Single Party States and Agricultural Policies

The Cases of Ivory Coast and Kenya

Jennifer A. Widner

Embedded in both the discussions of economists at the World Bank and the popular discourse surrounding regime change in Africa is the notion that "political liberalization" will lead to better policy and economic management. In *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, the World Bank posits a causal relationship between the ability to contest policy and the quality of public sector management, or "governance."[1] A free press contributes to "development," it argues, by disseminating information relevant to policy decisions and, more important, by circulating news of poor management. The report goes on to make a number of stronger statements, however. Its authors note that, "because countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served their own interests without fear of being called to account" and cities Botswana and Mauritius, two countries with the best economic performance on the continent, as examples of the consequences of "effective parliamentary democracies." In this view, the more competitive the political system, the greater the probability of generating sustainable growth. In these statements, as in the rhetoric of opposition politicians across the African continent, the emphasis is on the notion that political competition generates accountability.

Extending this hypothesis, one view suggests that, where majorities are rural, more open political competition creates a more favorable policy environment for agriculture. There is a spectrum of competitiveness, and we should expect that single party systems with multicandidate elections will generate policies that benefit farmers more often than systems with elections in which a single candidate of the ruling party runs unopposed in a referendum-style election, as in single party list voting. More open multicandidate competition within single party states contributes significantly to development, in this view, because it grants individuals and social groups a resource, the vote, which they can use to favor political leaders who support policies that suit their interests. In this way, producers' groups and individual smallholders are able to exercise "voice" on behalf of policies that broadly favor their interests as a sector.

For example, a version of this view appears in some of the new analysis of the reasons for greater or lesser levels of "urban bias" in the policies of developing countries. Recent writing on the subject has hypothesized that competitive political institutions empower producers to block transfers of resources out of agriculture. It explains the "rural bias" observed in some developing countries as a function of the empowerment of voters through elections.[2]

While not disputing the claim that de facto multiparty systems may produce greater accountability to the interests of farmers in countries where smallholders make up a majority of the population, this article queries whether there is either a clear or a continuous relationship between increasing the scope for choice at the ballot box and improving the policy environment for agriculture in Africa. The article suggests that, with regard to their capacity to support broad national policies favorable to agriculture, most "semicompetitive" systems are alike—that gradations in degree of openness alter the incentive structure little. Rather, the relationship between "level of ability to contest policy" and the character of policy choices and outcomes is discontinuous: there is a major difference between the operation of "semicompetitive" systems, as a group, and the operation of multiparty systems in which opposition parties have a real chance to secure power. Increases in the frequency of elections, lifting of restrictions on types of candidates who can run for office, reductions in polling station "irregularities," none of these alter the incentive structure facing elected representatives in a way that favors adoption of policies with broad groups of "winners" such as those that form the core of a proagriculture platform.

Specifically, the electoral rules of single party systems make provision of "public goods," national policies which can not be divided into private benefits or highly localized community benefits, extremely difficult. Such policies—for example, producer price and exchange rate policies—are precisely the stuff of a profarmer program. This essay argues that, to the extent a government in a "semicompetitive" system generates such policies, it does so for reasons that have little to do with the character of the regime. Elections in single party states or even in multiparty systems where parties are new, many, and weakly developed have few of the important behavioral consequences of full-fledged multiparty democracy.

The article's findings also reinforce an earlier view articulated in the literature on Africa: that policies favorable to farmers have resulted primarily from the stake of senior political elites in the welfare of their own agricultural enterprises. In the African cases, policies that benefit farmers are supplied not as the result of legislators' responses to electoral incentives, but by decision makers who have property rights in agriculture and who can themselves capture the benefits of a favorable policy environment. Robert Bates and Michael Lofchie originally set forth these views in their work on the politics of agricultural policy.[3] In Africa's new but weak multiparty systems, many semicompetitive in all but name, their analyses still offer analytic leverage.

The paper probes these questions through a study of Ivory Coast and Kenya, two cases chosen for the comparability of their economies (both heavily dependent on earnings from export agriculture) and their variation over time in dependent and independent variables. Both of these countries have witnessed periods of greater and lesser competitiveness within the single party systems that dominated them until 1990 and 1992, respectively. In both cases, too, farmers have fared better in some years than in others.

The *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) has dominated Ivorian politics from the late 1950s to the present, but the degree of openness within the system has changed substantially within this period. From 1960 to 1980 the Ivorian electoral system sanctioned party-list voting. In a de jure single party system, voters could therefore either cast their ballots for the PDCI candidate or abstain. In 1980, after a short period of greater party competitiveness when President Félix Houphouët-Boigny incorporated new elites into the PDCI's governing political bureau to broaden participation, Ivory Coast moved to a multicandidate single party system, which it maintained until 1990, when opposition parties became legal.

The party system and party-state relations in Kenya between 1963 and 1980 paralleled those of Ivory Coast between 1980 and 1990. Kenya emerged from independence negotiations with a multiparty system that rapidly became single-party-dominant. Electoral rules sanctioned multicandidate elections and required candidates merely to sign a loyalty pledge to the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which Jomo Kenyatta chose to enforce only in very loose terms. Beginning in 1980, under President Daniel arap Moi, the office of the president and senior party officials intervened in outcomes and screened candidates more heavily, although the institution of multicandidate elections persisted. Politics became significantly less competitive after 1985, when the secret ballot was replaced with a "queuing" system, party disciplinary bodies were strengthened, significant numbers of politicians were expelled from the party and thus from political competition, and those who criticized the president's policies were detained.

This essay first treats the analytic argument in greater detail. It then considers the two cases. Each case discussion includes an analysis of the degree of competitiveness within the electoral system, an assessment of the extent of political linkage, an evaluation of the role of elected officials in policymaking, and a description of the policies generated during the period under study. Each section concludes with a summary of the implications of the data for the hypothesis.

The Argument

This article suggests that there is no straightforward relationship between the increasing of electoral competition and the quality of "governance" in the agricultural sector in countries with rural majorities. Regimes may alter electoral rules to invite higher levels of contestation. They may support races among candidates of a single party. But even where a majority of the voters are farmers, policies that broadly favor agriculture, as opposed to local interests, may not be passed and implemented. Gradually expanding levels of contestation do not result in parallel improvements in the quality of "governance."

Competitive multiparty systems create significantly different incentives for support of policies that generate public goods in agriculture than do semicompetitive systems of any type for two broad reasons. First, multiparty systems help solve a collective action problem common in semicompetitive alternatives. Economic policies that yield general, indivisible benefits are hard to generate because there is no clear, individual return to those who invest time and energy in building a coalition for their provision. In semicompetitive systems, voters have no incentive to support candidates who favor such stands. If elected, the candidate who backs such broad policy reforms will simply be one among many, and the likelihood that the candidate's position will secure passage is very low. Robert Bates suggests that, by contrast, in multiparty systems there is a rationale for choosing candidates on the basis of their stands on such national issues. If elected, the candidate might join with others from the same party to forge a voting block. The expected value of a ballot cast for a "national issue," such as producer price policy, is thus greater than it would be in a single party competitive election.[4]

Second, competitive party systems help provide incentives for politicians to bear the costs of organizing reform platforms. First, parties are different from factions in that they have independent organizational bases and personnel to carry out administrative tasks. The party leadership can demand that candidates who carry the party banner contribute to reform efforts. That is, it can demand that each candidate who claims affiliation with the party take time out from the pursuit of purely local interests or even attenuate local demands to support national policies. If candidates fail to do so, they will lose access to the party's broader banner and to the help of its fundraisers.

The factions that proliferate in most single party systems provide a poor base for pursuit of national level policy changes in another respect as well. Where there are a high degree of factional competition and no clear and enduring organizational base for any subgroup, candidates are less likely to take a stand on a reform issue than simply to break with one ad hoc group and move to another. They have little incentive to demand changes in the positions held by other faction members. To do so would take investment of time if not of money and the creation from scratch of channels for articulating and discussing demands.[5]

The point is not only that single party elections fail to generate incentives for provision of public goods or policies that generate "lump-sum" or indivisible benefits, but also that there is little difference among semicompetitive systems in capacity to generate such outcomes. In this respect, single party systems with multicandidate elections (or new multiparty systems in which parties are weakly organized) are no different from single party systems in which candidates run unopposed and competition is more tightly restricted. Although greater openness within the single party system may increase the flow of information, support limited contestation of policies, and thereby lead to a better distribution of private goods, it does not create a base for many of the policies central to economic reform packages. Aid donors and others who pin their hopes for improved agricultural policy on small improvements in political "competitiveness" should redirect their attention either to altering rent-seeking opportunities for elites and making agricultural enterprise, including agro-industry, more important to leaders' pocketbooks or to furthering the creation of farmers' unions.

Ivory Coast: Party-List Voting and Agricultural Policy, 1960–1980

In Ivory Coast, the party system remained closed to significant political competition in the years immediately following independence. Ivory Coast's formal system of representation did not sanction contests for either electoral positions or party posts. Party-list voting in a single party system meant that the name of only one candidate appeared on the ballot in legislative elections. Competition for party office was also limited.

Counter to what many current analyses would lead analysts to expect, however, in the absence of any electoral imperative Ivory Coast's governing elites provided a relatively favorable environment for agriculture during this period, compared to other African countries (the record is less good when illuminated by data on policies from Southeast Asia). First, producer price shares—the share of the world price received by the farmer—were relatively high compared to producer price shares in many other African countries. Data from the 1960s are very difficult to secure, but we do know that in comparison to neighboring cocoa and coffee producing countries Ivory Coast offered its farmers about 50 to 60 percent of the world price, on average, lower than in some periods in Cameroon and

Kenya, but higher than in neighboring countries.[6] The government offered stable real prices to farmers, allowing the producer price to drop in real terms only in 1963–64 and, much later, in 1989. Second, until the mid 1970s Ivory Coast invested in the forest zone, building road networks and classrooms and electrifying some villages. After 1974 it began to transfer funds out of cocoa and coffee production and into cotton-growing areas of the north, sugar plantations and factories, and a variety of infrastructure projects. Although not all of the benefits accrued to the urban areas, a substantial portion of the funds invested in rural areas was misspent and never yielded a positive return.

Electoral Rules, the Party System, and Political Linkage Between 1960 and 1980 there was no clear linkage between voter demands and the actions of elected officials, the condition required to sustain the hypothesis that greater levels of competitiveness yield more favorable policy environments for agriculture. First, the electoral rules of Ivory Coast's one-party system did not favor the development of accountability and representation between legislators and producer groups, such as farmers and new businessmen. During this period, the constitution provided only for single candidate elections. The PDCI leadership held the right to screen and appoint nominees for both party office and legislative seats. In this system, those who aspired to become *députés* to the national assembly in Abidjan needed to curry favor, not with the electorate, but with the party hierarchy. This meant appealing first to the *secrétaires généraux*, the men and women who acted as links between the PDCI leadership, or political bureau, and the small party *comités* in the villages and urban *quartiers*, which replaced the official ethnic associations that ran local party affairs until 1972. In reality, however, members of the party's political bureau wielded ultimate nominating power, and ambitious candidates sought to establish ties directly with this elite, sometimes bypassing the local officers of the PDCI.

Although political aspirants had to lobby hard for the leadership's backing, this system provided little incentive to cultivate support among voters and to make legislators or party officials responsive to the interests of Ivorian farmers and entrepreneurs. Indeed, it promoted growing division between the party leadership and the mass base with which the PDCI had initially ventured into politics. It led first to the collapse of the party as a center of political authority important in the day-to-day lives of the citizens and the affairs of government and later to the transformation of the party into a locus of bargaining between elites, with little direct accountability to producer groups.

The electoral rules precipitated these changes. Because their own positions did not depend on their popularity or their success in promoting candidates acceptable to the voters, the *secrétaires généraux* clung to their positions for long periods, giving rise both to some discontinuity in interests between the party and the citizenry and to a generation gap. In addition to clearing candidates for legislative office and keeping an eye on dissent, the party's only function at the local level was to collect dues in exchange for the party identification cards required of every citizen. In most cases, this annual tax assessment was the only contact a resident had with "the party," outside of occasions when the *secrétaire général* joined the *sous-préfet*, village or *quartier comité* president, and local notables in resolving a dispute or transmitting information about producer prices.[7] There was no competitive pressure to force party officials to build popular bases of support through creation of patronage ties or through generation of local development projects.[8] In essence, the village party presidents and the *secrétaires généraux* became tax collectors who benefited themselves, to varying degrees and usually on quite a limited scale, from the party coffers, but who rarely, if ever, presided over party-sponsored projects in their local areas. In consequence, few residents perceived the party to have a representative function. It became, instead, a long arm of the government in Abidjan, but usually one that reached only for the annual tax. This perception was deepened in some areas by the appearance of a close, direct relationship between the administration and the party: few of the *secrétaires généraux* had adequate means of transport to visit the villages under their purview and many had to develop close ties with local *sous-préfets* in order to travel.[9]

The absence of strong links between the voters, on the one hand, and the party and the government, on the other, also manifested itself in constant intergenerational conflict within Ivory Coast. Younger local elites who wanted to gain access to the perks associated with political careers were often blocked from doing so by the overwhelming local power of the *anciens*, the older generation. Even by 1985, after the inauguration of competitive single party elections for both *députés* and party posts, over 44 percent of the *secrétaires généraux* were cadres born before 1931. Of the remainder, 35 percent were born between 1931 and 1940, and 16 percent between 1941 and 1950.[10]

Dissatisfaction with the limited opportunities for influence in this system precipitated occasional outbursts of discontent among younger local elites, usually the urban-based sons of families prominent in a region. Indeed, discontent became so severe in the early 1970s that in 1974 the president decided to sponsor a week-long conference to address the deficiencies of the party and the civil service. A "Year of Dialogue" followed (see the Appendix), and the party congress of October 1975 expanded the number of ministers and significantly increased the proportion of young technocrats in the group, leaving only six *anciens*. In 1977, popular grumbling about the level of corruption within the party's ranks provoked presidential orders to clean house and reduce ostentatious standards of living among party leaders. Later, the president himself expressed public annoyance with the party's lower-level officials, the *secrétaires*, saying: "The dialogue that we initiated at the summit [of the party] no long finds echoes at the *sous-section*, in the *quartier* committee, or in the village. . . . [These party officials] need to understand the necessity of certain sacrifices."[11]

Houphouët-Boigny's second response to discontent was to incorporate "radicals" into the cabinet and the political bureau of the PDCI at frequent intervals, usually after convening "days of dialogue" or a national seminar. The president installed younger technocrats in positions of power in 1966, 1970–71, 1975, and 1977, sometimes displacing long-time friends and allies and sometimes simply augmenting the size of the governing bodies. These changes opened the upper ranks of the political elite in order to accommodate the interests of new political entrepreneurs, including once-jailed student leaders. What they did not do was to open the lower ranks of the party to new faces or to strengthen links between the citizenry and the leadership, those local-center ties so central to the empowerment of the rural sector.[12]

To the extent that the middle ranks of the PDCI began to incorporate the new generation, including emerging leaders with rural ties, they did so through the efforts of Philippe Yacé, then a likely successor to the president. Yacé tried to improve his prospects for appointment to the country's highest office by using his authority in the political bureau to turn the party into a personal machine. He sought to break the grip of other *anciens* and cultivate a national-level political following by pushing for greater openness in the election of party officials and by bolstering the fortunes of younger elites.

If these efforts expanded regime support among a frustrated younger generation, they did little to turn the party into a representative institution at the local level. Further, the president became uneasy about the growing power of party "barons" who seemed to be running for the presidency before he was willing to leave. Yacé gradually lost presidential favor during the late 1970s, and the president initiated selective judicial proceedings against party officials accused of embezzling public funds. He also tried to shatter the bases of the new barons through the inauguration of multicandidate legislative elections.[13]

The *Député* and the Policy Process In the period 1960–1980 the president and the party increasingly incorporated new elites into the governing ranks, demonstrating greater flexibility and openness than in many African single party systems, but electoral rules undermined the creation of strong links between voters and the leadership. Accountability through the mechanism of elections was limited in another respect, as well. In Ivory Coast, as in many countries, the function of *députés* in the national assembly was less to articulate demands than to pass legislation initiated by the government.

The formal responsibilities of the national assembly include proposal of legislation in conjunction with the government, closed-door debate of initiatives in commissions created by the president of the national assembly, and debate of bills in a general session, or *séance plénière*, which may or may not be public.[14] In practice, before the 1980s and to a large extent since then the government has assumed responsibility for legislative initiative, and most *séances plénières* have remained behind closed doors. Indeed, most *députés* have wielded little influence over policies that affect their home regions. As a member of the franc zone, Ivory Coast has not had the capacity to control its exchange rate. Even with regard to producer price policy, however, the *députés* have had little leverage over the government. Prices are set by the *Caisse de stabilisation*, or Caistab, in consultation with the president. The assembly appears to have little formal power to affect Caistab policy choices directly, for example, through refusal to extend budgetary appropriations or to demand loans from the fund's reserves.

Because of the formal and informal rules that surrounded the activities of assembly members, and because there was no need to compete for votes at the local level, lobbying for local benefits and pork barrel projects remained primarily the preserve of a privileged few who had access to government decision making outside the halls of the parliament, by and large men with aspirations to ministerial posts or other national office who sought to build regional or national patronage networks. Their purpose appears to have been to build followings that could be counted upon to move into the streets when the patron's power was challenged. Such local benefits went primarily to the home areas of the president (Yamoussoukro), the party chief Philippe Yacé (Jacqueville), army chief Koudio M'Bahia Ble (M'Bahiakro), and the Coulibaly family (Korhogo). Despite complaints in the assembly and on the streets, many other regional capitals were underfunded and without basic services.[15]

Policy Outcomes Despite the absence of electoral rules and institutions which could empower producer groups, whether farmers, small businessmen, or industrialists, the policies the government chose and implemented between 1960 and 1975 included payment of relatively high and stable producer prices for export crops and comparatively sound management of key agricultural parastatals. Farmgate prices as a proportion of world prices varied, as is characteristic of countries which seek to stabilize prices for farmers; a portion of the receipts were collected and allegedly saved when world prices were high, and farmers were subsidized from the accumulated funds when prices were low. On average, farmers received 50 percent of the world price for cocoa and 70 percent of the world price for coffee.[16]

The exchange rate was neither significantly undervalued nor overvalued during the period. Technically, the Ivorian government had little control over exchange rates because it participated in the French-backed franc zone through the West African Monetary Union and the *Banque Centrale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (BCEAO), along with Senegal, Niger, Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Togo. The CFA franc, which Ivory Coast used, was fully convertible into French francs at a fixed rate of exchange. The rate of exchange could be altered only by unanimous agreement among the members of the union, including France. The BCEAO managed the country's reserves, along with those of other member states. During the period 1960–80, the French franc was weak on international exchanges, preventing the overvaluation of member states' currencies. Further, continued French technical participation in the management of governmental financial affairs may have helped limit creation of the large deficits incurred by many countries outside the zone during these years.[17] Nonetheless, the monetary policies adopted by the BCEAO required unanimous support of members, and during this time the Ivorian government did not press to overvalue the currency, as so many other governments not linked to the zone had done.

How much of Ivory Coast's revenues went to provision of local benefits or "pork barrel" projects during this period is difficult to assess. Certainly, more amenities were constructed in the home towns of the most senior officials than in others, as noted above. Further, as tension over representation of regional elites in the upper ranks of the party and government increased in the early 1970s, the president inaugurated a series of large and extraordinarily expensive projects in regional centers, which eventually totaled over 100 billion CFA. The best known of these was the massive and poorly planned effort to bring development to the northern part of the country. The government poured money into the creation of irrigated sugar plantations and factories destined to produce sugar at costs above projected world market prices. Such lavish expenditures on the SODESUCRE program also encouraged mismanagement of money; in 1982 alone, "overbilling" wiped out the entire value added of the company, about 10 billion CFAF.[18] Expressions of concern by elites over the higher rates of inflation and diversion of monies which resulted led to withdrawal of blueprints for comparable investments in agro-processing and iron mining programs in the west.

In this phase, when Ivory Coast was able to support relatively high agricultural producer prices and sustain its participation in a monetary regime that limited overvaluation of the currency, the individual economic interests of the governing elite were the strongest determinants of policy choice. Pressure from local voters in rural areas had relatively little influence on policy outcomes. Under the single party list voting system in place, competition for votes was nearly nonexistent. In Ivory Coast, however, the governors themselves had personal stakes in agriculture. Houphouët and many of the political leaders who held high office around him acquired extensive farm interests. Houphouët inherited large amounts of land around Yamoussoukro upon the death of his maternal uncle in 1940. He later increased his family fields, which some say are now equivalent in size to a French *département*.[19] Senior leaders of the party and close advisors to the president are also major landholders, although the secrecy surrounding land ownership and economic opportunities makes a systematic assessment of their holdings impossible. Philippe Yacé's holdings account for about ten percent of the country's export pineapple production, a sector in which there is noticeably little government involvement in marketing. René Ekra, one of the republic's founders, Henri Konan Bedié, a former minister of agriculture, A. Sawadogo, and other members of the country's elite derive substantial income from agricultural activities.

Ivory Coast: *Démocratie à l'Ivoirienne* and Agricultural Policy, 1980–90

The electoral rules in Ivory Coast's single party state changed significantly in 1980. The competitiveness of the political system increased. The president initiated the changes first at the municipal level in 1978 and later at the national level in the wake of popular rumblings about corruption and hints that "barons" had started to build significant political machines.[20] In 1978 Houphouët pushed for limited PDCI control over screening of candidates for municipal elections and inaugurated a debate over electoral rules within the party. In 1979–80 the electoral system and the party were "democratized" through multicandidate elections, expansion of the size of the national assembly, reduction in the number of members of the PDCI's *bureau politique* from seventy to thirty-two and retirement of nine key *anciens*, reduction in the size of the party's *comité directeur*, an *ancien* stronghold, from 201 to one-hundred members, and creation of a *comité exécutif* within the party, with a larger than usual proportion of *jeunes*, to advise the president.[21] In 1980, 249 candidates contended for 147 assembly seats in the first multicandidate legislative elections in the country's history.

The electoral test highlighted the divergence between the actions of the older political elite and the interests of the voters, although a mere forty percent of those eligible cast ballots. Of eighty incumbents,[22] only twenty-seven retained their seats. Those elected or reelected mostly belonged to urban elites, such as middle-level civil servants and teachers, and participated in local development projects in their home areas during previous years.[23] Many of the defeated elite deputies were reluctant to cede their posts, however, and in the year and a half following the election numerous conflicts arose between those displaced and the supporters of the new figures. Many of the successful *députés* who had contested the positions of local PDCI favorites suggested that they were independent of the party, and in 1981 the president convened a closed-door "reconciliation" meeting to bring them back into the PDCI fold, followed by the dispatch of "peace missions" to resolve feuds in Man, Korhogo, Bouaflé, Teningboué, Katiola, and Guitry.

If politicians now had to pay more attention to the voters than in the past, they nonetheless continued to have little ability to influence policy through the legislature. When six of the new members called on the assembly president, Henri Konan Bedié, to explain the use of the parliamentary budget, Bedié suspended the challengers. The man suspected of paying the six to pose their questions, Abidjan's mayor Emmanuel Dioulo, was later charged with serious corruption. As the country plunged more deeply into economic recession, Houphouët and Bedié tried to control discontent among the elite by expanding the opportunities of elected officials to raise issues for discussion in parliament, within a tightly controlled format. For example, in July 1986 the assembly inaugurated a general debate during which *députés* could express their views more openly. The president of the assembly set the themes for discussion, however, and when one *député* asked to address topics not included on the list, Bedié did not oblige. Bedié's reiteration that the *députés* could, nonetheless, speak openly met with laughter from the participants.[24] Several députés requested that the procedures used for the general debate be extended to ordinary sessions of the assembly. For example, one said: "This would allow the introduction of real freedom of expression . . . and would turn us away from sterile criticism . . . toward open, fertile, and constructive criticism."[25]

The change in parliamentary process was temporary, however. At the conclusion of the debate the assembly returned to the former constraints on discussion. Only in 1990 did the president initiate significant changes. In May 1990 Houphouët announced the legalization of opposition political parties and the intention to hold legislative and presidential elections under this new regime by the end of the year. The elections took place, as scheduled, with the PDCI winning overwhelmingly at the polls. This outcome surprised few; the PDCI and the president retained monopoly control of critical electoral resources, which made it difficult for the quickly formed alternative parties to build constituencies in the rural areas.

If the shift to multicandidate elections forced political aspirants to pay somewhat greater attention to voters, it had little effect on the ability of *députés* to monitor and influence policy. The new personnel whom the change in electoral rules admitted to the governing ranks subjected the political process to greater scrutiny. The profligate political machine Yacé had created to advance his own interests was a magnet for discontent. In the aftermath of Yacé's replacement as head of the national assembly, there was a crackdown on personal use of party funds that resulted in prosecution of seven *secrétaires* in public tribunals.[26] The president had never relied heavily on the party as a vehicle for governing the country, and he could easily afford to let the new *députés* try to reform the institution as long as they did not seek the supremacy of a single set of views. Houphouët had considerable incentive to allow the new members of the political elite to clean house at the party by ridding it of the vestiges of the machine Yacé had constructed.

Indeed, in the period 1960–90 it is difficult to document any expansion in the "localism" often associated with increases in political competition. Certainly, there were a few entrepreneurial *députés* who sought projects for their home areas. However, in most cases, these politicians directly addressed aid donors. Other forms of divisible benefits, such as the exchange of jobs in the burgeoning public enterprise sector for electoral support, actually diminished. In 1979, by presidential fiat, the government undertook to dissolve fifteen public enterprises, alter the mandates of eleven, and merge three.[27]

Although political competitiveness was greater from 1980 to 1990 than from 1960 to 1979, policies did not clearly reflect the greater empowerment of voters or farmers, who constituted the majority. Indeed, greater electoral competitiveness within the confines of the single party system produced no gains for smallholder agriculture. Producer prices for key export crops remained stable, in real terms, until the late 1980s. Because world prices fell during this time, the Caistab's margin diminished steadily, until the fund began to subsidize producers of coffee and cocoa at the rate of $1 per kilogram. The World Bank and international commodities associations began to pressure the government to lower the producer prices paid to farmers. The government did not do so until 1989, when it cut cocoa and coffee prices by half. Even though *députés* were now more dependent upon voter approval than in the past, the assembly did not protest Caistab's decision.

Moreover, during this period the CFA became increasingly overvalued, which in effect levied an extra tax on the farming sector. As a participant in the franc zone, Ivory Coast could not unilaterally devalue its currency. Nonetheless, the actions of central government officials reflect little significant action to try to remedy the problem within the bounds of what was possible. Nicolas van de Walle notes that "one of the most striking aspects of the crisis is the support that the currency continues to garner from West African elites." "None of the 14 countries in the Zone have sought to leave . . . during the current economic debacle, and there have been few if any calls for even minor modifications to attempt to come to terms with the current problems."[28]

Démocratie à l'Ivoirienne, the shift from single party list voting to multicandidate single party elections, did not result in greater support for agricultural policies with a "public goods" character. The Ivorian case does not support the thesis that in countries with rural majorities the passage and implementation of "profarmer" legislation increase with greater levels of political competitiveness and reduced levels of urban bias. Instead the ability of senior decision makers to capture some of the benefits that flow from improved agricultural performance provides an inducement to them to support profarmer policies.

Kenya: Multicandidate Elections and Agricultural Policy, 1963–1980

Superficially, the Kenyan case appears to sustain the argument that higher levels of political competitiveness produce better policy outcomes for agriculture. During the 1960s and 1970s Kenya offered comparatively high producer prices to export crop growers and avoided overvaluing the currency to the same degree as neighboring countries. At the same time, the government sponsored regular, multicandidate elections, and President Jomo Kenyatta tolerated a degree of policy debate among ministers and within parliament, although the main opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), lost the ability to function effectively, and J. M. Kariuki, who posed a threat to the economic interests of those closest to Kenyatta, was assassinated in 1975. During the middle and late 1980s the policy environment became less favorable to farmers, particularly to the Kikuyu farming communities in Central Province. The changes in policy corresponded with the imposition of significant new restrictions on the rights of speech and association by the government of Daniel arap Moi.

Closer examination of the forms of political linkage that have prevailed in Kenya and of the abilities of members of parliament to influence government policy suggests a need to reassess the Kenyan case. First, the character of political linkage provided incentive for provision of local benefits, not support for broad national policies with a "public goods" character. Although until the 1980s members of parliament certainly debated agricultural policy openly in the legislature—to a greater degree than Ivorian *députés* between 1980 and 1990—more often than not the ability to deliver local benefits, that is, pork barrel, affected a politician's chances of success at the ballot box. Stands on broad national issues such as producer prices and exchange rate parity were significantly less important. Second, to the extent that politicians formed coalitions on behalf of a "favorable policy environment" and showed the ability to significantly alter the balance of power with KANU or pose a credible electoral threat to key members of the president's coalition, the president intervened to constrain or eliminate their base of power. Such was the fate of J. M. Kariuki and Jean Marie Seronney.

Far more important in providing an impetus to high producer prices and exchange rate policies favorable to farmers was the fact that many members of Kenya's governing elite owned land and derived income from agricultural production, particularly the sale of export crops. Further, there was sufficient political openness to permit formulation of agricultural unions. Although the government maintained various forms of control over these unions, the meetings they sponsored and the ability of their leaders and activists to communicate with their membership made possible the growth of significant countervailing power.

Although regular, multicandidate elections continued after 1980, the ability of candidates to debate policy during campaigns diminished sharply, as did the degree of freedom of politicians within parliament. Also significant, however, was the reduction in the countervailing power of the farming community through restriction and deregistration of key agricultural unions and the reduced personal dependence of political elites on agricultural income. Increased authoritarianism played a role in changing the character of the policy environment, but it did so only secondarily through constraints on electoral competition. In the first instance, what mattered most was the reduction in the capacity of farmers to exert countervailing power. Reduced competitiveness of the (nonetheless regular, multicandidate) elections affected policy outcomes primarily by making it difficult or impossible for members of parliament to defend rights of association.

Electoral Rules, the Party System, and Political Linkage At independence in 1963, Kenya had a multiparty parliamentary system dominated by the Kenya African National Union. In 1964, the country became a republic, with Jomo Kenyatta its directly elected president. After key members of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) crossed party lines and took up positions in KANU, the country became single-party-dominant. Under Kenyatta's direction, however, the KANU party hierarchy limited the screening of candidates on the basis of "loyalty" to a party platform, which existed only in the vaguest of forms, and tolerated competition among multiple candidates with the same party affiliation. The president viewed opposition parties less sanguinely, and with his sanction his lieutenants took steps to block the activities of the only one of these to gather strength, the Kenya People's Union. Thus, between 1963 and 1980 Kenya had a single party system with regular multicandidate elections, similar in structure to the Ivory Coast after 1980.

Within this system, aspirants to public office had to campaign vigorously in their constituencies for voter support. Just as the elections subsequent to the 1980 rule change in Ivory Coast promoted the fortunes of "developmentally minded" elites with records of participation in rural development schemes, so the Kenyan system encouraged candidates to invest in projects in their constituencies. With Kenyatta's encouragement, communities demanded candidate contribution to *harambee*, or local self-help development projects, and politicians raced to supply funds and "big men" who could be counted on to deliver additional capital and visibility. At a *harambee* gathering, a local sponsor—a candidate for public office or a local notable—organized contributions from the community in the form of a few shillings' donation per person or goods and services in kind for the purpose of constructing a church, classroom, cattle dip, well, or other amenity needed by local residents. At the inauguration of the project, visitors from other areas might attend and offer both speeches and additional contributions. *Harambee* rapidly became the currency of politics in the country and even the basis of coalition building between elites from different regions.[29]

Competition for votes in multicandidate elections created a particular kind of political linkage between Kenyans and elected officials. The careful studies conducted by Joel Barkan and Frank Holmquist have revealed that Kenyan voters expected candidates and officeholders to deliver local benefits (localized "public goods," such as classrooms or a cattle dip) and that most politicians devoted the time they spent in their constituencies to discussion of these matters. Barkan has reported that during the later part of this period, MPs devoted over 70 percent of their time in their constituencies to discussing district matters and no timed at all to discussing national issues.[30] The dominance of local matters provided voters with power they lacked in other parts of Africa, as Barkan has noted.[31] It produced a direct flow of patronage from the political elite to rural communities. Further, when residents of an area held a successful *harambee* and created a school, cattle dip, or other facility, the government often stepped in to provide staffing or maintenance. To the degree that the choice of projects rested with the voters, then, farmers could affect the distribution of resources and policy emphases, at least in a minor way. As Frank Holmquist has noted in his research, self-help took the exclusive right of project initiative away from the ministries. It forced some elements of the farmers' agendas on to the state and prevented the interests of the political elite and the technocrats from dominating fully.[32]

The party itself remained loosely organized or "weak" as a vehicle for aggregating and channeling demands and influencing policy. Although the radical elements of the party eventually left to form the KPU, which was subsequently prevented from contesting elections, Kenyatta steadfastly resisted any attempts by politicians of any political perspective to turn the organization to their own ends. He blocked the creation of a KANU training institute, whose establishment would have forced clear definition of a platform and divisive debates about who should and should not be a party member. Similarly, until he became quite ill, he repelled efforts by those closest to him to exclude younger politicians who favored faster and more extensive redistribution of land and greater attention to the needs of Kenya's less well off. Thus, KANU remained an avenue to the political elite for many members of the younger generation. At least partly in consequence, Kenya during the Kenyatta period endured fewer intergenerational struggles than did Ivory Coast.

The MP and the Policy Process Although multicandidate single party elections in Kenya created a kind of political linkage, they did not help generate support for broad national policies that would benefit agricultural producers. As a vote-getting strategy, support of higher producer prices and resistance to overvaluation of the exchange rate were simply nonstarters in most areas. Politicians had scarce resources with which to build bases. Channeling government monies into local projects and supporting *harambee* projects could deliver the votes of a segment of the community. Where a single clan or ethnic community dominated, then ethnic idiom could, at times, also prove to be useful in formulating appeals. Only where the presence of settlement schemes or the existence of high levels of in-migration had created ethnic heterogeneity and given most residents similar economic bases did broad, "populist" appeals prove at all effective in campaigns. At the national level, the incentive was even less clear, and aside from J. M. Kariuki and a few "Rift Valley rebels" active between 1972 and 1975 few politicians sought to pursue such programs on the floor of parliament.

As in the case of Ivory Coast, members of parliament also had relatively little direct ability to influence policy outcomes. The Kenyan parliamentary system was substantially more open than the Ivorian national assembly. Although outsiders could not take notes of proceedings without special permission, general debates did take place, with broad participation, and transcriptions appeared in an official journal, where members of the public who were so inclined could read them. Members of parliament theoretically possessed immunity against prosecution for comments made within the halls of the legislature, although this protection was always tenuous and toward the end of Kenyatta's reign several members, including a deputy speaker, were detained for statements they had made. Nonetheless, as in the Ivorian case, the government had primary control over initiation of laws and appropriations. Members were reduced in most cases to quizzing ministers and permanent secretaries about the operation of their departments. Further, there was no electoral sanction for failure to obey the intentions or wishes of parliament. Government business proceeded with relatively little regard for the views of members, and, with the exception of the periods immediately after independence and between 1972 and 1975, few members established themselves as coherent voices on national policy matters.

Control over agricultural policy resided with the administration and with a small group of politicians who had shown themselves capable of delivering the support of an important constituency to the regime and of maintaining it from election to election. These politicians, whom the president appointed to the cabinet and to positions on statutory boards, derived their influence from their expertise as machine politicians at the national level and their ability to keep local residents from their constituencies satisfied.

Policy Outcomes During the Kenyatta period, Kenyan agricultural earnings grew at a prodigious rate, as much as 3.4 percent to 4 percent per year. The reason lay in substantial part with the producer price incentives the government offered farmers. Unlike many of its neighbors, Kenya paid growers of export crops a relatively high proportion of the world price, usually between 70 and 90 percent (compared to Ivory Coast's 50 to 70 percent). It chose not to stabilize crop prices but rather to adopt a "throughout" or "passthrough" system in which the world price was simply passed on to farmers after marketing costs incurred by the marketing board or parastatal were deducted.[33]

Kenya also differed from many other African countries in choosing a policy of flexible exchange rate adjustments. This system made possible a series of downward adjustments and prevented significant overvaluation of the Kenya shilling. Lofchie and others estimate that the unofficial exchange rate or shadow market rate of the Kenya shilling "rarely exceeded the official rate by more than 20 percent."[34]

The support for high producer prices and pressure against overvaluation of the currency derived from the personal interests of senior officials in agriculture, not from the pressures created by the fairly open but nonetheless only "semicompetitive" electoral system. The elections produced a kind of linkage, to be sure, but not the type required for generation of higher producer prices. Further, without the risk that KANU might lose its majority, there was no assurance that government leaders would feel impelled to listen to parliamentarians. Alternative explanations are more compelling. Many of the Kenyatta era's leaders held land and earned income from sale of cash crops. Even the nascent "opposition" invested heavily in land; J. M. Kariuki possessed extensive tracts. Further, between 1961 and 1966, maintaining a policy environment favorable to agriculture was one of the few ways in which Kenyatta could hold together a shaky coalition between the former Mau Mau, who fought to secure land on which to farm and were still armed and in hiding at independence, and the emerging agricultural bourgeoisie, some of whose members had allied themselves with the loyalists during the Mau Mau emergency. Even so, the president relied heavily on distribution of private benefits, such as plots of land, to secure his base. Finally, Kenya's agricultural sector was populated not just by individual farmers, but also by cooperatives and farmers' unions which had the ability to burn stocks or boycott international sales and thus erode the revenue base of the new state. Because Kenya entered the independence era with significant debts to Britain, the former colonial power, it depended heavily on dramatic expansion of export crop sales to help increase the public treasury. Expansion meant offering farmers a price incentive, one that would make it worth the while of some to buy new land in the former White Highlands and bring it into production. Simply levying higher taxes would have produced a retreat from the marketplace.

Political Change and Policy Consequences in Kenya, 1985–1990

Kenya experienced significant political change after 1985. Under Daniel arap Moi reliance on the intercession of "barons" with their clients on behalf of policies and personnel began to replace management of demands through institutional mechanisms. Members of parliament lost much of their ability to alter proposed legislation and to criticize government policy. The provincial administration still handled many functions in accordance with impersonal procedures and criteria. Particularly in Nairobi, however, bureaucrats became increasingly anxious about potential disapproval of their activities by the office of the president and were hesitant to make controversial decisions on their own.

Especially after 1985 the government took steps to increase the discretion of the president in political affairs. The party became an instrument of political and social control, not the loose federation of points of view it had been under Kenyatta, although it remained extremely weak as a body for aggregating and communicating the interests of the population. KANU increasingly enforced the loyalty oath against its members, on several occasions expelling MPs critical of the government from its ranks. It also created a highly unpopular youth wing to monitor dissent and act as a "watchdog." The party's police function expanded to include assistance rendered to the police in monitoring public places such as bars, hotels, and restaurants.

Electoral rules changed, too. The secret ballot diminished in importance, to be replaced by a queuing system in which voters had to line up behind the candidate they favored in order to be counted. Further, in 1987 KANU sought to implement a system of preliminary elections in which party members would select the top three candidates from among those interested in seeking a parliamentary post; candidates who secured 70 percent of the vote would advance to the general election unopposed. This provision limited the opportunity for party members critical of existing policies to gain a hearing.

Moreover, KANU abrogated parliamentary immunity with increasing frequency. Earlier, members of parliament enjoyed protection from prosecution for statements uttered in the halls of the assembly. Without this immunity, argued the framers of the country's constitution, MPs would not be willing to criticize the activities of ministries, and there would be little meaningful debate. However, beginning in 1988, KANU violated this immunity on several occasions.

Finally, KANU began to absorb other bodies that had long fulfilled representative functions. In 1988 the new finance minister, George Saitoti, announced that lawyers would have to register their activities under the Trade Licensing Act, which effectively gave the president the ability to close the practice of any lawyer of whose activities or views he disapproved. The Law Society of Kenya saw this as a preliminary step to the incorporation of the lawyers' association into the party. The Law Society was in fact spared, but other groups were not. In June 1990 KANU made official an association with *Maendeleo ya Wanawake*, the national women's organization. It also announced that the national confederation of trade unions would associate itself with the party, linking the already centrally controlled labor movement still more closely with the regime.

The decline of electoral competitiveness and the central manipulation of *harambee* (a practice common during the Kenyatta era as well) undermined independent political linkage between MPs and voters.[35] KANU also dismantled or weakened the associations that had wielded countervailing power and used strikes and boycotts to influence policy. Finally, it tried to remove Central Province business leaders and farmers, such as multiparty movement leader Kenneth Matiba, from their positions of political strength by fragmenting their political bases, monitoring their activities, manipulating their access to credit and services, and threatening police harassment.

What consequences did these changes have for the policy environment in the agricultural sector? The hypothesis that, in a country with a rural majority, increases in the competitiveness of elections encourage legislators to supply broad national policies favorable to farmers implies that, when representatives are under no such pressures, they may attenuate their surveillance of public management in the sector or cease efforts to continue policies that benefit farmers. The Kenyan record since 1985 offers only very weak evidence for this argument and suggests that the direct interest of leaders and policymakers in farm enterprises or businesses dependent on revenues related to export agriculture continued to be a more important influence.

First, the government continued to support higher producer price shares to growers of key export crops. In the period from 1986 to 1990, those who farmed coffee and tea received a higher share of the international reference price than they had in earlier years. Coffee growers secured 95 percent of the international price, compared to 82 percent between 1975 and 1979 and 88 percent between 1980 and 1985. Tea producers secured 109 percent of the international reference price, in part a reflection of the premium commanded by the high quality of the leaves harvested, compared to 103 percent between 1975 and 1979 and 99 percent in the years 1980–85.[36] Exchange rate overvaluation fluctuated but was on average lower than in previous periods, falling from 17 percent in 1980–85 to 7 percent in 1985–90.[37] With respect to maintenance of the kinds of broad national policies that constitute "public goods," then, the decline in the competitiveness of elections did not have the expected effect. Variations in the degree of openness of the single party system had little impact on the supply of a favorable policy environment for agriculture.

There were some signs that the quality of parastatal management started to decline, however. Marketing boards were potentially important revenue sources for political machines, and the benefits they provided growers could also be manipulated to favor those who supported the Moi government. In some cases, government producer price policies were altered to eliminate differentials in prices between regions based on the quality of harvests delivered, a step that favored farmers from Moi's base in the Rift Valley and western areas.

In the tea sector, where the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) had long claimed success (indeed, it had competed successfully against the multinational tea companies), there were signs of favoritism that threatened to disrupt operations. The Moi government reorganized the KTDA to give higher prices and higher quotas to farmers in the Rift Valley, particularly from Kalenjin strongholds, at the expense of the Central Province communities that cultivated the high-grade leaves that typically commanded higher prices on the international market. The introduction of Nyayo Tea Zones, a new parastatal, also limited the bargaining power of outraged tea farmers by flooding the tea factories with leaves from new government-controlled land and rendering less valuable the smallholder tea.

The changes in administration had rapid consequences for the reliability of tea collection services and for the condition of the country's hundreds of kilometers of tea roads, many of which became increasingly impassable. Farmers in Central Province also began to charge that the KTDA managers and the government were manipulating the level of end of season payments, which were supposed to reflect movements in world prices, in contrast to initial payments, which were in proportion to the quantity of tea leaves delivered. In 1989 several hundred farmers in Murang'a District tried to protest deteriorating services and price manipulation by boycotting picking and by burning 2.5 tons of already harvested tea leaves.[38] Matiba, who hailed from Murang'a District, was consequently quite attentive to farmers' problems and incorporated them into his platform.

The creation of the Tea Zones meant that the government received a larger share of the income from tea than it had in the past. Smallholders lost influence as their share of the proceeds dropped. Withholding or burning tea leaves was no longer the devastating tactic it might once have been. It could no longer be used to force the government to pay attention to farmers' concerns. Thus, although growers of coffee and tea, especially in Central Province, were discontented and become a potential reserve of followers for an opposition party, they could no longer, by themselves, muster bargaining power. There were no opposition parties for whom they could cast their ballots in protest, and the ability of candidates to run on an opposition platform within KANU depended increasingly on a pledge to support the policies of the ruling party.

In the Kenyan case, then, increasing political restrictions during the 1980s were associated with the maintenance of broad national policies favorable to agriculture, by comparison with the rest of Africa, but with some deterioration in the quality of management in parastatals. This pattern suggests that policies with the character of "public goods" have their roots, not in the level of electoral competitiveness in multiparty systems, but in other sources altogether.

Conclusions

This article has suggested that the link between the openness of political systems and better "governance" or provision of favorable economic policy environments is not as straightforward as the World Bank's long-term perspective study and recent U.S. assistance trends in Africa imply. Much of the current policy discussion assumes that there is a causal relationship between increasing opportunity to contest policy, especially through free and fair elections, and policies that reflect the interests of farmers or the rural voters who are in the majority. This assessment suggests otherwise.

The analysis draws a distinction between two types of policy. Although some aspects of a favorable policy environment for agriculture, such as availability of inputs and credit, are "divisible" goods which politicians and civil servants can award to those who support their careers, producer pricing and exchange rate policy are indivisible. That is, they are "public goods," in the technical sense of this term. Once high farmgate prices are provided or a devaluation takes place, all rural producers benefit. The policy decision rewards political supporters, opponents, and agnostics alike. There is little individual reward to be gained and little bargaining advantage to be had for the leader who sponsors such policies. It is not readily apparent, then, that politicians will undertake to provide these policies, which lie at the core of a favorable environment for agricultural production.

Findings from analysis of the Ivory Coast and Kenyan cases point to two conclusions. First, the evidence from Ivory Coast and Kenya suggests that all "semicompetitive" electoral systems are alike in the incentives they offer officials to support favorable policy environments for agriculture. If there is a relationship between the degree of competitiveness and the kinds of policies governments support, it is discontinuous. That is, the incentive structure facing elected members of parliament does not change gradually as party structures or electoral rules become more "open" and promote debate. Rather, only when a country moves from a semicompetitive system to full-fledged multiparty competition do incentives exist for representatives to support the broad national policies or "public goods" such as high producer prices and exchange rate parity that lie at the core of a favorable policy environment for agriculture. Only under these conditions do legislative assemblies become potentially important in the provision of public goods. Whether multiparty systems with only a few institutionalized parties supply such policies remains a subject for further research, however, as the evidence presented here does not permit a test of this hypothesis.

Second, what is clear is that incentives to supply broad national policies favorable to agriculture may exist independent of the electoral system. Such policies may have their roots in the individual economic interests of senior elites or the extent of countervailing power among farmers and agribusiness. The personal stake of top Ivorian officials in agriculture in the 1960s accounts for the relatively greater share of the world price that export crop growers received. The fairly open system of political competition that existed during the Kenyatta years in Kenya did not lie at the root of the country's favorable agricultural policies; far more important were the personal stake in agriculture of senior officials, some of them unelected, and the presence of organized producers' groups. More important still in Kenya was the organization of farmer interests through a variety of unions and associations.

In sum, this analysis suggests that scholars and policymakers should not look to small increases in the openness of semicompetitive African political systems for improvement in "governance." Although the introduction of multiparty systems and free and fair elections are important for a variety of normative reasons and for the greater accountability of the governors to the governed that they may bring, the source of variation in levels of urban bias more likely lies with the bargaining strength of rural producers' unions and with the personal income portfolios of senior officials and politicians.

Appendix Important Changes in Party Affairs and Party-State Relations, *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire*, 1960–1986

1969: Youth branch of PDCI formed.

1970: Party congress followed by private "political seminar" at Yamoussoukro and incorporation of younger generation into PDCI political bureau and national committee.

1971: President draws on younger technocrats outside party leadership in ministerial shuffle but also adds new representatives of the older generation of party militants to purely political positions. PDCI *secrétaires généraux* meet in October and complain about the high proportion of government monies flowing to Abidjan.

1972: Philippe Yacé continues efforts to make party a stronger political tool, partly by bringing members of the younger generation into the leadership.

1973: Criticism of party from university and from younger cadres with rural ties on grounds that party is diverting money from citizens who need funds for development.

1974: Weeklong conference of political and administrative leaders to address deficiencies in functioning of party and civil service. A "year of dialogue" follows.

1975: President uses party congress as opportunity to expand number of ministers in cabinet to thirty-six and add young technocrats. Only six *anciens* remain in cabinet.

1977: Major ministerial shuffle replaces some long-time allies of the president with technocrats. Party ordered to clean up corruption within its ranks and its leaders' ostentatious living.

1978: Student union reorganized and incorporated into the PDCI. PDCI political bureau holds emergency session to respond to wave of discontent over rapidly rising cost of living and to appearance of opposition tracts. First commune elections elicit objections from some PDCI leaders who believe the party's existence is threatened by the new level of competition permitted (first multicandidate elections). Philippe Yacé is strong advocate of the reforms, which open political office to younger elites.

1980: First multicandidate legislative elections held. 649 contestants vie for 147 seats in the national assembly. Of the eighty incumbents, only twenty-seven retain their positions. At seventh congress of

PDCI, the president condemns "barons" within the party who aspired to be machine politicians in line for the president's job.

1982: President convenes meeting of all political and administrative officials to address social divisions unleashed, allegedly, by the political liberalization of 1980.

1983: Seven secretaries of the PDCI are stripped of office at public tribunals after they are found guilty of embezzling funds. Days of dialogue organized.

1985: PDCI central leadership meets in Yamoussoukro to discuss 1985 elections, in which all of the party's elected posts are open to contest. Division in political bureau over advisability of retaining election rules introduced in 1980, whereby party abstained from screening candidates.

1986: Expansion of the size of the national assembly and the party's political bureau.

NOTES

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1. The World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1989), p. 61.

2. See Ashutosh Varshney, "Self-Limited Empowerment: Rural India in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Development Studies* (July 1993).

3. See Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), and Michael F. Lofchie, *The Policy Factor: Agricultural Performance in Kenya and Tanzania* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

4. Robert H. Bates, *Beyond the Miracle of the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 92.

5. Jennifer Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From Harambee to Nyayo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

6. Ivory Coast stabilized prices of cocoa and coffee, saving a higher proportion of the world price in "good years" in a central fund and taking a smaller margin or paying out a subsidy to farmers in "bad years." Thus, it is important to look at average producer price shares, not the figures for individual years.

7. These observations and others presented in this article are based on the author's three-year study of farmers' responses to agricultural policy changes in Ivory Coast. The research included open-ended interviews with local officials and notables as well as selected farmers. It also included extensive surveys. The information about patterns of participation during the late 1980s comes from survey results. The information about patterns of participation and party roles during the 1960s and 1970s comes from open-ended interviews.

8. Jean-François Médard has trenchantly noted that, "when one party started to monopolize power, the partisan patronage of the first period waned, not altogether disappearing but losing its mass characteristics, as people could no longer exchange votes for favors. Partisan patronage became only the concern of the elite or would-be-elite." This article argues that party-list voting within the confines of a single party system produced this outcome, not monopoly of power by a single party. See Jean-François Médard, "The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo-Patrimonialism?," in Christopher Clapham, ed., *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State* (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), p. 167.

9. Le Quatrième Seminaire des Secrétaires Généraux," proceedings of a meeting at Yamoussoukro, March 7, 8, and 9, 1985 (Abidjan: Fraternité-Hebdo Editions RDA-PDCI), p. 32.

10. Computed from data that appears in "Cinqième Congrès du PDCI, 9–12 Octobre, 1985" (Abidjan: Fraternité Hebdo, 1985).

11. République de la Côte d'Ivoire, *Il y a 40 Ans Naissait le PDCI* (Abidjan: Fraternité-Hebdo, 1980), p. 201.

12. For more on this subject through 1970, see the overview by Michael Cohen, "The Myth of the Expanding Centre: Politics in the Ivory Coast," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11 (1973), 227–240. The two main case studies on this subject are Richard Stryker, "A Local Perspective on Development Strategy in the Ivory Coast," in Michael Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), and Martin Staniland,

"Single Party Regimes and Political Change: The PDCI and Ivory Coast Politics," in Colin Leys, ed., *Political Change in Developing Countries* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965).

13. For information on the sequence of events, see *Africa Contemporary Record*. For a fleeting analysis, see Médard, pp. 167–8.

14. The most accessible discussion of the country's political and administrative organization, both before and after the changes of 1980, appears in Tagro Alexandre, "Organisation politique, administrative et judiciaire de la Côte d'Ivoire: Guide de préparation aux concours administratifs," (Abidjan: Imprimerie nationale, April 1986).

15. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1973–1974, p. B671.

16. This measure does not adjust for input subsidies, differential transportation costs, or divergence between the official exchange rate and real exchange rates. It is thus a flawed measure for use in comparative studies, but it is currently the best available. For a detailed discussion of the problems of measurement, see Jennifer Widner, "The Origins of Agricultural Policy in the Ivory Coast," *Journal of Development Studies* (1993).

17. See Nicolas van de Walle, "The Decline of the Franc Zone: Monetary Politics in Francophone Africa," *African Affairs*, 90 (1991), 383–405.

18. J. C. Berthelemy and F. B. Bourguignon, "Growth and Crisis in Ivory Coast," part 1, second draft (World Bank, August 1987), pp. 35, 115–116.

19. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1972–1973, p. B626.

20. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1974–1975, p. B663.

21. These changes eliminated Mohamed Diawara, Ibrahim Kone, Alphonse Bony, Konan Kanga, Lorougnon Guédé, Koffi Attobra, Dico Garba, Kei Bogouinard, and Bra Kanon from positions of power but retained some of the other key "barons," including Camille Alliali and Jean Banny, who put together the lists of *jeunes* from which Houphouët selected new personnel. See Jean-François Médard, "Jeunes et aînés en Côte d'Ivoire: Le VIIe Congrès du PDCI-RDA," *Politique Africaine*, 1 (January 1981), 108.

22. In 1980 the country also expanded the size of the national assembly to 147 from 120. In previous years, the size of the assembly had grown from seventy to eighty-five, then to 100, and in 1975 to 120.

23. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1974–1975, p. B515.

24. Assemblée Nationale de Côte d'Ivoire, Septième legislature, Premier session ordinaire, 1 juillet, 1986, p. 9.

25. Assemblée Nationale de Côte d'Ivoire, Septième legislature, Premier session ordinaire, 10 juillet, 1986, p. 9.

26. For information on the timing of these events, see *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1982–1983, p. B474.

27. Médard, "Jeunes et aînés en Côte d'Ivoire," p. 106.

28. Van de Walle, "Decline of the Franc Zone," p. 400.

29. For a detailed analysis of *harambee* and of changes in party-state relations in Kenya, see Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya*. On changes in governance, see Joel D. Barkan, "The Rise and Fall of a Governance Realm in Kenya," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., *Governance in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1991).

30. See Joel Barkan in Chong Lim Kim et al., *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984), p. 83.

31. See, for example, Joel Barkan, "The Electoral Process and Peasant-State Relations in Kenya," in Fred M. Hayward, ed., *Elections in Independent Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 213–237.

32. Frank Holmquist, "Self-Help: The State and Peasant Leverage in Kenya," *Africa*, 54 (1984), 81.

33. For a more extensive discussion of agricultural policy and performance, see Lofchie, *The Policy Factor*.

34. Ibid., p. 163.

35. For the collapse of the *harambee* system during the late Kenyatta and Moi eras, see Peter Ngau, "Tensions in Empowerment: The Experience of the Harambee (Self-Help) Movement in Kenya," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 35 (April 1987), 523–38.

36. World Bank/UNDP, *African Development Indicators* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1992), p. 217.

37. Ibid., p. 45.

38. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Kenya, First Quarter, 1988, p. 12.