The ERM-1: Key Features

- ERM: optional feature of EMS
- A parity grid:
 - (bilateral) parities against central unit (ECU)
 - margins of fluctuations (+/- 2.25%).
- A strange money: the E.C.U.:
 - as unit of account only
 - but you could bank in ECU (deposits/loans)
 - It did not exist as a note
 - Made by a basket of currencies (DM, FFR, lit...)

The ERM-1: Key Features


- Mutual unlimited support (?):
 - exchange market interventions
 - short-term loans.
- with realignments (currencies over/undervalued):
 - frequent (before 1986): due to inflation differentials
 - require unanimity agreement.

Evolution: from symmetry to DM Zone

• Initially a flexible arrangement:

- different inflation rates (monetary policy independence!)
- frequent realignments
 - usually too little to restore external balance
 - opened the door to speculative attacks
 - erosion of credibility of some countries
- Bundesbank emerged as the example to follow

feasible?



fixed exchange rates?

Table A2. Realignment dates and central DM parities in the ERM

| Realignment dates | BF/DM | DK/DM | FF/DM | IP/DM | IL/DM | NG/DM |
|----------------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 13/03/79 | 15.7164 | 2.82237 | 2.30950 | 0.263932 | 457.314 | 1.08370 |
| 24/09/79 | 16.0307 | 2.96348 | 2.35568 | 0.26921 | 466.460 | 1.10537 |
| 30/11/79 | | 3.11165 | | | | |
| 23/03/81 | | | | | 496.232 | |
| 05/10/81 | 16.9125 | 3.28279 | 2.56212 | 0.284018 | 539.722 | |
| 22/02/82 | 18.4837 | 3.38433 | | | | |
| 14/06/82 | 19.2693 | 3.52817 | 2.83396 | 0.296090 | 578.574 | |
| 21/03/83 | 20.0285 | 3.63141 | 3.06648 | 0.323703 | 626.043 | 1.12673 |
| 22/07/85 | | | | | 679.325 | |
| 07/04/86 | 20.4252 | 3.70332 | 3.25617 | 0.333416 | 699.706 | |
| 04/08/86 | | | | 0.362405 | | |
| 12/01/87 | 20.6255 | 3.81443 | 3.35386 | 0.373281 | 720.699 | |
| 08/01/90 | | | | | 748.217 | |
| 15/09/92 | | | | | 802.488 | |
| 02/02/93 | | | | 0.414757 | | |
| 25/11/96 | | | | | 990.004 | |
| 16/03/98 | | | | 0.402676 | | |

fixed exchange rates? BFR/DM

BELGIUM 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 1979.3 1985.1 1987.3 1988.7 1989.3 1991.3 1992.7 1993.3 1995.3 1995.1 1996.7 1997.3 1997.1 1998.7 1979.1 1981.3 1981.1 1982.7 1983.3 1983.1 1984.7 1985.3 1986.7 1987.1 989.1 1990.7 1991.1 1993.1 1994.7 1980.7

fixed exchange rates? lit/DM

ITALY 1980.12 1981.7 1982.2 1982.4 1982.4 1985.8 1986.10 1986.10 1987.12 1986.7 1986.7 1987.5 1987.12 1987.5 1982.1 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1982.8 1986.7 1986 1979.3 979.10


Convergenza dei tassi di inflazione tra i

FIGURA **10.2**

Convergenza dei tassi di inflazione in sei dei paesi fondatori dello SME, 1980–2006.


Nel grafico si riportano i differenziali di inflazione rispetto alla Germania per sei dei paesi fondatori dello SME: Belgio, Danimarca, Francia, Irlanda, Italia e Paesi Bassi.

Inflazione annua domestica meno inflazione annua tedesca (%)



Fonte: FMI, WEO Database. I tassi di inflazione sono relativi agli indici dei prezzi al consumo (IPC).

straight jacket



Breakdown of the DM zone - why it didn't last forever

- Bad design:
 - full capital mobility established in 1990 as part of the Single Act: TRINITY REQUIRES....
- Asymmetric shocks:
 - German unification: a big positive shock that called for very tight monetary policy in Germany
 Italy & UK in recession!
- Political shock

the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty worried exchange markets

A wave of speculative attacks in 1992-3:
 — the Bundesbank sets limits to unlimited support

Five Incarnations of the ERM 1

- 1979-82: ERM-1 with narrow bands of fluctuation (±2.25%) and symmetric.
- 1982-87: ERM-1 more centered on the DM, several realignments, careful capital controls.
- 1987-92: ERM-1 a DM area, fixed exchange rates and lessen capital controls.
- 1993-99: ERM??? wide bands (±15%) i.e. flexible rates.
- 1999- : ERM-, asymmetric, on the way to euro area.


European Monetary Union: One Market = One Money?



quite a long way: anyway a good idea?

| Towards Maastricht | | Between Maastricht and the single currency | | After Maastricht | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1970 | Werner Plan | 1994 | European Monetary Institute (precursor of ECB) | 1999 | Monetary union starts |
| 1979 | European Monetary System starts | 1997 | Stability and Growth Pact | 2001 | Greece joins |
| 1989 | Delors Committee | 1998 | Decision on membership | 2002 | Euro coins and notes introduced |
| 1991 | Maastricht Treaty signed | 1998 | Conversion rates set | 2007 | Slovenia joins |
| 1993 | Maastricht Treaty ratified | 1998 | Creation of ECB | 2008 | Cyprus and Malta join |
| | | | | 2009 | Slovakia joins |
| | | | | 2011 | Estonia joins |

3 Steps to get the Monetary Union



Maastricht Treaty states 5 criteria

The five convergence criteria

| What is measured: | Price stability | Sound public finances | Sustainable public finances | Durability of convergence | Exchange rate stability |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|--|--|
| How it is measured: | Consumer price inflation rate | Government deficit as % of GDP | Government debt as % of GDP | Long-term interest rate | Deviation from a central rate |
| Convergence criteria: | Not more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing Member States | Reference value: not more than 3% | Reference value: not more than 60% | Not more than 2 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability | Participation in ERM II for at least 2 years without severe tensions |

Six OCA criteria

Three classic (economic) criteria
 Mundell
 Kenen
 McKinnon
 Three political criteria

3 Economic Criteria

- Labour Mobility (Mundell): In an OCA labour (actually but this applies to Capital too) moves easily across national borders
- 2. Production Diversification (Kenen): Countries whose production and exports are widely diversified and of similar structure form an OCA (in this case asymmetyric shocks are unlikely)
- Openness (McKinnon): Countries which are very open to trade and trade heavily with each other form an OCA.

 Economic Criteria in EUROLAND
 Labour Mobility (Mundell): NO WAY!!! How many different languages and cultures???

- Production Diversification (Kenen): Unlikely: too much diversified production! Quite obvious as in an single economy i.e. EU it's natural to specialize.
- 3. Openness (McKinnon): OK in EU!

3 political criteria

4. Fiscal Transfers: Countries that agree to compensate each other for adverse shock form an OCA:

With a budget that is about 1% of GDP?

Mostly preallocated?

EU does not have transfers can act as an insurance that mitigates the costs of an asymmetric shock

3 political criteria

5. Homogeneous Preferences:

Countries that share a wide consensus on the way to deal with shocks form an OCA We have seen that in ERM 1!!! Not even within Germany!

6. **Commonality of Destiny** Countries that view themselves as sharing a common destiny better accept the costs of operating an OCA As above....

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FINANCE

German states oppose 'stupid' wealth transfers

Rich German states helping poor German states by sending them cash is a founding principle of Germany's financial equalization. Yet some of the richer states feel the system has gone too far and outlasted its use.



Date 04.03.2013

Author Wolfgang Dick / cd

Related Subjects Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW)

Keywords Federal financial transfer system, budgets, equalization, bavaria, hessen, baden württemberg


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ELECTIONS

http://www.dw.de/german-states-opposestupid-wealth-transfers/a-16640386

State tax transfers from 1995-2012 in billions of euros



http://www.dw.de/german-states-opposestupid-wealth-transfers/a-16640386

Germany first devised a financial transfer system in the 1950s. The idea was simple: all German citizens should have a minimum standard of living that was independent of their state's financial condition. Problems really began in 1995, however, when Germany was re-unified and five former East German states, impoverished by decades of Soviet control, were incorporated into the system.

Bavarian Premier Horst Seehofer agreed the financial transfers had gone too far.

"It can't be that 10 percent of our budget ends up in other states, which then pay for things we ourselves can't afford," he said. Over the last 17 years, Bavaria's 12.5 million citizens saw 41.2 billion euros in state tax revenues transferred out of Bavaria.

Over the same period, the state of Baden-Württemberg's nearly 11 million residents watched 34.3 billion euros get transferred over state lines. State Premier Winfried Kretschmann called the federal financial transfer system "unfair" and "stupid."