

TABLE 1. The Transition from Populist Authoritarianism (PA) to Post-Populist Authoritarianism (PPA) in Egypt since the Late 1970s and in Algeria since the Late 1980s

Country	PA	PPA
<i>Egypt</i>		
Fusion of army and party	Yes (the army dominates)	No longer maintained
Fusion of army and bureaucracy	Yes (the army dominates)	Weakened
Fusion of party and bureaucracy	Yes (the party dominates)	Weakened
<i>Algeria</i>		
Fusion of army and party	Yes (the army dominates)	No longer maintained
Fusion of army and bureaucracy	Yes (the army dominates)	No longer maintained
Fusion of party and bureaucracy	Yes (the party dominates)	Weakened

Neo-patrimonialism (Brownlee 2002) had poor effects on the ultimate power of the AFs, however, as is evident from the outcomes of the 2011 crisis in Egypt. These were the demise of both the party in power and Mubarak’s family and the reassertion of the military. The “retirement in the barracks” of the military was therefore misleading. Even if governments were made of a mix of technocrats and top civilian bureaucrats in addition to a new cohort of influential businessmen who emerged with powerful access to the very top of the political system, Mubarak remained a military man attached to the military apparatuses.

Table 1 summarizes changes in the coalitions as a result of political and economic “liberalization.” Since “liberalization” followed different sequences and produced different social and political outcomes at different times, the two cases are placed in two different rows.

The most outstanding and common result was the new role that the army was willing to play within the dominant party: it simply decided to disengage from party politics, limiting its role to a distant form of control. In general, the military took a position that was one of indirect control over civilian institutions rather than having their men at the top of them, with the major exception of the military political economy in Egypt.

Another variation emerged as the result of the severe political and social crisis produced by transition in the case of Algeria. The crisis started in 1988

TABLE 2. Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Staff in Algeria

President	Years	Minister of Defense (MoD)	Chief of Staff (CoS)
Ben Bella	1963-65		
Boumédiène	1965-79	Boumédiène	Boumédiène (1967-79)
Bendjedid	1979-92	Bendjedid (1979-90) Nezzar (1990-93)	Various (1984-90) Guenazia (1990-93)
Zéroual	1994-99	Zéroual (1993-99)	Mohamed Lamari (1993-2004)
Bouteflika	1999-2019	Bouteflika (since 2002) Guenazia (2005-13) Gaïd Salah (2013-)	Gaïd Salah (2004-)

security organization under the same director—Mohamed Mediene “Toufik”—from 1990 to 2016.³¹ Thanks to this continuity in office, the DRS was able to carve out for itself a political role which it disputed successfully with the CoS. During the same period, the senior ranks of the AFs were subject to readjustments, in particular the CoS,³² which remained nevertheless an important actor (table 2). CoSs were imposed by the AFs on the president, and not the contrary, even if the presidency was covered by military personnel, as in the case of Benjedid and Zeroual.³³ Since 2002, defense was formally put under the control of Bouteflika, as it was under Boumédiène, but contrary to the latter, this control should be understood as a mere façade. Interpreting this as a dominance of the president over the military would be a wrong since it does not take into account the role of the DRS. Furthermore, since 2005, a vice-minister actually runs the ministry and is a military man.


Finally, in January 2016, the power of the DRS was finally curtailed when Gen. Mediene was dismissed and the DRS transformed into the *Département de Surveillance et de Sécurité* (DSS), separated from the AFs and placed under

31. The DRS was actually created in 1990 for “Toufik” by Khaled Nezzar, who was also a member of the DAF faction. The DRS centralized all the intelligence sector previously divided between different agencies. Bendjedid, at that time still President, lost control over the intelligence services to the advantage of the Minister of the Defense, Nezzar.

32. The CoS was created by Houari Boumédiène in 1960 when the ALN became the ANP. Boumédiène weakened the political branch of the ALN and the army became increasingly autonomous from the party.

33. In the case of Benjedid, in 1990 he was forced to give up the Ministry of Defense to Nezzar.

Egypt



Algeria




FIGURE 1. Power Relations at the Top

Note: Military is Highlighted in Bold; Arrows = Influence and/or Control

that could have some effects after the fall of Bouteflika. Having opted to remain behind the scenes of a civilian presidency reduces the options of the army in the event of a crisis, forcing the military into a constitutional route and limiting its arbitrary role. The definition of the Algerian military power as an “enclave” (Cook 2007, 14–31) is therefore suitable if compared with

TABLE 3. Variations in Military Control

	Algeria	Egypt
Presidency	Indirect (civilian since 1999)	Direct (military; the exception is Morsi's interlude)
Control over bureaucracy	Indirect	Direct
Control over economic resources	Indirect	Direct
Relation to the party system	Indirect (two-party system since 1997)	Indirect (fluid party system since 2015)

the Egyptian case. The military in Egypt occupy important positions in the bureaucratic apparatus, in both the functions of control and of local government, while in Algeria, the military acts only indirectly with a power of influence and veto. These differences are not marginal. Power is more indirect, therefore more confined and limited. The same is true in relation to the economic arena. How much these differences have to do with the transformation that occurred during the transition from the PA and PPA is difficult to say. It is possible to consider that given the stronger dependency on hydrocarbon production in Algeria and its stronger economic vulnerability, this transformation came at the same time as a social and political crisis. This furthered the decision to “withdraw” but also to strengthen the instrument of social and political control, as the intelligence services, which were military, but largely autonomous, at the top of the hierarchy of the AFs.

In the introduction, an emphasis was placed on the principles of collegiality and cohesion. This too has proved to be more solid in Egypt than in Algeria. In Egypt, a specific body does exist: the SCAF. In Algeria, a similar organ is absent. The existence of a collegial body is of utmost importance in the regulation of the factional and generational conflict within the military apparatus. It is true that the repeated interventions of al-Sisi in the top military ranks and on the composition of the SCAF, as well as his growing reliance on the senior ranks of the Presidential Guard, indicate a defensive posture vis-à-vis other factions in the AFs. However, this personal factor is probably only reflecting the not-yet-solid position of the President of the Republic. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate its impact on the principle of collegiality. The question is rather how much co-optation could satisfy the

TABLE 4. Variations in Relation to Factionalism

	Algeria	Egypt
Military governing body	No	Yes
Relations between the army and the intelligence services	Diarchy (between the Chief of Staff (CoS) and the Intelligence services)	Dominance (by the army)

younger generation of second row officers against flag officers. The economy capture serves this objective by enlarging opportunities. Factionalism indeed affects collegiality and, most importantly, cohesion, as patrimonialism or personalization of political power. These factors are not to be excluded and play a continuous role in ensuring the progression of career and power promotions. Any authoritarian regime implies a concentration of power in few hands, but qualifying the two cases as “personal” or “patrimonial” (Brownlee 2002) seems misleading and it did not stand up to serious political crises. “Personalization” has therefore poor explanatory power. The outcome of the Egyptian post-“revolution” transition was clear: the “dynasty” fell and after a two-year transition was supplanted by another military regime. It is possible to extend the same arguments to Algeria. Despite the many media reports in recent years about the important role played by relatives of President Bouteflika, in particular his brother Said, this power of influence proved to be short-lived. These regimes remain firmly anchored in the military apparatus, which are not completely dominated by a single man even during lasting presidencies.

This cohesion within the military is also understandable by looking at the dominant position acquired by the military in relation to the crucial intelligence agencies. In Egypt they still represent the *longa manus* of the military which is exercised over various arenas, the political and the economic ones, and vis-à-vis the judiciary. The Algerian case varies in relation to this factor. During the twenty-year term of Bouteflika, the intelligence services were not actually subordinated to the military, but together with the latter, constituted a diarchy where the former regularly prevailed, at least until the retirement of Mediène in 2016 (table 4).

Thereafter, during the final two years in the term of Bouteflika, the intelligence services started to weaken, ending up as the major loser against the military during the recent crisis. Thus, the army also finally prevailed in this case, this time firmly in the hands of the new strongman,