



**OXFORD JOURNALS**  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

**The Royal African Society**

---

The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political Participation in Zambia: The Case of Southern Province

Author(s): Jotham C. Momba

Source: *African Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 352 (Jul., 1989), pp. 331-357

Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/722690>

Accessed: 03-05-2016 10:51 UTC

**REFERENCES**

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

[http://www.jstor.org/stable/722690?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.org/stable/722690?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents)

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://about.jstor.org/terms>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).



*Oxford University Press, The Royal African Society* are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *African Affairs*

# THE STATE, RURAL CLASS FORMATION AND PEASANT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ZAMBIA: THE CASE OF SOUTHERN PROVINCE

JOTHAM C. MOMBA

THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS an analysis of the relationship between rural class formation and the nature of peasant political participation in Zambia by taking Southern Province as a case study. It was chosen because it is the province which had the most developed cash production among African cultivators during the colonial period. By independence in 1964, economic differentiation among African cash crop producers was more developed and widespread than in any other province.<sup>1</sup> In discussing rural class formation in the province the focus will be on that taking the form of peasant differentiation.

Peasant differentiation here refers to a process in which, as a result of the intensification of commodity production, a peasantry undergoes internal contradictions. These internal contradictions take such forms as concentrations of wealth in fewer hands, struggle for land and the proletarianization of some sections of poor peasants, and other forms of contradictions inherent in commodity production situations.<sup>2</sup> Following a number of earlier authors, peasants will refer to rural cultivators who produce primarily for subsistence, but are also forced to produce some surplus in order to replenish their farming implements and meet their rent, ceremonial and other obligations. Their ultimate security lies in having some rights to land they work on and to the labour power of their family members. Although peasants produce primarily for subsistence, they are also involved in a wider system in which they are economically exploited, and politically and ideologically dominated.<sup>3</sup> Thus, according to Ken Post, peasants form a lower level

Jotham Momba is a member of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zambia.

1. For some of the writings on the development of African agriculture in Southern Province, see Samuel Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation in Zambia: a case study of Southern Province, 1930-1987* (PhD Thesis) University of Minnesota, 1987, pp. 53-68; Kenneth Vickery, *The Making of a Peasantry: imperialism and The Tonga Plateau economy, 1890-1936* (PhD Thesis) Yale University, 1978; and Carolyn Baylies, *The State and Class Formation in Zambia* (PhD Thesis) University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978, pp. 310-311.

2. This definition is derived from Lenin. See V.I. Lenin, 'The Development of Capitalism in Russia' in *Collected Works* Vol. 3 Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972 pp. 172-3.

3. John Saul and Roger Woods, 'African Peasants', in Teodor Shanin (ed.) *Peasants and Peasant Societies* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), particularly pp. 105-106; Eric Wolf, *Peasants* (Englewood, Prentice-Hall, 1966), especially pp. 1-10; Teodor Shanin, 'Peasantry, Delineation of a Sociological concept and A Field of Study', in *European Journal of Sociology* 12, (1971), pp. 289-300; and Colin Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 4-10.

in a class hierarchy in which power is unevenly distributed in a way that enables those at the top to use their power to syphon off the surplus produced by peasants.<sup>4</sup>

Peasant differentiation entails the stratification of peasants into rich, middle and poor peasants. Following William Roseberry, rich peasants in this paper will refer to those peasants who produce surplus product that is generally above what they require to meet their obligations; middle peasants will refer to those whose surplus product more or less equals their obligations; while those whose surplus product tends to be lower than they need to meet their obligations will be referred to as poor peasants.<sup>5</sup> In his analysis of the Russian peasantry Lenin more or less used similar categories. It is from the ranks of the poor peasants that, according to Lenin, the ranks of the proletariat eventually emerge.<sup>6</sup> Others who identify the poor, middle and rich peasants as Roseberry and Lenin do are Dick Kohnert and Rhoda Howard.<sup>7</sup>

The process of peasant differentiation does not necessarily mean that distinct classes exist within the peasantry, but implies merely a process that signals the eventual development of distinct rural classes resulting from the disintegration of the peasantry—the capitalist farmers and rural proletariat, in addition to the peasantry. Thus, it is in this connection that I think it is inappropriate to argue for the existence of distinct social classes within the peasantry. Indeed other Africanist scholars such as Gavin Williams still consider peasants as members of the same class: even though rich peasants are better off compared to the rest of the peasants, all peasants share similar class interests against those of the other stronger classes.<sup>8</sup> For his part, Issa Shivji suggests that undue weight should not be given to the existing peasant stratifications in the countryside.<sup>9</sup> Yet there are other Marxists and neo-Marxist writers such as Bjorn Beckman, Dirk Kohnert and Rayah Feldman who take the view that peasants are divided into classes.<sup>10</sup> The scholars who have argued for the existence of social classes within the peasantry have

4. Ken Post, 'Peasantization and Rural Political Movements in West Africa' in *European Journal of Sociology*, 13 (1972), p. 226.

5. William Roseberry, 'Rent, Differentiation and Development of Capitalism Among the Peasantry' *American Anthropology*, 78 (1976), pp. 51–55.

6. V. I. Lenin, 'The Development of Capitalism in Russia', pp. 71–76.

7. Dick Kohnert, 'Rural Class Differentiation in Nigeria: theory and practice: a quantitative approach in the case of Nupeland' *Afrika Spectrum* 79, (1980), pp. 61–80; and Rhoda Howard, 'Formation and Stratification of the Peasantry in Colonial Ghana', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 8, (1980), pp. 61–80.

8. Gavin Williams, 'Taking the Part of Peasants: Rural Development in Nigeria and Tanzania', in P. C. W. Gutkind and E. Wallerstein (eds), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa* (London, Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 150–151.

9. Issa Shivji, 'Tanzania—"The Silent Class Struggle"', in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds), *Socialism in Tanzania* Vol. II (Dar-es-Salaam, East African Publication House, 1973), p. 305.

10. Bjorn Beckman, 'Peasants, Capital and the State' (Editorial) in *Review of African Political Economy* No. 10 (1977) pp. 1–2; Rayah Feldman, 'Rural Social Differentiation and Political Goals in Tanzania' in Ivor Oxaal, Tony Barnet, and David Booth (eds), *Beyond the Sociology of Development* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 158–170; and Dick Kohnert, 'Rural class differentiation in Nigeria', pp. 301–310.

done so partly to counter the view of many liberal scholars, such as C. C. Wrigley, Peter Lloyd, Polly Hill and Sara Berry among others that class analysis is not appropriate in discussing the political economy of rural Africa.<sup>11</sup>

In my view in discussing the importance of peasant differentiation in understanding peasant politics in Africa the issue of whether peasants are divided into classes is not particularly useful. Rather what is useful is to investigate the extent to which the process of peasant differentiation is not only economic but also manifests itself in politics, and the form it takes.

Thus, it will be the main focus of this article to try to show that the economic differentiation that is leading to economic polarization within the peasantry in Southern Province is also manifested at the political level. Even though peasants as members of one class do in general share many social and economic problems which need joint action, increasingly different interests are beginning to emerge among the various peasant strata, particularly between the rich and poor.

It was earlier stated that there are other categories of cash crop producers besides peasants. We need to identify these groups also in order to situate the peasants among them and to establish the relationship between such cash crop producers and peasants. The first such other category is that of capitalist farmers. The capitalist farmers differ from peasants in that their ultimate security does not lie in having some rights to family labour and the land they work on as is the case with peasants. The capitalist farmers produce primarily for profit and not for subsistence, and their farming enterprises are so large that they depend on the exploitation of the labour power of the agricultural worker. Family members do not have to participate in such highly commercialized and mechanized agricultural enterprises. As we shall see later, these farmers are largely found on the non-traditional 'state land'<sup>12</sup> lying about twenty kilometres on either side of the railway. The lone line in the province runs from Livingstone up to the end of the Mazabuka district at Kafue river bridge. These farmers are commonly referred to as 'commercial farmers' or 'large-scale farmers', and these are the

11. C. C. Wrigley, 'The Changing Economic Structure of Baganda', in L. Fallers (ed.) *The Kings Men* (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 38-44; Peter Lloyd, *The New Elites of Tropical Africa* (London Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 56-57. Polly Hill, *Rural Capitalism in West Africa* (Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 155-156; and Sara Berry, *Cocoa, Custom and Socio-economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 182-183.

12. The strip of land about twenty kilometres on either side of the rail line used to be called 'crown land' during the colonial period. It was called 'state land' up to 1975 when people purchased farms in this area and owned it on freehold basis. In that year all the land in the country became state owned. However, on the hitherto 'state land' individuals got leaseholds of 99 years instead of freehold title deeds. The arrangements that existed for the traditional land areas remained customary land tenure as practised from one area to another. Thus, for lack of a better term, 'state land' will be used to refer to the land which until 1975 was 'crown' land and 'state' land respectively. For all practical purposes the pre-1975 distinctions are still used in most documents including some official documents.

terms that appear in most official documents whenever reference to these farmers is made.


As implied earlier, the logic of the process of peasant differentiation is the development of a rural capitalist class from the rich peasants and a rural proletariat from the poor peasants. Consequently, there are already some isolated cases of individuals from the predominantly peasant communities in the villages, whose levels of agricultural production make them more like capitalist farmers than peasants. Individuals who can be called capitalist farmers are, however, very few, and, as just stated, such farmers are mostly confined to the hitherto exclusively European farming area. Rather the relatively more common group of cash crop producers in the villages, besides peasants, are those who have some characteristics of both capitalist farmers and peasants. Such cash crop producers produce primarily for the market and resort to some hiring of agriculture workers, particularly at peak periods of the agricultural seasons. They are, however, still primarily dependent on family labour. These farmers are sometimes referred to as 'medium-scale farmers' and occasionally official documents refer to them by that term. This category of cash crop producers is most prevalent in the settlement schemes, which will be discussed more closely later.

These 'medium-scale farmers' are similar to the Russian 'kulaks' Lenin described. Although, according to Lenin, these kulaks were in fact part of the peasantry, they are different from the kind of peasants described earlier, for example, by John Saul and Roger Woods. The Russian 'well-to-do peasants' or 'kulaks' produce primarily for commercial purposes and resorted to hiring labour. Although some Africanist scholars such as Mamdani tend also to use 'kulaks' and rich peasants interchangeably,<sup>13</sup> it seems to me that African cash crop producers who fit Lenin's description of what a Russian 'kulak' was cannot be part of the peasants in the way that John Saul and Roger Woods and others define peasants. Thus, in this paper, and largely for lack of a better word, the term 'kulak' will be used to refer to this transitional rural social group: the 'medium-scale farmers' who can neither be called peasants nor capitalist farmers, in the way the terms have been described earlier on.

#### *The state and peasant differentiation in the village communities*

The process of peasant differentiation in Southern Province started during the colonial period. As already indicated in the preceding section, Southern Province, particularly Mazabuka, Monze and Choma Districts, have had the earliest and most developed cash crop production among the Africans. The colonial state recognized this fact also. Thus, the Department of Agriculture Annual Report for 1939 stated:

13. Mahmood Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976).



Map of Southern Province (adapted from maps by the Surveys Department and Land Use Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of the Republic of Zambia).

Work . . . has been confined to some 14 Tonga Plateau Chieftaincies which form the core of native maize growing area, and constitute, from a purely economic point of view, the most important area in the territory.<sup>14</sup>

What the Department of Agriculture was referring to was the limited extension services given the peasant producers in Mazabuka, Monze and Northern parts of Choma Districts. Signs of growing economic differentiation among the peasants in Southern Province began to show. For example, there were African producers who ploughed as much as 140 acres of land employing some wage labour, while there were others who ploughed less than half an acre.<sup>15</sup> By the 1940s a well established rich peasantry existed in many parts of the Southern Province. The findings of the Reconnaissance Survey Team on land use in the present Mazabuka and Monze Districts, which I have analysed elsewhere,<sup>16</sup> showed the extent of economic differentiation among the African cultivators in the district during

14. The Northern Rhodesia Government, Department of African Agriculture, *Annual Reports* 1946.

15. ZNA Sec 1/56, Rushome Native Settlements, Mazabuka District, 1933.

16. Jotham C. Momba, 'Peasant Differentiation and Rural Party Politics in Colonial Zambia', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, (1985), pp. 108–113.

the early 1940s. The Team's findings, for example, showed that the richest of the African cash crop producers in the area (referred to as 'farmers' by the Team) used as many as six ploughs per farmer, produced over 100 bags of maize for sale, employed agricultural workers, and had an annual income of about K665.00. The majority of those which the team referred to as 'subsistence cultivators' had no ploughs and did not produce any maize for the market; those who did, produced less than 10 bags of maize on the average. The cultivators had an annual income that averaged K10.00.<sup>17</sup>

The colonial state exacerbated the differences identified by the Survey Team in 1945 by the introduction of the Southern Province African Farming Scheme. The Scheme entailed giving exclusive extension services and agricultural credit only to those peasants who were willing to join the Scheme and able to adhere strictly to the methods of crop husbandry prescribed by the Department of Agriculture.<sup>18</sup> In addition to exclusive access to extension services and agricultural credit, such peasants bought farming implements at subsidized prices; they also received a 'bonus' of K2.70 per acre which other peasants did not get. Largely because of the extension services the yield was about 7 bags of maize per acre for those in the scheme while it was three bags for those outside it. As a result of the 'bonuses' and other services to the peasants, those in the scheme had an average annual income of K80.00, while those outside it averaged K30.00. Furthermore, the peasants in the scheme had more farming implements and cattle than those outside.<sup>19</sup>

This kind of economic differentiation among the peasants continued even after the end of colonial rule. These inequalities were sustained through the continued role of agricultural credit, and to some extent the unequal access to extension services. Although the state managed to make the commercial banks lend to African farmers, the commercial banks, with the exception of the state's Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB), do not lend to the peasants in the villages. However, even in the case of the ZNCB, only very few peasants have over the years benefited from agricultural credit since strict conditions must be met for anybody to receive it. First, he must have an account with the bank; this enables the bank to assess the ability of the borrower to repay the loan. Second, the bank officials must inspect the land, livestock and farming implements he possesses.

17. William Allan, *et al.*, *Land Holding and Land Use Among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District: a reconnaissance survey* (Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 168-169.

18. I also briefly discuss the organization and impact of the Southern Province African Farming Improvement Scheme in the article just quoted. The organization and impact of this scheme are discussed more extensively by C. E. Johnson, *African Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga Maize Areas of Northern Rhodesia* Lusaka, Department of Agriculture, N.R. Bulletin No. 11, 1956 and Morgan Rees, *An Economic Survey of Plateau Tonga Improved Farmers* (Lusaka Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 14, 1958).

19. For the Average yields per acre see Northern Rhodesia Department of Agriculture, *Annual Report 1953*. For the rest of the information see C. E. Johnson, *African Farming*, pp. 19-25.

This is to assess both his credit worthiness and the extent to which his assets can act as security in case of complete failure to pay back the loan. Lately, the bank has somewhat relaxed its lending conditions to allow for a few peasants with two hectares and above, and recommended as 'good farmers' by the extension officers of the Department of Agriculture, to borrow from the bank. Thus, despite the 'openness' of the ZNCB, most of the agricultural credit goes to 'large-scale farmers', the capitalist farmers outside the traditional land. For example in the 1978/79 agricultural season the bank lent a total of K1,353,317.28 to farmers in Monze and Mazabuka Districts, and only K117,196.99 or 8.66 per cent went to 'small-scale farmers' mostly in settlement schemes. During the 1987/88 season the bank lent K1,713,000 to 571 cash crop producers in villages throughout the country. Another K20,756,107 went to farmers on 'state land' and settlement schemes.<sup>20</sup> This means that of the total K22,469,107 directly lent out to cash crop producers in the country by the ZNCB during the 1987/88 agricultural season only 7.5 per cent went to those in the villages.

With the restrictive lending conditions of Commercial Banks, the Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) has been the main source of agricultural credit to peasants in the province until some two years ago when the company was dissolved and in its place was created the Lima. The Lima Bank came out of merging the AFC with the Zambia Agricultural Development Bank. The Zambia Agricultural Development Bank lent only to the 'large-scale farmers'. The Southern Province Co-operative Marketing Union (SPCMU) has been another source, but largely supplementing the AFC credits. The amounts given by the SPCMU to recipients of its credits were too insufficient to buy the necessary farming inputs.

The AFC was formed in 1970 and took over from the dissolved Credit Organization of Zambia (COZ), a parastatal organization credited in 1967 to handle all state agricultural lending to all categories of cultivators. During its three years of operation as a lending institution, COZ had faced many problems. It was inefficiently run. Money lent out was rarely paid back, and most recipients took these credits as gifts; rewards for their role during the struggle for independence, and refused to pay back. Furthermore, no attempt was made to assess the credit-worthiness of the recipients, neither did the company officials ensure that money lent out was used for agricultural purposes.<sup>21</sup>

Largely because of the kind of problems that had faced the Credit Organization of Zambia, the AFC did not extend agricultural credit

20. Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Committee on Agriculture, Lands and Co-operatives for the Fifth Session of the Fifth National Assembly*—Appointed on 20th January, 1988. pp. 7.

21. On the kinds of problems that credit organization of Zambia faced see Dan Musenge and Winner Matongo, 'Why COZ failed and charges brought about by the AFC', in Sam Geza (ed.) *Rural Development Papers* (Lusaka, University of Zambia, 1972), pp. 23–25.



indiscriminately as the COZ did. The AFC extended credit only to those peasants who, in the opinion of the agricultural extension officers, were good farmers and credit-worthy. After 1975 the company began to use the services of Ward Development Committee officials to assist the agricultural extension officers determine credit-worthiness of the borrowers. Records of Ward Development officials in Mazabuka and Monze districts for the period 1975 to 1980 show that a large number of applicants for agricultural credit without cattle or farming implements were not recommended to get AFC seasonal credit. In order to prevent recipients from redirecting the loans to other uses, successful applicants received vouchers instead of cash. They presented the vouchers to depots of the National Marketing Board, a parastatal organization responsible for marketing, which acted as a distribution centres for fertilizers and seeds. Recipients of AFC credits were legally bound to sell their produce only to Namboard or the Marketing Co-operative Unions.<sup>22</sup>

The AFC expected all recipients of seasonal loans to repay at the end of the agricultural season irrespective of whether they had good harvests or not. Failure to pay back at the end of the year rendered one ineligible for further loans. Such peasants also automatically disqualified themselves from borrowing from other lending institutions. Furthermore, peasants with bad repayment records were considered bad debtors, and were generally denied further credits even after eventually settling their debts. As a result of constant failures to repay the loans at the end of the agricultural season, many peasants have been eliminated as recipients of AFC credits, particularly during the past eight years when the province has experienced spells of severe droughts. An even larger number of peasants did not even bother to apply. Thus, even though AFC credits were in principle open to all 'small-scale' producers, in practice only very few have benefited from the financial assistance given by AFC. For example in the 1977/78 agricultural year, a total of only 8,775 'small-scale farmers' managed to secure loans. A total of K2,836,691, or an average of K323.27 was spent on these farmers.<sup>23</sup> In 1987/88, ten years later, the Lima Bank, a later body with similar lending conditions to AFC, lent out K36,966,092 or K4,633 per recipient to 7,978 applicants.<sup>24</sup> Although the amounts received were larger, the number of recipients was now about 800 persons less.

The Southern Province Co-operative Marketing Union (SPCMU) was another source of credit. The SPCMU, however, largely supplemented

22. From the Agricultural Finance Company Ltd., offices in Mazabuka and Monze, 1980. This includes all the information on the lending conditions of the AFC, and the changes that had been taking place since 1970.

23. Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations, *Zambia-Southern Province Area Development Project Identification Report Vol. II—Working Paper 2* 1979, Table 14.

24. From the Lima Bank Ltd., Head Office, 1988.

AFC credits. Comparatively fewer people have received SPCMU credits. For example during the 1978/79 season K240,354 was lent out to 1,648 applicants, each receiving about K145. 2,598 people got a total of K720,000 in 1985, which was K277 per person.<sup>25</sup> Even in the case of SPCMU, failure to repay at the end of the agricultural season renders a borrower ineligible for any loan during the next and subsequent years until the original debt is settled. Furthermore SPCMU loans are restricted only to members of the SPCMU's societies. Largely because a high membership fee (currently K20.00) is asked, most members of these societies are rich peasants. Thus the SPCMU credits go mainly to rich peasants, who need them mostly to supplement credit from the AFC. The number of recipients of the SPCMU loans is, therefore, smaller than that of the AFC loans. For example during the 1985 agricultural season a total of 2,598 cash crop producers received a total of K720,000, an average of K277. During the 1987 season a total of 7,978 received K36,966,092 from the Lima Bank, an average of about K4,633.<sup>26</sup>

From the above examples we can see that the lending structure in the villages is heavily biased towards rich peasants. This has merely exacerbated the already wide differences that existed between the rich and poor peasants prior to 1964. Thus, while the rich peasants who are in a better position to afford seasonal and other agricultural inputs even without state assistance are the ones with the easiest access to agricultural credit, the people who need such credits most, the poor peasants, are generally denied access to them. Consequently, it is generally only the rich peasants who use farming inputs such as fertilizers and hybrid seeds. Use of such inputs does raise the crop yields very much. This means that rich peasants tend to have higher yields per acre than the poor peasants.

The role played by agricultural credit in accelerating peasant differentiation in the villages has been supplemented by the role that the extension services provided by the Ministry of Agriculture have played. In principle, the post-colonial state was committed to extending extension services to all rural inhabitants. However, in practice only very few peasants benefited. The major problem that faced the Ministry of Agriculture was that there were very few extension officers at independence. It was, for example, estimated that there were an average 580 peasants per extension officer throughout the country.<sup>27</sup> Largely because of the few extension officers, most of the extension services were confined only to those peasants regarded as 'progressive' by extension workers. Such peasants tended

25. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations *Zambia—Southern Province*.

26. The 1978/79 figures are from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Zambia*, p. 38. The 1984/85 figures are from Neva Seidman Makgetta 'Financial Institutions' (Mimeo for the Institute for African Studies), p. 29.

27. Government of the Republic of Zambia, *First National Development Plan, 1966–70*, (Lusaka, Office of the National Development and Planning, 1966). p. 24.

always to be rich peasants. Thus, even in the case of extension services the rich peasants have been the ones who benefited most.

As a result of the role played by agricultural credit and, to some extent, extension services, economic differentiation in the villages has continued to grow. In the villages today there exist inhabitants who own tractors, use as many as ten single-furrow ploughs per family per season, and own as many as 1,000 head of cattle.<sup>28</sup> In 1979/80, for example, there were as many as 220 families recorded as using tractors among the villages in Mazabuka and Monze districts alone.<sup>29</sup> The use of tractors by village inhabitants is still common despite the serious economic problems that have been faced by the country since the late 1970s. Samuel Chipungu estimated a total number of 900 tractors owned by village inhabitants in the province by 1986, and estimated a total of 119 in Monze Central alone.<sup>30</sup> The cash crop producers using tractors or many single-furrow ploughs per season tend to produce more cash crops than those using only one single-furrow plough or none per season. In 1980 there were some rich village cash crop producers growing over 1,000 bags of maize for sale while there were also those who produced no cash crops.<sup>31</sup> According to Lima Bank officials, even presently there are people in the villages producing as many as 2,000 bags of maize for sale.<sup>32</sup> Some of these rich cash crop producers have been able to get into other business ventures such as retail trade and transportation. Some of the richer cash crop producers have also managed to purchase trucks, vanettes and other kinds of motor vehicles which they use in the transport business.

The effect of this unequal access to resources has been big income inequalities among the village dwellers in the province. As early as 1974 Allan Marter and David Honeybone estimated that the richest village inhabitants in the province had an annual income of about K647.00 while the poorest had an annual income of about K3.00 per family.<sup>33</sup> Chipungu estimated that some of the richest had an annual income of K33,000 a year while 'the drought conditions of the 1970s and early 1980s have further impoverished'

28. From research interviews, 1979/80.

29. Department of Agriculture, Monze and Mazabuka District offices, 1980.

30. Samuel Chipungu, *Peasant Differentiation*, p. 381.

31. Jotham C. Momba, *The State, Peasant Differentiation and Rural Class formation in Zambia. A Case Study of Mazabuka and Monze Districts* (PhD Thesis) University of Toronto, 1982, p. 200.

32. Lima Bank Officials, Head Office, Lusaka 1988.

33. Allan Marter and David Honeybone, *The Economic Resources of Rural Households and the Distribution of Agriculture Development* (University of Zambia, Rural Development Studies Bureau, 1976), p. 109. The two authors divide village cultivators into four categories. The first is that of cultivators who usually have a shortage of labour and do not normally have adequate food or cash income. They are partially dependent on income from non-agricultural activities. The second is that of cultivators who produce some surplus, but also involve themselves in non-agricultural activities. The third category is that of cultivators whose resources are slightly above average, although they also involve themselves in other economic activities. The fourth category constitutes the richest. These are cultivators whose resources are above average. They have the most draft power, labour, farm equipment, finance and cash income.

the poor peasant so much that thousands of them were 'earmarked to receive food aid from the World Food Programme'.<sup>34</sup> Some of the relatively richer rural dwellers also had casual workers, perhaps as many as ten workers during peak periods of the agricultural season. Such cash crop producers also tend to have up to 30 distant relatives staying with them.<sup>35</sup>

From the above discussion it is clear that commodity production in the villages in form of cash crop production has led to wide economic differences among the village dwellers. The richest among them have reached a level of cash crop production, have accumulated wealth, and have so many farm implements and draft power that it is increasingly difficult to refer to them as peasants in the way described in the proceeding section. In fact, when advancing agricultural credit, the Lima Bank classifies some of the cash crop producers as 'large-scale farmers' along the same lines as the capitalist farmers on state land. Some of the producers using tractors tend to produce primarily for profit. They employ some agricultural workers, although family labour still constitutes an important component of the total labour force on such farms. They are also involved in other commercial activities such as involvement in transport businesses using their vehicles and at times their tractors. Although these cash crop producers own tractors and motor vehicles, they do not, however, exactly fit the description of capitalist farmers given earlier. The important role played by family labour is one important difference between them and capitalist farmers. Instead they are closer to the description earlier given of 'kulaks', the transitional social group that can neither be referred to as peasants nor capitalist farmers. Some of these rich cultivators can be referred to as 'rich peasants'. The line between 'kulaks' and rich peasants is extremely narrow. However, if the rich peasants are a mere strata of the peasantry and we stick to our overall description of peasants given earlier, it then seems to me that the rich peasants in the province are those rich cash crop producers who, even though they participate in the market regularly, produce primarily for their own consumption. Their participation in the market is usually by reason of the fact that due to ploughing larger pieces of land they find themselves always with some surplus for sale. In very bad years they may not even sell to any official marketing institutions but may barter their crop for cattle with their neighbours or may just stockpile it to assist their needy relatives. Since they have many cattle, adequate farming implements, and are always out of danger of starvation, they attract many extended family members to stay with them. The rich peasants are not involved in a wide range of commercial activities as is the case with those who may be referred to as 'kulaks'. In contrast the poor peasants in the province can be identified as those with inadequate draft power and who may not own any farming

34. Samuel Chipungu, *Peasant Differentiation*, pp. 389–390.

35. From research interviews, 1979/80.

implements. In a cattle-keeping province such as Southern Province, such peasants may have few or no oxen and depend on their relatives. It is mostly these peasants who opt to stay with their richer extended family members and engage in casual agricultural work. In between the two groups of peasant are those with adequate farming implements and draft power. They participate in the market regularly except in bad years such as the spells of drought in recent years. Although they are unable to attract many extended family members, they are never in danger of starvation.<sup>36</sup>

In general, however, what seems to emerge as well is that, despite the fact that rich peasants began to develop as early as the 1930s, no full transformation of such cash crop producers into capitalist farmers has occurred on a wide level in the villages. Rather, as we shall see in the next section, what seems to happen is that the peasants who made this transformation did so by moving out of their villages onto 'state land'. In fact even the transformation from peasant to 'kulak' has been most rapid and clear outside the villages—in the settlement schemes. In the next section I shall briefly look at the cash crop producers on 'state land' and settlement schemes. I shall do so in order to identify the differences between them and peasants and some relationship between peasant agriculture and these cash crop producers.

*The state and the development of the capitalist farmers and the 'kulaks'*

We have already seen that the existence of capitalist farmers is not a widespread phenomenon in the villages. Rather the pattern has been for some of the most successful rich peasants to leave their traditional areas and join the 'commercial farmers' on the state land, which before independence was the preserve of European farmers. This was particularly the trend immediately after 1964. A number of 'commercial farmers' in Monze district, for example, had been at one time or another peasants. A survey undertaken by Carolyn Baylies in 1974 showed that 67 per cent of the 'commercial farmers' in Monze had been involved in farming for most of their lives.<sup>37</sup> They started as peasants in the villages, some briefly worked, others accrued the capital used to purchase these farms through involvement in retail trade, and most others were just peasants.

In principle, the post-colonial government was opposed to the development of capitalist farming and opted for 'small-scale' farming. This policy was most explicitly stated in 1969 by the then Minister of Rural Development Reuben Kamanga, when he declared that the Zambian Government

36. For an earlier attempt to delineate the differences among the rich, middle and poor peasants see Momba *The State, peasant Differentiation and Rural Class Formation in Zambia*, pp. 192–228.

37. Carolyn Baylies, 'The Emergence of Indigenous Capitalist Agriculture', *Rural Africana* 4–5 (1979), p. 69.

preferred ten good farmers earning K200 a year to one good farmer earning K2,000 a year while nine subsistence farmers earn nothing.<sup>38</sup> In practice, however, the state has continued to promote and support capitalist farming. The capitalist farmers on 'state land' are given the most extension services. Even though they can easily transport their produce to the market, they also have the added advantage of being near markets. The state has also assisted these farmers in terms of credit. The commercial banks were under pressure from the state to lend to the farmers. The foreign owned commercial banks, Standard Bank and Barclays Bank, only lend to these capitalist farmers. Barclays Bank does, however, also extend some credit to settlement farmers settled by Family Farms Limited. Even the state-owned Zambia National Commercial Bank lends mostly to these large-scale farmers; in 1987/88 season a total of K22,469,107 was lent out of which K20,756,107.00 or 92.5 per cent was lent out to 812 'large-scale' and 'medium-scale' farmers in the country.<sup>39</sup> The Agricultural Finance Company and the Lima Bank have also lent out generously to these farmers. For example, during the 1979/80 agricultural season, AFC lent out K6,349,000 to cash crop producers in Mazabuka and Monze districts, of which K3,017,330 or 47.5 per cent went to 'large-scale' farmers. These 180 farmers were a mere 2.42 per cent of the total number of 7,425 borrowers in the districts.<sup>40</sup> The lending position has not changed significantly since the Lima Bank took over. During the 1987/88 season the Lima Bank lent out a total of K44,477,591 of which K7,511,499 or 16.88 per cent was to 83 'large-scale farmers'. The 83 farmers constituted 1.02 per cent of the total number of 8061 borrowers.<sup>41</sup>

The large-scale farmers are, as expected, the richest of all cash crop growers. They employ anywhere between 25 and 100 agricultural workers per farm. They all use tractors and all have their own vehicles to transport their produce to the market. Their production ranges from 1,000 bags of maize to 20,000 bags. They are also involved in the production of other cash crops such as wheat, tobacco and cotton on a large-scale.

Besides the rich peasants who moved onto 'state land' during the 1960s to join the class of capitalist farmers, another set of peasants have moved from their traditional areas into settlement schemes. The Ministry of Agriculture has been responsible for settling farmers on the schemes. The department has been joined by a private organization, Family Farms Limited, which began in 1967. Farms that belonged to Europeans had

38. The statement by the then Minister of Rural Development Mr Reuben Kamanga is quoted from C. S. Lombard and A. H. C. Tweedie, *Agriculture in Zambia Since Independence* (Lusaka, National Education Company of Zambia, 1972), p. 62.

39. Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Committee on Agriculture, Lands and Co-operatives*, p. 7. No breakdown was given, but I was informed by the ZNCB officials that most of this money went to 'large-scale' farmers on state land.

40. From the AFC offices, Mazabuka and Monze Districts, 1979.

41. From the Lima Bank Limited, Head Office, 1988.

been acquired and it is on such farms, divided into smaller plots, that these farmers have been settled. In recent years, and with the increased pressure for land, particularly in Mazabuka and Monze districts, the settlement option has become very popular among peasants, particularly the rich peasants.

The programme of settlement schemes, like the 'large-scale' farming, was in fact a continuation of a colonial programme which began as the African Peasant Scheme in 1946. The programme was most successful in Eastern Province, and it was only with the establishment of the Ngwezi Settlement Scheme in 1964 that it started in Southern Province. Ngwezi began with 39 settlers, and by 1980 there were 110 settlers in this scheme. Since Ngwezi Scheme was established there are now approximately 1,000 families in settlement schemes in the Province.

The peasants selected into the schemes tend to be among some of the most successful and in the opinion of the extension officer most 'progressive' cash crop producers in the villages. Thus, consistent cash crop production, sufficient farming implements and draft power have been some of the most important criteria used in selecting peasants into the schemes. For example, the first 39 Ngwezi settlers had, on average, two ploughs each before they moved into the settlement scheme. Almost half of them had some work experience on European farms.<sup>42</sup>

Once settled in their respective schemes, these farmers receive a great deal of state assistance. The state carries out soil surveys and demarcation of plots. It constructs access roads to each settlement scheme, and in the case of the Ngwezi Scheme access roads had been constructed for each farmer. This, and the fact that most of these schemes are near the markets, means that it is much easier for them to sell their produce. The state also provides communal water, cattle dipping facilities and paddocks, none of which services are supplied to peasants in the villages. These farmers are also provided with good extension services. There are extension officers from the Ministry of Agriculture for each Scheme averaging about 30 settlers. These officers pay fortnightly routine visits to each farm and they are available to a farmer on request. In contrast, the majority of peasants in the villages do not see extension officers for as long as ten years.<sup>43</sup>

The settlement farmers are also well served with agricultural credit. In fact, most of the credit by the Zambia National Commercial Bank designated for 'emergent' farmers goes to them as has been noted earlier. The AFC and Lima Bank has also extended credit to these farmers generously and so has the Southern Province Co-operative Marketing Union. As stated earlier, Barclays Bank only lends to large-scale farmers and the scheme

42. Magoye Regional Experiment Station, 'Investigations into Small-scale Farming Systems No. 1 Ngwezi Settlement Scheme: preliminary survey', October 1966, pp. 6-7.

43. From the research interviews for my PhD Thesis, 1979/80.

farmers settled by Family Farms. Family Farms also provides other services for their farmers. It conducts courses for the farmers and has a hardware shop where items such as ox-carts, cultivators and a variety of spare parts are sold, at subsidized prices.<sup>44</sup>

The settlement farmers, particularly those settled by Family Farms Limited, are under great pressure to produce cash crops. All the farmers in the schemes are expected to produce a minimum of 25 bags per hectare each season. Those settled by Family Farms are liable for eviction if their crop production continuously drops for five consecutive years.

Largely as a result of the assistance these farmers get, they have established themselves as an important group of cash crop producers in Southern Province. The estimated yield per acre of these farmers is 53 bags of maize per hectare compared to that of peasants in the villages which is about 25 per hectare.<sup>45</sup> The case of the Ngwezi Settlement farmers illustrates the level to which these farmers can develop. Most of the 110 Ngwezi settlers use tractors instead of ploughs; and those who do use ploughs have an average of four per family. As early as 1974, 67 per cent of the land in Ngwezi was ploughed by tractors.<sup>46</sup> In 1980 there were 72 tractors owned by the 110 Ngwezi farmers, representing some 36 per cent of the 200 tractor owners in the district. When the first settlers moved into Ngwezi there was only one farmer with a tractor.<sup>47</sup> In addition to their better farming records the Ngwezi settlement farmers have also acquired many consumer items. For example, whereas only one settler had a motor cycle in 1964, seventeen settlers had motor vehicles by 1980.

These settlement farmers are certainly transforming themselves into some kind of rural capitalist class. They are increasingly beginning to hire wage labour although family labour is still important. They are producing primarily for profit and not for subsistence. However, they do not fully meet the characteristics of the capitalist farmers as described, while very few of the Ngwezi farmers compare with some of less successful 'commercial farmers' on state land.

### *Differentiation and peasant political participation*

The preceding sections have discussed the process of peasant economic differentiation between the rich and poor peasants. In this section an attempt will be made to discuss the political manifestations of this peasant

44. Family Farms Limited, Annual Returns, 1977.

45. From the Crop and Livestock Husbandry Section of the Mazabuka District Agricultural Office, 1979.

46. Bomford, 'Field Survey of Mbaya Musuma Settlement Schemes: preliminary tabular analysis' (*Mimeo for Family Farms Ltd*).

47. From the Mazabuka District Agricultural Office, 1979.



differentiation. This will be done by discussing the nature of peasant participation, particularly in terms of their responses to the nationally initiated political processes.

It was argued in the introduction that, contrary to what has been suggested, rich peasants do not constitute a separate class from the other peasants, but merely form a stratum of the class of peasants. The economic interests of the rich peasants and those of the poor peasants are not in contradiction in the way, for example, that those of the landlord and share-cropper or the capitalist farmer and agricultural work would be. What will be shown in this section is that the differences between the various peasant strata are the differences in the level of interest in matters affecting cash crop production and animal husbandry. To those whose participation in the market is most regular and have many cattle, problems regarding marketing arrangements for both their crops and animals, credit facilities, extension services and related matters constitute pressing day-to-day matters. On the other hand, those whose participation is most irregular and may have no cattle tend to display the least concern in such matters, but are still interested. Even poor peasants strive to be cash crop producers and may own one or two animals. Largely because of the predominance of issues relating to cash crop production and animal husbandry, the rich peasants and the 'kulaks' in the villages have tended to take up leadership positions. The other peasants have tended to regard the rich peasants as community leaders, and, since even poor peasants aspire to own many cattle and participate in the market, the rich peasants tend to be trusted as the best able to protect and promote cash crop production and animal husbandry by all peasant strata. In exercising this leadership, the peasant leaders have also articulated other issues that are general in nature such as the availability of schools and health facilities, land shortage, and poor infrastructure in the rural areas.

Thus peasant political participation from 1964 to date has been characterized by the dominant leadership role played by the rich peasants in which issues pertaining to cash crop production and cattle ownership have been predominant, while at the same time articulating all the other problems faced by the rural communities in general. This has been the situation both during the multi-party period from 1964 to 1973 and the one-party period from 1973 to date.

#### *Peasant political participation in the multi-party period, 1964 to 1973*

The nature of peasant political participation in the period from 1964 to 1973 was determined by the political competition for control of the Southern Province that existed between the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the opposition African National Congress (ANC). Though in opposition, the ANC was the dominant party in Southern Province from 1958 when the Zambia African National Congress, a break away

party from the ANC and forerunner of UNIP, was formed.<sup>48</sup> Since then ANC's support country-wide had been declining and increasingly became confined to Southern Province and Mumbwa and Kabwe rural districts in Central Province. In the 1964 elections, ANC managed to win only three seats outside Southern Province. It won seven of the eight seats in the province. The party, therefore, had a total of ten of the common roll seats in the new National Assembly.<sup>49</sup>

Ethnicity, perhaps more than any other factor, has been advanced to explain ANC's continued support in the province while such support had been declining in the rest of the country. This is the position taken by writers such as Robert Rotberg and Richard Hall.<sup>50</sup> While the role of ethnicity is not denied in explaining ANC's continued support in Southern Province, it is one argument of this paper that ethnicity alone is inadequate to explain the kind of support that ANC had been getting during this period. Other factors may be advanced to explain this situation, factors that have to do with the economic interests of the rural population in the province. The first alternative explanation is UNIP's urban bias as argued by William Cowie. It seems that from its inception in 1958 ZANC/UNIP had a strong urban bias.<sup>51</sup> Indeed its support came from the copperbelt. The rural areas of Luapula and Northern provinces, where UNIP was also very strong, happened to have been the main recruitment areas for the copperbelt mine workers, so that the copperbelt influence had been greatest in these two provinces. This bias was reflected by the party's apparent insensitivity to the needs of the peasantry, particularly those involved in cash crop production and those owning many cattle, the rich peasants. It was, for example, in the 1960s that the producer price of maize was deliberately held down in order to diversify the production of cash crops.<sup>52</sup> It was also during the 1960s that the UNIP government severely limited the use of Kafue Flats as winter grazing area for people in some parts of Namwala, Mazabuka and

48. The split that took place in that year was the first major split in Zambian politics. Prior to that split there was only one nationalist movement. However, in 1958 radical members of the party who had grown increasingly dissatisfied with the leadership of Harry Nkumbula left the party to form their own, the Zambia African National Congress. The new party was banned in 1959 but resurfaced as the United National Independence Party in 1960. After the 1958 split ANC leadership mainly came from Southern Province. The majority of the people who formed the new organization came from Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces.

49. The only constituency the party held was the largely urban constituency of Livingstone. Two of the seats came from Central province among the Lenje speaking people. The Lenje are ethnically related to the Tonga people of Southern province.

50. Robert I. Rotberg, 'Tribalism and Politics in Zambia', *Africa Report*, 12, 9 (1967), p. 31 and Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), pp. 195-196.

51. William Cowie, 'Nationalism, Peasant Politics and Urban Bias in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia' *mimeo*, (University of Toronto, Scarborough College, 1980), pp. 21-22.

52. Doris Dodge, *Agricultural Policy and Performance in Zambia: history and prospects for change*, (Berkeley, Institute for International Studies, 1977), pp. 98-99. The need to diversify cash crop production at this time was not particularly directed at the peasants. The peasants did not have the means to undertake this diversification so that even if they were adversely affected by the policy they were not really expected to diversify away from maize.

Monze districts. Whatever the economic soundness of these measures, they hurt the interests of peasants, particularly the rich peasants.

The above measures were not the only ones that put the peasants at odds with the ruling party, the rich peasants in particular had general distrust and misgivings about UNIP's overall development strategy and its ideological position. The government introduced programmes such as producer co-operatives, where people were expected to work collectively on co-operative farms. This was greatly resisted because it was perceived as intended at undermining individual means of production. The co-operative movement was in fact the cornerstone of the party's rural development strategy during the First National Development Plan period from 1966 to 1970,<sup>53</sup> but during this time there were no serious attempts to form any co-operatives, not even by those peasants who joined UNIP. The party also wanted to introduce village re-grouping exercises along the lines of the Ujamaa villages in Tanzania. This too was greatly resisted and completely failed. Even more serious was the general view that UNIP intended to dispossess those with plenty of cattle and other forms of property and redistribute to the poor in order to achieve greater equality. In this the situation was made even more difficult by the fact that the ANC did in fact encourage the peasants to believe that UNIP's talk of equality meant eventual dispossession of the rich peasants and 'kulaks'.<sup>54</sup> For reasons advanced earlier, the rich peasants managed to get the support of other peasants to resist these measures. In any case the cattle-keeping and cash crop production cultures are so deeply entrenched among the peasants that they all have come to regard it as some unique feature of the Tonga-speaking people.

This strong anti-UNIP feeling among peasants translated itself into very strong support for the ANC. Put differently, what is being argued here is that, with UNIP's determination to wipe out the ANC as an opposition party, the party's support even in Southern Province would have dwindled significantly, particularly given the economic incentives to join UNIP that we shall see later. Yet the party survived and firmly controlled the province. It survived to the extent it did largely because the level of peasant differentiation had reached the point where social groups of rich peasants and 'kulaks' had emerged with identifiable economic interests, interests which were at variance with UNIP's stated policies. On the other hand, the ANC was identified as the party that represented the interests and aspirations of

53. Government of the Republic of Zambia, *First National Development plan, 1966-1970*, Lusaka, Office of National Development.

54. The ANC used this kind of campaign most openly during the 1969 referendum vote. The vote was intended at concluding all referenda as was enshrined in the constitution. It was a constitutional requirement that aspects of the constitution regarding private property and related matters could only be amended through a referendum vote. On the ANC campaign tactic, see for example Robert Molteno and Ian Scott 'The 1968 General Elections and the Political System', in William Tordoff (ed.) *Politics in Zambia*, (Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 188. Also from Daniel Similoka (30/9/79) UNIP Regional Secretary from 1967 to 1970.

these social groups. One thing that shows that the ANC was clearly identified with the interests of the cash crop producers is the fact that variations in the degree of ANC support existed within the province. The party had entrenched itself in the Tonga Plateau area covering Mazabuka, Monze and Choma districts more than anywhere else. The plateau area, in fact, is the area where cash crop production was most developed. Most cash crop production from the 1930s to the 1950s took place in this area.<sup>55</sup> Thus even though the leader of the ANC was an Ila from Namwala district, the support was most solid in these districts. In fact after the second major split in the ANC in 1963 there had been no prominent leaders from the Tonga Plateau in the organization. The split that took place in that year and which could have destroyed the organization was in fact a Tonga–Ila split at the national leadership level.<sup>56</sup> In that year all major Tonga speaking leaders left the party and formed their own party, the People's Democratic Party (PDC).<sup>57</sup> From 1963 and into the 1964 elections most national leaders were from outside the Tonga Plateau area. For example the President and Vice-President were all Ila-speaking people from Namwala. Other senior positions such as those of National Secretary and Director of Elections for the 1964 elections were held by people outside the Tonga Plateau area. Yet despite the nature of the 1963 split ANC's support remained stronger in the Tonga Plateau area than anywhere else in the province. There was more support, for example, in many parts of the rural areas of Monze, Mazabuka and Choma between 1964 and 1969 than in Namwala where the President and Vice-President of the party came from.<sup>58</sup> In the 1964 elections, for example, ANC received higher percentage vote in the constituencies in Monze and Mazabuka districts than in Namwala. The ANC candidate polled 95·4 per cent of the vote in Magoye constituency, which covered some parts of Mazabuka and Monze districts. The ANC polled 90·6 per cent in the Monze constituency. On the other hand ANC polled 90·4 per cent in Namwala constituency, even lower than the 92·6 per cent polled by the party in Gwembe constituency.<sup>59</sup> The pattern was repeated in the 1968 general elections and the 1969 referendum vote. In the 1968 elections, the highest ANC vote came from a Monze constituency, the second from a Choma

55. See Northern Rhodesia Government, Department of Agriculture, *Annual Report*, 1946, Government Printer 1946.

56. The Ila and the Tonga speak very similar languages. Together with the Lenje in Central Province the three ethnic groups are related to each other. This is probably one reason why scholars who tend to emphasize ethnicity in understanding Zambia's politics ignore the 1963 split.

57. The Party existed only for a few months. The PDC fought the 1964 elections as members of the ANC, although some of the PDC members refused to accept this election arrangement announced on the eve of the nominations for the elections.

58. In 1969, the United Party, dominated by Lozi speaking politicians, joined the ANC. In order to accommodate the new party, the Vice-President went to Munda who was the President of the United Party before the merger. The ANC Vice-President became the Party's Secretary-General.

59. *Northern News*, 23 and 24 January, 1964.

constituency and the third from a Monze/Mazabuka constituency.<sup>60</sup> Namwala constituency came fifth after a Gwembe constituency. The pattern was repeated in the 1973 general election. Even though 1973 elections were under the one-party participatory democracy system, the previous ANC loyalties were still a very influential factor in determining the outcome of the presidential vote. Namwala constituency was one of the constituencies that gave a 'Yes' vote to the President in the Province. President Kaunda won 59.2 per cent of the total valid votes cast, compared with 20.3 per cent in Monze West and 34.8 per cent in Magoye constituency.<sup>61</sup> The electoral performances of the party in the Tonga plateau area compared with its performance in Namwala, where both the President and Vice-President of the organization came from, clearly show that the ANC's main political base had been in the Mazabuka, Monze and Choma districts area. This was the area that had the most concentration of rich peasants and 'kulaks' at the time of the country's independence.

In fact the relationship between the existence of rich peasants and 'kulaks' and support for the ANC is not confined to Southern Province alone. As I have shown elsewhere, isolated support for the ANC in the rest of the country is largely confined to areas that had some developed African cash crop production during the colonial period.<sup>62</sup> A typical case is that of Eastern Province. Even though UNIP was viewed as a party for people from Northern and Eastern provinces, among prominent ZANC founders when it split from ANC were leaders from the Eastern Province, showing that the ANC had retained some significant support there. However, even in the case of Eastern Province, it was the areas where the colonially-initiated peasant scheme was most successful that had the most ANC support. In the 1964 general elections, ANC managed to get an average of about 25 per cent support in the rich agricultural districts of Chipata, Katete, and Petauke, getting as high as 40 per cent of the total vote in a Katete constituency. Katete district also happened to be the area where the peasant farming scheme was most successful. The ANC electoral performance in the Chipata/Katete area compared favourably with the average of 0.6 per cent the ANC received in the contested seats in Lundazi and Chama districts.

These latter districts had been agriculturally backward during most of the colonial period. It was only in 1959 that the peasant farming scheme was attempted, without much success, in the two districts. Considering the fact that the people in Eastern Province are ethnically related, the different

60. Goodwin Mwangilwa, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: a biography of the 'old' Lion of Zambia*, (Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, 1982), pp. 123–124. In Monze West ANC won 95.1 per cent; in Pemba constituency in Choma district it won 92 per cent; and from Magoye in Monze and Mazabuka districts it won 87.0 per cent.

61. *Times of Zambia*, 7 and 8 December, 1973.

62. For all the observations on Eastern Province see Momba, 'Peasant Differentiation and Rural Party Politics in Colonial Zambia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 11, (1985), pp. 291–292 and see earlier discussion in the same paper, pp. 288–289.

attitudes towards the ANC in the two sets of districts cannot simply be explained in ethnic terms. There is certainly evidence that ANC enjoyed some support in the areas that had rich peasants at the time of the country's independence.<sup>63</sup>

In order to appreciate the above analysis better it would be most useful to outline briefly the historical origins of the links between the rich peasants and 'kulaks' and the ANC, which go back to the time of the formation of the African National Congress towards the end of the 1940s. The ANC was itself something of a coalition of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the working class, and the rich peasants from Southern Province. It seems that from the very beginning each of these social groups had some different expectations of their roles in the struggle for independence and what they would gain from it. From the very beginning there were problems between the ANC and the rich peasants. The official ANC policy before 1958 was to discourage peasants from joining the development programmes initiated by the colonial state. Thus the ANC discouraged peasants from participating in the improvement farming scheme operating in Southern, Central and Eastern Provinces. The ANC also discouraged the peasants from having any dealings with the Ministry of Agriculture. Those peasants who defied the ANC opposition to these schemes were branded as 'sell outs'. In spite of the ANC's position, however, a number of rich peasants remained in these schemes and did not take any active part in the ANC.<sup>64</sup> However, when the split occurred and the radical faction within the party left to form the ZANC, the ANC dropped its opposition to peasant participation in these schemes. Instead the rich peasants who were in the Southern Province Improvement Farming Scheme came to play some prominent role in the leadership of the ANC in the province, particularly at district and branch levels.<sup>65</sup> This was the position right up to 1964.

The influence of the rich peasants and 'kulaks' in the ANC increased after independence as the party came to rely on the financial support of these people. Furthermore, with most of the urban petty bourgeoisie leaving the party to seek wage employment in the civil service and other sectors, the party's manpower reliance on 'kulaks' and rich peasants increased. In turn the ANC had increasingly come to identify itself with the interests of the rich peasants. The party opposed UNIP's socialist

63. In order to appreciate the performance of the ANC in Eastern Province, the following are average percentage polls of the ANC in the provinces that experienced no cash crop production during the colonial period, thus had no rich peasants as was the case in Eastern, Southern and Central provinces. The ANC polled an average of 0.24 per cent in Northern province and 0.61 per cent in Luapula province.

64. On the ANC's position towards the colonial state initiated programmes, and the reaction of the rich peasants towards ANC's position see Momba, *The State, Peasant Differentiation and Rural Class Formation in Zambia*, pp. 156–159.

65. This information came from Job Mayanda. Mayanda was the provincial president of the ANC during the 1958 split. The branches then covered very wide areas. There were two to four branches per district depending on the size of the districts.

rhetoric, and was opposed to producer co-operatives and village regrouping, among some of the unpopular UNIP programmes. The ANC on several occasions called for better prices for agricultural crops that were produced mainly by the peasants. In general it seems the rich peasants found themselves more comfortable with the ANC than they did with UNIP.

In spite of what has been said about the relationship between the rich peasants and the ANC, some rich and middle peasants found themselves in UNIP. There were those rich peasants who had left ANC in 1963 and joined PDC. Some of them joined UNIP immediately after the 1964 elections when the former leader of the party, Michelo, joined UNIP.<sup>66</sup> There were others who had joined UNIP between 1964 and 1973 when the ANC was formally dissolved. One common feature of both groups was that their joining UNIP was largely precipitated by the fact that ANC had no possibility of ever forming a government.<sup>67</sup> In fact Michelo himself clearly stated that the reason the People's Democratic Party was formed was because the ANC was very disorganized and could not win the 1964 elections. The PDC's idea was to be effectively organized so that it and the ANC could form a coalition government. The PDC, Michelo stated, had similar policies with ANC on several issues and those who decided to join the PDC could have remained in ANC, had it not been for ANC's bad organization and thus its weakness under Harry Nkumbula.<sup>68</sup> Thus in both the 1973 and 1979/80 interviews, all the party officials interviewed stated that their main reason for leaving ANC was that the party would be permanently in opposition and they would rather be in the ruling party. The implication was that, had ANC been in government or strong enough to be in a position to be a realistic alternative to the UNIP government, they would have remained in the party.

Furthermore, there were also some economic considerations for most peasants, particularly the middle peasants, to join UNIP. Through its slogan 'It pays to belong to UNIP' the ruling party made it clear that those who joined would be appropriately rewarded. Newcomers to the party were given agricultural credits by the Credit Organization of Zambia, most of which were taken as rewards for joining and organizing the party.<sup>69</sup>

66. Interview with Esnart Humvwele, the women's constituency chairperson in Chikankata at the time of the interview. Her husband was the first leader of the PDC in Chikankata/Mapangazia area. She also played a prominent role in the women's wing of the party. Also from the interviews with Daniel Simoloka a UNIP regional secretary for Monze from 1967 to 1970. He was one of the early leaders of the PDC. He helped organize the party in Choma and the Copperbelt.

67. From interviews with party officials in 1973 and 1979/80. The 1973 interviews were undertaken as part of the 1973 Department of Political and Administrative Studies Election study project, studying that year's General and Presidential Elections in the country.

68. From the interview with Job Michelo.

69. On the discriminatory tendencies of the Credit Organization of Zambia in favour of UNIP members see Robert Molteno, 'Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Zambia*, p. 98.

Thus some of the peasants who joined UNIP after 1964 saw the possibilities of financial benefit in doing so. Indeed some of the poor (but relatively well educated) and middle peasants who joined UNIP as organizers also joined the ranks of rich peasants and 'kulaks' through massive state assistance.

However, even though in UNIP, particularly after transforming themselves into rich peasants or 'kulaks' through the party's patronage, these UNIP local organizers shared the scepticism of their ANC counterparts about most of the UNIP policies. For example, in the interviews conducted in 1973 and 1979/80 all the UNIP leaders who had been in the ANC before 1973 expressed strong opposition to producer co-operatives, village regrouping, the leadership code and all other 'socialist-like' policies of the United National Independence Party. Above all they were opposed to the party's talk of a 'classless' society, for they shared, to a large extent, the earlier concerns of the ANC about the possibility of their being dispossessed of their wealth.<sup>70</sup>

This lack of commitment to UNIP policies was clearly dictated by the economic interests of the rich peasants and 'kulaks' within UNIP in Southern Province. Thus, while the peasants who joined UNIP believed that it was of immediate economic benefit to become UNIP members and expand the party support in the province, they were uneasy about the long-term implications of UNIP's overall development strategy. They were, therefore, in agreement with almost all that ANC stood for and the party's positions towards UNIP's policies. Consequently many of the UNIP local leaders were reluctant to mobilise popular support for government policies, neither did they attempt to counteract ANC's allegations against UNIP. They were reluctant to do so, it can be argued, because they also hated UNIP's rural development programmes and policies, with the possible exception of the generous extension of agricultural credits to UNIP members. Largely because of this awkward position the UNIP local leaders found themselves in, they could not effectively organize the party in the rural areas of Southern Province or set up viable organizational structures in the villages to counteract the massive support ANC was getting from peasants.

What the analysis of the peasant politics in the period of the multi-party system indicates is that some consensus among the rich peasantry on what they considered their basic values and needs existed in the province. There was also some consensus on the kind of changes they wanted to see take place in their respective communities. These were in fact values and changes that greatly favoured the promotion and development of the stratum of rich peasants and their interests. Thus the division along party lines that characterized the rich peasants and 'kulaks' during this period should not be

70. From the 1973 and 1979/80 interviews with local party officials in Mazabuka and Monze districts.



seen as fundamental differences. Rather, the differences should be seen in terms of the differing perceptions of the best way to promote rich peasant and 'kulak' interests. For those who remained in ANC it seems their concern was protection of these values which they believed were seriously threatened by UNIP, and which could be protected only if the ANC continued to exist. For such peasants this existence could only be assured if they provided committed support to ANC. On the other hand, for those who joined UNIP without accepting its policies, support for UNIP was seen as the only way to ensure that development would be brought in the province, without causing any significant changes in their style of life, and generally in a way that would not seriously threaten their economic interests as a social group. They also believed that UNIP would perhaps experience difficulties introducing any far reaching changes. This position was very much shared by other social groups, the settlement farmers and farmers on state land. Thus in part it was because of this that most of the peasants who supported UNIP were relatively younger and better educated, and most had benefited greatly from some of the government's early policies.

*Rural politics under the one party participatory democracy*

The introduction of one party participatory democracy in 1973 altered the nature of rural politics in the province significantly. The proscribing of the ANC ended the politics of party competition and with it the superficial division of the rich peasants. Emerging after 1973 was increasing participation by peasants in institutions such as Ward Development Committees (WDC) and marketing co-operative societies, through which they increased their demands on the state. Prior to 1973 these bodies had been avoided by peasants in both UNIP and ANC.

The introduction of the new system led to the integration of ANC and UNIP branches, following the Choma declaration of 27 June 1972, when it was agreed that some of the ANC branches would be turned into UNIP branches and new branches would be formed by members of both parties. This arrangement enabled many former ANC officials to get elected once they went through the primaries, a process by which candidates were 'nominated' by being elected by local party leaders.<sup>71</sup> The effect of previous party allegiance did play some significant role in the 1973 general election and in the election of party leaders in 1974. In the 1973 elections all the former ANC candidates who went through the primary elections won easily while those who were closely identified with UNIP lost. Of the 16 elected MPs only two were closely identified with UNIP. In one of these the sitting ANC MP lost in the primaries, while in another he had a very strong backing from the former ANC MP in the constituency who was promoted to the Central Committee. Another who was loosely identified

71. 1973 interviews.

with UNIP won in large part because there was no-one with strong links with the outlawed ANC standing against him, and he was opposed by weak candidates. All the sitting MPs who won the primaries did so easily, while the remaining victors were either considered pro-ANC or neutral and were not opposed by anybody with strong links with the ANC.<sup>72</sup>

The period 1973–78 witnessed reduced tension between those who were old UNIP members and old ANC members. The 1974 party elections saw the election of many ANC faithfuls to leading party positions. However, many of these old UNIP officials regained their positions in the 1978 party and general elections. In the 1978 elections two sitting MPs with strong ANC links who sought re-election lost, while another strong, long-standing UNIP member and former cabinet minister, won the seat from a sitting MP who was loosely identified with the ANC in 1973.<sup>73</sup>

The re-election of many old UNIP members into party positions could perhaps be explained by the fact that the rich peasants hitherto in ANC who joined UNIP had lost interest in party leadership, and thus most did not seek re-election. This loss of interest could have been a result of several problems. The first is that while the leadership changed at local level it did not do so at regional level. The UNIP leadership at the regional level was still staffed by the old UNIP faithfuls who expected these old ANC members to perform tasks expected of staunch UNIP members, such as selling UNIP cards and campaigning for the President's 'massive' re-election. The new party leaders were not as enthusiastic about such tasks. Inevitably conflict and tension developed between the regional level and the local level. In any case most of these local leaders still harboured some resentment towards regional officials and were not too keen to receive and implement directives from them. With the pre-occupation of the party machinery with selling cards and the President's re-election and less on development matters, most rich peasants found themselves less and less attracted to UNIP positions. This attitude was exacerbated by the uneasy relationship they had with regional leaders.

The growing importance of WDCs and marketing co-operative societies as avenues of peasant participation increasingly attracted the attention of the rich peasants and 'kulaks'. These bodies were the avenues through which peasants pressured the state to attend to local problems, and, as we shall see soon, matters pertaining to the problems central to the development of cash crop production were the most important issues that occupied these committees.

The WDCs had been created by the UNIP government as avenues of peasant participation in matters of rural development. However, as a result of the weakness of UNIP in the rural areas of Southern Province these

72. 1979/80 interviews.

73. 1979/80 interviews.

WDCs only became active after 1973. Prior to 1973 the ANC had discouraged peasants from participating in any of the bodies created by the UNIP government. These committees were associated with UNIP and its socio-economic policies, which, as earlier indicated, were rejected by most rich peasants and 'kulaks' including those who were in the UNIP leadership. It is therefore in this context that the WDCs were only 'discovered' by rich peasants after 1973. Furthermore, it was only during the 1971-76 National Development Plan that emphasis shifted from producer and consumer co-operatives to marketing co-operatives, which may also account for their increased popularity. The marketing co-operatives were acceptable to most rich peasants because of their marketing role while the 'socialist' implications of producer and consumer co-operatives made them unacceptable to the majority of rich peasants even after 1973.

Although the WDCs were assigned important roles, they generally acted as avenues through which peasant leaders made their demands on the state.<sup>74</sup> Thus most of their meetings were used to discuss matters that they intended to bring to the attention of appropriate state organs, in addition to approving loan applications to the Agricultural Finance Company. Thus among issues raised in most of these meetings were the provision of social services, land shortage, and high prices of farm in-puts. These issues affected WDCs both in the villages and in settlement schemes.<sup>75</sup>

In addition to the WDCs, co-operative societies seem also to have attracted many rich and educated peasants. In large part, the popularity of these societies could be because of their important marketing role, for it is the marketing co-operative societies that are responsible for handling all marketing arrangements in most rural parts of the province. In addition to these functions, the co-operative societies' committee members discuss matters relating to the proper functioning of the marketing system, such as feeder roads, maize shelters, and the problem of agricultural loans. Thus these bodies, having taken some of the functions of WDCs, have seen their prestige grow over the years.<sup>76</sup> The high profile enjoyed by the marketing co-operative societies relative to almost any other body in the countryside has resulted in leaders of these societies enjoying more influence and prestige than that enjoyed by the WDC and party officials, with the possible exception of the WDC chairmen. The result of this is that many rich peasants were concentrated in the committees of the marketing co-operative societies and to some extent in the WDCs while local party organs attracted very few rich peasants, particularly at branch and section levels.

74. For the functions of the WDCs, see The Republic of Zambia, *Pocket Manual Book*, (The Government Printers, 1971).

75. 1979/80 interviews.

76. 1979/80 interviews.

*Conclusion*

From the above discussion it is clear that to deny the importance of class analysis in the discussion of the political economy of rural Africa, as some liberal scholars do, is an error. Equally erroneous is the tendency by some neo-Marxists to try to show classes where they do not exist in any attempt to legitimize class analysis in Africa. Some form of class analysis of rural Africa can still be made even if distinct classes may not have emerged, in the sense that the political dynamics of the process of rural class formation can be studied in an attempt to enhance our understanding of the nature of politics in rural Africa. Thus in my discussion of the process of peasant differentiation we saw that due to the role played by the state in both colonial and post-colonial periods a stratum of rich peasants had developed, which increasingly is developing distinct interests. However, as we have seen in our discussion of the political manifestation of peasant differentiation, a certain level of peasant harmony also exists, reflected by the absence of independent political actions and class contradictions that are caused by different class interests. This, it is argued, is because these cultivators are still members of one class, the peasantry. Whatever conflicts may exist between the various peasant strata, they are mainly petty with no political expression. Furthermore, the 'silent' struggle over the diverging interests between all those who produce cash crops and the urban social classes, the consumers, tend to unite the peasants even more.

The absence of 'class struggle' between the various peasant strata does not mean, however, that the process of peasant differentiation is not reflected at the political level. On the contrary, as has already been pointed out, the level of interest in these agricultural issues certainly differs among the various peasant strata. For those most involved in the market, the rich peasants, these are problems that are central to their daily lives, whereas those who do not regularly participate in the market generally tend to display passing interest in matters of marketing, pricing and related problems; it is only in the years that they happen to produce a few bags of maize that some interest in such matters is generated. Consequently, it is in part because of this factor that rich peasants have taken a leading role in ANC and to some extent in UNIP before 1973 and in running WDCs and marketing co-operative societies after 1973. It is in these bodies that matters pertaining to cash crop production are discussed.