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# Patronage as Institutional Choice

Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda

*Elliott Green*

*Organisation pour la démocratie populaire–mouvement du travail (ODP–MT)*  
(Organization for Popular Democracy–Labor Movement)  
Name of ruling party in Burkina Faso, 1989–1996

*Office de distribution du pain; mange et tais-toi*  
(Office for Bread Distribution–Eat and Shut Up)  
Popular wordplay on ODP–MT<sup>1</sup>

In recent years scholars have placed increased emphasis on the importance of patronage as a mechanism by which politicians build and maintain political support. The rapidly growing literature on patronage has attempted to understand how, why, where, and when politicians allocate material incentives to their constituencies. Recent studies, for instance, have focused on the relationship between corruption, economic development, democratization, and patronage; whether politicians target patronage at “swing” or “core” voters; how politicians and voters overcome commitment problems; and why or whether politicians target their own ethnic group for patronage.<sup>2</sup> However, there has been minimal interest in exploring variations in the types of patronage politicians employ, or why and how the nature of patronage distribution varies across regimes.

This article discusses patronage as a series of “institutional choices” or strategies which hinge upon a series of trade-offs.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, patronage variation can be explained by the nature of political threats to politicians, which vary across time and space. Two variables that capture this variation in political threats—geography and visibility—help explain why politicians might choose to allocate patronage in a state’s periphery versus its center, and why the patronage that is distributed can vary between being very visible and obvious to being practically invisible and secretive in nature.

A small-N comparative approach is better than a large-N quantitative analysis for understanding the causality behind patronage allocation, a process which is often complicated and secretive and therefore not easily quantifiable. Rwanda and Uganda are ideal case studies for this approach because, despite an unusually high degree of similarity in the current regimes of these two countries, the allocation of patronage across both states is strikingly different. While patronage in contemporary

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Rwanda is centralized and relatively invisible, it is peripheral and highly visible in contemporary Uganda.

### **An Institutional Choice Typology of Patronage**

Patronage is a universal form of politics, whereby political rulers allocate material benefits to a select group of citizens in return for political support.<sup>4</sup> Inasmuch as patronage allocation is governed by a set of rules and established practices, it is thus a type of institution along the lines established by Douglass North.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, inasmuch as rulers are the ones who decide when, where, and to whom they will allocate patronage, their institutional choices are governed by the desire “to maximize their individual political power... by designing institutions that will allow them to exercise their power to the greatest extent possible. They will prefer institutions that make them more powerful rather than less.”<sup>6</sup> Therefore, rulers should be expected to choose patronage strategies that will maximize their power and maintain them in office,<sup>7</sup> suggesting that rulers will have different strategies depending on the particular threats to their power.

Yet, despite a growing literature on patronage, there have been remarkably few attempts at developing theories to explain patronage variation across time and space.<sup>8</sup> This lacuna should not, however, be surprising, considering the more general focus of scholars in the new institutionalism paradigm on institutions as independent rather than dependent variables.<sup>9</sup> While a new set of literature has more recently attempted to explain why various political rulers choose one set of institutions over another based on a variety of preexisting conditions, much of this literature has been focused on the postcommunist transition in eastern Europe and therefore has been largely concentrated on market and electoral reforms at the expense of other issues.<sup>10</sup> As explained in this article, two variables which can help to explain patronage variation are geography and visibility.

**Geography** One choice faced by rulers in the distribution of patronage is geographical, whereby they can hand out patronage at the center of their state or in the rural periphery. The advantage of the former is spelled out in the old adage, “keep your friends close but your enemies closer.”<sup>11</sup> In other words, provide your political enemies with patronage to keep them from rebelling while also keeping an eye on them. Such a strategy involves the distribution of patronage in the state capital, thereby encouraging provincial rivals to leave their rural source of power behind. The classic practitioner of this strategy was King Louis XIV of France, who drew together his nobles at the court of Versailles in order to prevent a recurrence of the *Fronde* and other provincial revolts that preceded his rule.<sup>12</sup>

However, there are at least three problems with this strategy. First, patronage that goes to the center will trickle down to peripheral citizens, most likely through their ethnic delegates at the center. This strategy, however, requires an enforcement mechanism between urban migrants and their rural brethren, and when this mechanism fails or is nonexistent and patronage does not trickle down, poor citizens in the periphery

will often take up arms in revolt, arguably as took place in Mali and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.<sup>13</sup>

A second problem is a risk that, once clients are hooked on patronage and a state fully suffers from what Jean-Paul Azam calls the “redistribution syndrome,” those who receive less patronage than others can become angry and threaten the government. Indeed, the oft-heard claim from coup d’état leaders that the previous regime was “tribalistic” or “corrupt” is merely another way of saying that patronage was unequally distributed across society. For example, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s relative parity of patronage distribution in Côte d’Ivoire allowed him to rule in peace up to his death from natural causes in 1993, but his successors’ unwillingness to redistribute to northerners led to a coup d’état in 1999 and an ongoing civil war since 2002.<sup>14</sup>

A third and final problem with patronage at the center is that a sudden drop in patronage can lead to instability as clients grow angry and rebel against their former patrons. Once they decide their patrons are more a burden than a benefit, these clients can use the commercial networks and links they had formerly established to fund and launch insurgencies, as seen in the collapse of such regimes as Doe’s Liberia, Barre’s Somalia, and Mobutu’s Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), among others.<sup>15</sup>

An alternative approach to the centralized model is for a government to create patronage in the rural periphery, where clients cannot threaten to overthrow the regime in power. While this strategy is politically safer for the government, its downside is that clients are free to develop independent sources of power in the countryside and potentially form secessionist or rebel movements. For instance, Barrington Moore notes how such a concern among India’s Mogul emperors led them to frequently shift peripheral bureaucratic assignments despite the subsequent rural instability that these policies produced.<sup>16</sup> More recently the Afghani warlords Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan developed their own armies and links with neighboring Uzbekistan and Iran, respectively, before the overthrow of the Taliban; as a result, President Hamid Karzai appointed Dostum and Khan to largely ceremonial posts in Kabul so as to neutralize their ability to threaten his rule from the periphery.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, in states where secession, rebellion, or invasion is not a worry or where peripheral areas do not threaten the center, leaders will likely employ patronage in the periphery rather than the center. Conversely, where the periphery poses a political challenge to the center, leaders are likely to centralize patronage.

**Visibility** A second trade-off is in the visibility of patronage, whereby the patron can choose to utilize patronage that is either visible to the general public or unknown to others beyond the recipient. Where politicians face serious political competition they have incentives to use public resources or policy concessions to win elections or maintain support,<sup>18</sup> whereby their spending often takes the form of public goods that are both observable or measurable and whose benefits are easy to trace back to the politicians who created them.<sup>19</sup> In particular “pork” or club goods—that is, patronage that is publicly and legally allocated to a select group of citizens in the form of government policies<sup>20</sup>—are highly visible, inasmuch as they are “clearly seen as evidence of political

patrons fulfilling their promises to clients.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, inasmuch as politicians in competitive democracies have short time horizons, there are more incentives for them to pursue short-term policies like pork that will win them the next election. As such, evidence abounds of highly visible public projects that developing world politicians have utilized to win elections, including state farms in Ghana and Nigeria,<sup>22</sup> sugar factories and port facilities in Côte d'Ivoire,<sup>23</sup> wells in Pakistan,<sup>24</sup> drought relief programs in Botswana,<sup>25</sup> and, perhaps most famously, food distribution programs in postindependence India,<sup>26</sup> among others. In all of these cases, however, the level of visibility is contingent upon the media, whose coverage of a policy can greatly alter its influence on voters. Indeed, recent scholarship has shown how both the media and competitive elections push governments to spend money on club or public goods rather than on private goods.<sup>27</sup>

However, as political competition decreases, the pressures for redistribution diminish as well, since politicians have less of a need to curry votes from the public. In states with noncompetitive elections and low levels of press freedom there is obviously more of an incentive for politicians to provide private goods, or "spoils,"<sup>28</sup> to their rivals in order to maintain their support. As opposed to the club goods or pork in competitive democracies, here patronage primarily consists of politicians offering jobs. In particular, according to James Robinson and Thierry Verdier,<sup>29</sup> the allocation of jobs is useful as it is reversible, thus getting around the problem of how to ensure long-term political support. Indeed, the problem with pork in this setting is that, once it has been created, it cannot be withdrawn from ungrateful clients.

Patronage in this sense is personalized and not always legal, and as a result usually fails to leave a paper trace. As with club goods, evidence abounds, but perhaps one classic example from Mobutu's Zaire can suffice here. When the Kabila government's aptly named Office of Ill-Gotten Gains (OIGG) attempted to locate Mobutu's estimated \$8 billion fortune, it only managed to find \$4 million in his Swiss bank accounts. The rest of the money, it seemed, had been distributed as patronage, but a lack of records meant that any attempts of the OIGG to track down who received what was largely hopeless.<sup>30</sup>

According to this logic, leaders in competitive democracies with a free press should be more likely to employ easily visible types of patronage, or pork, as they seek to win their next election, while leaders in states without competitive elections and a free media would more likely rely upon less visible or permanent types of patronage. Phrased another way, politicians with high discount rates have an interest in employing visible project-based patronage that could bring them a large one-off benefit, rather than a series of more modest long-term gains. Conversely, when politicians are better able to plan for the future due to a weak opposition, they are likely to employ less visible types of patronage like state jobs, tariffs, and taxes that they can (threaten to) withdraw from unworthy clients.

## **Empirical Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda**

Table 1 recapitulates the two institutional strategies listed above, along with examples of what types of patronage comprise each strategy.

**Table 1** Patronage as Institutional Choice

<b>Institutional Variable</b>	<b>Option 1</b>	<b>Option 2</b>
Geography	Center (Central Government Jobs)	Periphery (Local Government Jobs)
Visibility	Invisible and Reversible (Private Goods or “Spoils”)	Visible and Non-Reversible (Club Goods or “Pork”)

As with practically all of the other empirical literature on patronage, I employ here a case-based approach in order to assess the empirical evidence behind these predictions. Specifically, I examine the two case studies of Rwanda and Uganda, with the goal of explicating exactly how the current regimes of Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni have utilized patronage to maintain political support. Rwanda and Uganda have many factors in common which have been previously taken to account for varying types of public policy allocation, including the degree of democratic institutionalization,<sup>31</sup> poverty levels,<sup>32</sup> the number of years of continuous democratic elections,<sup>33</sup> levels of urbanization,<sup>34</sup> the ratio of the winning political coalition to the “selectorate,”<sup>35</sup> and literacy/education levels.<sup>36</sup> Kagame and Museveni have chosen different institutional strategies for the allocation of patronage. My theory explains not only how both leaders have allocated patronage but also patronage variation under previous regimes in both countries.

### **Background Information on Rwanda and Uganda**

As indicated in Table 2, Rwanda and Uganda are among the poorest countries in the world, with low literacy and urbanization rates and high levels of poverty. Both countries are landlocked and blessed with high-quality farmland suitable for growing coffee, historically both country’s main export, with concomitant higher population densities than any of their other neighbors. Presidents Kagame and Museveni have a remarkable amount in common as well. Both men were raised in southwest Uganda, attended the same secondary school in Mbarara district, left Uganda for Tanzania in 1978 to fight against Idi Amin’s regime, and fought together against Milton Obote’s regime in the early 1980s.<sup>37</sup> After joining Museveni’s government as the head of military intelligence in 1986, Kagame started his own rebel movement of Rwandan exiles, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), with whom he invaded Rwanda in 1990 and took Kigali in 1994.

**Table 2** Select Descriptive Statistics for Rwanda and Uganda

	<b>Literacy Rate</b>	<b>GDP/Capita</b>	<b>Human Poverty Index</b>	<b>Urbanization Level</b>
<b>Rwanda</b>	64.9%	\$866	32.9%	18.9%
<b>Uganda</b>	73.6%	\$1059	28.8%	13.3%

Source: UN Human Development Report, 2009.

Both Kagame and Museveni took power as the leaders of rebel armies which had fought against regimes that targeted the formerly dominant ethnic groups in each country, namely, the Tutsi and Baganda, as part of their counterinsurgency strategies. After overthrowing the previous regime, both Kagame and Museveni formed broad-based, postconflict governments and initiated processes of democratization, beginning with local elections alongside the creation of a constitutional commission designed to solicit views of the public on the design for a new constitution. Once the new constitutions had been approved by their parliaments, Kagame and Museveni set up presidential and parliamentary elections under majoritarian rules (in 2003 and 1996, respectively), which they and their parties overwhelmingly won. In both cases the new constitutions mandated for the first time significant minority representation in the parliament, especially for women but also for youth and the disabled.<sup>38</sup> Postconflict reconstruction in both countries, as well as efforts at post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda and successful HIV/AIDS policies in Uganda, have drawn large amounts of praise and aid from donors and visits from U.S. Presidents Clinton and Bush. Both leaders were for a while dubbed members of the “new breed” of African leaders that were supposed to lead Africa to a new era of democracy and development.<sup>39</sup>

Yet despite holding a number of elections, both countries have authoritarian tendencies and therefore fit into the recently created category of “semidemocracies” or “anocracies.”<sup>40</sup> In both cases opposition politicians are regularly arrested and power remains in a small series of concentric groups within each government. In Uganda power rests in the Banyankole ethnic group (10 percent of the population), and within it in the hands of the Bahima subgroup, while in Rwanda Tutsis (14 percent of the population) dominate in the government, with more power concentrated in the *akazu* (little house) of Ugandan-born Tutsis.<sup>41</sup> In other words, in the terminology of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.,<sup>42</sup> the size of both Kagame and Museveni’s “winning coalition” is small in comparison to the size of their “selectorates,” which in both cases is synonymous with the electorate.

### **The Institutional Logic of Patronage in Rwanda and Uganda**

Despite these similarities, however, Kagame and Museveni have employed strikingly different strategies of patronage allocation. These apparent inconsistencies can be explained by the institutional constraints of each country’s political and economic endowments.

**Geography** As discussed above, rulers that were unconcerned about political threats from the periphery but concerned about potential rebellions from the center tended to allocate patronage in peripheral areas, and vice versa. Uganda, despite verbal threats of secession from southern political leaders in the 1960s and northern politicians today more recently, does not have a history of secession or peripheral rebellion that has threatened the center.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, the various rebel movements that have erupted in Uganda’s periphery have all failed to threaten the center, with the one partial exception

of Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (discussed below). Much of this peripheral weakness in Uganda is due to the fact that none of Uganda's major indigenous ethnic groups have politically or numerically powerful brethren in neighboring countries.

On the other hand, Uganda has a long history of central instability, with five coup d'états overthrowing regimes since independence. Moreover, the one Ugandan rebel movement that successfully overthrew the regime in Kampala was Museveni's National Resistance Army, which was based in central Uganda rather than its periphery. More recently, President Museveni has faced numerous threats from within his ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, most notably from his former personal doctor, Colonel Kizza Besigye, who broke ranks to run against Museveni in the 2001, 2006, and 2011 presidential elections. Thus, the peripheral allocation of patronage in Uganda would be expected.

Rwanda is different from Uganda, in that, with the exception of Juvenal Habyarimana's coup d'état in 1973, it does not have a history of rebellion from the center. It does, however, have a history of being surrounded by enemies intent on overthrowing the regime in Kigali. As opposed to Uganda, all four of Rwanda's neighbors have significant Tutsi and Hutu populations due to migration and refugee movements. Indeed, Rwanda's history of foreign invasions and enemies started only one year after independence, when Tutsi exiles launched two failed invasions from Burundi in 1963, the second of which reached as close as 12 miles from Kigali before being repelled; a week after the second invasion Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda launched another failed attempt. More recently, of course, Kagame and the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 and took Kigali after the 1994 genocide. The RPF's success led the *interahamwe* who committed much of the genocide to flee across the border to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); their presence there supposedly prompted Rwanda's subsequent invasion of the DRC. However, relations between Kagame and Museveni over their joint invasions of the DRC soured to the point where the Rwandan and Ugandan troops fought each other in the Congolese city of Kisangani in 1999–2000. At the same time many *interahamwe* reformed as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and invaded the provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in northwest Rwanda, only to be repelled by the Rwandan army after fierce fighting. This long history of invasion from three different neighboring countries, the threat of ALIR and its successors, the presence of a hostile neighbor only 80 kilometers from Kigali, and Kagame's own successful history in leading an invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, all suggest that Kagame would be concerned about the allocation of patronage in peripheral Rwanda that might fall into the hands of his enemies. In other words, more centralized patronage in Rwanda and more peripheral patronage in Uganda would be expected.

**Visibility** The logic above suggested that rulers in competitive democracies with a free press would employ more visible patronage, or pork, in order to win elections, while their counterparts in less competitive states with fewer press freedoms would allocate patronage less visibly. Here again, there is a marked contrast between Uganda and Rwanda, which have very different histories of political competition. The nature of



each country's social composition has much to do with this difference. Some 85 percent of the Rwandan population is Hutu, making it possibly the most ethnically homogenous country in Africa.<sup>44</sup> Uganda, on the other hand, has a claim to the title of the most ethnically fractionalized country in the world,<sup>45</sup> with the largest ethnic group, the Baganda, comprising only about 17 percent of the population. Similarly and just as important in many ways, Rwanda has been dominated since colonial times by Catholics, who currently account for 57 percent of the population, with the rest of the population splintered among a number of different religious groups. Uganda, on the other hand, has historically been split between Catholics (currently 42 percent of the population) and Anglicans (36 percent),<sup>46</sup> with the latter assuming national power after independence thanks in part to British support.

Thus it is no surprise that Rwanda has had a postindependence history of single-party dominance; its sole multiparty election took place before independence in 1961, when the Hutu Catholic PARMEHUTU party secured 77.7 percent of the vote. However, even before independence Uganda was politically split between the Protestant Uganda People's Congress and the Catholic Democratic Party, which had fierce electoral battles in the first two postindependence elections of 1962 and 1980. In the latter case the election was largely assumed to be stolen by Milton Obote, whose brazenness in doing so launched Museveni's ultimately successful rebellion. More recently, in each country's first postconstitutional election, Museveni received 74.3 percent in 1996 while Kagame got 95.1 percent of the vote in 2003; in each country's first multiparty legislative elections, the NRM received 57.8 percent of the seats while the RPF coalition received 73.8 percent.

Another measure of political competition is the nature of regime change and the length of rulers' tenure,<sup>47</sup> and here again Rwanda and Uganda differ. Rwanda's most recent political succession, namely, the resignation of President Pasteur Bizimungu in 2000, was peaceful; in all it has had only three extralegal regime changes since independence, in 1973 and twice in 1994. Uganda, however, has had no peaceful political transitions since independence, with six extralegal regime changes in 1971, 1979, 1980 twice, 1985 twice, and 1986. Uganda's presidents have only lasted in office for a mean of 4.8 years and a median of 1.7 years, while Rwandan presidents have lasted in office for 9.8 and 11+ years, respectively.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, there is also a large contrast between Rwanda and Uganda in their levels of press freedom. Rwanda has one of the lowest levels of press freedom in the world. The government has regularly suspended newspapers and radio broadcasts, including the BBC Kinyarwanda service, and has routinely arrested and expelled numerous local and foreign journalists. With only one daily newspaper—the government-run *New Times*, which is published in English and has a circulation of only 5000 copies per day—and one television station, Rwandans have remarkably little access to information about their government and thus are ill-placed to respond to visible patronage. In contrast, Uganda has a moderately high level of press freedom in comparison to other African countries. Its two most popular newspapers have a combined circulation of 75,000 copies per day, and several other magazines, newspapers, and television stations are published or broadcast in a variety of languages.<sup>49</sup>

As a result of Rwanda's relative lack of political competition and press freedom compared to Uganda, more visible patronage is expected in Rwanda than in Uganda.

### **Patronage in Current Rwanda and Uganda**

The evidence of actual use of patronage conforms very well to the predictions that patronage in Rwanda would be centralized and relatively invisible, while in Uganda it would be peripheral and invisible. These predictions are confirmed further by the changing nature of patronage during the course of Museveni's reign in Uganda.

**Rwanda** Patronage distribution in Kagame's Rwanda has largely been focused on central government jobs, both in the cabinet and the legislature, and particularly in the Senate (the upper house of Parliament). Rwanda's twenty-six senators serve for eight-year terms. Of these, twelve are elected by provincial councils, eight are appointed by the president to "ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities," four are appointed by the Forum on Political Organizations, and two are elected by university staff. Kagame has used his power to appoint to the Senate an opposition presidential candidate in 2003 from the opposition Party for Progress and Concord as well as the former vice president of the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) and son-in-law of the interim president of Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Since 2005 the Senate president has been the chairman of the opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD), which received 12.3 percent of the vote in the 2003 parliamentary elections, while one of the two vice presidents is the former president of the Liberal Party (PL), which received 10.6 percent of the vote in the elections. In all, there are seven non-RPF members in the Senate, comprising 26.9 percent of the seats, a far cry from the 4.9 percent opposition candidates received in the 2003 presidential election. As regards the Chamber of Deputies (Rwanda's lower house of Parliament), MPs are elected according to a closed list, proportional representation system with one national constituency, with MPs selected by party leaders in Kigali rather than by voters.<sup>50</sup>

Moreover, Rwanda's 2003 constitution has institutionalized power sharing across political parties by stipulating both that the president and speaker of the Chamber of Deputies must be from different political parties (Article 58) and that no party can control more than 50 percent of seats in the cabinet (Article 116). These provisions, while ostensibly designed to prevent future conflicts, not only allow for the allocation of cabinet posts to opposition party members but, by stating this openly in the constitution, greatly increase the credibility of Kagame's offers of patronage redistribution. As such, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies is the leader of the Centrist Democratic Party (PDC), while opposition members in the cabinet include the current Prime Minister, Minister of Youth, and Internal Security Minister, among others. In addition, there are allegations that the government fraudulently increased the proportion of the vote received by the PSD and PL in the 2008 parliamentary election in order for the two parties to maintain themselves above the 5 percent minimum threshold.<sup>51</sup>

One could argue, of course, that the opposition parties represented in government have little popular support and are only allocated positions in order to allow Kagame to pretend that his regime is broad-based, despite the fact that he banned the main MDR opposition party in 2003. Yet of the three original opposition parties other than the MDR which were allocated cabinet positions in the 1993 Arusha Agreement, the leaders of all three—the PL, PDC, and PSD—have seats in the Senate or cabinet today. Moreover, Kagame has successfully bought off individual MDR members with offers of positions in the cabinet and Senate, including current Prime Minister Bernard Makuza, former Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema, and former Foreign Minister Anastase Gasana. Finally, Kagame has also integrated former rebel leaders like Paul Rwarakabije into his army after their surrender with the same ranks that they held in the bush.

Indeed, while increasingly utilizing patronage opportunities in Kigali,<sup>52</sup> Kagame has simultaneously reduced the amount of patronage in the periphery. In 2002 he cut the number of districts, the second highest level of local government, from 154 to 106 before making even sharper cuts across all levels of local government in 2006. More specifically, Kagame's government reduced the number of provinces from 12 to 5, districts from 106 to 30, sectors from 1,536 to 416, and cells from 9,135 to 2,148; it also cut the number of vice mayors per district from three to two.

Finally, Kagame's provision of central government jobs has been relatively invisible as well, with very little public focus on patronage as a means to garner votes. For instance, in 2003 Kagame ran his presidential campaign on nondistributive issues like security, stability, reconciliation, and economic recovery.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, the 2008 parliamentary election focused on general government achievements such as stopping "the genocide, rebuilding the country, promoting unity and reconciliation, providing for the genocide survivors, increasing overall healthcare [and] promoting regional integration."<sup>54</sup> The election was notable for the paucity of campaign posters, restricted campaign finance expenditures, and a general lack of information about party programs, all of which served to leave voters relatively uninformed about specific government policies.<sup>55</sup>

**Uganda** In recent years Uganda has seen a very different system of patronage than in Rwanda. While Museveni, like Kagame, has used central government positions as a source of patronage, he has not allocated them to current or former political rivals but rather to political allies. Since his rebel days Museveni's base has been among the Bantu-speaking peoples of southern and western Uganda, specifically the Baganda of central Uganda and his own Banyankole ethnic group in western Uganda. Under his rule, it is these two groups which have most benefited in Kampala. To take a recent snapshot of the cabinet as an example, of the nineteen senior ministers in 2004, eleven were from the west and five were from Buganda, with only two from the north and one from the east.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, two of Museveni's three vice presidents and three of his four prime ministers have been Baganda, while five of six army commanders as well as two of the three inspector generals responsible for fighting government corruption have been westerners.

However, Museveni began his reign very differently, inasmuch as he enjoyed overwhelming support across much of the country, thanks in large part to his relatively

successful efforts at postconflict reconstruction.<sup>57</sup> At the time, Museveni faced an unusually strong rebel movement called the Holy Spirit Movement from northern Uganda, which reached less than 100 kilometers from Kampala in 1987 before it was finally defeated by the government army. Thus, with little political competition alongside peripheral threats to Museveni's power from the HSM and other rebel movements, the patronage theory presented here suggests that Museveni would have employed a centralized and invisible patronage strategy at the time. True to form, for most of his first decade in power Museveni led a broad based government that included the main opposition leader and chairman of the Democratic Party as a member of his cabinet up to 1995, alongside other leaders from the Conservative Party and the former UNRF rebel movement. Moreover, he decidedly failed to create new patronage opportunities in the countryside, despite calls from a government-appointed Commission of Inquiry for the creation of new districts in 1987 and from monarchists for the restoration of the five ethnic kingdoms abolished in the 1960s.

Yet Museveni's broad-based support began to narrow in the 1990s as political party leaders and even former rebel army allies like Besigye started to turn against him in Kampala. With no non-NRM and only one or two non-Bantu ministers and army officers left, Museveni shifted toward other forms of patronage to rule over Uganda. In Bantu areas he restored four of the five ethnic kingdoms just in time for the 1994 Constituent Assembly elections.<sup>58</sup> While the kingdoms were not granted the political powers they held in the 1960s and under colonial rule, they were allowed to exist as cultural institutions. In the non-Bantu areas of northern and eastern Uganda which had never had large ethnic kingdoms, Museveni focused on the creation of new districts (the highest level of local government), despite his aforementioned earlier reluctance. In complete contrast to Kagame, Museveni has created seventy-eight districts since 1990, or more new, highest level subnational units than any other country in the world.<sup>59</sup> These have been concentrated in non-Bantu areas of Uganda and consistently created around election times. In 2000, 2005, and 2010 Museveni created districts only months before elections the following year, while in the 1996 and 2006 campaigns he promised to create new districts after the elections. As expected, voters in new districts have responded by voting more for Museveni than the Ugandan average across all four elections.<sup>60</sup>

These two types of patronage—the restoration of kingdoms and new districts—have been peripheral in location. Almost by definition the new districts have been in the periphery, with only one of the sixty-four districts created in an urban area. The kingdoms have brought many new jobs to rural parts of central and western Uganda. Even the Buganda kingdom, whose capital is in Kampala, has used funds donated by rich Baganda to restore its various palaces and shrines across rural Buganda. Each district has also brought a slew of new jobs to rural Uganda, including more than two dozen technical support positions, a new set of district councilors representing special interest groups, and jobs in the construction and donor industries. As Uganda's districts are not represented in Kampala (with the exception of women MPs from each district), Museveni thus does not face the risk of creating clients that could eventually overthrow him.<sup>61</sup>

The kingdoms and new districts have been very visible as well. The restoration of the kingdoms in 1993 drew international attention, and each kingdom has focused on local development projects within its area. Uganda's decentralization program has brought prominence to local governments by reallocating power over public land from the center to the districts, and regular local elections mean that leadership positions within the districts, as with kingdoms, are not decided from Kampala. Moreover, both kingdoms and districts are not reversible like central government jobs inasmuch as the government has never even threatened to abolish a kingdom or a district. Finally, in contrast to Rwanda, Museveni and NRM candidates have prominently reminded voters of the restoration of the kingdoms and the creation of new districts in numerous parliamentary and presidential elections.<sup>62</sup>

### **Historical Extensions and Counterfactuals**

The point of the "most similar" comparative research design is to demonstrate that two cases are almost identical with the exception of a dependent variable and the crucial independent variable, thereby isolating and clarifying causality.<sup>63</sup> Of course, what this approach suggests is that the same causal explanation should apply when the cases are not so similar. In the current context, this would mean that patronage allocation in Rwanda and Uganda should not only conform to the theory developed above under the regimes of Kagame and Museveni but also under previous rulers as well. An examination of patronage allocation of four previous regimes in Rwanda and Uganda, and their subsequent success or failure at maintaining themselves in power, clearly provides support for the theory.

In Rwanda the pregenocide regime of Juvenal Habyarimana was quite successful at allocating patronage to maintain its hold on power. On the one hand, Habyarimana claimed at least to be interested in the allocation of patronage to the countryside, with positive references to agriculture and the Hutu peasantry in his speeches.<sup>64</sup> However, as with Kagame, Habyarimana centralized power in Kigali rather than in the countryside, using coffee revenues to buy off his opposition in Kigali while also channeling large amounts of state resources to Hutu elites from his home region of Gisenyi. Indeed, despite claims in 1974 that development policy would be decentralized to the communes, Habyarimana increasingly centralized control over local government personnel and policy in Kigali.<sup>65</sup> As regards ethnicity, Habyarimana hired many Tutsis as cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and senior members of his MRND party. In accord with the theory here, however, Habyarimana allowed Tutsis no remit in the countryside, with "an almost total absence of Tutsis from the organs of the local state: [in 1990] there was only one Tutsi prefect, the prefect of Butare who was killed in the genocide, and not a single Tutsi burgomaster."<sup>66</sup> Habyarimana's loss of control from the late 1980s onwards thus arguably had less to do with patronage politics than with the collapse of international coffee prices, the winds of change blowing through Francophone Africa, the imposition of a structural adjustment program in 1990, the end of the Cold War, and

the invasion of the RPF, which consisted of Tutsi exiles whose allegiance Habyarimana was unable to purchase.<sup>67</sup>

In Uganda Idi Amin's rule conformed to the Museveni pattern of decentralized patronage but, as his regime had no competitive elections and little freedom of the press, patronage was largely invisible and personalized. While Amin was notorious for almost exclusively appointing his fellow citizens from the West Nile region to top positions in the military and government, he was able to maintain power by creating three new sources of patronage that he could allocate to his political rivals. First, in 1972 he notoriously exiled the country's Asian community, thereby opening up a great deal of patronage resources. Rather than centralize these assets by resting them in government hands, instead Amin quickly redistributed some 3,000–4,000 former Asian businesses within only three months, thereby creating a new class of businessmen known as the *mafutamingi* (Swahili for "a lot of fat").<sup>68</sup> Second, in 1973 he introduced a whole new provincial tier of regional government, numbering ten across the whole country, while also nearly doubling the number of districts from nineteen to thirty-seven. As under Museveni, these new provinces and districts allowed Amin to placate his political rivals and at the same time remove them from Kampala.<sup>69</sup> However, unlike Museveni, Amin did not allow for local elections or decentralized power, decision making, or resources in these new administrative units, thereby making them useful as patronage posts or "prebends," but hardly visible or useful to most Ugandans. Third, in 1975 Amin's government passed the Land Reform Decree, which nationalized all land in Uganda and thereby created even more peripheral sources of patronage. As with the example of Mobutu and the DRC's missing billions, almost no records exist of the names of the recipients of these three types of patronage, which again is indicative of the largely secretive or invisible nature of patronage allocation under Amin. In the end, Amin's ability to redistribute enough patronage to maintain himself in power lasted until the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, the U.S. ban on the import of Ugandan coffee in October 1978, and the Tanzanian decision to counterinvade after Amin sent troops across the border two weeks after the U.S. coffee ban.

Another way to test the theory presented here is to examine counterfactuals or "off-the-path" behavior by politicians that led to adverse consequences.<sup>70</sup> Again the evidence is strong. As opposed to Habyarimana and Kagames's centralized system of patronage, Rwanda's first president Grégoire Kayibanda did not redistribute resources to his political enemies in Kigali. For instance, Kayibanda completely shut out Tutsis from his government after 1964 while allowing Tutsis to gain access to lower level jobs, especially in schools. However, perhaps most important in Kayibanda's eventual downfall was his failure to distribute centralized patronage to Hutus outside a small circle from southern Rwanda, who dominated the powerful state marketing board, TRAFIPRO. Instead, Kayibanda kept troublesome military leaders like Major Sabin Benda and future RPF chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe far from Kigali, appointing them instead as directors of a tea factory in Cyangugu and a seminary in Gisenyi, respectively. Kayibanda's final mistake was to create local anti-Tutsi vigilante committees in 1972–1973, whose power was

quickly usurped by local Hutu politicians who, along with the aforementioned military officers outside the remit of Kigali, supported Habyarimana's military coup in July 1973.<sup>71</sup>

The Obote regime in the early 1960s represents a similar example of "off-the-path" behavior from Uganda. Obote made the mistake of centralizing patronage, most notoriously by abolishing Uganda's southern Bantu-speaking kingdoms and all regional and district assemblies across the country in 1967. In his attempt to copy Julius Nyerere's *ujamaa* policies in Tanzania, Obote announced the partial nationalization of some eighty major companies in his so-called move to the left, whose rhetoric indicated that future policies were more likely to include the nationalization of land and large-scale government redistribution of income than the distribution of club goods. Included among these policies was Obote's notorious "one plus three" election proposal for the never-held parliamentary elections of 1971, which required putative MPs in a given constituency to receive a base amount of support in three other constituencies in other parts of Uganda and thereby disadvantaged MPs who only had local support. All of these moves thus threatened local patronage networks, especially among the Baganda who stood to lose the most from Obote's policies. Despite efforts to build an inclusive cabinet and bureaucracy with citizens from all of Uganda's regions, Obote was nonetheless overthrown by Amin in a widely supported coup in 1971.

## Conclusion

This article develops a typology of patronage as a series of institutional choices or strategies along two variables—geography and visibility. Similar regimes in Rwanda and Uganda have employed different strategies of patronage allocation, with centralized and relatively invisible types of patronage in Kagame's Rwanda, and peripheral and highly visible patronage more recently in Museveni's Uganda. Moreover, the same logic of patronage allocation explained a shift over time during the Museveni regime in Uganda, the logic of patronage under Habyarimana's and Amin's regimes, and why off-path behavior in Kayibanda's and Obote's initial postindependence regimes contributed in both cases to their fall from power.

Three lessons for the study of patronage are evident. One is that the nature of patronage allocation can have little to do with regime type and economic development but much to do with the different threats to political power across time and space. The evidence suggests that geographical factors play a large role in deciding where political leaders allocate patronage, and it emphasizes the role of competitive elections and the media in altering the decision of politicians to create visible vs. invisible patronage. Thus, the level of democracy as measured by Polity IV and others may not be the most important factor in explaining patronage distribution, thereby adding to a growing literature that suggests that democracies and nondemocracies in the developing world have fewer policy differences than previously thought.<sup>72</sup> Further research into the differences between countries with varying levels of political competition and press freedom

alongside different political geographies might help to bring their patronage strategies into sharper focus.

A second lesson is that attempts to develop theories of patronage need to incorporate variations in threats to political power. The debate over whether governments allocate patronage to swing or core voters discussed by Susan Stokes is thus not very useful without a political context, as increasingly suggested by the literature. For instance, in Uganda neither the core nor swing voter hypotheses do a good job of predicting district creation;<sup>73</sup> and there is similar evidence that country-specific institutional factors like executive dominance and center-local ties, rather than the swing/core voter hypotheses, account for patronage variation in contemporary South Korea.<sup>74</sup>

Third, the focus on ethnic patronage may miss much of the variation in patronage across time and space. While ethnic patronage has been prominent in all six regimes examined here, arguably none of the four previous regimes were overthrown due to an overconcentration of patronage among the president's ethnic group, and in contemporary Rwanda and Uganda the most important political opposition currently comes from the same ethnic groups as Kagame and Museveni.<sup>75</sup> In other words, future research on the role of patronage in regime survival may wish to examine in more detail how politicians distribute patronage to citizens from other ethnic groups rather than continue to focus on the redistribution of patronage within ethnic groups.

In the end, however, it is important that scholars continue to study the nature of patronage allocation across both time and space in order to better understand how and why governments employ a variety of patronage strategies. The evidence presented here helps to advance this goal.

## NOTES

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1. Ernest Harsch, "Burkina Faso in the Winds of Liberalization," *Review of African Political Economy*, 25 (December 1998): 636–37.

2. A nonexhaustive list includes Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Miriam Golden, "Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy," *British Journal of Political Science*, 33 (April 2003): 189–212; Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, "Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Kimuli Kasara, "Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa," *American Political Science Review*, 101 (February 2007): 159–72; Simeon Nichter, "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying," *American Political Science Review*, 102 (March 2008): 19–31; James Robinson and Thierry Verdier, "The Political Economy of Clientelism," unpublished paper, Harvard University; Susan Stokes, "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," *American Political Science Review*, 99 (September 2005): 315–25; and Susan Stokes, "Political Clientelism," in Charles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).



3. Catherine Boone, *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

4. Despite their confusion in the literature, it is important to distinguish patronage, which is generally not illegal, from corruption, which is considered illegal inasmuch as it involves politicians both allocating and receiving material benefits. It is also important to distinguish patronage, which can take the form of "pork" or club goods that are targeted toward specific groups of citizens and are therefore (at least, de facto) excludable, from the allocation of pure public goods, which by definition are nonexcludable. Clientelism, on the other hand, appears to be merely a synonym for patronage in much of the literature and thus I do not consider it here. For more on these definitions see Stokes, "Political Clientelism."

5. Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

6. Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," *Comparative Political Studies*, 30 (October 1997), p. 532.

7. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies*, 40 (November 2007): 1279–1301.

8. The sole notable exception here is René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics*, 4 (January 1972): 149–78, who establish a four-fold typology of patronage along a single variable of modernization. Their analysis, however, unfortunately does not help us much in analyzing patronage variation at similar levels of development.

9. See criticism from Boone; and Kenneth Benoit and John W. Schiemann, "Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13 (April 2001): 153–82.

10. Frye; Benoit and Schiemann; Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington, *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

11. While this phrase is most famously uttered in the film *The Godfather, Part II* (1974), its origins lie in Sun-Tzu's *The Art of War* (Sixth Century, B.C.).

12. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the Revolution* (New York: Anchor Books, 1955 [1856]).

13. Jean-Paul Azam, *Trade, Exchange Rate and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 236.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

15. William Reno, "The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States," *Development and Change*, 33 (November 2002): 837–58.

16. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 327–28.

17. Antonio Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

18. Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel," *Journal of Politics*, 56 (May 1994): 377–99.

19. Anandi Mani and Sharun Mukand, "Democracy, Visibility and Public Good Provision," *Journal of Development Economics*, 83 (July 2007): 506–29.

20. While some authors consider pork merely a type of private good, with club goods as an intermediate between private and public goods, I consider the two concepts synonymous inasmuch as they are understood to mean the "distribution of a collective benefit... targeted to a specific electoral district"; Golden, p. 200.

21. Philip Keefer and Stufi Khemani, "Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services," *World Bank Economic Observer*, 20 (Spring 2005), p. 12.

22. Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 114–15.

23. Azam, p. 234.

24. Keefer and Khemani, p. 13.

25. Roger Charlton, "The Politics of Elections in Botswana," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 63 (August 1993), p. 342.

26. Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), pp. 179–80.

27. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess, "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117 (November 2002): 1215–1451.

28. Gandhi and Przeworski.

29. Robinson and Verdier.

30. Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), pp. 286–88.

31. Nicolas van de Walle, "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
32. Kitschelt and Wilkinson; Stokes, "Political Clientelism."
33. Philip Keefer, "Clientelism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science*, 51 (October 2007): 804–21.
34. Ethan Scheiner, "Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations," in Kitschelt and Wilkinson.
35. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alistair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
36. Keefer and Khemani.
37. Colin M. Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front* (London: McFarland and Company, 2004), p. 12.
38. Rwanda's 2008 elections saw 56.25 percent of its parliamentary seats go to women, the first time in world history women have comprised an elected majority of a national parliament.
39. J. Oloka-Onyango, "New-Breed" Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Uganda's Yoweri Kaguta Museveni," *Africa Today*, 50 (Spring 2004): 29–52.
40. This fact is reflected in similar scores for both countries in the most recent Polity IV datasets, where scores between –5 and 5 qualify as anocracies. Rwanda had a score of –4 from 2000 to 2002 and has had a score of –3 since 2003, while Uganda's was –4 between 1993 and 2004 and has been –1 since 2005. Rwanda and Uganda have also had almost the same Freedom House scores since 2000.
41. An Ansoms, "Re-Engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the Rwandan Elite," *African Affairs*, 108 (April 2009): 289–309; Elliott D. Green, "Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Uganda," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 44 (November 2006): 370–88.
42. Bueno de Mesquita et al.
43. The one exception here, namely, the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1978, was, of course, a counterinvasion in response to Amin's invasion of Tanzania.
44. James D. Fearon, "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8 (June 2003): 195–222.
45. Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeshauer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8 (June 2003): 155–94.
46. U.S. State Department, 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148727.htm>.
47. Gandhi and Przeworski.
48. Kagame's time in office currently marks the median tenure for Rwandan presidents.
49. *Reporters without Borders* (RWB) has consistently lowered Rwanda's global annual ranking from 107<sup>th</sup> in the world in 2002 to 169<sup>th</sup> in 2010, or the third worst in Africa. Uganda, however, has consistently been ranked in the upper half of African countries in RWB's rankings. For more, see <http://en.rsf.org/>.
50. Alexander Stroh, "Electoral Rules of the Authoritarian Game: Undemocratic Effects of Proportional Representation in Rwanda," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 4 (March 2010): 1–19.
51. Stroh, p. 9.
52. Kagame's government created three new ministries in 2008; it also proposed a constitutional amendment in 2010 which allocated sole power over the appointment of members of National Commissions and parastatals to the President.
53. Waugh, pp. 88–198.
54. European Union Election Observation Mission, "Republic of Rwanda: Final Report" (Kigali, 2008), p. 26.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.
56. Richard Mutumba, "Issues in Parliament," *The Monitor*, August 31, 2004.
57. Nelson Kasfir, "The Ugandan Elections of 1989: Power, Populism and Democratization," in Holger B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., *Changing Uganda* (Oxford, James Currey, 1991), p. 255.
58. The restored kingdoms were Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, and Toro. The one kingdom Museveni did not restore was his own, Ankole, ostensibly because it was not popular, but possibly also because a restored traditional king would be technically superior to all Banyankole, including Museveni.
59. Inasmuch as the kingdoms and the districts created under Museveni "incorporate potential opposition forces, investing them with a stake in the ruler's survival," they are thus highly comparable to the use of partisan legislatures by autocrats analyzed by Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions," p. 1280.

The only real difference here is that I claim that the kingdoms and districts are themselves a form of patronage, rather than a means to create patronage as in Gandhi and Przeworski. The end effect, however, is the same.

60. Elliott D. Green, "Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 45 (2010): 83–103. While Museveni has also expanded the number of ministries and presidential advisors since the 1990s, these posts are both few in number in comparison to those created through the restored kingdoms and new districts, and remain largely targeted towards his fellow Banyankole. Cf. Giovanni Carbone, *No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 66–67.

61. The expansion in the number of Parliamentarians due to the Women MPs from the new districts has merely brought Uganda into line with other countries: with one Parliamentarian per 101,473 citizens in 2010, it has proportionally exactly the same number as Rwanda (101,380). While both countries have proportionally more Parliamentarians than the DRC, Kenya or Tanzania, they have fewer than Burundi, Mozambique, Sudan, or Zambia.

62. Carbone, pp. 107–08; Green, 2010.

63. John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

64. Philip Verwimp, "Development Ideology, the Peasantry and Genocide: Rwanda represented in Habyarimana's Speeches," *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2 (November 2000): 325–61.

65. Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), p. 24.

66. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 141. Burgomasters were the political heads of the communes.

67. Ibid; Philip Verwimp, "The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship and Genocide," *European Journal of Political Economy*, 19 (June 2003): 161–81.

68. Michael J. Schultheis, "The Ugandan Economy and General Amin, 1971–1974," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 10 (Fall 1975): 3–34.

69. Jan Jelmert Jørgensen, *Uganda: A Modern History* (London: Croom Helm, 1981).

70. Boone.

71. Filip Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et Droit au Rwanda: Droit Public et Evolution Politique, 1916–1973* (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1985).

72. Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18 (Winter 2004): 51–74; Michael Ross, "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (October 2006): 860–74.

73. Green, 2010.

74. Yusaku Horiuchi and Seungjoo Lee, "The Presidency, Regionalism and Distributive Politics in South Korea," *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (June 2008): 861–82.

75. Uganda's most prominent opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, is a Munyankole like President Museveni. In Rwanda Kagame's main opposition has come from other Tutsi returnees within the RPF, including those who support the restoration of the monarchy. Cf. Sebastian Silva-Leander, "On the Danger and Necessity of Democratization: Trade-Offs Between Short-Term Stability and Long-Term Peace in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *Third World Quarterly*, 29 (December 2008): 1601–20.