

A7. MORTGAGE MARKET

FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS

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
ARGOMENTI



- WHY DO MORTGAGE LOANS EXIST?
- HOW DO THEY WORK?
- HOW DIFFERENT ARE THEY?
- SECONDARY MARKETS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISES

PURPOSE AND FEATURES

- **Long-term** loan **secured** by **real estate**
- Both **residential** and **commercial/industrial**
- Repayment with periodic payments of C and I (**amortisation**)
- IR fixed, variable, or a combination
- Estimated global size (Allied Market Research): 11.5 TRN USD (2021)



PRICING

$$i\% = \text{Market} + \text{Spread}$$

Variable: EURIBOR, EONIA ...
Fixed: EURIRS

Lender:

- Strategy and competition
- Funding
- Existing portfolio
- Expectations


Borrower:

- Creditworthiness, net worth and income
- Outstanding debt
- Past behavior and credit scores

Operation:

- Duration, rate and amortization plan, purpose
- Down payments (f.i. 80/20) and loan-to value
- Collateral, insurance

PRICING



VARIANTS

Many variations:

- can be **guaranteed by public agencies** (f.i. veterans, young couples, ...)
- IR: adjustable rate – ARM, with caps/floors, also in combination (f.i. fixed installment, variable rate)
- **increasing installments**, such growing equity (GEM, designed to allow early repayment) – risky if offered aggressively
- **decreasing optional installments** (very risky for lenders)
- **multiple mortgages** on same collateral are possible
- **reverse annuity (RAM)**



SECONDARY MARKET

- Mortgages are **illiquid** for lenders
- Partially also for borrowers (but: laws and regulation)
- Illiquidity threatens lenders:
 - IR risk (A/L mismatch, reinvestment of future flows)
 - default risk / market risk of collateral
 - loan servicing is expensive (administrative costs)




Secondary markets can be useful, but are difficult:

- Initially, **ceding loans** to other investors (but costly and time consuming)
- Then, funded by (and transferred to) **public repurchase programs** (in bulk, with asymmetric information issues)
- More recently, through **securitization**

SECONDARY MARKET & SECURITIZATION



Securitisation:

- Securities backed by assets (mortgages, **MBS**) to fund new acquisitions
- Useful for a number of small-size loans, unstandardised, with different maturities and other economic features, towards borrowers with different credit scores, costly to service, uncertain in default rates
- Allows **liquidity** to originator, **diversification** to investors
- Dangers: distance between risk-bearer and risk-assessment and complexity/pricing




EXAMPLES

1. SECONDARY MARKET AND REAL ESTATE



EXAMPLES

2. DELINQUENCY RATES



EXAMPLES

3. COURTS AND GUARANTEES






Figure 13. Foreclosure proceedings' characteristics across jurisdictions

Panel A: Weeks after first missed payment that foreclosure procedure starts




Panel B: Duration of foreclosure proceedings



Note to Panel B: Typical duration of the foreclosure process for the most common procedure in the respective country (out of court or in court).
Source: OECD QUASH survey and various public sources.

EXAMPLES


4. WEIGHT OF SEGMENT
(OUTSTANDING / GDP – 2008)



EXAMPLES

5. LEGACY

% of households




Note: 2019 or latest year available.

Source: OECD Affordable Housing Database.


(A) Variable rate mortgages

% of new lending



(B) Fixed rate periods of mortgages

% of new lending




EXAMPLES

6. LEGACY (2)

Figure 9. Total household (including mortgage) debt to GDP

Panel A: Household debt to GDP in 2018 and 2008

Panel B: Change in household debt to GDP versus change in house prices (2008 – 2018)




Source: OECD Household Accounts, doi:0.1787/na-data-en; OECD Housing Prices, doi:10.1787/63008438-en and EMF.

EXAMPLES

7. MARKET VS RULES

Figure 10. Loan-to-value at origination and loan-to-value caps



Note: De jure LTV-caps refer to official regulation of government institutions. The de facto caps are caps that follow from self-imposed constraints by financial institutions or recommendations from governments.

Source: ESRB (2021) Macroprudential database; OECD QUASH 2019 survey; IMF Macroprudential database; ECB (2020_[30]); Bank of England.

EXAMPLES



EXAMPLES

