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Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective

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The current renewed interest in the study of borders and borderlands is paralleled by a growing concern and debate on the possibility of a border model, or models, and of a border theory, or theories. Certainly, there is a new attention to theoretical consideration and discussion that could help sharpen our understanding of borders. In this essay, I argue that a model or general framework is helpful for understanding borders, and I suggest a theory of borders. The seeds of my arguments are grounded in a variety of discussions and in the works of border scholars from a variety of social science disciplines. My contention is that the literature on borders, boundaries, frontiers, and borderland regions suggests four equally important analytical lenses: (1) market forces and trade flows, (2) policy activities of multiple levels of governments on adjacent borders, (3) the particular political clout of borderland communities, and (4) the specific culture of borderland communities. A model of border studies is presented in the second part of this essay, and I argue that these lenses provide a way of developing a model that delineates a constellation of variables along four dimensions.

INTRODUCTION

The current renewed interest in the study of borders and borderlands is paralleled by a growing concern and debate on the possibility of a border model, or models,[1] and of a border theory, or theories. Certainly, there is a new attention to theoretical consideration and discussion that could help sharpen our understanding of borders.[2]

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Yet, there are no debatable models. The study of borders and borderland regions could be confined largely within the limits of various social science disciplines. However, the interdisciplinary nature of the scholarship on borders makes theoretical discussion more complex. The ranks of border scholars have expanded from geographers, historians and economists to include anthropologists, ethnologists, political scientists, lawyers, psychologists, sociologists and other social scientists. Today, most scholars acknowledge that borders are complex and intimately related to the nature of their physical and human environment and that states, markets and culture provide important explanatory lenses. Nonetheless, there have been few attempts to formulate models that would encompass this diverse scholarship's range of analytical concerns.

In this essay, I argue that a model or general framework is helpful for understanding borders, and I suggest a theory of borders. The seeds of my arguments are grounded in a variety of discussions and in the works of border scholars from a variety of social science disciplines. Because the model emerges from the current cross-disciplinary debates on borders, the first part of this essay is a discussion of the many empirical works on borders. My contention is that the literature on borders, boundaries, frontiers and borderland regions suggests four equally important analytical lenses: (1) market forces and trade flows, (2) policy activities of multiple levels of governments on adjacent borders, (3) the particular political clout of borderland communities, and (4) the specific culture of borderland communities. The second part of this essay presents a model of border studies, in which I suggest that these lenses should not only help our understanding of how structure and agency interact in the formation of borders and borderlands, but also help guide our analysis of structure and agency, according to levels of analysis.

HISTORY OF IDEAS ON BORDERS

Borders, boundaries, frontiers and borderlands are human creations that are grounded in various ethical traditions. When Buchanan and Moore compared natural and international law traditions with the Jewish, Christian, Confucian, Islamic and Liberal ethical traditions of boundaries, although they found that the ethical traditions were somewhat ambiguous in terms of how to establish borders, including settlement, purchase, inheritance and secession, all of these traditions agreed that *conquest* is unjustifiable.[3] Nevertheless, the history of the Roman Empire is testimony to the fact that conquest was central to the differentiation between barbarism and civilization. Boundaries organised the Roman Empire according to a hierarchy of spaces – territories of varied dimensions and functions, which included settlements, cities, provinces and regions.[4] During the Middle Ages, there is some evidence

that the feudal system was more concerned with the control of cities and territories, which, rather than having clear boundaries, had somewhat vague borderlands. Thanks to geographers, however, mapping technology allowed rulers to have a spatial view of their possessions; thus, what were originally borderland or border regions progressively became boundaries or frontiers.[5] As well, the vocabularies of space began to reflect this evolution, refining meanings so as to differentiate between boundaries, borders, borderlands and frontiers. Anderson described how meaning varied according to place, noting, for instance, that 'frontier' in the American and French traditions does not appeal to the same imagery.[6] In French, a 'frontière' is a borderland or border region. The French Alsace region is such a border region or *région frontalière*. In American English, however, a 'frontier' is a moving zone of settlement, which refers to the American imagery as described by Turner in *The Frontier in American History*.[7] Also, 'frontière' did not appear in the *French Dictionary of Geography* until 1783, at a time when French geographers were attempting to establish accurate physical boundary lines.[8]

These early works of geographers and historians contributed to the formation of the modern political order, which required international recognition, by other states, of the boundaries of sovereign and territorially demarcated states. One notable example is the Spanish–Dutch Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the treaty that established boundaries for the territorial possessions of England, France, Dutch-land, the German princedoms, Muscovy, Poland, Turkey, Spain and Sweden. The Treaty of Westphalia marked the beginning of the era of the nation-state and nationalism, which historians and geographers studied and explained during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Another, more recent, example is the Treaty of Paris, which reviewed the borders of most states at the end of the First World War. Margaret Macmillan, in her book *Paris 1919*, detailed the diplomatic negotiations and influence games that took place around the treaty-making process; again and again, she noted that the representatives of states or nations would refer to aggrandised maps that served their purposes but were not exact depictions of territories and their people.[9] During both of these eras, sovereignty – defined as the exclusive right of exercise of legitimate violence within the limits of a territory – was mutually recognised by states, particularly by the superpowers France, the United Kingdom and the United States. As self-determination and sovereignty became the organising principles, boundaries delineated modern states.

During the first half of the twentieth century, as summarised by Minghi, the earliest systematic studies of boundaries focused on both natural and man-made boundaries.[10] Ellen Churchill Semple, for instance, compared boundaries and frontiers, arguing that natural geographic frontiers, where humans cannot settle, are ideal boundaries.[11] Later, Holdich and Lyde discussed the virtues of boundaries.[12] They viewed boundaries as being either

good or bad, depending on their intrinsic merit in fostering or limiting tensions, and possibly wars, between states.

These views also marked the beginning of a debate on the functions of boundaries. Brigham argued that boundaries should provide economic equilibrium.[13] Boggs suggested that boundaries have specific functions that vary in time and space; later, he asserted that they may also interact to lessen intra-state tensions.[14] This idea led Spykman to suggest that the territory surrounding the boundary is probably central to understanding power relations across boundaries.[15] Peattie and Jones further discussed those views. Peattie contended that boundaries should strengthen state power, whereas Jones suggested that international organisation should alleviate boundary tensions.[16]

The literature clearly points to the transformation of the traditional mediating role of borderland communities into that of buffer zones. European states turned their borderlands into military regions where combat was rehearsed regularly and eventually took place. Also, underground-militarised tunnels were built along boundaries; the French Maginot Line is one such example that divided France and Germany until 1939. In the early 1960s, however, the generally accepted view was that changes in boundary functions might lessen boundary tensions across borderland and border regions.[17]

Originally, borders were used to delimit the territorial possessions of sovereign states, and the work of social scientists served the purpose of rulers who were eager to picture the boundary line demarcating their possessions. In short, borders became central to the nationalist agenda and the development of nation states. Paasi identified such boundaries as institutional constructs.[18] At the core of such constructs is the fact that boundaries result from international agreements that are established by mutual understandings between states. These create complex, intermeshed networks of government policies and functions that interact to form international boundaries delineating sovereign spaces.

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON BORDERS

More recently, scholars have started to conceptualise the complexity of government activities in terms of policy networks, policy communities and multi-level governance. The overall discussion entails the formulation of an understanding of government activities that, in the intergovernmental maze, influence public policy. In particular, this discussion has focused on two directions of intergovernmental relations: (1) horizontal relations between similar governments or government organisations, which have traditionally been described as governance issues, and (2) vertical relations, which have been understood as intergovernmental relations.

The multi-level governance approach evolved from the study of governmental interaction in the European Union (EU). Gary Marks was the first scholar to describe the interactions of governments in the EU context as resulting in multi-level governance.[19] Originally, Marks and Liesbet Hooghe described the European structural fund policies, that is, regional development and social policy funds, as dependent primarily on lower-level government for their successful implementation.[20] These scholars argued that a clear understanding of the very complex networks of lower-level governments and the constellation of connections and interactions of elected and public officials is necessary to understand the implementation processes of these European policies.

Marks and Hooghe argued that multi-level governance is not only both vertical and horizontal but also of two types: (1) general-purpose governance and (2) task-specific governance. Their analysis of the EU's traditional intergovernmental relations is the best illustration of vertical governance as a process in which multiple government levels interact to co-produce and implement policies. This view is relevant when scholars study, for instance, the EU's social and regional policy, its legal system, or its border-security policies.[21]

General-purpose governance, or Type 1 multi-level governance, is concerned exclusively with the interactions of agencies of general-purpose jurisdiction, such as local, county, regional, provincial/state, central/federal and international. A multi-purpose Russian-dolls-like legal system is a good example of this. Horizontal networks, which are characteristic of task-specific governance, or Type 2 multi-level governance, are best understood with reference to the interactions of public and private local, national and international actors within a specific policy process.[22] Such governance processes may lead such diverse actors to produce or implement a specific policy regulation or to deliver a specific service; a good example is security policy in Europe or North America.[23] The task-specific jurisdiction of specialised agents – such as state, provincial, municipal or county police, as well as Interpol, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or the US Coast Guard, and specific private-sector security corporations – which intersect in a policy network but have no limit as to the number of jurisdictional levels, is the best characterisation of Type 2 multi-level governance.

Both types of multi-level governance contribute to our understanding of the nature of borders and borderlands. They provide analytical tools to redefine the horizontal and vertical interactions of multiple governments and public/private organisations as they implement a border/borderland policy. Empirical evidence points to varied cross-border functions and multiple policies that characterise borders or borderlands where the primary catalyst for border policy may be a central government, a province, a region or a municipality.[24]

Scholarship on borders also focuses on the culture of local borderland communities. The literature often describes how these communities may

either enhance the effect of dividing territory and communities when their culture, that is, their language, ethnicity, socio-economic status and place of belonging, differs, or bridges an international boundary when they share the same culture.[25]

Case studies of borderland communities spanning international boundaries have suggested that *nations* are an important phenomenon; indeed, in both Europe and North America, they challenge the straightforward assumption of primacy-of-state ideology and domination. Keating, for instance, argued that there are stateless nations, bounded by culture, as defined by race, religion, language and socio-economic status.[26] Furthermore, the idea that multinational communities live in peace within the boundaries of a state is only recent.[27] In the end, the unifying power of nationalist ideologies seems to be called into question by research on multiple identities and allegiances.

Political geographers Paasi and Newman contended that borders may be institutions but their very functions may be challenged.[28] Other social scientists, historians, anthropologists, economists and functionalists have identified the crucial role of borderland communities as organised polities within the larger institutional architecture of their state of belonging and have underlined the importance of local culture.[29] Indeed, although international borders divide stateless nations, borderland communities may remain unified by culture – ethnicity, language and/or religion – or by the nature of local political institutions. For example, three international borders divide the Kurds, two divide the Flemish people, and one divides the Basques, the Catalans and the Irish, yet scholars generally agree that these borderland communities also bridge these territories.[30] The nature of their local political organisation and culture influences the very nature of the boundary, and the functioning of the border depends on their activism.

This argument is striking, particularly when scholarship on nationalist movements (e.g., the Welsh and Catalan movements), minority groups (e.g., the Germanic-Belgians), and stateless nations (such as the Basques, the Scots and the Quebeçois) is considered. Michael Keating and John McGarry, the editors of a work on Irish, Scots, Catalans and Quebeçois, asserted that the existence of institutions embodying the claims of these groups varies according to their political environment.[31] Yet, Keating argued that they are affirmed and affirming.[32] In all instances, these movements are either somewhat or not at all integrated into the institutional architecture of their respective national states; hence, their claims may or may not be bounded to a specific territory. Clearly, territorial belonging may play a critical role, but its existence is not in direct correlation to their identity. Keating also noted that those discreet nations seem to be found in most contemporary national states, including France and the United Kingdom, which are traditionally viewed as highly nationalistic and centralised.[33] In those states, nationalism as a state ideology is directly challenged by the social reality of the pluri-national,

fluid, yet affirmed identity of the communities that they govern. Hence, the French include Basques, Catalans, Provençals, Bretons, Normans, Valaisins, Alsatians, Walloons and Flemish people, among others. Similarly, the British are a composite of English, Welsh, Scots and Irish nationals. Some of these nations are integrated territorially, such as the Corsicans, the Scots or the English, but others are 'divided' by an international boundary, the Basques, the Flemish, the Catalans and the Irish being traditional examples.

What is clear is that the literature suggests that the unifying, symbolic, dividing and exclusionary role of a border as a founding principle of a sovereign state is currently under pressure.[34] What is also clear is that there is a wealth of scholarly characterisations of borders, boundaries and borderlands, where non-central-state actors, pluri-national communities and stateless nations perforate borders or undermine the integrity of state borders because of ethnic, religious, social and economic identities.[35]

The cultural influence of borderland communities, however, seems to depend on a central characteristic, namely, their political clout – understood as the local political activism and organisational capacity of a borderland community. The literature documents two broad categories of case studies of such cross-border communities, which demonstrate cooperation or tension for various reasons. There are few examples of borderland communities that have developed institutions spanning an international border,[36] but there are many instances of contiguous borderland communities that have established linkages. There are also many examples of local cross-border tensions.

Bi-national cities – understood as urbanised borderland communities – and their regions are good examples of such tensions.[37] The literature documents local tensions with the central-state level;[38] local divergence of views across the border, despite the influence of higher-level governments;[39] local multicultural tensions and wide bi-national difference, despite shared infrastructures;[40] and local tensions or no socio-political relations, despite strong economic linkages.[41]

However, some research documents cases contrary to those examples. Focusing on the Canadian–American border, Susan Clarkes identified the existence of a *symbolic regime*, which in the Vancouver–Seattle corridor across the Cascadian region organises local Canadian–American regulatory relations.[42] Clarkes argued that policy networks and interest-specific communities interact closely to develop similar, and often parallel, regulatory transportation or environmental policies. Other scholarly works in geography, management, public policy and political science have confirmed those views. Cold-Rauvkilde, Sing and Lee argued that globalisation enhances Cascadia's identity formation, which also influences government response to local needs.[43] Alper argued that cross-border policy networks are critical to the environmental regulatory regime found in Cascadia.[44] His work documents environmental policy communities and transboundary networks of scientists, public and elected officials, and local civic activists to suggest that,

despite a clear lack of institutions spanning the Canadian–American border in the Vancouver–Seattle region, there is evidence of shared social-scientific environmental views, which, in turn, impact the content of environmental public policy, regulations and standards. In the same vein, Brunet-Jailly illustrated how local elected officials on the Dutch–German border of the Enschede–Gronau cross-border region were able to initiate the first indirectly elected parliament, representing cities, counties and regions from both sides of the German–Dutch border.[45] This partnership originated in the late 1940s when elected officials believed that cooperation across the border would benefit all. Three associations, the Dutch Regio Twente and Achterhoek and the German Kommunalgemeinshaft Rhein-Ems, were the founding partners of this transborder parliament. Despite the economic downturn of the 1970s, which affected the textile and agricultural industries of the region, in 1972 about 100 municipalities and local districts formed the Euregio to implement their first socio-cultural policies. In 1979, Prince Krauss of the Netherlands recommended establishing a parliament that would include all the borderland communities involved in the partnership; the Euregio Council, the grouping of local governments, and the Euregio Forum, the grouping of regions and large cities, formed this border-spanning parliament. Today, local and regional governments of the Euregio indirectly elect the 80 members of this unique international cross-border institution. During the 1980s, centre–periphery tensions on both sides of the border led to an expansion of the now-traditional socio-cultural agenda to include socio-economic policies. The Euregio also initiated contacts with European Commission officials. The European Union Interreg policies emerged out of those unique relations. Germany and the Netherlands recognised the official existence of the Euregio in 1989 and 1963, respectively. Today, the Euregio parliament and its staff of 30 executives manage a multiplicity of policies for their borderland region, which groups 149 municipalities, districts (*Kreis*), and other local representative organizations (chambers of commerce, labour and business unions, and political parties). Despite language differences, it seems that, because they believe in cooperation, these borderland communities have successfully created institutions that span the border.

Hence, the scholarship on borders and borderlands documents the influence of local political clout as a central feature of current border research. It allows us to differentiate between boundaries that are clear lines of demarcations, where they unify or filter people – sometimes people with multiple identities and legitimacies – and boundaries that cut through national communities.

Both political clout and local culture are important analytical lenses. For instance, policies that delineate a territory of belonging or a cultural territory, such as border-security policies, or those that work as filters to differentiate between desirables and undesirables, such as immigration or trafficking policies, all face challenges that are inversely proportional to the

levels of integration of local culture and political clout. The current literature on border-policing argues that these policies are mostly unsuccessful.[46]

As suggested above, the local culture and local political clout of borderland communities might be fundamental lenses for a border theory. However, although both point to the critical value of local political activism and culture as important for understanding state boundaries and borders, they do not address the role of market forces, particularly in the current era of globalisation. The specific exigencies of flows of individuals, goods or currencies have yet to be understood fully, but it is clear that they have significant implications for borders and borderlands. Still, this answer is not without controversy; some economists argue that boundaries have a cost, while others argue convincingly that they are withering away due to increased amounts of global trade.

August Loesch, in *The Economics of Location*, reasoned that according to neoclassic economics, borders have a cost because they are barriers to trade and free trade, or the free flow of goods, labour or skills. Loesch equated borders with distances, that is, the marginal transportation cost necessary to cross the border, as did Engel and Rogers.[47] Similarly, contemporary Canadian economist John Helliwell argued that, despite some economic integration, borders continue to 'matter' because they not only delineate the boundary of governments but also bound social networks and most human interactions.[48]

An important argument regarding the borderless world is that globalisation – understood as the global increase in transactions of goods and labour – and economic integration, particularly in North America and Western Europe, lead to the end of the nation state. Ohmae explained that economic regions emerge out of culturally homogeneous borderland regions, contending that 'put simply in terms of real flow of economic activity, nation states have already lost their roles as meaningful units of participation in the global economy'.[49] In the same vein, Castells argued that 'spaces of places' are replaced by 'spaces of flows'.[50] Later, Castells (2000) asserted: 'Bypassed by global networks of wealth, power and information, the modern nation state has lost much of its sovereignty.'[51] These arguments suggest that flows of goods, capital and migrants not only limit the influence of central governments but also modify their local culture and political identity.

What is so interesting in this debate is not who is right or wrong. Rather, it is that these scholars acknowledge the influence of markets on borders and boundaries and that the debates underline the functions of markets and boundaries in shaping the division of labour between markets and politics.

Borders allow market actors to play states against states, regions against regions, cities and communities against cities and communities. Markets also exploit the economic inequalities of people and goods in space and time.[52] Hence, moving people and goods to where value increases creates multidimensional markets across borders. Clearly, however, the international

boundary that divides the Gobi Desert or the North Pole is not as economically active as the boundary separating Detroit (United States) from Windsor (Canada). This is the most economically active border gate in the world, with over 30 million people crossing yearly, because it cuts through the core of the worldwide Canadian–American auto-industrial complex. It also seems clear that borders still wall out markets and communities,[53] despite the numerous examples of cross-boundary cooperation taking place at the local, state, provincial or national levels and the organising policies that span borderland regions.[54]

Furthermore, in the current era of increased security, the borderless world argument – the underpinning issue of globalisation and economic integration[55] – seems to be called into question. Hence, the study of borders, boundaries, borderlands and frontiers needs more than the partial explanations currently available that focus on the economics of market forces, government activities and the roles of culture and local communities to explain the relative transparency of borders. All of these studies contribute to the discussion, but none clearly identifies either a single correlation or a complex of reasons that would lead to an explanatory model for the understanding of borders. Geographers and historians tend to point to the role of local actors and their communities. Political scientists identify institution-building mechanisms as important. Finally, economists generally disagree with all other social scientists, pointing to the limiting and restrictive role that borders play in trade and in flows of goods and people. They also assert the structural influence of boundaries and the resulting market forces that identify opportunities for positions of competitive advantage.

In the end, many single explanations of boundaries, borders, borderlands and frontiers exist, but none is really satisfying; most scholars seem to agree that there are many types of borders and each social science subfield has its own epistemology of borders. Some scholars have made rare propositions for unifying those discussions so as to identify central concepts and variables that would allow for the emergence of a theory of borders. To date, however, there is no model available that addresses, first, why some borderlands integrate economically but not politically, while others have institutions spanning an international boundary without the pressure of intense economic linkages, and, second, what role local political clout and local culture play in defining and shaping borderlands and boundaries.

TOWARD A THEORY OF BORDERS: WHAT ROLES DO AGENCY AND STRUCTURE PLAY?

In this section, I propose a theory of borders. I suggest that market and trade flows, the policy activities of multiple levels of governments on adjacent

borders, the particular political clout of borderland communities, and the specific culture of borderland communities, as detailed in the previous section, ground our development of four analytical lenses to frame the analysis of borders. These lenses provide a way of developing a model that delineates a constellation of variables along four dimensions (see Figure 1).

In other words, I suggest that the relative explanatory power of each analytical dimension varies and that these dimensions are correlated, that is, the specific and complex interaction of the four analytical lenses forms the backbone of a theory that allows us to work empirically and to analyse borders at two levels. Several scholars have dealt with the empirical difficulty of agency and structure by developing analytical dimensions that only work at a specific level. In contrast, this present model provides space for agency and structure to interact by assuming that each analytical dimension can work either at the structural or at the agency level. Each analytical dimension aims to capture how the relative power of structural forces and of agents vary across time, space, and according to specific political, geographic and cultural conditions. In other words, none of these dimensions is exclusively structure or agent oriented; instead, each dimension provides a historically variable expression of agent power. Hence, each analytical lens is *variably* structural, where structure is understood as those social processes that frame and contain individual action.

A macro-analysis of borders and borderlands would thus document the multiple and complex social processes that establish borders and organise borderlands. Empirical research would find that the primary characteristics of a specific case study are defined by a specific structure. For instance, market forces and trade flows may be structural to the Canadian–American borderland because of free trade. Neither market and trade flows, the policy activities of multiple levels of governments on adjacent borders, nor the particular political clout or the specific culture of borderland communities are assumed to be structural in all instances of border case study. Similarly, each analytical lens is only variable in terms of agency. Agency refers to the activities of individuals and how their intentions, motivations, beliefs and values shape social life. Hence, a microanalysis of borders and borderlands would underline the multiple and complex activities of individuals across and around borders. Empirical research would document that, despite structuring characteristics, social agency would also colour the specific nature of a case study.

Both agent- and structure-centred approaches are at the core of important discussions in social science and social theory. They are fundamental to an analysis of borders and borderlands because agency and structure interact in the formation of social action and history. Part of this debate, which is also a central question in social science, is whether the activities and ideas of individuals, or social laws and processes, best explain history or social life. Classical and contemporary social theorists resist a one-dimensional

analysis. They tend to agree that neither the agent- nor the structure-centred approach explains social life; rather, these approaches explain the interaction and dynamics between agents and structures. Today, most social scientists seem to agree that individuals participate in the creation of social, political, cultural, and economic institutions and cultures, but are contained by those creations. This, then, is the core of the theory of border studies: the implicit recognition that agency and structure are mutually influential and interrelated in the shaping of emerging and integrated borderlands.

Contemporary social theorists such as Anthony Giddens attempted to go beyond the primary classical structural views of Marx or Parsons. Giddens argued that it is the very interaction of agents and structures that foster social action.[56] For Giddens, there is a 'duality of structure', where social structures are the medium of action that makes action possible and are reproduced by social action. Hence, for Giddens, this duality, or reflexivity, undermined the view that structures would be uniquely constraining without being under the influence of individual action.

The hypothesis of this synthetic model of border regions is that, if the key factors suggested by each analytical lens enhance and complement one another, the result is an economically, politically and culturally emerging and integrating borderland region. Empirical analyses might show that, in most cases, those factors will not enhance and complement each other; however, they will allow us to compare borders according to similarities and differences and to categorise borders and borderland regions. Such a comparison will also allow us to escape the current view that each border is unique and that no taxonomy of border is conceptually feasible because there are too many types of borders (Gideon Biger's encyclopedia of borders documents 180 borders worldwide)[57] or because no encompassing theory of border can withstand Popper's falsification test.[58]

A THEORY OF BORDER AND BORDERLAND STUDIES

In light of the views noted above, the border theory presented here:

- asserts that the interplay of all four analytical lenses is useful, both in time and space;
- assumes that both agent and structural levels of analysis are central to the understanding of borders; and
- proposes that empirical testing will demonstrate the strength of this theory.

Few scholars will be able to document borders and borderlands that are economically, politically and culturally emerging and integrating; this is an ideal case in comparative border studies. However, there might be debates over borders and borderlands where market forces, the policy activity of



FIGURE 1 A theory of borderland studies.

multiple levels of governments, local culture or local political clout is structural. For example, if in time and space a given border or borderland is structured by market forces, it does not follow that the three other analytical lenses are irrelevant. Indeed, they will serve to focus attention on three dimensions of agency.

In the end, this model will provide scholars with a complex of explanations for understanding borders and borderlands. Social scientists who focus on structural analysis will have to incorporate agency in their research and, conversely, those focusing on agency might want to integrate structural characteristics. In effect, this is primarily a model for the cross-disciplinary and comparative study of borders and borderlands.

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NOTES

1. A model is understood as a broad framework that is necessary for the understanding of borders, but does not suggest correlations between variables. A theory, on the contrary, provides correlations between variables and a hypothesis.

2. See James Anderson, Liam O'Down and Thomas Wilson, 'Why Study Borders Now? New Borders for a Changing Europe: Cross Border Cooperation and Governance', *Regional and Federal Studies* 12/4 (2002) pp. 1-13; Joan Anderson and Egbert Wever, 'Borders, Border Regions and Economic Integration: One World, Ready or Not', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 18/1 (2003) pp. 27–38; Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, 'Toward a Model of Border Studies', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 19/1 (2004) pp. 1–18; Xiangming Chen, *As Borders Bend: Transnational Spaces on the Pacific Rim* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2005); Jaidev Singh, and Paul Ganster, 'Transboundary Environmental Cooperation: A Conversation on Issues in Research and Methodologies', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 18/1 (2003) pp. 51–60; Oliver Kramsch and Virginie Mamadouh, 'Crossing Borders of Political Governance and Democracy', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 18/1 (2003) pp. 39–50; Kenneth Madsen and Ton van Naerssen, 'Migration, Identity, and Belonging', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 18/1 (2003) pp. 61–76; David Newman, 'On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 18/1 (2003) pp. 13–26; Martin van der Velde and Henk van Houtum, 'Communicating Borders', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 18/1 (2003) pp. 1–76.

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4. Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1996), Introduction and Chapter 1.

5. Ibid, chapter 1.

6. Ibid, p. 9.

7. Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1920).

8. Christopher Pollmann, 'Frontières et espaces frontaliers du Leman à la Meuse: Recompositions et echanges de 1789 à 1814', *Actes du Colloque de Nancy*, Novembre (2004) pp. 25–7; Christopher Pollmann, 'La frontière: Horizon indépassable de l'humanité ou pouvoir objectivé?', *Revue de Droit Public* II (1999) pp. 482–99.

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11. Ellen Churchill Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment* (New York: Holt 1911), as cited in Minghi (note 11) p. 407.

12. Thomas H. Holdich, *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making* (London: MacMillan 1916). Lionel William Lyde, *Some Frontiers of Tomorrow: An Aspiration for Europe* (London: A.&C. Black 1915).

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