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“A LITTLE BIT LIKE A VOLCANO”—THE UNITED PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND RESISTANCE TO ONE-PARTY RULE IN ZAMBIA, 1964–1980*

By Miles Larmer

Introduction

Studies of political parties that came to power in newly independent African states have frequently assumed that they, to a large degree, reflected a consensual nationalist popular consciousness, and a relative lack of social differentiation, in the countries which they governed. In this regard, it has generally been accepted that the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) represented the progressive aspirations and expectations held by Zambians, at least in the years immediately after independence. While Gertzel, Baylies, and Szeftel identified important foci of opposition to and within UNIP, their contemporaneous research did not describe the extent and range of such opposition, in particular the degree to which UNIP was preoccupied about such challenges.¹ My research has uncovered evidence of significant and ongoing discontent within, and opposition to, the United National Independence Party and its policies and practices.² This weakness in the existing literature reflects a tendency amongst political scientists to take official declarations by the state and ruling party at face value, and to take the political temperature of the country at an institutional level, for example in the analysis of voting patterns during elections.³

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Southern African Historical Society, Cape Town, 26–29 June 2005, and the “Zambia: Independence and After” Conference, Lusaka, 11–13 August 2005. The author is grateful for the useful comments of attendees at both events, particularly David Gordon, which have considerably improved the paper. The author would also like to express his gratitude to Mulenga Sokoni, who provided invaluable assistance in research carried out in Zambia’s Northern Province in April 2005.

¹ Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies, and Morris Szeftel, eds., *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia* (Manchester, 1984).

² See also Giacomo Macola, “‘It Means as if We Are Excluded from the Good Freedom’: Thwarted Expectations of Independence in the Luapula Province of Zambia, 1964–1966,” *Journal of African History* 47, 1 (2006), forthcoming.

³ See for example William Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), and more generally, W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa* (1984; reprint, New York, 2002). *The Dynamics of the One-Party State*, by Gertzel et al., although generally excellent, is nevertheless over dependent on the outcomes of one-party state elections. Posner’s recent study of ethnic politics in postcolonial Zambia replicates this tendency in reducing “ethnic politics” largely to factors influencing voting behavior, disregarding the wider sphere of political life outside electoral systems: Daniel N. Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, (Cambridge, 2005).

Developmentalist literature, generally assuming that the failure of newly independent African governments to meet popular demands resulted primarily from the incapacity of postcolonial states, tends accordingly to place such popular demands outside the realm of political legitimacy and analysis.⁴ This disregards the centrality of such expectations in anticolonial movements, in particular the promises of nationalist politicians seeking to mobilize popular opposition to colonial rule. This is not to argue that *all* the aspirations of the peoples of postcolonial Zambia (or indeed elsewhere), could have been met by UNIP or any of its political opponents. However, the impact of these failures was not simply the result of a technical incapacity, but rather the result of political decisions that were contested within and outside UNIP. Such expectations were implicitly predicated on the significant redistribution of wealth, both nationally and internationally. While the feasibility of such a radical approach is of course doubtful, the failure of UNIP to seek any such change to its position in the international economic order had profound political consequences. Historical analysis therefore requires an assessment of the impact of such decisions on Africans whose support for nationalist movements was predicated on promises of radical postcolonial political and economic change.

Evidence from the recently opened UNIP archives demonstrates that the ruling party was by no means hegemonic in Zambian political life, before and after the declaration of the one-party state in December 1972. The United Progressive Party (UPP) presented the most effective challenge to UNIP hegemony, during its brief period of legal existence in 1971–72; it was banned with the introduction of the one-party state, and its leaders detained. The UNIP archives, and interviews with thirty-five former UPP leaders and activists, demonstrates that UPP activists continued to organize secretly throughout the 1970s within and outside UNIP, presenting periodic challenges to the ruling party, and partially expressing widespread opposition to it amongst significant sections of the Zambian population. The archives provide clear evidence of the extent of the resultant damage to UNIP in its core areas of pre-Independence support.

This support rested on popular expectations of significant social and economic development, based on the promises made by UNIP leaders before and after independence. Despite significant developmental achievements in the 1960s, these expectations never came close to being met. Growing discontent expressed itself in a complex combination of regional and social forms, and culminated in

⁴ One example of this discourse is provided by Schraeder: "The newly elected leaders had to contend with popular expectations that the fruits of independence, most notably higher wages and better living conditions, would be quickly and widely shared ... however, the former colonial state did not have the capabilities to satisfy public demands.... The vast majority of African leaders resolved this paradox by promoting the concentration of state power at the expense of civil society;" Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformations* (Boston and New York, 2000), 218.

the establishment of the UPP. Led by former Vice President Simon Kapwepwe, the UPP rested on three key constituencies. On the Copperbelt, the UPP received substantial support from unionized workers and small businessmen, both groups whose expectations of postcolonial economic advance had been thwarted. In Lusaka, younger party intellectuals unhappy with the growth of corruption, their own exclusion from power, and the gains that flowed from it, joined the UPP in significant numbers. Finally, in Northern Province, veterans of UNIP's nationalist struggle (and intimately connected to the Copperbelt by kin-based labor migration and financial remittances) linked the marginalization of ethnic Bemba politicians to their own economic marginalization, and believed that the UPP would enable a re-distribution of national wealth that would improve their own circumstances.⁵ Posner has recently demonstrated the ways in which the identification of "Bemba" influence in postcolonial Zambian politics was variously applied to both the core Bemba tribe in its Chinsali heartland and to the wider Bemba linguistic grouping in Northern and Luapula Province, as well as to its different construction in the self-consciously multiethnic Copperbelt.⁶ Variegated and contradictory postcolonial discontents found temporary common cause against a ruling party perceived to be excluding these constituencies from postcolonial advancement on ethnic, regional, and class grounds, experienced by the UPP's supporters as a singular sense of exclusion and injustice. In this sense, characterizations of the UPP as a "Bemba" tribal party are misleading. Rather, as in the colonial era,

Contests over property rights and access to resources (including the new opportunities of modernity through state and capital), social differentiation and class formation, became inseparable from debates over the legitimacy of political authority and the definition of a moral and political community cast in ethnic terms.⁷

The UPP's populist and anti-elitist agenda was both an expression of discontent against the failure of the postcolonial state to adequately deliver on its promises of development, and an attack on an emergent political-business class based in Lusaka, corruptly consuming the national wealth that would otherwise

⁵ This alliance of interests was identified in the most significant existing analysis of the UPP, by Robert Bates, *Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia* (New Haven, Conn. and London, 1976), 227–50. Bates's exemplary analysis of growing divisions in postcolonial Zambia is hampered by his misplaced characterization of these divisions as essentially rural-urban. As his own study demonstrates, discontent (and the potential for political opposition that it created) was as evident in the Copperbelt as in Luapula Province, expressing itself as discontent with the consumption of national wealth by a growing national state-based elite.

⁶ Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics*, xi–xii.

⁷ Bruce J. Berman, "'A Palimpsest of Contradictions': Ethnicity, Class and Politics in Africa," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 37, 1 (2004), 25.

fund productive investment and improvements in the living standards of organized workers and the rural poor. Such discontent, as Roberts identified, certainly intensified with economic stagnation and falling investment from 1970.⁸ As this paper will however show, the roots of this discontent can be traced back to the failure of postcolonial expectations to be met, even in the boom years after independence.

Frustrated Expectations and Their Expression in UNIP, 1964–1971

The 1960s are generally regarded as a period of successful social and economic development in Zambia, and consequent high levels of popular support for UNIP.⁹ While UNIP's first government certainly built substantial numbers of clinics, hospitals, and roads, and in particular expanded access to education, it should not be assumed that these measures addressed the expectations of Zambians for independence. As Macola has shown, criticism of government's failure to address the demands of people in Luapula Province was expressed as early as 1964.¹⁰ On the Copperbelt, mineworkers clashed with UNIP in 1965–66, as the ruling party sought to restrict their demands for the transformational wage increase they saw as the just reward for their role in the nationalist struggle.¹¹ Myriad localized complaints were recorded during voter registration in 1966, for example in Northern Province:

Apathy throughout Kasama District hit the entire registration of voters. The main reason for lack of enthusiasm was due to maladministration.... Some alleged that the Rural Council had not done anything praiseworthy since its inception. Others claimed that ward Councillors had not visited their wards for longer periods etc.¹²

UNIP warned touring ministers and MPs to expect

a lot of complaints of people who will say that only those who were against the Party have been employed and that freedom fighters are still suffering.... It is important for people to compare the present with ... how much worse off they were before the

⁸ Andrew Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (London, 1976), 244.

⁹ See for example Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia*; Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence* (Boulder, Colo., 1979); Ben Turok, ed., *Development in Zambia—A Reader* (London, 1979).

¹⁰ Macola, "It Means as if We Are Excluded from the Good Freedom."

¹¹ Miles Larmer, "Unrealistic Expectations? Zambia's Mineworkers from Independence to the One-Party State, 1964–1972," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 18, 4 (2005), 318–52.

¹² United National Independence Party Archive, Lusaka (hereafter UNIP) 5.9.3, "PS R.T. Sikasula tour of Kasama, report 15 May 1966."

present Government took over. They should not compare the present with an imaginary glorious future.¹³

Respondents from Chinsali District, in Northern Province, generally recall that little or no development occurred there in the years after independence.¹⁴ This is surprising, given the area's prominence in the nationalist movement. Chinsali was the birthplace of childhood friends Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe, the home area of many UNIP leaders, and a center of nationalist struggle, particularly during the Cha Cha Cha action of 1961. During Cha Cha Cha, UNIP activists in Northern and Luapula Provinces burned government offices and schools, blocked roads, and organized other acts of sabotage. Some UPP activists claim that UNIP refused to spend development funds in Chinsali as retribution for the Lumpa Church episode.¹⁵ Whether this is true or not, the widespread perception regarding the area's neglect fueled growing discontent with UNIP.

Government leaders sought to blame general discontent on external influence. In 1966, Minister Dingiswayo Banda argued that, since "the people in the urban areas have shown lack of enthusiasm for no apparent reason," the apathy adversely affecting election registration could only result from agitation by Zambia's enemies. Banda declared, "The nation's honey moon is over and now is the time for discipline." He directed, "The youth must now give the public a dose and woken [sic] them to their national responsibilities."¹⁶ UNIP had consistently mobilized youth to ensure electoral turnout and intimidate political opponents before Independence. However, such efforts, for example the forced closure of shops to ensure attendance at UNIP rallies, now only increased discontent. The head of the African Traders Association wrote to the UNIP Secretary General in March 1968:

Our members' Shops are closed deliberately by the so call[ed] Party Officials.... African traders gave unequalled support to U.N.I.P. during the Struggle and we are part and parcel to the bringing about of this Independence.... we are U.N.I.P. and in no

¹³ UNIP 5.9.3, "Notes for Touring Ministers and MPs," n.d., 1966.

¹⁴ Interview with Francis Bowa, Lusaka, 13 April 2005; interview with Lovemore Kapyanga, Chinsali, 16 April 2005.

¹⁵ Bowa interview. Led by the charismatic Alice Lenшина, the Lumpa Church clashed with UNIP in mid-1964 when it encouraged its supporters to boycott political activities and not to vote. Following attacks on Northern Rhodesia police, Kaunda, then prime minister, sent in the army to suppress the rebellious church, leading to violent clashes in which more than 700 people were killed. Although most locals did not support the Lumpa Church, many lost relatives in the violence, and saw others flee into exile in the Congo. For an analysis of the Lumpa Church, see David M. Gordon, "Massacre or Uprising?: The Lumpa Conflict Revisited, 1963-4," paper presented to "Zambia: Independence and After" conference, Lusaka, August 2005.

¹⁶ UNIP 5.7.2.2.1, Dingiswayo Banda MP to all Regional Youth Secretaries, "Call to the Youth Brigade," April 1966.

way subordinated [sic] to any U.N.I.P.... Do you Love anything that is given to you by force? If this behaviour cannot be stopped immediately, the Party should expect very severe reaction from African businessmen.¹⁷

Some of UNIP's veterans were amongst its strongest critics, for example in submissions to the party's constitutional review in 1969. Founding member Lasford Nkonde wrote:

During struggle for our independence there was strong unity among the nation and false promises to the true freedom fighters in their respective areas where the landmarks of the country's struggle for independence has left so many people in miserable e.g., widows, orphans, aged people, destitutes....¹⁸

While international observers praised Zambia's new education and health services, Nkonde criticized the continued existence of fee-paying schools and hospitals:

a child who has born in a poor family could not proceed with good education neither fail to go for further education on the barr[i]er of conditions imposed on him and those poor people could not be treated well because they have no money to pay for good treatment in fee paying hospitals.... while we are shouting at public meetings that let us pray for those who suffered and lost their lives in struggle for independence yet their families are completely ignored [sic] and forgotten forever without any assistance ... the recommendations on giving Government Loans ... by adding more riches to the rich people or persons with responsible jobs who earn big salaries rather than raising the standard of living and opportunity for all poor people to have equal rights ... but the poor people are left out in the poor state forever which leads to the failure of the implementation of the philosophy of Humanism....¹⁹

George Chew expressed anger at the betrayal of the freedom fighters:

If I go back to the time of our st[r]uggle ... the Branches and Sections group were the fearless workers, but why should be now forgotten ... and to day are refused the right to participate in ... institutions created by themselves and are being called old

¹⁷ UNIP 5.7.2.2.5, M.S. Mulwanda, Secretary General ZATA to Secretary General UNIP, 3 March 1968.

¹⁸ UNIP 16.9.17, Lasford Nkonde to Secretary UNIP Constitutional Commission, 22 October 1969.

¹⁹ Ibid. "Humanism" was Kaunda's attempt to foster a national philosophy: see Kenneth D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation* (Lusaka, 1968).

politicians, illiterates, uneducated, and regarded as tools for example "when the rain season is nearer a hoe is cared for and after the hoe has dug it can be put in the hiding co[r]ner." The people who were abroad, the people who were hiding in the bush and under their beds for fear of torture, beatings by Federal Police are to day the masters of our ha[r]d fought independence.²⁰

Among many complainants, in March 1970, women in Kasama threatened to demonstrate in protest at the shortage of school places.²¹ UNIP faced growing opposition at this time over policies including the ban on *chitemene* agriculture and over village re-grouping, itself a response to its failure to deliver health, education, and agricultural services to Zambia's small and scattered villages. This was compounded by economic stagnation, reductions in government expenditure, and increased taxes announced in 1969.

As Szeftel identified, colonial economic underdevelopment and the consequent lack of domestic private capital made the postcolonial Zambian state the focus of accumulation for the aspirant bourgeoisie.²² Attainment of (or exclusion from) a position within UNIP and/or the expanding state bureaucracy could enable (or prevent) the acquisition of capital for business opportunities. In 1968, government instituted the compulsory sale of most retail businesses owned by foreigners to Zambians, a measure that benefited many local UNIP organizers.²³ However, new shop owners failed to access private capital, and their hopes for state loans went unfulfilled. By 1970, government policy shifted towards state ownership of the retail sector, undermining many new shop owners. E.D. Chimpinde, of the Zambia Grocery, Ndola, wrote to the Copperbelt minister of state in April 1971:

When His Excellency the President announced the famous Mulungushi economic reforms ... The President knew we had no money but he had trust in his Ministers that they were going to make it possible on his behalf to arrange for the obtaining of loans.... But unfortunately most of the Ministers saw it fit a time to now obtain these riches for themselves and their relatives only.²⁴

²⁰ UNIP 16.9.17, George Chewe to Secretary UNIP Constitutional Commission, 28 November 1969.

²¹ UNIP 5.1.1.11.2, Northern Provincial Party Conference, 13 March 1970.

²² Morris Szeftel, "Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia—the State as a Resource in Itself," *Review of African Political Economy* 24 (1983).

²³ Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, "The Rise of a Zambian Business Class," in Gertzel et al., *The Dynamics of the One-Party State*.

²⁴ UNIP 5.7.2.2.12, E.D. Chimpinde, Zambia Grocery, Ndola, to Minister of State, Copperbelt Province, 5 April 1971.

Discontented small businessmen, particularly on the Copperbelt, provided one of the core constituencies of the UPP (see below).²⁵

Division in UNIP, 1967–1971

Official documents presented to UNIP's 1967 national conference recorded complaints in seven of Zambia's nine provinces regarding the lack of investment in development, and delays in the release of funds. Acknowledging the importance of such problems, these reports depicted people ridiculing local UNIP officials:

“You told us to vote for U.N.I.P. and U.N.I.P. is governing, but what has U.N.I.P., for which you suffered so much, done for you?... you are living worse now than you were under Colonial rule.... Other people were enjoying life under Colonial rule and they are still enjoying life today.... UNIP believes in, ‘Unto those who have, more will be given and Unto those who have not, more will be taken away.’” This is the commonest and cheapest complaint...²⁶

At the conference, Simon Kapwepwe defeated Reuben Kamanga for the vice presidency of UNIP and, effectively, Zambia. As is widely recognized, this led to a conflict within UNIP between party leaders from Northern Province (Kapwepwe's group) and Eastern Province (Kamanga's associates), which eventually led to the formation of the UPP in 1971.²⁷ Following the conference, simmering tensions within UNIP led to the establishment of secret committees representing regional factions. Gertzel and others characterized this as a “sectional” rather than ethnic conflict, which reflected “a competition for scarce resources between interests which reflected the regional or provincial cleavages which at that time dominated Zambian society.”²⁸ Such conflicts can best be understood as a partial reflection of rising discontent in much of Zambia at the perceived failure to deliver on expectations of postindependence transformation.²⁹ Politicians, under pressure to deliver development to their areas of origin, defended themselves by accusations of regional bias in the allocation of resources, related to the skewed provincial representation in the UNIP leadership. In order to gain funds, it was therefore necessary to ensure the election of local politicians to senior positions in the party and government. Local UNIP leaders came to believe

²⁵ For example, interview with Daniel Kapapa in Kasama, 19–22 April 2005, interview with Stebbin Mutale in Chililabombwe, 24 April 2005.

²⁶ UNIP 5.1.1.11.1, “Conference Report” and “How UNIP is organised today,” August 1967.

²⁷ Tordoff, *Politics in Zambia*, 28.

²⁸ Gertzel et al., “Introduction,” *The Dynamics of the One-Party State*, 7–8.

²⁹ Interview with Alexander Chikwanda, Lusaka, 12 April 2005.

that the allocation and utilization of provincial development funding was significantly affected by the conflict between senior politicians in Lusaka.³⁰

Regional expressions of such discontent were heard throughout Zambia, but took different forms reflecting historical, political, and economic particularities. In Northern Province, discontent was heightened by a perception that the area's prominent role in the liberation struggle was not being adequately compensated for in terms of both political appointments, and economic development.³¹ As Bratton explained, during the liberation struggle in Northern Province,

the center had little control over the way that peasants were introduced to the aims and ideology of the party. From the outset, UNIP's program was presented to peasants by local party leaders in terms of local grievances and in terms of the prospect of material reward.³²

Such promises mobilized young men to burn government offices, blow up bridges, and commit other illegal acts in order to win independence. Hundreds were jailed, expelled from schools, and in some cases lost employment. As the statements of Nkonde and Chewe suggest (above), Cha Cha Cha veterans frequently felt marginalized in comparison to those who had taken a less active role in the movement. They expected postindependence compensation, through the fulfilment of developmental promises, and appointments to state and party positions. However, the significant number of relatively unschooled northerners expecting official appointment were overtaken by more educated Zambians from other areas.³³ Whilst this sectional conflict had its regional basis, many supporters of Kapwepwe perceived it as a clash between the corrupt rich and the poor:

the people in UNIP, they were fearing ... Kapwepwe. They wanted someone who was very weak. This is the reason why ... *apanwamba*, they don't want to get SMK [Kapwepwe] ... those people who are ... higher level, like Ministers, and those Managing Directors, and Permanent Secretaries. Because they were fearing ... that if we put that one [Kapwepwe] as a Vice President ... we are not going to work well... Because that man, he was a principled man.³⁴

³⁰ Interview with Marcellino Bwembya, Chingola, 23 April 2005.

³¹ Similar discontents were expressed in Luapula Province, where the nationalist struggle had also been fiercely contested: Bates, *Rural Responses*, 65–79.

³² Michael Bratton, *The Local Politics of Rural Development: Peasant and Party-State in Zambia* (Hanover, NH and London, 1980), 206. Bates also stresses materialist explanations for popular participation in the nationalist movement: *Rural Responses*, 65.

³³ Interview with Boniface Kawimbe, Lusaka, 1 May 2005.

³⁴ Interview with Kapyanga. “*Apanwamba*” is a popular Zambian term for the corrupt wealthy elite, comparable to the term “*Wabenzi*” in use elsewhere.

Such tensions were contained within UNIP during the 1968 election, in which the ruling party lost control of Barotse (later Western) Province to the opposition African National Congress (ANC). UNIP's dependence on its nationalist strongholds of Copperbelt, Northern, and Luapula Provinces thereby increased.

In August 1969, Kapwepwe quit as Zambian vice president after threats of a vote of no-confidence led by Eastern leaders. Kapwepwe declared, "The people from the northern part of Zambia—the Bemba speaking people if you like—have suffered physically, and sometimes been beaten. They have suffered demotions and suspensions because of my being Vice-President."³⁵ Although Kapwepwe was publicly persuaded by Kaunda to stay on until the following August, he had effectively resigned. Some activists identify meetings that took place to organize an alternative party at this time.³⁶ George Kasonde attended one such meeting:

In 1969, February, I saw a delegation of the late Dr Sefelino Mulenga coming to my house.... It's urgent. You are wanted to Luanshya today.... we went to Luanshya at night. Where we started planning for the formation of an alternative political party....³⁷

Having himself briefly resigned as UNIP and Zambian president in 1968, Kaunda now sought to address these divisions by suspending the party's Central Committee, and appointing himself secretary general. UNIP introduced a new party constitution in November 1970, giving each province equal representation in the general conference. Previously, the large membership in Northern and Copperbelt Provinces meant that leaders from those areas were strongly represented in the Central Committee and other decision-making bodies. Now, they felt relatively marginalized.³⁸ Kaunda consistently warned against what he characterized as "tribalism" in UNIP, portraying his own role as carefully balancing such conflicts.³⁹ It is certainly true that Kaunda publicly campaigned against the public expression of any discontent that took a regional or ethnic form. However, he also sought to use the allegation of "tribalism" to de-legitimize all criticism of his government and policies. Kaunda's critics believe that, by 1969, he was privately siding with the Eastern Province group against Kapwepwe and his substantial support base, seeking to marginalize his only credible successor.

³⁵ *Times of Zambia* (hereafter *ToZ*), 26 August 1969. See also Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, 244.

³⁶ For example, interview with Stanley Sinkamba, Kitwe, 25 April 2005.

³⁷ Interview with George Kasonde, Kasama, 20 April 2005.

³⁸ Gertz et al., "Introduction," in *The Dynamics of the One-Party State*, 14.

³⁹ Tordoff, *Politics in Zambia*, 29.

In 1969, "parochial meetings" (such as those of the regional committees) were banned.⁴⁰ Despite such directives, secret meetings of Northern politicians continued in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt, and by 1970, appear to have constituted a self-conscious "party within a party." Such activities were fueled by an increasing belief that Bemba speakers were being systematically excluded from appointments in the party and government.⁴¹ Amongst many examples, George Kasonde claims he was denied a promised diplomatic posting, his reward for dedicated service as a Youth Regional Secretary in Central Province.⁴²

There is consensus that Kapwepwe was reluctant to leave UNIP. Whilst some respondents claim that his friendship with Kaunda made it difficult for him to challenge the UNIP leader, others argue that he had properly gauged the extent of repression that a breakaway party would face, and therefore urged adequate preparation before such an action was taken.⁴³

Despite the preponderance of Bemba-speaking leaders in this grouping, most expressed their criticisms of the government's record within a national framework. Deputy Minister John Chisata was one of the most outspoken critics:

People started to be fed up, '66, '67, because definitely we did not tow the same line that we promised people. They expect employment, it was not there.... agriculture ... was not being funded properly. Roads were still terrible. And they said, "but these are the things you promised you would do better when you take over. It's now 3, 4 years, there's nothing you have done."... We were very very unpopular. And that's why each time we meet in State House, it was either me, Justin Chimba, or Robinson Puta [saying] ... "Mr President are you sure what we're doing now is what we promised the people in 1964?"⁴⁴

In 1970, Chisata, a leading advocate for an alternative political party, was charged with murder, a charge he claims was fabricated by senior UNIP Easterners.⁴⁵ He was removed from government office, and spent six months in detention before being cleared. Chisata addressed the National Assembly in January 1971, voicing many of the complaints of UNIP veterans. He claimed that Zambia's copper mines were still largely run by "the Boers." He criticized the

⁴⁰ UNIP 16.4.6, Secretary General Circular No.5 1969, 27 November 1969.

⁴¹ Interviews with Bwembya, Sinkamba.

⁴² Interview with Kasonde. Kasonde describes the way he mobilized youth to ensure the unopposed election of UNIP ministers as MPs in Central Province in 1964, by physically preventing ANC candidates from lodging nomination papers.

⁴³ For example, interview with Lasford Nkonde, Lusaka, 13 April 2005.

⁴⁴ Interview with John Chisata, Mufulira, 26–27 November 2003.

⁴⁵ *ToZ*, 3 September 1969; Chisata interview.

growing business interests of government ministers and the potential for corruption this created. However, his most controversial allegation was that Vice President Kamanga had raped a white secretary, who was then paid by the government to leave the country and to keep the incident secret.⁴⁶ A commission of inquiry was launched into his allegations, and those of his colleague Justin Chimba, then minister of commerce and industry.

These allegations heralded the active organization of what was now known as the United Progressive Party, although its public launch was still some months away. At this time, Kapwepwe was persuaded to lead the breakaway party. In mid 1971, "UPP" supporters were writing and distributing anonymous circulars claiming that Kaunda was a foreigner, because his parents had been born in Malawi.⁴⁷ At this time, UNIP officials reported that in Chinsali the political situation was "critical": "Bwalya Mufonka [president of the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers] has created the underground political movement, this has confused the situation in the District, and if we are not careful this will affect the Province."⁴⁸

At this time, the University of Zambia (UNZA) emerged as a center of opposition to the UNIP leadership. In July 1971, the UNZA Students' Union protested against the sale by France of Mirage jets to South Africa, ostensibly in support of Zambian government policy. However, when 1,500 students stormed the French Embassy, police opened fire, wounding one student, and using tear gas against the crowd.⁴⁹ As well as attacking police violence, student leaders publicly criticized what they saw as Kaunda's inconsistency in his condemnation of Apartheid, following the revelation that April that he had been in secret correspondence with South African Prime Minister John Vorster.⁵⁰ As Jonas Mukumbi puts it, "we now saw our President as a collaborator with the South African racist regime. And a betrayal [sic] to the freedom struggle."⁵¹ When UNIP youths threatened to march to UNZA, they were deterred by the preparation

⁴⁶ Zambia, *Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Second National Assembly*, No. 25, 21 January 1971, Cols 154–169 (Lusaka, 1971).

⁴⁷ Interview with Zilole Mumba, Lusaka, 7 December 2003. This accusation against Kaunda was first made before independence by, among others, ANC Deputy President Lawrence Katilungu. In 1996, Kaunda was prevented from standing for the state presidency by a constitutional amendment declaring that the parents of any candidate must have been born in Zambia.

⁴⁸ UNIP 5.1.1.11.2, UNIP Chinsali District report to Northern Provincial Political Committee, 29 June 1971.

⁴⁹ *ToZ*, 8 July 1971.

⁵⁰ *ToZ*, 13 July 1971; Interview with Dennis Sikazwe, Lusaka, 26 April 2005.

⁵¹ Interview with Jonas Mukumbi, Kitwe, 7 August 2005.

by students of petrol bombs and other weapons.⁵² The following day, UNZA was closed by riot police; student leaders were subsequently expelled, and two expatriate lecturers deported. Although the student leaders apologized to Kaunda, ten of them subsequently left UNZA to work full time for the UPP.⁵³

More generally, many supporters of the new party were critical of Kaunda's stance on regional liberation struggles. Attempts to establish alternative trade routes via Tanzania were seen as expensive and unwarranted.⁵⁴ It was widely felt that Zambia was making a disproportionate sacrifice in hosting divided and ineffective nationalist organizations, which spent more time fighting each other than engaging in military action against their supposed enemies.

The United Progressive Party

In mid 1971, there was widespread speculation that Kaunda might be overthrown by foreign opponents, a coup, or by rising internal opposition. In May, as attacks were launched by Portuguese-trained Zambian dissidents into North-Western Province, militant local leaders of the mineworkers were detained on the Copperbelt.⁵⁵ In the wake of such instability, the United Progressive Party was publicly launched on 22 August 1971. Kapwepwe, carefully flanked by supporters from all parts of Zambia, declared that "Independence is good, but is meaningless and useless if it does not bring fruits to the masses."⁵⁶ He criticized financial indiscipline in government, and declared that UNIP was undemocratic and stagnant. He also raised the possibility of merger with the opposition ANC. Kapwepwe announced the appointment of national and provincial UPP officials. The following day, two such officials from Eastern Province were detained. One was Zilole Mumba, accused of writing circulars regarding Kaunda's Malawian ancestry:

In the middle of the night, I saw that there were vehicles around. "Are you Zilole Mumba?"... they showed the paper, from the intelligence agency. "Hands up." They chained me behind. And the vehicles were being driven to Mumbwa state prison.... In the first instance, they stripped us of naked. And started beating us.... They said, "Tell us how many you are."... "Tell us the source [of the UPP's funding]. All these things [are] from South Africa."... I did

⁵² *ToZ*, 15 Jul 1971.

⁵³ Kawimbe, interview; Sikazwe, interview.

⁵⁴ Bwembya, interview.

⁵⁵ Regarding the latter, see Larmer, "Unrealistic Expectations?," 338–40.

⁵⁶ *ToZ*, 23 August 1971.

not need a South African to tell me what to say. Because it's a fact.⁵⁷

Mumba and others argue that non-Bemba leaders of the UPP were specifically targeted, so as to undermine its efforts to win support across Zambia.

The launch initiated a wave of public demonstrations of loyalty by UNIP members. Vitriolic telegrams denouncing the new party, and the individuals supporting it, flooded into UNIP's headquarters. Kapwepwe was likened to Judas Iscariot and the Devil.⁵⁸ In this heightened political atmosphere, denunciations of alleged UPP supporters enabled the settling of old scores and new grievances. Fred Ramsey (now Chief Chesa) was detained after accusations by poor villagers in Matumbo village, Kasama, who resented his business successes. Ramsey denies having supported his cousin Kapwepwe, but claims that those who accused him were UPP supporters.⁵⁹

In Northern Province, UNIP organization was substantially weakened by the loss of local officials to the UPP, such as Abel Mulenga, hitherto UNIP district treasurer in Kasama.⁶⁰ While UNIP's remaining officials generally claimed that the ruling party retained majority support, they highlighted low morale and membership levels. They called for the mobilization of youth to deal with the party's enemies, for the accelerated appointment of local party officials to paid positions, and for developmental grievances to be urgently addressed.⁶¹

On 20 September 1971, all senior UPP leaders (except Kapwepwe) in Lusaka, the Copperbelt, and Northern Province were arrested and detained. Kaunda claimed they had been engaged in military training abroad. During these detentions, Kasama town was sealed off by the armed forces. Headman Abbey Kasama recalls:

On the day of arrest, we were attacked by security forces at my house, where we were holding an executive meeting. We were told earlier that three trucks of security forces had come to "protect Kasama." ... those of us who didn't run were arrested and told to pack up and taken for detention.... The people protested to the

⁵⁷ Interview with Zilole Mumba.

⁵⁸ UNIP 16.6.109.

⁵⁹ Interview with Fred Ramsey, Chinsali, 17 April 2005.

⁶⁰ Interview with Abel Mulenga, Kasama, 21 April 2005.

⁶¹ See for examples, UNIP 5.9.6, Tour report of Mansa and Samfya by District Governor R.M. Namutabo, 20 August–6 September 1971; UNIP 5.9.11, Minister of State in Ministry of Labour and Social Security S. Sikombe, tour of Solwezi, 24 August–3 September 1971; and UNIP 5.9.14, Minister of State Frank Liboma, tour of Copperbelt, meeting in Kitwe, c. Aug–Sep 1971.

Resident Minister, and he told them that the detainees were UPP who were in opposition and were planning a coup.⁶²

Eric Bwalya was questioned about the military training he supposedly received in Angola. He denies these accusations, and claims that Kapwepwe specifically rejected such tactics:

Questions were there: "How many people were sent to Angola?" It was not true, I was reporting to office every day, to the council. I could not go for military training and go to work every day. I don't think Kapwepwe sent anyone for military training, no.⁶³

Stebbin Mutale's detention order claimed he had

conspired and assisted others, or that your activities in furthering the aims of the United Progressive Party knowingly or unknowingly assisted in obtaining from governments hostile to Zambia, materials including firearms, the training of Zambian nationals with the intention to dislodge by unlawful means the legally constituted Government.⁶⁴

Despite this, Mutale (like many other detainees) was never questioned about such activities during his year in detention.

Assessments of UPP support vary considerably, and are highly dependent on the conflicting reports of local UPP and UNIP officials. Faustino Lombe visited Northern and Luapula Provinces, meeting at night with local UNIP officials:

We'd phone the [UNIP] constituency or the region that, if we set up the meeting ... we want to find 1, 2, 3, 4 people at your house, such and such a time. And we'd find them. We'd tell them that, tomorrow we want you to go and register UPP, remove UNIP on the buildings and put UPP. And it would be done the following day. So, by the time we came back to Lusaka, Northern Province had turned UPP.⁶⁵

In October 1971, Lombe and Boniface Kawimbe reported a high level of support in most of Northern Province. However, the arrests had created an atmosphere of fear; one supporter in Mbala told them "that people were UPP at

⁶² Interview with Abbey Kasama, Kasama, 19 April 2005.

⁶³ Interview with Eric Bwalya, Mufulira, 1 December 2003.

⁶⁴ Mutale, interview. Detention order, 29 September 1971, in Stebbin Mutale's possession.

⁶⁵ Interview with Faustino Lombe, Lusaka, 11 December 2003.

heart [but were] only afraid of victimisation....⁶⁶ Lists of former UNIP branches that had been converted wholesale to UPP were provided.⁶⁷

Bratton described how the UPP played on local grievances regarding unfulfilled promises, for example the failure to provide tractors for agricultural development.⁶⁸ UPP was particularly popular in UNIP's historical strongholds, amongst former UNIP activists. The new party targeted teachers and businessmen, prominent local figures whose support would provide them with influence amongst the wider rural population.⁶⁹ Direct appeals for support were also made to Bemba chiefs. Kapwepwe's own aristocratic credentials provided him with authority in this regard. The UPP's provincial president was Victor Ng'andu, formerly a minister of state for rural development, and subsequently Chief Nkula. In 1971, Ng'andu was central in approaching and recruiting village headmen to the emergent UPP.⁷⁰ However, there is little evidence that, as Posner asserts, the UPP played the "ethnic card" in its campaigning in Northern Province.⁷¹

Such tactics appear to have been effective. UNIP reports in January 1972 found:

Since the formation of the United Progressive Party in the country, Kasama has not enjoyed its real peace ... many [UNIP] branch and constituency leaders were already disorganized....⁷²

in Mporokoso Region, political situation is very bad, the Region has lost many members who has joined UPP, and a number of Constituency and Branch officials have also joined and are strongly supporting UPP.... of the population in Chishawamba's Village have switched to UPP. But when they are asked to give reasons why have joined the UPP. They give some very queer and un believable answers. "That UNIP Government has interely [sic] failed to provide us with employments, and so we have found that the new party might offer us employment." Most of Government and Rural Council employees have joined the UPP and are also

⁶⁶ African National Congress archives (hereafter ANC, held in UNIP archives) 7.113, (typed version ANC 9.15), "UPP in the Northern Division," October 1971, report to Kapwepwe.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Bratton, *The Local Politics of Rural Development*, 214.

⁶⁹ Abbey Kasama interview.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics*, 183.

⁷² UNIP 5.1.1.11.2, Kasama District Governor A.A. Kawonga to Provincial Political Committee (PPC), 18 January 1972.

organising for this party, therefore it is very difficulty [sic] for us to organise very effectively....

Youth Brigade in Mporokoso is not obligatory due to the reason that most parents of the Youths have left the Party UNIP and joined the UPP for instance Mporokoso Constituency all Youths being discouraged by parents from UNIP the whole section of Youth Brigade is flopped.... If employment were avairable [sic] in the District we should have got a lot of Youths.⁷³

However, state repression weakened the UPP's formal structures in Northern Province; following the detentions, it existed primarily as a loose personalized movement rooted in allegiance to Kapwepwe.⁷⁴

Luapula Province presented more of a challenge. As Macola shows, there was no shortage of discontent there.⁷⁵ In March 1971, Alex Shapi reported that UNIP leaders in Luapula were publicly accused of having

completely forgotten the sufferings of their people and were not fighting for the betterment of their people and for equal distribution of wealth based on equal economic developments with other Provinces. The leaders since 1964 up to this time had only been fighting for their personal gain and that they were still fighting for higher posts in order to continue enjoying high life.... "How could you leaders forget that we in this Province had died, were tortured, imprisoned and endured untold torments in the struggle...?"⁷⁶

Bates explains how support for the nascent UPP amongst Bemba-speaking Luapulans was undermined by a rumor, apparently spread by Kamanga's supporters, that Kapwepwe had insultingly dismissed Luapulans as ignorant fishermen ("*batubulu*"). By increasing Luapula Province's representation in senior party and government positions, Kaunda secured the support of provincial leaders like Shapi and Sylvester Chisembele.⁷⁷ Lombe concedes that Mansa and Samfya were "very difficult areas for UPP."⁷⁸ UPP organizer Lewis Kangwe reported:

⁷³ UNIP 5.1.1.11.2, Mporokoso Regional Secretary J.C. Mundubile to PPC, 18 January 1972.

⁷⁴ Bratton, *The Local Politics of Rural Development*, 216.

⁷⁵ Macola, "It Means as if We Are Excluded from the Good Freedom."

⁷⁶ Luapula Tour—Meet the People Tours, 25–30 March 1971, in Shapi papers, NAZ/HM 89, File 1, "Personal/Secret."

⁷⁷ Bates, *Rural Responses*, 231.

⁷⁸ Lombe, interview.

There's a news vacuum in the local areas.... The few who realise that something is afoot are those who are government employees and for fear of reprisals are keeping quiet. However people in the villages, who can have nothing except violence to fear, are willing to talk.... People want material benefits.... They want an assurance that they won't simply [experience] a new exploitative regime.⁷⁹

Respondents report UPP activity in most parts of the country. Peter Lubusha, working in Maamba Collieries in Southern Province, reports three functioning UPP branches in the area.⁸⁰ Alfred Chileshe, a railworker in Livingstone, estimates that 15 percent of his colleagues were active UPP supporters.⁸¹ Francis Bowa, like all former UPP officials interviewed, strongly rejects the allegation that the UPP was a "Bemba party." He insists that the party had support across the country, but particularly on the Copperbelt:

And the Copperbelt is ... cosmopolitan. Multi-ethnic ... we never looked at it from a tribal context. So UNIP was trying to weaken the following or the support of UPP, by portraying it as a tribal party. By trying to portray Kapwepwe, of all people, as a tribalist. Kapwepwe ... was a nationalist, and I'm sure most of his followers and lieutenants, those were nationalists.⁸²

The Copperbelt was a key target for the UPP, as John Chisata explains:

when you win support here on the Copperbelt, it's automatic you've got Luapula Province and Northern Province.... Because most of the people in these other Provinces, they depend on their sons, daughters ... to ... tell them here is what they follow.... So we wanted to get leadership here, and then send the same leadership from here to go to Luapula and Northern Provinces.⁸³

Jonas Mukumbi recalls Kapwepwe's similar prioritization of the province:

You cannot rule this country politically, if you don't get the Copperbelt. Because the Copperbelt is like a melting pot. All the tribes are here ... If you can get the Copperbelt, organise it properly, you will have established branches in other provinces ...

⁷⁹ ANC 7.113, (typed version ANC 9.15), UPP "Opinion Survey of the Luapula Province," Lewis Kangwe, 28 September–9 October 1971.

⁸⁰ Interview with Peter Lubusha, Chinsali, 15 April 2005.

⁸¹ Chileshe, interview.

⁸² Bowa, interview.

⁸³ Chisata, interview.

And the people on the Copperbelt, influenced by miners, are more militant than other provinces.⁸⁴

Copperbelt Minister Alex Shapi regularly briefed Kaunda about the UPP's activities. In one report, Shapi outlined the party's discourse:

They made allegations that the UNIP Government was in the hands of foreigners including the President himself, the Secretary-General to the Government [Rhodesian-born Aaron Milner] and others. They also allegedly accused Government and UNIP of having let down the country through bad economic and agricultural policies which are causing severe sufferings and mass unemployment to the common man. Development was also described as a failure and members in Government were accused of corruption and the squandering of public funds.⁸⁵

As Gertzel perceptively noted, "the loyalty of the labour movement, including the miners, became crucial not only for the government's position but for the maintenance of authority itself. In the government's mind the danger of the opposition working within the labour movement and of winning its support was apparently considerable...."⁸⁶ Many of the UPP's most important leaders—Chisata, Robinson Puta, and Jameson Chapoloko—had been leaders of the mineworkers' union in colonial Zambia. Bates demonstrated the link between mineworkers' economic discontent, and their support for the UPP. He identified how,

Working clandestinely and utilizing their numerous ties with the dissident mineworkers and their spokesmen, the leaders of the UPP hoped to take advantage of currents of dissent in the mine-working community and to gain support for their opposition party.⁸⁷

Bates cited a "Zambia Daily Mail" report suggesting the success of their efforts:

dissident miners, angered by the government's roundup of rebel leaders earlier this year, had pledged their support for the new party, called the United Progressive Party.... there had been secret movements among the miners' dissident groups. The sources said

⁸⁴ Mukumbi, interview.

⁸⁵ Shapi to Kaunda, 14 September 1971, "Members of the United Progressive Party—Copperbelt Province," Shapi papers, National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ) HM/89, File 1, Personal (Secret).

⁸⁶ Cherry Gertzel, "Labour and the State: The Case of Zambia's Mineworkers' Union," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 13, 3 (1975), 295.

⁸⁷ Bates, *Rural Responses to Industrialisation*, 242.

that the rebel miners had promised the organizers of the new party that they would back it...⁸⁸

My research confirms that while the leadership of the Mineworkers' Union (MUZ) unanimously reaffirmed the union's support for UNIP, a substantial part of the mining community was supportive of, and responsive to, the ideas of the UPP.⁸⁹

Certainly, large numbers of UNIP and trade union officials on the Copperbelt joined the UPP, and the area was wracked by violence and intimidation as the parties clashed. In Chililabombwe, UNIP supporters threatened to burn down the shop owned by local UPP chairman Stebbin Mutale.⁹⁰ Alfred Kaniki, a mineworker and UPP branch chairman in the Kitwe mine township of Chamboli, was hospitalized after being beaten by UNIP supporters.⁹¹ Fidelis Mwamba, an MUZ branch official and UPP organizer in Luanshya, found it impossible to hold party meetings in the town; these were held secretly in the "bush" nearby.⁹² Basilio Kunda, MUZ branch treasurer in Nchanga and UPP district publicity secretary, organized indoor meetings at night, for fear of UNIP "spies."⁹³ MUZ head office suspended shop stewards identified as UPP supporters.

For Chisata, this repression occurred because other "parties did not give them [UNIP] as much worries as us. Because UPP was right in the centre. In a place where we could, we were capable of even ... organising ... the general strike...."⁹⁴ It is noticeable, however, that the UPP did not take practical steps to prioritize the mobilization of organized labor during its brief period of legal existence. It was not until the late 1970s that Kapwepwe appeared to appreciate the potential of the union movement in removing Kaunda (see below).

The UPP subsequently stood in six by-elections resulting from the detention of MPs. Abel Mulenga was the UPP's electoral agent in Mpika East. He recalls how he and the UPP candidate, Samuel Shimumbi, had to break through a UNIP roadblock into order to lodge nomination papers.⁹⁵ Kapwepwe stood in the Mufulira West mine township constituency, although he only visited once during

⁸⁸ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 2 August 1971, cited in Bates, *Rural Responses to Industrialization*, 332.

⁸⁹ MUZ Supreme Council minutes, 24 September 1971, MUZ Luanshya file 5B, "Supreme Council, 1971-73."

⁹⁰ Mutale, interview.

⁹¹ Interview with Alfred Kaniki, Kitwe, 5 August 2005.

⁹² Interview with Fidelis Mwamba, Kitwe, 15 September 2002.

⁹³ Kunda interview. Sefelino Mumba, another UPP member, estimates 75 percent of miners supported UPP; interview with Sefelino Mumba, Chingola, 15 February 2003.

⁹⁴ Chisata, interview.

⁹⁵ Mulenga, interview.

the campaign, for fear of violence. Jonas Mukumbi, who organized the UPP’s campaign in Mufulira, remembers Kapwepwe’s single campaign speech:

We fought for Independence, we achieved Independence. But Independence is empty if it doesn’t deliver. If the ordinary people are not eating well, ordinary people are not getting employment, ordinary people can’t have health facilities, ordinary people can’t get education facilities, then that Independence is hollow.⁹⁶

The UPP was denied permits to hold public meetings, and instead campaigned by word of mouth, organizing secret house meetings at night. UPP organizers carried Bibles to suggest they were attending church.⁹⁷ The party received active support from local ANC activists, who had a strong presence in Mufulira.⁹⁸ There were widespread allegations that local UNIP officials campaigned for the UPP. UNIP placed senior government ministers in Mufulira for the campaign, and sought support by standing Alexander Kamalondo, Mufulira MUZ branch chairman and national MUZ vice president, as its candidate.⁹⁹ Kapwepwe won the by-election in December 1971, receiving 2,120 votes against Kamalondo’s 1,814.¹⁰⁰ Mukumbi recalls that, during the counting of votes, it was the mine township areas that voted most decisively for Kapwepwe.¹⁰¹ Elsewhere, UNIP won comfortably; however, given the extent of intimidation, and the fact that the UPP was unable to campaign openly, this cannot be treated as a useful gauge of either party’s support.

In late 1971 and early 1972, violent clashes continued between the two parties, particularly on the Copperbelt. Meanwhile, state and parastatal employees suspected of being members of the UPP were sacked. Businessmen identified as UPP supporters had their businesses attacked, and their operating licences revoked. Faustino Lombe:

Anybody who belonged to UPP in Government [employment] was fired. People started being evicted from their houses if they belonged to UPP.... I was living with a brother who was a teacher.

⁹⁶ Mukumbi, interview.

⁹⁷ Chisata, interview; Sefelino Mumba, interview.

⁹⁸ Mukumbi, interview.

⁹⁹ Following Gertzel, Posner claims that Kamalondo was selected as the UNIP candidate for Mufulira West as an attempt to exploit differences between Zambians of Luapula and Northern Province origin respectively (Kamalondo was originally from Luapula Province). As indicated, my research suggests that Kamalondo’s local MUZ position was the primary basis of his candidature in a constituency with an ethnically heterogeneous population: Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics*, 193.

¹⁰⁰ *ToZ*, 22 December 1971.

¹⁰¹ Mukumbi, interview.

He had to evict me, for the fear that he was going to lose the job... [sympathisers] would tell us that, "You see we are totally with you... If they fire me from this job, what am I going to feed the children?" And they had seen how our families were suffering.¹⁰²

At the same time, internal UNIP reports warned about the continued presence of UPP sympathizers at the highest levels. Following the Mufulira by-election defeat, UNIP's regional secretary argued:

the way the UPP got first hand information of the UNIP Candidate in Mufulira West is an open indication that we have in the midst of our Central Committee UPP strong supporters.... Their continued stay in the party and Government without taking any appropriate action against them will wreck the party and the Government. ...¹⁰³

Kapwepwe returned to Parliament in January 1972 as the UPP's sole MP. Days later, he was violently attacked in Lusaka.¹⁰⁴ Despite Kapwepwe's warning against reprisals, UPP activists including Josiah Chishala carried out attacks on UNIP officials in the following days.¹⁰⁵ On 4 February, the UPP was banned, and 123 leaders, including Kapwepwe, were detained. Kaunda claimed that the party was "bent on violence and destruction."¹⁰⁶ Weeks later, Kaunda confirmed widespread speculation that Zambia would become a one-party state.¹⁰⁷

As suggested above, the potential for an alliance between the UPP and the ANC had been proposed from the party's launch. If the UPP had been able to achieve electoral success in its regions of strength, then an alliance between these parties would almost certainly have had majority support. Despite their apparent ideological differences—Kapwepwe had long been regarded as politically radical, while the ANC was economically and socially conservative—the two parties cooperated closely, with the UPP operating from the ANC's offices. Davies Mwaba recalls policy compromises between the parties:

[It]was at that time was more or less like an alliance, where you give and take. We said we will nationalise the mines. He says no. We say OK, give us this but can you give us something ... which

¹⁰² Lombe, interview.

¹⁰³ UNIP 5.7.1.10.7, Mufulira Regional Secretary, speaking at Copperbelt PPC, 7 January 1972.

¹⁰⁴ *ToZ*, 13–15 January 1972.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Josiah Chishala, Lusaka, 15 August 2005.

¹⁰⁶ *ToZ*, 4 February 1972.

¹⁰⁷ *ToZ*, 26 February 1972.

we should give up for you to get your policy in? It's give and take.
And we were prepared, clearly ANC were very accommodating.¹⁰⁸

While ANC President Harry Nkumbula was initially enthusiastic about the alliance, other party leaders saw no reason why, given Kapwepwe's previous attacks on the ANC, an alliance with the UPP would be preferable to one with UNIP. The UPP's J.B. Monga found that in Southern Province, cooperation between the parties was well supported.¹⁰⁹ Daniel Kapapa, an ANC official in Northern Province, enthusiastically joined the new party, but UNIP intelligence found that ANC supporters in Mufulira were against any merger.¹¹⁰

Senior UPP leaders increasingly saw this alliance as the only way to defeat UNIP; John Chisata wrote from prison to Nkumbula in July 1972:

I write on behalf of all the detained former members of U.P.P. to express our appreciation for the stand which you have taken on all national issues.... Having contacted Mr. Kapwepwe when he issued his directive that all our members should join the African National Congress ... we have placed our hopes and the high spirits of our people in the confidence that you will not allow Kaunda to make a complete mess of our country.¹¹¹

The following year, however, Nkumbula abandoned his legal challenge to the one-party state, effectively dissolved the ANC, and encouraged its members to join UNIP. Nkumbula, not prepared to face the prospect of detention by Kaunda, was apparently offered financial compensation in the form of an emerald mining concession.¹¹²

The UPP's Successors, 1972–1973

In early 1972, the leadership of the banned (and now re-named) party passed to Faustino Lombe:

Let's call a conference. So we informed the people on the Copperbelt; some few people travelled from Northern Province. And the Lusaka people ... We met at night in a farm in Makeni [south of Lusaka]. That's where I was elected the President of the Democratic Peoples' Party.... I went to see Harry Nkumbula, to

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Davies Mwaba, Lusaka, 6 December 2003.

¹⁰⁹ ANC 9.15, J.B. Monga, UPP, reports on Livingstone, Kalomo, Choma, Mazabuka, Sept 1971; Chileshe interview.

¹¹⁰ Kapapa interview; Shapi papers, NAZ/HM/89, SECRET, A K Shapi to President Kaunda, 23 August 1971.

¹¹¹ ANC 8.11, Chisata to Nkumbula, from Mpima prison, Kabwe, 12 July 1972.

¹¹² I am grateful to Giacomo Macola for this information.

say this is what we decided to do here.... Nkumbula was very much afraid, and didn't like that.¹¹³

Lombe and his group, unable to campaign openly, issued a series of circulars. He and the former UNZA students were critical of what they saw as UNIP's accommodation with international capital.¹¹⁴ DPP circulars contrasted low wages with the earnings of senior politicians:

Late last year, President Kaunda's salary was increased by K3,000 per year, back dated to June 1971, also Ministers' salaries were raised by over K600 per year and not very long ago, the Nation was informed that another 15% gratuity for President Kaunda was granted.... This shows that these people want to finish even the last ngwee before they are removed, shame! It takes the Parliament a short time to approve such increases, but on the contrary, why should it requires [sic] a Commission of Inquiry to look into Minimum Wage Increase and Conditions of Employment for the peasant workers....¹¹⁵

One analogous circular sought to illustrate Zambia's betrayal by Kaunda, the Malawian "outsider":

One day, hunters went into the bush. On their way back, they found a person lying down.... he told them he didn't want to return home. But because he looked so bad, the oldest in the group suggested that they take him home.... the patient looked peaceable and would cause no havoc....

Another mistake they did on arrival at the village was ... to give all power to the man they hardly knew. What he started doing was controlling all food supplies. When these people wanted food, he would always say that the food was meant for other villagers. Eventually, all the food supplies ran out....

People in the village eventually assembled to decide on how to ask that man about the food. When he heard the story, he got all those assembled and threw them in the store houses.... he informed everyone that those he had thrown into the storehouses were wrongdoers and that he'd release them whenever he wanted.... the

¹¹³ Lombe, interview.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ ANC 7.113, DPP Vice National Secretary for Youth A.B. Mwansa, circular "To all Zambian Youths," 19 March 1972. Zambia's currency, the Kwacha, is divided into 100 Ngwees.

village asked, "If someone asks about their food, is it reason enough to throw them into prison?"¹¹⁶

By this time, open opposition was virtually impossible. UNIP officials described the situation as peaceful in most of Northern Province, although in Kasama, "There were D.P.P. circulars all over. There were also bitter feelings about sackings by Local Authorities of their employees.... There are many visitors who come to Kasama and these tend to confuse the people."¹¹⁷

Some young DPP supporters resorted to more direct methods. Dennis Sikazwe admits bombing UNIP local offices in Lusaka, for which he was subsequently arrested. He was saved from a long jail sentence only because his confession was extracted by torture.¹¹⁸ In Kaputa, Northern Province, UNIP officials reported

The passing of the banned U.P.P. men in the District on their way to Zaire ... On their way back to Muteembo village, they told the people of this village ... the purpose of their journey saying: "We are going to Zaire to get magic powers and the fighting Weapons..."¹¹⁹

Foreign support was not only sought from Zaire. Following the UPP's banning, DPP Vice National Secretary Andrew Mwansa secretly met with South African officials in Malawi in June 1972. Mwansa claimed he had been sent by the DPP national executive (this is denied by Lombe, who insists Mwansa acted without authority).¹²⁰ Mwansa requested financial assistance in the event of an election being called, or military assistance for a coup attempt. The reaction of South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS) is instructive. Firstly, it suggests that no previous support had been provided to either the UPP or DPP. Secondly, it recommended that no assistance be provided, because "the Zambian security service will also attempt to infiltrate agents into the ranks of the UPP or DPP."¹²¹ BOSS feared that aid was being sought by government agents within the opposition, and that it would be publicly exposed in order to embarrass the South African government.

A third party, the United People's Party, was launched by Musonda Chambeshi and Justin Chimba (visibly disabled following torture while in

¹¹⁶ ANC 7.113, George Kasonde, DPP Circular, unnumbered and undated, c. April 1972. Translated from CiBemba.

¹¹⁷ UNIP 5.1.1.11.2, Northern Provincial Political Committee minutes, 27 April 1972.

¹¹⁸ Sikazwe, interview.

¹¹⁹ UNIP 5.1.1.11.4, Kaputa report to Provincial Political Committee, 6 July 1972.

¹²⁰ Lombe, interview, 8 July 2005.

¹²¹ South Africa Foreign Affairs archives, 1/157/3, Vol 8, BOSS to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Attn E. Myburg, re UPP/DPP and A.B. Mwansa, 27 June 1972.

detention) in October 1972. These and other leaders of the new party were quickly re-detained, and it was unable to offer any substantial challenge to the introduction of the one-party state that December. Shortly before, Chimba issued a rallying call:

When UNIP was formed in 1959, it was formed with expressive intentions of bringing about self-government and independence.... It was never thought UNIP would turn out into a terror organisation as it has become.... Where is the so called Humanism if the people who preach it act like those rulers who oppress others in South Africa and Rhodesia?¹²²

Chimba's circulars condemned the influence of the Chinese in Zambian politics, illustrating an anti-communist discourse that stood in contrast to the DPP's more radical position:¹²³

the Chinese who were working on the Railways engaged themselves in transporting UNIP members to the polling stations in their trucks during the December, 1971 bye-elections. This is what we call political interference.¹²⁴

Davies Mwaba recalls ideological differences between UPP detainees in Mukobeko Prison in 1972:

there were tensions, even in detention. The students would say, "Is this what we're here for, this type of leadership?" Pointing at Chapolokos, Chambeshis and that, they couldn't get on. "What is the economic policy?" They wouldn't understand what the students were talking about. It was terrible. "What does UPP stand for?" One would say "The UPP stands for respect for traditional leaders." "What?!! We are detained for that sort rubbish?" So there were continuous tensions between the members.¹²⁵

Torture of detainees seems to have become increasingly common. Davies Mwaba:

They drive you at night blindfolded ... When they drag you to interrogation, you're going to face 1,000 plus watts of light. You're blinded, and they're asking you questions. If you don't answer they beat you, you won't see where the blow is coming from. And if you don't answer correctly, you get electrified

¹²² ANC 9.15, United Peoples' Party Circular No. 3, National Secretary Musonda Justin Chimba, "How Long is this Country going to be ruled by Political Maniacs?," 14 October 1972.

¹²³ Interviewees such as Stebbin Mutale and Alfred Chileshe saw the UPP as supportive of free enterprise and liberal democracy, in contrast to UNIP's undemocratic state "socialism."

¹²⁴ ANC 7.113, United Peoples' Party Circular No. 2, National Secretary Chimba, 13 October 1972.

¹²⁵ Mwaba, interview.

slippers. And if that is not enough they get the hood. And the hood is the worst torture one can suffer. You wear a cap, like the ones they use in hair salons. And they switch on the electricity.¹²⁶

Most detainees were released during 1973. Most had been dismissed from their jobs, and were now unable to find employment, because they were blacklisted.¹²⁷ Others lost their businesses because their trading licences were revoked.¹²⁸ Many were isolated in their communities, and constantly followed by intelligence officials.¹²⁹ Alfred Bwebe:

When I came back to Kasama ... People were terribly coward. There were no person to come and greet me. Because they were saying that these are UPP people. Kaunda hates this one. So, I was made lonely.¹³⁰

Many activists regarded this as the end of the UPP. Kapwepwe issued instructions that supporters should now rejoin UNIP, and agitate for progressive change from within. The ambiguity of this position led some former UPP supporters to take up positions in UNIP and lobby for policies that they believed were in the national interest.¹³¹ Others rejoined UNIP, but sought to undermine party structures, and waited for the right moment to move against Kaunda. Still others remained "UPP," organizing underground opposition to UNIP, particularly on the Copperbelt.¹³²

Disunity Under the One-Party State, 1973–1976

The introduction of the one-party state ended overt political opposition to UNIP, but did little to resolve its internal tensions, nor its reduced support. UNIP's records provide a wealth of examples of the decline in party organization. Minister of Lands Solomon Kalulu toured his Lusaka constituency in April 1973:

the whole of Woodlands, the whole of Sunningdale, Kabulonga, Prospect Area, Cathedral, Long Acres, University, Kalingalinga, Hospital and David Kaunda Technical College had no Branches

¹²⁶ Ibid. Such testimonies are confirmed by the unpublished report of the "Munyama Human Rights Commission of Inquiry" (Lusaka, 1995).

¹²⁷ For example, Lubusha interview; Kasonde interview.

¹²⁸ For example, Bwalya interview; Bwembya interview. Stebbin Mutale not only lost his business, but also found that UNIP officials in Chililabombwe had arranged the auction sale of his house without his knowledge: Mutale interview.

¹²⁹ Bwembya, interview.

¹³⁰ Interview with Alfred Bwebe, Kasama, 20 April 2005.

¹³¹ For example, Marcellino Bwembya, who was subsequently elected as a UNIP councillor in Chingola, interview.

¹³² For example, Lombe interview.

and Sections... The Party is left to the old veterans, uneducated ... I was left with the impression that UNIP was thoroughly undermined from the bottom and that the time-bomb could go off any time.¹³³

UNIP was also affected by the widespread belief that its remaining Bemba leaders were secret UPP supporters.¹³⁴ Respondents report the presence of UNIP leaders such as Shapi, Lewis Changufu, Unia Mwila, Malama Sokoni and Andrew Mutemba at pre-launch UPP meetings. Mutemba was alleged to have secretly sworn oaths of loyalty to the UPP.¹³⁵ He nevertheless remained within UNIP, and was apparently a loyal party leader throughout the 1970s.

In these circumstances, UNIP was continually suspicious of its own members and officials. During the first one-party election in 1973, UNIP was torn between the use of force and intimidation to deliver votes, and the knowledge that this might provoke resistance in areas in which it had little support. In Kasama, senior UNIP officials reported in late 1974 that

The anti Party elements no doubt had and still try to kill the existence of the people's party UNIP.... attitude of the people is completely different and their spirit towards the party is dead. This really shocked us.... Constituencies, Branches, Village Productivity Committees do only exist in name.... so called leaders ... were not members of the Party.... These could be seen from the sort of questions, complaints and suggestions.... "we have been told to regroup villages, but after doing so things they promised us have not been brought to us.... What is Government doing in completing unfinished primary schools and Health Centres?"... people are mislead [sic] or they have misinformed leaders or there is no party at all....¹³⁶

A UNIP report on Northern Province in 1975 reported difficulties with voter registration:

The people feel that the Party and Government has not done anything for them since Independence they need better roads and Rural Health Centres ... the Party in these areas has lost clip [sic -

¹³³ UNIP 8.4.3, Minister of Lands S. Kalulu, tour of his Lusaka constituency, 12 April 1973.

¹³⁴ UNIP 5.7.1.10.12, Luanshya District Political Committee, 19 December 1973.

¹³⁵ UNIP 5.7.2.2.10, Minister of State Southern Province Andrew Mutemba to Regional Secretary Livingstone, 21 March 1972.

¹³⁶ UNIP 8.9.11, Kasama tour report, Alex Shapi and Frank Chitambala, 28 August–21 September 1974.

grip?] on the people.... they generally behave as if they are under colonial Government.¹³⁷

On the Copperbelt, Provincial Minister Axson Chalikulima reported in December 1974, "The Political situation is being contained although it is a little bit like a volcano."¹³⁸ There, the threat of support for the banned party amongst organized labor remained a key concern. In 1974, MUZ deputy leader Kamalondo alleged that branch officials in Luanshya and Mufulira were plotting to "overthrow" the union's national leadership, and to revive the UPP.¹³⁹ Days before branch elections in Mufulira, eleven candidates were detained by the police.¹⁴⁰ One reported that he had been questioned about the UPP.¹⁴¹ Shapi secretly wrote to Kaunda:

the Party is terribly weak ... in the Mine Township Compounds. My meetings with the Leaders in the Registered Constituencies, Branches and Sections of the Party were almost a failure.... The Leaders seem to be very un concerned [sic] and independent.

Another list enclosed ... is the list of names of Ex-UPP previously detained but promised to be Royal [sic - loyal] to Your Excellency, the Party and the Government when they were realised [sic - released]. These are the same people suspected to have resumed their activities against the party and Government.¹⁴²

Mufulira was the underground UPP's strongest base. Chisata, Bwalya, Lombe, and Elias Kaenga organized a party cell there, meeting regularly with sympathizers (including UNIP officials and members) across the Copperbelt, particularly at social events such as funerals and weddings.¹⁴³ They sought to persuade people to vote "No" in one-party presidential elections, and to support parliamentary candidates who might oppose the UNIP leadership. Mostly, they held discussions, and kept a flickering flame of opposition alive.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁷ UNIP 8.9.11, Registration of Voters report, Kaputa, Luwingu, Mporokoso, 5–23 April 1975, J. Mutala [sic–Mutale?].

¹³⁸ UNIP 8.4.4, Copperbelt Province report to National Council, 14–18 December 1974 written by Minister for Copperbelt A.C. Chalikulima, 13 December 1974.

¹³⁹ Joint Executive Committee, 6 January 1976, in Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (hereafter MUZ) Luanshya 6A, "Luanshya JEC and caucus meetings, 1979–81.

¹⁴⁰ *ToZ*, 18 July 1974; see also Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, *Class Struggles in Zambia, 1889–1989, and the Fall of Kenneth Kaunda, 1990–1991* (Lanham, MD, 1992), 58.

¹⁴¹ Quoted in *ToZ*, 26 July 1974.

¹⁴² Shapi to Kaunda, n.d., c. end July 1974, in Shapi papers, NAZ/HM/89, untitled file.

¹⁴³ Chisata, interview.

¹⁴⁴ Lombe, interview.

In the Copperbelt in December 1974, UNIP had 63,442 members in a population of 1,072,000, yet to fill all UNIP local positions required a minimum of 121,978 members.¹⁴⁵ A basic problem was the lack of incentives for membership. In the years after independence, access to credit, land, and other economic opportunities was closely tied to party position, encapsulated in the ubiquitous slogan, "It Pays to Belong to UNIP." As such opportunities declined with economic stagnation in the mid 1970s, the clamor amongst local party officials for the channeling of economic advantages to them became increasingly shrill. In 1976, UNIP's Copperbelt Provincial Conference resolved:

the UNIP Membership Card should be made a legal document for the purpose of identification and holders of such cards should be given preferential treatment over non holders in such spheres as employment, promotions, markets, loans, businesses, housing and all socio-economic activities.¹⁴⁶

While senior UNIP officials used their positions to acquire significant wealth, the decidedly limited trickle-down of patronage prevented most local officials from gaining meaningful advantage from their positions, contributing to the party's decline as a functioning local organization.

As the party leadership received a steady flow of reports testifying to the apathy of local officials, and the atrophy of local structures, it sought to balance the need to attract active supporters against the danger of opening its doors to its enemies. All candidates for local and national election were vetted. In 1975, the Chinsali Political Committee vetted 32 of 64 prospective candidates for the local council. Comments on rejected candidates, all UNIP members, included:

Ward 4, Mr Tailoka and Mr Musanya ... The Security people feel that they are secretly supporting UPP. These two people went round in the area telling people that Government has no money, and it is very difficult for the Party to sell cards in the area they live.

Ward 8, Mr J. Nkonde, Mr. A Katongo, Mr. J. Chileshe ... come from villages organised by UPP. They influence people not to go and vote during the General Elections. They tore 16 UNIP cards and any posters of UNIP they see they tear them up. Anti-Party and Government up to now.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ UNIP 8.4.4, Copperbelt Province report to National Council, 14–18 December 1974.

¹⁴⁶ UNIP 8.1.3, 1st Copperbelt Provincial Conference of UNIP, n.d., 1976.

¹⁴⁷ UNIP 8.1.76, Chinsali Council candidates list, n.d., 1975.

Bratton described how in Kasama, electoral candidates endorsed by UNIP headquarters were consistently rejected in favor of locals, many known or perceived to be UPP supporters.¹⁴⁸

The UPP in UNIP, 1977–1980

In 1977, some national UNIP leaders, concerned about the party’s weakness, successfully advocated for the re-admission of UPP leaders. UNIP’s Northern Province membership subsequently doubled in the space of one year. Former UPP leaders saw this as an opportunity to gain control of the ruling party, aiming to replace President Kaunda with Kapwepwe, who re-joined UNIP in September 1977.

UNIP was rightly suspicious of the motivations of its prodigal sons. When Musonda Chambeshi won the Roan mine township by-election in December 1977 as a UNIP candidate, an internal inquiry found that “the electorate deviated somewhat from the expectations of the nation and the Party.... both Party leaders and the electorate of Roan Parliamentary Constituency have by their actions refused to toe the Party line.”¹⁴⁹

In September 1978, Kapwepwe's challenge to Kaunda for the UNIP presidency was prevented only by hasty changes to the party constitution. Former UPP organizers who traveled to the conference at which the election would have taken place were turned back by security forces.¹⁵⁰ Within days, the UPP organizers in Mufulira were arrested, accused of starting a nightclub fire in Chililabombwe, and badly tortured.¹⁵¹ Bwalya was systematically beaten, and given electric shocks, while being questioned about his loyalty to Kapwepwe.¹⁵² Chisata and Lombe were detained until 1981 without charges being brought. Other allies of Kapwepwe, including UNIP veteran Lasford Nkonde (see above), were arrested.¹⁵³ In late 1979, Kapwepwe himself was briefly detained on charges of possessing a gun and pornography, and was subject to a campaign of harassment and surveillance.¹⁵⁴

Amidst this upheaval, UNIP propaganda sought to ensure a high turnout in the 1978 elections, by stressing the threat of an unnamed “outside force”:

¹⁴⁸ Bratton, *The Local Politics of Rural Development*, 249.

¹⁴⁹ UNIP 8.1.114, “Analysis of Roan Parliamentary Constituency,” 26 January 1978 by Member of Central Committee for Copperbelt Province S.J. Soko, 1–2.

¹⁵⁰ Kapyanga, interview.

¹⁵¹ Interviews with Chisata, Bwalya, Lombe.

¹⁵² Bwalya, interview.

¹⁵³ Nkonde, interview.

¹⁵⁴ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 23 December 1979.

This theme has been chosen to counter the apathy resulting from present economic problems and to explain to the voting public that the shortages ... they experience now result from outside economic pressure rather than reflecting internal maladministration. To do this the "outside FORCE" must be developed into a real living and threatening FORCE.¹⁵⁵

Days before the election, UNIP's senior Copperbelt official warned that the party's enemies were encouraging a NO vote (Presidential elections during the one-party state involved the casting of "yes" or "no" votes for or against the sole candidate, President Kaunda):

it is a simple but very effective strategy worked out upon the anvil of our declining economic situation.... the rank and file do not know that Zambia and the President ... do not control the process of copper. They do not know that these prices are determined and controlled by world markets.... It is our duty as leaders, to explain and tell them the true position.... UNIP's enemies are putting out the big lie that UNIP as a Party is weak. Some even call it a "Minority Party." ... If you do not hold constant meetings and meeting the people in every part of the townships, the masses shall believe this big lie and it shall be your fault if the reactionaries win the battle....¹⁵⁶

Despite an increased turnout, UNIP was disturbed by the results in at least half of Zambia's provinces. A postmortem report admitted that in Central Province, "the 'NO' votes were a genuine expression of political opposition in the light of the shortage of essential commodities in the country."¹⁵⁷ In Northern Province, it was recommended:

Old members of the Party who are dissidents should be weeded out.... Distribution of essential commodities should be improved. This depends on improvement in the general economy of the country.... The massive NO votes in CHINSALI and SHIWANGANDU and other areas came about due to some Presiding Officers who had been influenced by ex UPP supporters.... Anti UPP campaign to be mounted on radio, TV and in the papers. This should be aimed at discrediting the former

¹⁵⁵ UNIP 8.8.4, H.K. Maunga memo, "General and Presidential Elections 1978," 24 July 1978.

¹⁵⁶ UNIP 5.7.2.1.20, Member of Central Committee for Copperbelt Province S.J. Soko to all Copperbelt Province District Governors, 21 February 1978, "Tactics with which to counter the destructive efforts of counter-revolutionaries."

¹⁵⁷ UNIP 8.8.4, "Important Points: Postmortem: Presidential and General Elections, 1978 Conclusions and Recommendations" undated [c. end 1978, start 1979].

members who still cling to the dead Party. It should be branded as a Tribal organization—hence its failure to continue.¹⁵⁸

Senior UNIP officials were thus still advocating propaganda against a party legally outlawed in 1972. They were also forced to admit (privately) that political opposition was related to rising economic discontent, which they felt powerless to address.

Kapwepwe and Nkumbula launched an unsuccessful legal challenge to the changing of UNIP's constitution. Subsequently, Kapwepwe recognized the growing importance of the trade union movement in Zambian politics. Jonas Mukumbi claims that, as early as 1974, Kapwepwe had assigned him to “infiltrate” the labor movement and encourage the new Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) national chairman, Frederick Chiluba (a secret UPP sympathizer) to speak out publicly on economic issues.¹⁵⁹ Chiluba certainly met Kapwepwe on a number of occasions, but G.Y. Mumba and others suggest that it was only in the late 1970s that Kapwepwe prioritized links with the labor movement.¹⁶⁰ Stanley Sinkamba recalls Kapwepwe's remarks to him three months before his death:

the only one who can defeat Kaunda is Chiluba. If we used Chiluba, Kaunda will fall.... “we can use this fool.... He has got the workers,... If only the workers turn against Kaunda, then he's gone.”¹⁶¹

At the same time, Kapwepwe appears to have accepted advice from friends and colleagues that a more radical approach to political change would be necessary. Research in this area is ongoing; evidence, limited to oral sources, must be treated cautiously. Nevertheless, two surviving leaders of the 1980 coup attempt claim that Kapwepwe was engaged in, and supportive of, the plot that they launched.¹⁶² Faustino Lombe, who was involved in a subsequent attempt to free the detained coup plotters, admits to links with South African military intelligence at that time.¹⁶³ Ironically, Kaunda's constant but initially false allegations of links between the UPP and South Africa appear to have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By preventing the party from campaigning openly, and then repressing its leaders using detention and torture, he may have pushed some of them into cooperating with the Apartheid authorities with which they had no underlying sympathy.

¹⁵⁸ UNIP 8.8.4, Member of Central Committee J. Litana, to Election and Political Strategy sub-Committee, recommendations to Central Committee, n.d., c. start 1979.

¹⁵⁹ Mukumbi, interview.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with G.Y. Mumba, Lusaka, 10–15 August 2005.

¹⁶¹ Sinkamba, interview.

¹⁶² G.Y. Mumba, interview; interview with Deogratias Symba, Kitwe, 4 August 2005.

¹⁶³ Lombe interview.

Kapwepwe's sudden death in January 1980 led to widespread suspicions that he was killed by state forces.¹⁶⁴ His death generally brought to an end to the idea of UPP, although John Sakulanda, Chisanga Puta-Chekwe, and others were detained for organizing a "UPP" on the Copperbelt in the mid-1980s.¹⁶⁵ At Kapwepwe's funeral, President Kaunda was heckled, but ZCTU leader Chiluba was cheered. Chiluba continued to meet former UPP activists throughout the 1980s, particularly Mukumbi and Chambeshi. Chiluba went on to lead the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, and become President of Zambia, following a popular campaign to restore the multiparty system in 1990–91. There is however disagreement amongst the former members of the UPP as to whether Chiluba was a worthy successor to the UPP president, or if his political legacy was an unfortunate diversion from Kapwepwe's principled leadership.¹⁶⁶

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the extent of popular discontent with the results of UNIP's first decade in government was far greater than has generally been assumed. This discontent rested on expectations of a post-independence transformation of Zambia that would not have been possible without a revolutionary redistribution of wealth and power. This was never part of the UNIP leadership's agenda, but it is nevertheless the case that many UNIP activists, particularly in its strongholds, expected to be the beneficiaries of such a transformation. Activists imagined the benefits of postcolonial development would flow to them in the form of new state and party positions, and to their communities (and/or to the nation) as vastly improved social services, economic opportunities, and employment, depending on their own personal standing in the party and potential to take advantage of those opportunities that did arise.

Support for the UPP was by no means the sole expression of such discontent among former UNIP activists. It did, however, have a disproportionate impact on party and nation, located as it was in UNIP's nationalist strongholds, and fed by an acute sense of the betrayal of those who sacrificed most in the struggle for independence. The UPP, while centered on Northern and Copperbelt Provinces, is noteworthy not for its ethnic coherence and political singularity, but rather for the ambiguity of its policies and language. While UNZA students saw the UPP as a leftist ideological vehicle and unionized mineworkers believed it would improve their pay and conditions, small businessmen were convinced the party would reduce state intervention in the economy and promote individual enterprise. Indeed, it was precisely this ambiguity which enabled Zambians of varying

¹⁶⁴ Most interviewees continue to believe that Kapwepwe was murdered.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with John Sakulanda, Lusaka, 9 April 2005.

¹⁶⁶ Most former UPP activists joined and/or supported the MMD in 1991, but Musonda Chambeshi, Elias Kaenga, and others formed the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NADA).

ethnic, social, and political backgrounds to view it as a credible vehicle for the expression of their heterogeneous, and ultimately contradictory, discontents. In this sense, the UPP resembled UNIP and other nationalist precursors, and indeed the MMD's subsequent alliance of former politicians, aspirant businessmen, and discontent trade unionists.

This paper has rejected a purely quantitative approach to assessing the extent of the UPP's support, understanding that, in a context of significant state and party repression, support was necessarily expressed in a number of forms (activism, membership, attendance at secret meetings, undeclared affiliation, etc.) that are impossible to quantify, either contemporaneously or in retrospect. It is argued, however, that the UPP represented a significant and consistent threat to UNIP hegemony in its traditional areas of support. This was a challenge that required the mobilization, not only of the ruling party's own resources, but that of an increasingly repressive state. The UPP was not withering away at the time of its outlawing in 1972. While illegality, and the detention and harassment of its members, deterred most of its potential supporters, UNIP's consistent preoccupation with dissidents within and outside its ranks in the 1970s was primarily a reflection of the discontent with the outcomes of independence that the UPP partially expressed.

The challenges faced by liberation movements in the transition to postcolonial governance are hardly a new subject for academic enquiry. The constraints, tradeoffs, compromises, and "necessary sacrifices" are the commonplace discourse of developmental debates. However, the tendency to regard such outcomes as unfortunate inevitabilities has led to an analytical neglect of the ways in which they have profoundly affected postcolonial politics across Africa. Militant demands for a second and real independence affected countries as different as Malawi and Zaire. The sense of betrayal of Independence fighters who received little or nothing of what they saw as their just reward was part of the discourse of the Land Freedom Army in Kenya and the war veterans of Zimbabwe, both of which continue to influence the politics of their respective countries. In present-day South Africa, service delivery protests adopt and adapt the symbolism and songs of Apartheid era demonstrations to fortify their discourse of betrayal, while Umkhonto we Sizwe veterans publicly protest their neglect by the ANC government they helped to place in power. This paper seeks to help address this neglect, in de-centering the focus of analysis from the hard choices of policy makers to the reaction of those affected by their choices and its influence on postcolonial political history.