges, rehabilitations, clientelism, corruption, succession maneuvers, and similar activities which have been significant and recurring features of political life during the past two decades. Furthermore, there is no indication that such activities are about to decline in political importance. Whereas these features are usually seen as merely the defects of an otherwise established political order—whether capitalist, socialist, military, civilian, or whatever—we are inclined to regard them much more as the integral elements of a distinctive political system to which we have given the term "personal rule."²

It is ironic that in the twentieth century a novel form of "presidential monarchy" has appeared in many countries of the Third World. The irony consists in the contradiction of what is perhaps the major tendency in the evolution of the modern state during the past several centuries: the transformation of political legitimacy from the authority of kings to the mandate of the people.³ What has happened in the

Third World and especially in Africa was not expected to happen. When colonial rule was rapidly coming to an end in the 1950s and 1960s, it was hoped that independent African countries would adopt some form of democracy, be it liberal-democratic or socialist or some indigenous variant.⁴ Instead of democracy, however, various forms of autocracy appeared.

Fifteen years ago, scholarly writings on the New States . . . were full of discussions of parties, parliaments, and elections. A great deal seemed to turn on whether these institutions were viable in the Third World and what adjustments in them . . . might prove necessary to make them so. Today, nothing in those writings seems more *passee*, relic of a different time. Marcos, Suharto, Ne Win, al-Bakr, Sadat, Gaddafi, Boumedienne, Hassan, Houphouet, Amin, Mobutu may be doing their countries good or harm, promoting their peoples' advantage or oppressing them, but they are not guiding them to democracy. They are autocrats, and it is as autocrats, and not as preludes to liberalism (or, for that matter, to totalitarianism), that they, and the governments they dominate, must be judged and understood.⁵

There is a related methodological irony in this unforeseen historical development of presidential monarchy. At about the same time that students of politics were discarding the traditional tools of political theory, biography, and history that had proved of some value in the study of statecraft and were adopting the modern tools of sociology—thereby acknowledging that modern politics are mass, social politics in which governments interact with national populations or large classes or groups within them—political systems appeared in the Third World in which social politics were practically nonexistent and ruling politicians were remarkably free from the constraints of democratic institutions or social demands.⁶ Therefore, despite the crucial importance of sociological explanations of politics—in which society is at least as important as the state; quantity or political weight counts for more than quality or political skill; impersonal social process is more significant than individual political practice; and little room, if any, is left for the analysis of rulership or leadership as such—in the Third World, and certainly in Africa, we continue to encounter prominent politicians who act as if the principle of popular legitimacy had not been invented and national societies did not exist.

Political sociologists are justified in their criticisms of the "great man" theories of some historians, and we do not wish to suggest either that rulers are wholly independent actors or that biography is the most suitable approach in studying rulership. But the "little man" and certainly the "invisible man" theories of social politics can also be criticized, especially in those societies, as in Africa, where the image of the "big man" is deeply embedded in the political culture and politics is often a vertical network of personal, patron-client relations.⁷ If we are to deal with rulership in sociological terms—that is, in theoretical and not merely descriptive terms—we are obliged to regard political life as "a dialectic of power and structure, a web of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and structured, to make choices and pursue strategies within given limits, which in consequence expand and contract over time."⁸ Therefore, in terms of methodology the image of personal rule draws our attention not only to rulers and their activities, but also to

the political networks, circumstances, and predicaments in which they are entangled and from which they can never entirely extricate themselves.

Political images can often be sharpened by the careful selection of terms with which they are designated. If the terms "social politics" or "public politics" are apt for designating the political life of nation-states in which a popular mandate is the principle of legitimacy and politics is a "sociological activity . . . of preserving a community grown too complicated for either tradition alone or pure arbitrary rule to preserve it without the undue use of coercion," then perhaps Bernard Crick's term "palace politics" captures the largely personal, private, and elitist characteristics of political life in the autocracies that have emerged in Africa and elsewhere during the past several decades.⁹ In this essay we present a theory of personal rule and its integral practices in independent African countries.

A Theory of Personal Rule

In the introductory remarks we have hinted at the main characteristics of personal rule. To understand its distinctive character we must first set aside some central sociological assumptions about the nature of the modern state, including the following: (1) the modern state's legitimacy ultimately rests upon, and its government interacts on a continuous basis with, an underlying national society and its constituent groups and classes; (2) the relations of society and government concern primarily group demands or class interests, ideal or material, calling forth public laws and policies which in turn provoke policies which in turn provoke new demands and so forth; (3) the institutional and policy biases of government reflect the power and privilege of classes and groups in society; and (4) the activity of government policymaking is at once social (in attempting to address societal demands) and technical (in attempting to apply the knowledge of the policy sciences, including especially economics, to deal with policymaking problems).¹⁰

The assumptions of personal rule are quite different, and an instructive way to approach them is to recall the concept of rulership in Machiavelli's masterpiece, *The Prince*.¹¹ Machiavelli assumes that the Prince is a self-interested, rational actor who desires to acquire and hold a principality. But the principality is not a national society of mobilizable groups and classes whose interests command the attention of the Prince; and the Prince is not primarily concerned to promote the welfare and conciliate the conflicts of an underlying national society upon which his legitimacy depends. Rather, the principality is a political entity which is acted upon—ruled—by the Prince and may be capable of occasional political reaction—such as rebellion—but it is not integrated with the government and has few political interests other than to be left unexploited and in peace. "As long as he does not rob the great majority of their property or their honour, they remain content. He then has to contend only with the restlessness of a few, and that can be dealt with easily and in a variety of ways."¹²

Personal rule is an elitist political system composed of the privileged and powerful few in which the many are usually unmobilized, unorganized, and therefore

relatively powerless to command the attention and action of government. The system favors the ruler and his allies and clients: its essential activity involves gaining access to a personal regime's patronage or displacing the ruler and perhaps his regime and installing another. As an elitist system, personal politics concerns cooperation and rivalry among leaders and factions within the political class only and not among broader social classes or groups.¹³ Consequently, the political process in personal regimes is primarily asocial insofar as it is largely indifferent to the interests, concerns, and problems of social strata beyond the political class. Personal politics is not public politics: it is not a "sociological activity" in Crick's meaning of the term, nor is personal governance significantly technical in practice. Although it may employ technocrats and proclaim socioeconomic plans and policies—including national development plans—its concrete activities are rarely guided by such impersonal criteria. Rather, government and administration are likely to be highly personal and permeated with patronage and corruption.

Figure 1 identifies personal rule in relation to three familiar models of politics—constitutional rule, multi-party democracy, and one party democracy—and in terms of the distinctions between elite and mass politics, on the one hand, and monopolistic and pluralistic politics, on the other.

Figure 1

	Monopolistic Politics	Pluralistic Politics
Elite Politics	Personal Rule	Constitutional Rule
Mass Politics	Single Party Democracy	Multi-party Democracy

As already indicated, personal rule is a form of elite politics. However, it does not rest upon established constitutional rules and practices (including traditions) that effectively regulate the activities of the political class—especially the ruler—and is therefore distinguished from constitutional rule. Established and effective political institutions are largely absent from regimes of personal rule. In defining a political "institution" we follow Rawls.

By an institution I shall understand a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules

specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden. . . . An institution may be thought of in two ways: first as an abstract . . . system of rules; and second, as the . . . [realized] actions specified by these rules. . . . A person taking part in an [real] institution knows what the rules demand of him and of the others. He also knows that the others know this and that they know that he knows this, and so on.¹⁴

Most contemporary Black African states have abstract political institutions, but they do not have them in the concrete, or realized, sense specified by Rawls. Institutional rules do not effectively govern the behavior of most leaders most of the time. Individuals do not perform political actions in an institutionally required way in the awareness that others expect it and that risks and difficulties would arise if they failed to do so. Political conduct is governed by the awareness that constitutional rules or administrative regulations can, and probably ought, to be evaded. The real norms that affect political and administrative action are not rooted in state institutions and organizations but in friendship, kinship, factional alliance, ethnic fellowship—that is, norms that are frequently at odds with the rules of state institutions and organizations and which tend to undermine them rather than reinforce or support them.¹⁵ Political action in personal regimes is thus strongly affected by expediency and necessity. What an actor can do is more strongly affected by the resources at his disposal than by the office he occupies. What an actor must do is more strongly affected by particularistic norms—that is, obligations and attachments to friends, kin, factional allies, clansmen, ethnic fellows—than by state rules and regulations.

Personal rule is a form of monopolistic rather than pluralistic politics. Personal regimes consist primarily of the internecine struggles of powerful individuals, civilian or military, for power and place and secondarily of the actions of outsiders who desire to enter the monopoly, influence members within it, or displace it with their own personal regime. Politics tend to be closed to public participation and observation and even to be secretive—hence “palace politics.” Personal rivalry within the monopoly for the ruler’s favor gives rise to clandestine political activities, while challenges to the regime from without can often assume the character of political conspiracy since general political liberties are usually withheld by law or are not allowed in practice.¹⁶ Political stability in all regimes depends ultimately on the ability and willingness of powerful men to regulate their conflicts and forebear from using violence, but, as pointed out, leaders in personal regimes do not have legitimate and effective institutions to assist them in this endeavor. Furthermore, personal regimes are neither highly organized nor effective monopolies that penetrate and control society. They are a type of authoritarianism, autocratic or oligarchic but not bureaucratic. African regimes rarely have the character of bureaucratic authoritarianism, which is a prominent feature of many Latin American countries,¹⁷ and only a few have come close to being single-party democracies.

Personal politics involve almost exclusively the activities of “big men” who are a considerable distance from the ordinary people. As indicated, “the people,” “the public,” “the nation,” “the national interest,” “public opinion,” and similar collectivities are abstractions that have little effect on political life. Individuals figure very

prominently in politics while social collectivities figure very little. Personal politics express the conflicting appetites, desires, ambitions, aversions, hopes, and fears of a relatively small number of leaders who seek access to the resources and honors of the state and care little about questions of political ideology or public policy except as these affect their political situation and that of their associates, clients, and supporters. In African autocracies there are no elections to be won by actively promoting social or economic programs. Where elections are occasionally held, they are typically intraparty affairs in which big men—current or aspiring—vie with each other in promising benefits for local electorates; there is little to be gained from advocating national programs that reflect ideological viewpoints or require technical expertise.¹⁸ Indeed, if there is an official ideology, it is not likely to be a subject of political debate.

Models and Metaphors for Theorizing about Personal Rule

In thinking and writing about personal rule, we have confronted the methodological problem of finding appropriate heuristics that can reveal the distinctive characteristics of such political systems and guide empirical studies of them. None of the usual models employed in comparative and African politics, which postulate social politics, is very suitable. And, while none of the following models and metaphors is entirely adequate by itself in capturing the character of personal rule, each has proved to be useful in exploring different features and facets of it in Black Africa.

Politics as a Competitive Game This is a very widespread model of politics where actors are at the forefront of the analysis. A “game” indicates an orderly activity involving rules, authorities, players, skills, stratagems, prizes, uncertainty, and luck. Order is provided primarily by legitimate and effective rules. “Rules are an essential part of games: indeed, in a sense a game *is* a set of rules, for it can only be defined by a statement of these rules.”¹⁹ Thus in a game the competition among players and teams is kept within acceptable bounds by their acceptance of the rules and the authorities who enforce them. Scholars who employ this metaphor (such as Bailey) find it instructive to substitute “politics” for “game,” “politicians” for “players,” “parties” or “factions” for “teams,” and so forth.

This model reveals some interesting features and facets of personal rule. Unlike institutional or constitutional government, personal rule lacks legitimate and effective rules and authorities that keep the game orderly. Personal regimes are far more dependent than institutional regimes on the cooperation, self-restraint, and good will of politicians and factions if the “game” is to remain orderly and not deteriorate into a fight. Political order depends far more on informal, “pragmatic” rules—what we prefer to call “practices”—that politicians accept out of self-interest rather than moral or legal obligation.²⁰ (For a definition and discussion of “practices,” see below.) Of course, the limitation of pragmatic rules in keeping political competition orderly is precisely their pragmatism: if they are no longer useful, politicians will readily discard them. And if there are no legitimate and effective formal institutions

to serve as backstops when this happens, only the players themselves can prevent politics from deteriorating into a fight.

African politics resembles a game without legitimate and effective institutional rules: most African states have not succeeded in becoming institutionalized in a formal-legal sense, and political life is highly dependent on the politicians and factions to keep it civil and non-violent. However, some political players, particularly soldiers, are often presented with a situation in which they have far more to gain than to lose by violating any tacit understandings that prohibit the threat or use of armed force in politics. Indeed, in some African countries the military *coup d'état* has become the most frequent type of political practice.

Politics as a Stage Play This metaphor is not as familiar as the previous one, but it is similar in that it too can be used to explore the important distinction between personal rule and institutional government. Here politicians are likened to actors cast in different roles which they attempt to perform with whatever talent and skill they possess. Plays (i.e., politics) are performed before audiences, and a great play is one with an outstanding script and talented actors who can capture and hold the attention of an audience by playing upon its sympathy, curiosity, amusement, righteousness, anger, and other emotions. But plays are not the improvisations of actors; they are the scripts of playwrights. "A play depends on its actors . . . as well as on its author. What the audience sees is an interpretation of the script."²¹ Some playwrights are more gifted, some plays more popular, some performances more successful, and some performers more talented than others. Whereas all these elements are necessary for a play to be successful, a play would be impossible without a script. Scripts are to plays what rules are to games. In comparing "institutions" to "plays," Ridley argues that "political institutions are not merely endowed with a script but the script, in one way or another, generally embodies the meaning of the institution. . . . Institutions . . . are the script rather than the play."²²

In applying this metaphor to politics, we can consider rulers and other leaders as actors in a national political drama that is ultimately defined by its political offices and institutions, that is, by parliamentary democracy, cabinet government, congressional government, federalism, democratic centralism, and so forth. Great leaders are like great actors: they give a commanding performance and create affection and support among an audience. By the same token, unsuccessful leaders are like novice or apprentice actors who aspire to give a commanding performance but are not fully aware of the possibilities and limitations of their offices (roles), owing primarily to their lack of political experience and "talent," which include energy, resourcefulness, and luck. If they cannot learn how to perform their roles successfully, it is unlikely that they will remain in them for very long.

Leaders in personal regimes differ from leaders in institutionalized regimes not in lacking a script—as indicated, institutions are present in the abstract although not in the realized sense—but in disregarding it and preferring, or finding it expedient or necessary, to improvise distinctive political roles. Personal leaders do not usually perform the roles assigned to them by the constitution. If they do, it is not unlikely

that they have arbitrarily changed the constitution to accommodate their preferred personal roles rather than attempted to draw their roles from the script, which is the way of constitutional government.

In many African countries political improvisation predominates. Some African rulers succeeded in creating for themselves the office of "life president" (Kwame Nkrumah, Kamuzu Banda, Idi Amin, Francisco Macías Nguema, and Jean-Bédél Bokassa, who went on to crown himself "emperor"). Is it an exaggeration to suggest, as one writer has, that President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire has succeeded in becoming a *de facto* "king"?²³ Successful African rulers are those who have created an elevated political role for themselves which is acknowledged (if not always appreciated) by other leaders and the wider audience, for example, Leopold Senghor, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Sékou Touré, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, Ahmadou Ahidjo, Omar Bongo, and Gaafar Numeiri. Not only are these political actors self-taught, but also their roles are self-made. In most cases it is still unclear whether their personally tailored roles will become distinctive offices (defined by a "constitutional script") that are widely regarded as legitimate and can be occupied by succeeding politicians. In a few cases there are signs of such a development, as for example in the 1978 succession of Daniel arap Moi to the presidency of Kenya on the death of Kenyatta. However, for every successful political improviser in African politics there has been an unsuccessful one, usually a novice on the political stage. Some of these political amateurs, but by no means all, have been soldiers who gained power by armed force but could not hold it owing to limited political skill.

Commanding the Ship of State The metaphor of the ruler as commander of the ship of state is as old as political philosophy and as new as cybernetics.²⁴ Historically and etymologically, the predominant idea in this metaphor is government as the art of the steersman.²⁵ In addition to the idea of steering (and navigation), the metaphor evokes an image of seamanship: a ruler is responsible not only for guiding government toward its goals, but also for keeping it afloat, steady, and on an even keel.²⁶

Of these two images the first seems to us to be far more prominent and influential at present. In the Third World and certainly in Africa a predominant idea is the rationalist concept of governing as promoting, planning, guiding, managing, and coordinating the activities, not only of government agencies, but also of diverse social and economic organizations so as to move a country in the direction of greater national prosperity and welfare. It is the central idea of the planning and administrative state and of the policy sciences that stand behind such a state.²⁷ There is little doubt in our minds that the concept of governing as an activity of guiding a nation toward preselected, largely socioeconomic goals is the primary standard against which contemporary governments are appraised. The Third World is not different from the First and Second Worlds in understanding government primarily in terms of purpose, enterprise, and management. However, it is very different in imposing on governments with extremely limited resources, capacities, discipline, and authority a task that is comparatively far more burdensome and is unlikely to result in significant progress at least in the short and medium terms.

Personal rule can be explored in terms of the contrasting ideas of political steering and political seamanship. Most African rulers speak—and many endeavor to act—in a manner consistent with the idea of steering and navigation. At least officially government is held to be an instrumental agency of public policy where “the word ‘policy’ can be taken to refer to the principles that govern action directed towards given ends.”²⁸ The proclamation of national goals and of plans and policies with which to pursue them is central to their political style. The idea of steering is especially characteristic of avowed socialist rulers, such as Nkrumah, Touré, Nyerere, and Modibo Keita. The articulate Nyerere provides excellent examples of the vocabulary of political steering in his speeches and writing. Perhaps this is nowhere more evident than in the first sentence of “The Arusha Declaration,” which reads: “The policy of TANU [the Tanganyika African National Union] is to build a socialist state.”²⁹ In a speech to explain the meaning of the declaration to students at the University of Dar es Salaam, Nyerere began by saying that “the Arusha Declaration is a declaration of intent. . . . It states the goal towards which TANU will be leading the people of Tanzania, and it indicates the direction of development.”³⁰

Lest it be assumed that only socialist rulers use the language of political steering, we hasten to add that most nonsocialist rulers in Africa and elsewhere speak in similar terms. This is the predominant language of late twentieth-century governance, and it is spoken virtually everywhere, regardless of the official ideologies of regimes. It is the idiom of modern liberalism as well as of socialism; Americans are no less fluent in it than are Swedes or Russians. The idea of purpose is independent of the content of a particular purpose: a government is no less purposive if it seeks to promote capitalist development rather than socialist development. Furthermore, this is the technological language of the policy sciences. In a world that understands governments primarily as purposive, problem-solving, progress-creating agencies, merely for a regime to avow a socially valid purpose might garner it some legitimacy. Of course a problem of credibility arises if declarations and resolutions repeatedly fail to be followed by concrete actions and discernible progress. This is the legitimacy problem of modern government, and it is not confined by any means only to African or even Third World governments.³¹

In many Black African countries the concrete practices of governance much more closely approximate the image of political seamanship, however. We find rulers who are not nearly as preoccupied with the problem of going somewhere as with the task of keeping themselves and their regimes afloat: they are trying to survive in a political world of great uncertainty and often turbulence. Many are in danger of capsizing as a result of either poor seamanship or stormy political weather, and many others have gone to the bottom owing to either their own misadventures or the efforts of others. In most African countries the military is feared rather like a hostile submarine is feared by the captain of a merchantman. Unlike their counterparts in constitutional states, a personal ruler who is striving to survive and a rival leader who desires to replace him are not usually afforded institutional protection to complete a term of office or legal guarantees of a chance to compete for the right to rule.

In consequence, African personal rulers are more likely to be old-fashioned, conservative system-maintainers rather than progressive nation-builders. Among the most successful of such rulers are the great survivors of contemporary African politics: Senghor, Touré, Houphouët-Boigny, Kenyatta, Numeiri, Kenneth Kaunda, Mobutu, Ahidjo, Bongo, Banda. Even Nyerere, one of the few African rulers who has earnestly and persistently striven to conduct his government in terms of the modern criteria of political and economic development, is also a survivor. We are inclined to believe that most African regimes appear inadequate probably owing to their rulers' preoccupation with political survival—not an unusual disposition among politicians—which is often purchased at the expense of a concern for socioeconomic development, let alone its realization. But if these regimes are to be appraised, it seems more reasonable to appraise them in terms of the criteria of legitimacy that their practices invoke. These are the criteria not of political navigation but of political seamanship—namely political order, stability, and civility. Although many African governments will be found wanting by such standards as well, unlike the criteria of modern rationalism—which, when applied, leave all but a very few African countries in one large, undifferentiated category of “underdevelopment”—those of political seamanship at least enable us to draw some important distinctions among African personal regimes. For example, they enable us to distinguish the more orderly and civil rule of a Senghor, a Nyerere, or a Kenyatta from the more abusive rule of a Mobutu or a Bokassa—to say nothing of a Macias or an Amin—and, more important, to seek an explanation of such distinctions.

Some Characteristic Practices of Personal Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa

Largely by utilizing indigenous political-cultural materials readily at hand as well as by accommodating the necessity of pragmatism, many African politicians have improvised a makeshift polity that is not modeled on any design and lacks effective institutions but is characterized by a number of distinctive practices.³²

By “practices” we mean activities in which political actors are commonly engaged. As such, they are recognized and frequently used ways of pursuing one's power or security goals. It is important and useful to distinguish political “practices” from social “processes”: while the former are the activities of political actors, the latter are the operations of a more impersonal social system. It is also necessary to distinguish between “practices” and “institutions”: like all practices, those of personal rule are entirely pragmatic and carry no legitimacy or value that is independent of their effective uses, unlike formal political institutions and procedures which are valued not only for what they enable but also for their own sake.

Among the most important practices in personal regimes are conspiracy, factional politics and clientelism, corruption, purges and rehabilitations, and succession maneuvers. We do not regard these as the necessary “functions” of personal political systems, but we do regard them as the kinds of political behavior one might expect in countries in which formal institutions are ineffective. Not all of these

practices contribute to political order, stability, and civility; in fact, some of them, such as conspiracy, are harmful to the provision of such political goods. However, taken together, they appear to accurately characterize the kind of politics to which politicians in the great majority of sub-Saharan countries have resorted over the past two decades.

These practices have been widely noted—and often deplored—in the study of contemporary African politics. Indeed, they have been the subjects of considerable commentary, and an already sizable literature deals with some of them, such as coups and corruption. However (as we have noted), as yet there has been little inclination to view them as integral elements of a distinctive type of political system, personal rule. Instead, they have usually been viewed from the rationalist perspective as shortcomings in the endeavor to establish modern social politics and policy government in Black Africa. As indicated, we are inclined to regard such practices as the very essence of political and governmental conduct in most countries south of the Sahara. While it is evident that most contemporary African states have not acquired the rationalist characteristics of social politics and policy government, they nevertheless have become something more than can adequately be described in terms merely of the absence of such characteristics. The political system of personal rule and its distinctive practices are the reality of what they have become.

Before we begin to examine the distinctive political practices of personal rule in Black Africa, it may be appropriate to remind ourselves of the obvious fact that all political systems, and not only systems of personal rule, consist of persons and systems of personal relationships. Political institutions that are effective—that is, those which are not simply unrealized, abstract rules—always give rise to informal relationships and practices that enable them to work: “To each of the legal organs of the state corresponds, more or less exactly, a social system, which consists in effect of persons brought together by legal relationships, existing together in social relationships.”³³ Thus the House of Commons is not only a primary political institution of Great Britain but also the “best club in London.”³⁴ In contrast, in contemporary African regimes of personal rule we find informal social systems that have evolved not out of sympathy and loyalty to the formal political institutions but out of indifference or antagonism to them. The personal system has displaced rather than augmented the legal system of rule; where a concern for legality has been displayed, it has always been dependent on the interests of powerful individuals rather than the other way about. (Why this has happened is a question we address briefly in the conclusion.)

Political Conspiracy Individuals or groups usually resort to conspiratorial politics either when they are deprived of a fair opportunity to compete openly for government positions or when they believe they cannot win by open competition. In contemporary Black African countries both conditions have frequently been present, and coups and plots have emerged as characteristic political practices. By 1983 there had been at least fifty successful coups since the end of colonial rule in twenty-three countries, and many others that were unsuccessful. By definition a

coup is an unlawful action, an action in violation of constitutional rules. Similarly, to engage in political plotting is to undertake actions such as scheming and spying aimed at displacing a ruler or leader—or protecting him. There have been widespread reports of plotting in Black Africa, including bogus as well as genuine plots, by rulers as well as by their opponents. Plotting is generally associated with conspiracies against rulers and regimes, but it has been alleged that at least one African despot—Touré of Guinea—has governed “by plot.”³⁵ While it is impossible to know with certainty how widespread such practices have been owing to their secretive nature, there is little doubt that many African politicians have engaged in them.

The relationship of weak political institutions and the prevalence of coups has been given considerable attention by political scientists.³⁶ The absence of effective institutional restraints is undoubtedly a critical consideration which disposes ambitious individuals or groups with access to power to contemplate and engage in unlawful bids for political control. In contemporary Black Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, members of the military, or factions within it, have found themselves in a position to contemplate political intervention. During the initial postindependence years, African soldiers were less disposed to intervene, probably owing more to their inexperience and peripheral position in the state than to the strength of political institutions. But with the passing of time and the increasing contravention of constitutional rules by civilian rulers, the self-restraint of soldiers has declined, and their political ambitions have increased. By the second half of the 1960s they had become less hesitant to assert their power. In place of constitutional-democratic government, there appeared contrary expectations and practices in which the checks on powerholders became merely the power of others or personal loyalty to one’s supporters. Politically ambitious African soldiers who were lacking in loyalty to the ruler and his regime and who in addition possessed more than sufficient power to take command of the government became disposed to intervene in politics. Once some successful coups had been perpetrated, others were contemplated and attempted. It is perhaps understandable that in such circumstances it was not long before the coup was established as a recognized political practice which was most frequently—but not exclusively—engaged in by soldiers. Today military rulers are as common in sub-Saharan Africa as civilian ones. Indeed, they have been for some time. However, the distinction between military and civilian rule—which has received much attention in African political studies—is probably less important than the fact that *both* soldiers and civilians are attempting to rule without the benefit of effective institutions and that *both* have been victims of coups.

Factional Politics and Clientelism The politics of faction has been evident in African political life throughout the independence era, especially as political pluralism declined, and political monopoly increased in the years immediately following independence.³⁷ By “factional politics” we mean jockeying and maneuvering to influence a ruler and to increase one’s political advantage or security in a regime, an inherently nonviolent political activity (unlike conspiratorial politics, which may

involve violence). By its nature, factionalism tends to be an internal competition for power and position within a group rather than an open contest among groups. Under political monopoly, factionalism is ordinarily the prevalent form of nonviolent politics because open, legitimate political competition based on parties is forbidden. When a factional struggle is transformed into a public, nonviolent contest which is governed by rules of some kind, factions in effect have become parties. To our knowledge this has never happened in contemporary African politics, undoubtedly owing to the fact that open political competition has seldom been permitted. Moreover, a factional struggle may deteriorate into violent conflict and civil warfare; this has happened in Chad, Burundi, post-Amin Uganda, and Ethiopia following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974.

It is to factional politics (and clientelism) that Senghor is referring in employing the term "politician politics." Ordinarily, the objects—the prizes and spoils—of factional politics are government positions and the patronage they control.³⁸ The less autocratic and the more diplomatic and tolerant a personal ruler is, the more likely factional politics is a common practice in his regime. Outstanding examples of politics based on faction (and also clientelism) are Senghor's sagacious rule in Senegal (1960–80), Kenyatta's courtly but stern governance in Kenya (1963–78), William Tolbert's paternalist style in Liberia (1971–80), Numeiri's adroit and resolute rule in Sudan (1969–present), and Kaunda's somewhat self-indulgent and utopian pursuit of socialism in Zambia (1964–present). By comparison, in a few highly autocratic regimes there has tended to be less factional politics because the ruler is sufficiently strong and confident to attempt to dominate the state without sharing power with other leaders if he so desires. Such is definitely the case in Banda's Malawi and Ahidjo's Cameroon; these two rulers have displayed a type of personal regime reminiscent of European absolutism, where the country is virtually the ruler's estate and the government is his personal apparatus to deploy and direct as he wishes without consulting anyone. Thus while factional politics is practiced widely in sub-Saharan Africa, it is by no means practiced everywhere or to the same extent.

Closely related to factionalism in idea and expression is the practice of clientelism. The image of clientelism is one of extensive chains of patron-client ties extending usually from the center of a personal regime, that is, from the ruler to his lieutenants, clients, and other followers, and through them to their followers, and so on. The substance and conditions of such ties can be conceived of as the intermingling of two factors: the resources of patronage (which can be used to satisfy wants and needs and can be allocated by patrons to clients) and personal loyalty (which is an affective relationship that helps to sustain dyadic relations during times of resource scarcity).³⁹ Clientelism is primarily personal: unlike institutions, individual patron-client linkages are contingent upon the persons in a relationship and ordinarily cannot outlast them. A change of ruler or leader—as a result of a successful coup or assassination plot, for instance—can alter greatly both an existing clientelist pattern and the political fortunes of those entangled in it. When Tom Mboya and Josiah Kariuki, each a "big man" in Kenyan politics, were assassinated (Mboya in 1969 and Kariuki in 1975), the political fortunes not only of personal clients and

followers but also of clans and large segments of ethnic communities were adversely affected. Clientelist relations are the outcome of a stratagem of pursuing power and position by securing the support of others in exchange for patronage (or vice versa) in societies in which democratic political organizations and interest groups are weak or nonexistent.

Political Corruption Unlike clientelism, corruption is an unlawful practice; it is the disregard of the rules and requirements of one's office for the sake of a personal advantage, such as a bribe. While corruption occurs whenever officials accept bribes, corrupt governments can develop only where such practices are widespread and are sustained by social attitudes: it is more difficult and offensive to be corrupt in Sweden than in Italy. Where corruption is widely practiced, it is evidence of the weakness of public institutions and the strength of private appetites and desires as determinants of political and administrative behavior.⁴⁰

Corruption is a widely noted practice in contemporary African states.⁴¹ In addition to the weakness of civil and political institutions, the incidence of corrupt behavior in personal regimes depends greatly on the conduct of those leaders who are in the best position to be corrupt. If a ruler and other prominent leaders strenuously oppose corruption, are able to police it, and refuse to engage in corrupt practices themselves, then it may not be as prevalent. This is clearly the case in Banda's Malawi, where such practices have been kept in check. But if the ruler or other prominent leaders indulge in such practices themselves, then the demonstration effect upon the rest of the country can be profound because such practices can reinforce existing social expectations in which family, friends, associates, clients, clansmen, and tribesmen have a higher claim on a public official's conduct than do government rules and regulations.

In some African countries corruption has been virtually "a way of life," for example in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Amin's Uganda, Bokassa's Central African Empire, Nigeria, and Zaire. In these countries the expectation of corruption is probably more difficult for officials to ignore than the institutional regulations which prohibit such practices. Nigeria's pervasive corruption has been viewed as part and parcel of "the present accepted value system of Nigerian society."⁴² Nonetheless, it is probably Zaire which enjoys the dubious status of being the most thoroughly corrupt country in sub-Saharan Africa. Corruption is so extensive that observers have virtually had to invent new phrases to describe it; it is termed a "structural fact," and Zaire is referred to as "an extortionist culture" in which bribery is common and has been described as "economic mugging."⁴³ Probably the most corrupt individual of all is the ruler, Mobutu, who is reputed to be one of the world's richest men and to have amassed an enormous fortune (in the millions of dollars) by personally appropriating or misusing the funds of the Bank of Zaire, the state trading companies, and other government agencies.⁴⁴ What Mobutu debases on a vast scale, lesser leaders debase on a diminishing scale from the upper levels of government to the lower ones, where soldiers and minor officials act virtually as if they possess "a license to steal."⁴⁵ Zaire is an extreme case of a country where government is personally appropriated by the governors.

Political Purges and Rehabilitations Like factionalism, purges and rehabilitations are entangled with political monopoly. A purge is an action which expels from an organization members who are accused of disloyalty, disobedience, or excessive independence. If there is but one political organization in a country to which all politicians must belong, the threat or use of expulsion may be a method of controlling them, while offers of rehabilitation may reduce their temptation to conspire against the regime from outside the ruling group. In most African countries the political monopoly is a monopoly not only of power but also of wealth and status; there is no comparable source of privilege outside of politics. Therefore, to be deprived of membership in the ruling monopoly of an African country or to be restored to membership is to have one's life and fortune dramatically altered. For politicians everywhere the political wilderness is a lonely place; for African politicians it is also a misfortune.

With the decline of political pluralism and the rise of political monopoly in sub-Saharan Africa in the past two decades, there has been a corresponding increase in purges and rehabilitations as rulers have endeavored to maintain control of their regimes. Such practices were in evidence in Nkrumah's Ghana soon after his Convention People's Party (CPP) acquired its political monopoly in 1960.⁴⁶ In autocratic Malawi these practices have been a jealously guarded prerogative of the ruler, Dr. Banda. Since 1964 he has not hesitated to exercise his prerogative, and during this period there has been a consistent emphasis on the requirement of absolute obedience and devotion of all politicians to the ruler.⁴⁷ In a few countries leading politicians have been purged for a lack of expressed ideological fervor, as in Guinea, where Touré has periodically removed notables from his regime on these grounds, and in Congo-Brazzaville, where a "purge commission" with the authority to remove cadres who failed to meet contrived standards of "socialist" behavior was established in 1975.⁴⁸

Succession Maneuvers The ultimate prize in most regimes is the attainment of rulership. In multi-party democracies the allocation of the prize is determined by rules: the president or prime minister has won his party's nomination and a general election contested with other parties, or he has succeeded to office in accordance with constitutional provisions. In contrast, in personal regimes the struggle of rulers to maintain their position or to pass it on to a designated successor, and the efforts of other leaders to become the ruler or to prevent their rivals from attaining rulership, is a direct struggle of power and skill unmediated by political institutions. Therefore, uncertainty always surrounds the question: "Who shall rule and for how long?" For elites the prospect of succession is likely to be a catastrophic destabilizing political issue because the regime is tied to the ruler. When he loses his ability to rule or passes from the scene, his regime can be jeopardized; a change of ruler might augur a change of regime. "Succession" is the replacement of a ruler who has died, become incapacitated, or resigned; it differs from a change of ruler by election, a termination of office, or a reconstitution of a country after an interlude of unconstitutional rule. In personal regimes succession is an important problem precisely because the rules governing succession—like all constitutional

rules in personal regimes—lack legitimacy and therefore the predictable capacity to shape political behavior.

Succession uncertainties have affected politics in some African personal regimes, although perhaps not to the extent that the theory of personal rule would lead us to expect. Furthermore, there have been several, albeit qualified, constitutional successions. The uncertainty of who would succeed Kenyatta and whether the succession would be peaceful or violent affected Kenyan politics for a decade prior to his death in 1978. As it happened, the succession of Vice-President Moi to the presidency was orderly and appeared to comply with constitutional procedures, an indication that Kenyan politics is becoming institutionalized at least in this respect. The succession of Vice-President Tolbert to the Liberian presidency following the death of President William Tubman in 1971 also complied with constitutional provisions. In 1983 there appeared to be a possibility of a constitutional succession in Tanzania, where Nyerere has declared his wish to leave the presidency by 1985, when elections are scheduled. However, if he is still alive and in good health the personal legitimacy of Nyerere himself, rather than the constitutional rules, may be the deciding factor in an orderly succession. Such was the case in Senegal, where Senghor took the step—extremely unusual in African politics—of voluntarily resigning his office on December 31, 1980, and passing it on to his prime minister and protege, Abdou Diouf. The succession had the quality of being orchestrated by Senghor insofar as he had arranged a revision of the constitution in 1976 to make the prime minister, who is appointed by the president, the automatic successor to the presidency.⁴⁹ Senghor's example may have been followed by Ahmadou Ahidjo, the autocratic ruler of the Cameroons for more than two decades, who resigned from the presidency in November 1982 and was succeeded by his own nominee, prime minister Paul Biya.⁵⁰ Therefore, the Senegalese and Cameroonian successions more nearly correspond to the model of the "dauphin," in which the ruler manipulates constitutional procedures to arrange for a successor of his own choosing, than to the model of a fully institutional succession. The dauphin model was also apparent in Gabon, where ailing President Leon M'Ba created a vice-presidency in 1966, designated its incumbent the rightful successor, and appointed a loyal and capable lieutenant, Bongo, to the post. (Bongo became president in 1967).

Conditions of Personal Rule

In conclusion, let us explore two questions. First, what conditions appear to be the most important in encouraging and sustaining the practices of personal governance in sub-Saharan Africa? All political systems are provisional; they are all built on sand, not on the rock of Gibraltar. Personal rule is no exception. It is dependent on the inclination and ability of people, particularly politicians, to understand and utilize its practices. Second, since personal rule is the converse of institutional government and since political institutions in the great majority of sub-Saharan countries are present formally as abstract rules but not substantively as effective restraints on political behavior, it is important to ask what conditions discourage the

realization of concrete political institutions in these countries and what the prospects are of changing them.

Neither of these questions is easy to answer, and we have the space to offer only some suggestions as to the direction in which we believe answers might be found. It is somewhat easier to conjecture an answer to the first question because the practices of personal rule are essentially pragmatic and can be understood in terms of a rational politician who must operate in a country in which state institutions are merely forms and duties other than those of his office compete with self-interest as a claim to his conduct. In other words, the practices of personal rule are the sort in which a rational politician would engage if he found himself in a world in which the official rules and regulations of the state were not well understood or appreciated and were poorly enforced, and if he knew that others were aware of this and were not likely to conform to the rules in their own conduct. In such circumstances political and administrative conduct would be shaped by a combination of expediency and whatever obligations were owed to family, friends, allies, clansmen, tribesmen, and any other moral community to which an actor belonged. Most African politicians and administrators find themselves in more or less such circumstances.

At the center of any answer to the second question there must be an explanation as to why personal, arbitrary rule has not been widely condemned as political misconduct in sub-Saharan Africa. Why has personal rule not become sufficiently established as misconduct to effectively discourage the kinds of practices that we have reviewed in this essay and to encourage the realization of institutional rules and regulations? These questions are difficult to formulate, let alone answer, but if an answer is to be found, it will probably be connected with the widely acknowledged arbitrariness of most African states and its political and sociological roots.

In political terms, almost every sub-Saharan African state was the successor of a geographically identical, preexisting colonial entity. From the perspective of the European colonial powers a colony was not arbitrary. It was an extension of the sovereignty of the metropole, and its officials were subject to imperial policy and colonial regulations; far from being arbitrary rulers, colonial officials were considered responsible servants. However, from the perspective of subject Africans, colonial government was essentially arbitrary. It was imposed from outside and worked in accordance with alien and unfamiliar rules and regulations, in disregard, often in ignorance, of indigenous institutions. The British in effect acknowledged that colonial rule was arbitrary in their practice of indirect rule, but even indirect rule could not cancel the fundamental political reality that colonialism was essentially the imposition of government by an external, superior power.

The African states were arbitrary entities in sociological terms as well. It is well known that the size and shape of almost every sub-Saharan country was the result of boundaries arbitrarily drawn by colonialists who rarely acknowledged, or were not even aware of, the preexisting boundaries of traditional African societies. (Even if they had been aware of such boundaries, the traditional political systems were usually too small to be viable as separate colonial entities.) Consequently, there were no territory-wide traditional institutions that could be resurrected at indepen-

dence and used to identify legitimate conduct and condemn misconduct by a state's new rulers. (It must be acknowledged that even if such institutions had existed, most of the new leaders, who were usually intellectuals, would very likely have been as hostile to them as they were to the traditional institutions that existed at the subnational level. However, in some cases such institutions might have been sufficiently strong to command the reluctant compliance of the new rulers.)

Sociologically, most African countries are multiethnic societies with populations that are sharply divided along racial, cultural, linguistic, religious, and similar lines of cleavage. Most are composed of several and some of many different traditional societies, each with distinctive institutions to which members of other traditional societies are not only detached but also disinclined, if not actually opposed. Multiethnic societies are not confined to sub-Saharan Africa, but they appear to be a characteristic of most new states. Roth suggests that

one of the major reasons for the predominance of personal rulership over legal-rational legislation and administration in the new states seems to lie in a social, cultural, and political homogeneity of such magnitude that a more or less viable complementary and countervailing pluralism of the Western type, with its strong but not exclusive components of universality, does not appear feasible.⁵¹

Roth sees the divided plural society as an impediment to the realization of modern, rational-legal institutions. But it is no less an impediment to the realization of traditional institutions or any other kind of general political institutions. All institutions that are realized in conduct must rest upon some kind of general understanding and acknowledgment by most of the people who live under them.

The attempts by the colonial authorities—very belated in the case of Belgium and Spain, and scarcely undertaken in the case of Portugal—to introduce modern political institutions as an essential stage of decolonization were not successful owing to the political and sociological impediments we have noted. British parliamentarianism and French republicanism were as alien to most Africans as colonial bureaucracy. Indeed, they were probably more difficult to understand since they are inherently less pragmatic and rational and more exotic and ritualistic in their rules and offices. It is easy for the forms and rites of (for example) parliamentary government to be mistaken for its substance, which is what happened not infrequently in some African countries before the forms too were discarded or fundamentally altered to suit the interests of those in power.

Imported European political institutions had no greater inherent capacity to overcome the centrifugal effects of sub-Saharan Africa's multiethnic societies than did any other institutions. The British were sensitive to this sociological problem, as indicated by their preference both for bicameral legislatures (with upper chambers to give representation to traditional rulers) and for federalism. Nonetheless, the checkered history of federalism in Nigeria, where politicians have striven to make it work, suggests that federalism, like any other national political institution, requires a commitment of the parts for the whole, of the whole for the parts, and of each part for each other part. In no sub-Saharan country to date has federalism proved to be a workable and durable institutional arrangement, although the Nigerians must be given full marks for persevering in efforts to make it a reality and not merely a

formality in their political life. In short, the borrowing of institutional forms from abroad—even the most widely admired models—in no way guarantees their substantiation in political conduct.

In regard to changing the conditions that presently encourage personal rule and obstruct the realization of institutional government in sub-Saharan Africa, there seems to be very little prospect, if any, of altering the political and sociological conditions mentioned above, at least in the short and medium terms. Such fundamental change is a long-term historical process. But if institutional development is to occur in the foreseeable future, it will very likely begin at the top and not at the bottom of African political systems. It is not inconceivable—and there is some evidence to support the contention—that rulers and other leading politicians might begin to value the limited security of official tenure more highly than the uncertain possession of personal power and, beyond this, the greater stability and order attainable only under institutional government. Periodic attempts to reconstitutionalize some states which had been ruled by soldiers, as in Ghana (1969 and 1979), Nigeria (1979), and Upper Volta (1978), are evidence. However, wholesale attempts at constitutional engineering hold out less promise of success owing precisely to their very ambitious character: they literally ask leaders and their followers to transform their political attitudes and behavior overnight. Institutionalization in politics is a transformation involving piecemeal social engineering and time.⁵²

A less improbable course of political institutionalization in sub-Saharan Africa is the incremental steps taken by some rulers and their associates to find acceptable and workable procedures to organize political competition and to prevent violence and other political evils. Constitutional rules of succession tend to be accepted for preventive reasons: leaders who face the prospect of a succession may fear the threat of uncertainty, dislocation, violence, bloodshed, and other hazards more than they desire the prize of becoming the successor or his associate. This “negative” political rationality, which we usually associate with the political theory of Hobbes, is also evident in electoral institutionalization in sub-Saharan Africa.⁵³ For example, in Senegal under the prudent and judicious rule of Senghor the one-party system was liberalized in the late 1970s to allow other parties to compete openly with Senghor’s party, but only under labels approved by the regime with Senghor’s party preempting the most popular “democratic socialist” label. This experiment in “guided” democratization apparently reflected Senghor’s conviction that a *de facto* one-party system—such as had existed from 1963 to 1976 in Senegal, with its numerous and various ethnic and ideological tendencies—invited conspiratorial politics and threatened national stability.⁵⁴ But the success of Senegalese liberalization to date probably must be attributed to Senghor and to his successor, President Abdou Diouf, who in 1981 accepted the challenge of governing a multi-party democracy.

Senegal is a fascinating experiment in moving from a party monopoly to a multi-party state and would reward study by political scientists who are interested in political institutionalization. But to date it is unique and has not inspired imitation by other African rulers. A more typical path of electoral development in sub-Saharan Africa is the encouragement of institutionalized competition within a ruling

party. Kenya and Tanzania are good examples of this tendency. Kenya is probably the most unrestricted of Africa's one-party democracies, where elections regularly result in a high level of participation and a large turnover of elected politicians. In the November 1979 general election, more than 740 candidates competed for 158 elected parliamentary seats in the national assembly; seventy-two incumbent MPs, including seven ministers and fifteen assistant ministers, were defeated.⁵⁵ Similar results have occurred in previous Kenyan elections and also in Tanzanian elections, although the latter are more strictly controlled and do not exhibit the freewheeling character of Kenyan one-party democracy. Neither of these countries has suffered a successful military coup, which reinforces our impression that they have established the beginnings of a democratic tradition during their two decades of independence. The Kenyan experiment is the more impressive of the two, since that country has also experienced a presidential succession following the death of the founding father, Jomo Kenyatta, in 1978. Nyerere has been at the helm since Tanzania's independence in 1961 and lends his personal authority to that country's political procedures. The real test for the Tanzanian experiment will occur after Nyerere exits from the political stage that he has dominated for so long. These experiments in expanded political choice have more recently encouraged others in Zambia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Malawi, and Gabon. This may indicate that one-party democracy is better suited than multi-party democracy to the personal and communal idioms of African politics.

These African political experiments suggest the following conclusions, one practical and the other theoretical. First, democracy can be promoted by inventive political practitioners as well as by favorable socioeconomic processes, and the former do not necessarily have to wait upon the latter. Statesmen are to political development what entrepreneurs are to economic development. Indeed, they may be more important insofar as political development is less dependent on material resources and consists essentially in appropriate inclinations and conduct. Political development may be within the reach of countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, which are as yet too poor in resources to achieve much in the way of substantial economic development. Second, politics can therefore be understood theoretically as a (constructive and destructive) human activity as well as an impersonal process, and can be studied profitably in terms of choice, will, action, opposition, obligation, compulsion, persuasion, possession, and other elements of individual and intersocial volition, that is, in terms of neo-classical political theory.

NOTES

1. Only a few recent political science studies have centered upon rulership. Two important general statements are Dankwart A. Rustow, ed., *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (New York: George Braziller, 1970), and W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Among the more important African studies are Henry Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1966); John R. Cartwright, *Political Leadership in Sierra Leone* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978); Rene Lemarchand, ed., *African Kingships in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1977); Christopher Clapham, "Imperial Leadership in Ethiopia," *African Affairs*, 68 (April 1969); and Ali A. Mazrui, "Leadership in Africa: Obote of Uganda," *International Journal*, 25 (Summer 1970), 538-64.

2. This essay attempts to develop the theory of personal rule contained in our study entitled *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

3. This is the central theme of Reinhard Bendix's *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
4. The contrasting ideas in these variants of contemporary democracy are succinctly set out in C. B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1965).
5. Clifford Geertz, "The Judging of Nations: Some Comments on the Assessment of Regimes in the New States," *European Journal of Sociology*, 18 (1977), 252. While autocracy was not expected to prevail against democracy, it was sometimes recognized as a possibility given the magnitude of the problems of state-building facing African leaders: "The problems of stabilization and modernization that African leaders face are equivalent in magnitude to past crises in the West. It is from this perspective that we must view prospects for democracy in Africa. . . . Many developing countries have had to rely upon autocratic leadership when nascent democratic institutions have been unable to govern effectively." Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., "Democracy and the New African States," in Kenneth Kirkwood, ed., *African Affairs* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), No. 2, p. 53.
6. Very influential in the basic change of academic orientation was Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).
7. See Robert M. Price, "Politics and Culture in Contemporary Ghana: The Big Man-Small Boy Syndrome," *Journal of African Studies*, 1 (Summer 1974), 173-204; Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 5 (March 1972), 104-19; and Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March 1972), 68-90.
8. Steven Lukes, *Essays in Social Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 29.
9. Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 20-24.
10. This model is captured brilliantly in historical terms by Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), chs. 5 and 6.
11. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. by George Bull (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961).
12. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
13. Robert H. Jackson, "Political Stratification in Tropical Africa," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 7 (1973), 381-400.
14. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 55-56.
15. The literature on political clientelism is useful in understanding personal rule, although there is a tendency to emphasize structure at the expense of actors and behavior and therefore to understate the uncertainty, instability, and choice inherent in personal rule. For an outstanding volume of recent essays, see Steffan W. Schmidt, James C. Scott, Carl Landé, and Laura Guasti, eds., *Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); also see a comprehensive review in S. N. Eisenstadt and Louis Romigu, "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange," *Comparative Studies in Society and History: An International Quarterly*, 22 (January 1980), 42-77.
16. Machiavelli devotes a long discourse to conspiracies in *The Discourses*, ed. by Bernard Crick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 398-424.
17. See David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies of South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973).
18. A tendency toward the making of promises to local electorates has been noted even in socialist Tanzania, where personalism and specifically such practices as patronage, nepotism, and corruption are officially condemned. See Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2 (October 1972), 416.
19. F. G. Bailey, *Strategems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics* (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Co., 1969), p. 1.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
21. F. F. Ridley, *The Study of Government: Political Science and Public Administration* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975), p. 40.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 41; also see F. F. Ridley, "Political Institutions: The Script Not the Play," *Political Studies*, 23, 243-58.
23. V. S. Naipaul, "A New King for the Congo," *New York Review of Books*, June 16, 1975, pp. 19-25.
24. For the use of the metaphor in a cybernetic approach to governing (i.e., steering and feedback), see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: Free Press, 1966), ch. 11.
25. The Greek root of "govern" is *kubernan*, "to steer" *Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, ed. by C. T. Onions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 407.
26. This image is taken from Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (London: Methuen & Co., 1962), p. 127. In his most recent work it has become one of two dominant images of the modern state in western political thought: that of *universitas*, or a common-purpose, "enterprise associa-

- tion," and that of *societas*, or a non-purposive "civil association." See his *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 185–326.
27. Fritz Morstein Marx, *The Administrative State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965).
28. Richard M. Titmus, *Social Policy: An Introduction* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 23. The idea of "policy government" is explored in Robert H. Jackson, *Plural Societies and New States: A Conceptual Analysis*, Research Series No. 30 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1977), pp. 27–35.
29. Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 231.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
31. See James Cornford, ed., *The Failure of the State* (London: Croom Helm, 1975).
32. For an interesting analysis of the necessity of pragmatism or prudence in politics, see R. L. Nichols and D. M. White, "Politics Proper: On Action and Prudence," *Ethics*, 89 (July 1979), 372–84.
33. W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Politics and Social Science* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 347.
34. *Ibid.*
35. See Ladipo Adamolekun in *Afriscopes*, 5 (March 1975), 45.
36. See especially Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), ch. 2; Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Soldier and State in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5 (November 1967), 305–22; and Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
37. See, for example, Donald B. Cruise O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Jonathan S. Barker, "Political Factionalism in Senegal," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 7 (1973), 287–303; J. M. Lee, "Clan Loyalties and Socialist Doctrine in the People's Republic of Congo," *The World Today*, 27 (January 1971), 40–46; Dennis L. Dresang, "Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (December 1974), 1605–17; and Richard Stren, "Factional Politics and Control in Mombasa, 1960–1969," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 4 (Winter 1970), 33–56.
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