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Political Money and Party Organisation in Zambia

by IAN SCOTT*

It has long been recognised that political money is a critical variable affecting the organisation of mass parties.¹ These are dependent on the collection of dues for their survival and vitality, for the payment of their officials, and for the fulfilment of the rôles they aspire to play within their communities. Yet the relationship between political money and party organisation has not been widely studied. In Africa, with one or two provocative exceptions, the field has been barely touched.² The reasons for this hiatus are fairly obvious. Parties – and, perhaps, particularly those in Africa – are notoriously secretive about their finances, and even when figures are released, scholars treat them with often-justified suspicion.

These difficulties, however, possibly apply with less force to the United National Independence Party of Zambia than to other African parties since U.N.I.P. has been more willing than most to reveal its financial position. When its figures do seem to be dubious, this often appears to be a result of its own inadequate systems of financial management and control, rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead. U.N.I.P.'s relative openness may itself be a reflection of the importance that its leaders attach to political money. Until the introduction of a one-party state in 1973, when the Party declared itself eligible for state assistance, the political leadership was constantly concerned about the perilous position of party finances. This, in turn, generated considerable tension between the headquarters of U.N.I.P. and local-level officials. I shall suggest that this tension, examined in this instance through the lens of political money, throws light on the organisational problems faced by the Party and on its changing structure.

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¹ See, for example, Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York, 1962), Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: their organization and activities in the modern state* (London, 1954), and Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (London, 1967). I use the term 'political money' rather than the more conventional, but also more neutral, 'party finance'; see Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 93–5.

² See, for example, Henry Bienen, 'Political Parties and Political Machines in Africa', in Michael Lofchie (ed.), *The State of the Nations: constraints on development in independent Africa* (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 195–213.

The argument presented here is that the centre and the local organisations had very different attitudes towards political money. For the headquarters, the collection of dues was a necessary condition for the continuing existence and dominance of the national party; for the local organisations, it was a means of strengthening and mobilising local support, of establishing social control, and of maintaining local party prerogatives. Under a two-party system, when U.N.I.P. was not subsidised by the state, these differing views on the purpose of fund-raising were not necessarily detrimental to the shared objective of strengthening the local organisations. After the introduction of the one-party state, however, when the centre prohibited the mobilisation of the Party for fund-raising and prevented militants from forcing people to buy membership cards, the local organisations had little incentive to collect political money. This factor, I shall suggest, is of considerable importance in explaining the organisational decline of U.N.I.P.

FINANCING THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

The nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia was largely a post-war phenomenon. A political party, the African Congress (later the African National Congress), was formed in 1948, drawing its support mainly from welfare societies in the urban areas. Problems with money afflicted the nationalist movement from the outset. The A.N.C. was largely dependent on small donations, which fluctuated according to the intensity of African feelings about the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Harry Nkumbula, who was elected A.N.C. President in 1951, initially had to work to make sufficient money to support himself, and it was not until February 1952 that a Congress conference voted him £50 to tour the territory with the aim of setting up local branches and of mobilising support against the Federation.¹ There were, however, difficulties in maintaining active branches in the rural areas, as well as some mismanagement of funds, first indications of perennial problems which were to plague the Party.

In the late 1950s the financial position of the A.N.C. improved. Membership grew as resentment of the Federation increased, and there was, in addition, some political and monetary support from the Mineworkers' Union and from other African governments. In 1958 the A.N.C. split when Kenneth Kaunda formed the more militant Zambia African National Congress. This organisation was soon proscribed by

¹ 'African National Congress: 1965 Presidential Address', 6 November 1965, Lusaka, mimeographed.

the colonial Government, but its successor, the United National Independence Party, spearheaded the drive for independence.¹ Shortly after its creation, Kaunda visited Ghana to seek recognition as the pre-eminent nationalist leader in Northern Rhodesia, as well as financial assistance from Kwame Nkrumah. By 1960, U.N.I.P. had received support in cash and in kind from abroad,² and was clearly the dominant political organisation. It was, however, still much more of a movement, embodying deeply felt attitudes towards the Federation and colonial authorities, than a disciplined party, responsive to leadership demands or to a coherent set of ideological goals.

U.N.I.P. conducted a major reorganisation in 1962, mainly in response to its chance to win power in the forthcoming elections. The aim was to effect greater central control over the local levels of the party – a continuous theme in its organisational history – and, as previously, these new efforts were only temporarily successful. However, the introduction of the region as a key unit in the local structure of U.N.I.P. proved to be a considerable improvement. Under the new party constitution the country was divided into 25 regions, each of which had five full-time paid officials,³ and the reforms increased their control over the constituencies and branches, as well as the support that could be expected from them.

Control was facilitated by the sanctions at the disposal of the regional secretary (the most important of the regional officials), and by improved communications between the lower levels of the party. The greater attention paid to the constituencies and branches produced in some areas a more cohesive organisation and one which looked to the regional officials to seek satisfaction for local interests from the administration and from the party headquarters. In addition, the local power base of the regional secretary and the potentially coercive support available to him in the form of the Youth Brigade, coupled with the legitimacy that some local U.N.I.P. organisations derived from the struggle for independence and their increasing access to local resources, all served as constraints upon effective central intervention.

Although regional officials depended on Freedom House, the party headquarters, for their salaries (£15 per month), their position in the community was far more important than these low payments would suggest. Any major decision affecting U.N.I.P. in the district was likely

¹ For further details, see David C. Mulford, *Zambia: the politics of independence* (London, 1967), Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: the making of Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), and William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester, 1974).

² Mulford, *op. cit.* p. 81.

³ U.N.I.P. Constitution (1962), Articles 14–17.

to involve the regional secretary in the first instance. Since this might cover such matters as the appointment of councillors to local authorities and assistance in securing employment for loyal party supporters, the personal position of the regional secretary in the district tended to be more powerful as time went on, while his dependence on Freedom House correspondingly decreased. Despite the appointment of a regional treasurer under the 1962 reforms, there were still difficulties in ensuring that the proceeds from the sale of membership cards were sent to Lusaka. A formal proviso that the regional treasurer should pass on all money to Freedom House within seven days, as well as explain any financial problems to headquarters, was honoured largely in the breach.

U.N.I.P. succeeded in forming a coalition government with the A.N.C. after the 1962 elections. However, neither its victory then nor its organisational reforms were immediately successful in providing central control over the local levels of its organisation. The headquarters proved to be relatively powerless in enforcing bureaucratic standards and in obtaining necessary information from the branches. Even when the regional officials did provide Freedom House with information, it was often inaccurate. For example, in April 1963, as the U.N.I.P. National Secretary complained, 'the figures indicate that the number of branches given to us by regional secretaries is an exaggeration. This leads one to think that the figures for UNIP membership are also exaggerated.'¹ In an appeal repeated periodically, and equally unsuccessfully, over the next decade, the National Secretary called for up-to-date membership lists from the regions. The extent of the communications gap can be judged by the fact that headquarters was forced to rely on the *Government Gazette* for such basic data as the number of party branches within a region.²

U.N.I.P. spent heavily during the pre-election period, and by early 1963 had run into severe financial difficulties because of lack of control and bureaucratic inefficiency – indeed, according to headquarters, regional treasurers made almost no remittances between November 1962 and February 1963. One possible explanation is that regional officials, who were still settling into their new positions, felt that a card-selling campaign might alienate potential electoral support. Instead of actively seeking members, they had tended to rely on proven party supporters and donations to finance the election campaign. In February 1963 Freedom House temporarily suspended its payment of salaries to

¹ National Secretary to all Regional Secretaries, 'Registration of UNIP Branches', 19 April 1963.

² Ibid.

regional officials,¹ a move no doubt designed to ensure that card sales and fund-raising schemes would henceforth be taken more seriously, especially since external funds declined once U.N.I.P. became the ruling Party and Government in 1964.

POST-INDEPENDENCE PROBLEMS

The tension over money between the central and local levels continued after independence. Freedom House regarded the collection of funds as a gauge of the capabilities of U.N.I.P. regions and branches, and of the prowess of their officials, while both central and local politicians saw the sale of party cards as a reason for mobilising the Youth Brigade and visibly demonstrating the strength of U.N.I.P. But the most important and obvious reason for central anxiety was that, until 1968, money derived from paid-up members and from local donations was the major source of party funds. Indeed, U.N.I.P. very nearly went bankrupt after 1964, mainly owing to the increased demands placed upon it and to the poor response to fund-raising drives. As the Treasurer, Simon Kapwepwe, explained in his 1967 report:

Before independence, we got some help from some friendly countries and indeed our own subscription and membership fees including donations. But after Independence the Party suffered from two things: one, the aforesaid friendly countries stopped sending us donations as a Party, they moved with the formation of the Government. . . Secondly, our people, most of them took it for granted that after Independence there was no need for further contributions to the Party.²

While these were undoubtedly important factors, it was equally true that, both at the centre and in the regions, the party bureaucracy could not deal adequately with fund-raising and accounting problems. The Treasurer, for example, was required to submit a detailed financial statement to the 1967 Annual Conference, but was unable to do so because receipt books had been lost, financial reports had not been submitted by regional and constituency officials, and no accountant had been found for U.N.I.P.³

The seriousness of the situation had already been appreciated by the National Council, which in October 1966 resolved to lay down certain principles and regulations for the conduct of financial affairs. Hence the

¹ Deputy National Secretary to all Regional Secretaries, UNIP/3/F/Yen/36-307, 13 February 1963.

² 'General Financial Report to the Mulungushi Conference of 25 August 1967', Lusaka, mimeographed.

³ Ibid.

U.N.I.P. handbook which was issued to party officials in December of that year.¹ The party regions were no longer allowed to retain membership subscriptions, donations, and funds raised through dances and other social functions – all such moneys received had to be sent to the headquarters in Lusaka, either directly or through the Provincial Minister of State. Annual estimates of regional expenditure had now to be submitted to, and approved by, the party headquarters. The Provincial Minister was expected to conduct a regular check of regional account books, with his political assistant serving as the accounting officer. In addition, financial committees of U.N.I.P. were widely established both in the regions and in the provinces, where the members were nominated by the Minister. It was probably the introduction of his Office, rather than any specific regulations, which contributed to the improvement in finances. As William Tordoff recalls, the Minister was not only ‘the local political boss’ but also the headquarters’ man in the province.² It is significant that those who were initially appointed had no local political connections in the provinces in which they were to serve.

Among the advantages of the new system were the better utilisation of the scarce resources of U.N.I.P. and a more equitable distribution of funds among the various party regions – by way of contrast, the former arrangements had benefited the richer areas, notably the Copperbelt. The main source of regional funds (to be remitted to national headquarters) now came from the sale of membership cards. The constitutional provision whereby each party member had to pay both an entrance fee (2s 6d) and an annual subscription, was allowed to lapse because of the difficulties of collection, and Zambians were encouraged instead to contribute to the U.N.I.P. building fund which was established after independence. The new system required all members to buy an annual party card, which was printed in a different colour each year. Their sale was not only critical to the Party’s financial health, but also provided a mechanism for social control and for establishing seniority within the organisation. Long-standing supporters would produce their old party cards to claim precedence for patronage over the *parvenus* of the post-independence period. At elections, the cards became an indication of political loyalty and support, and failure to produce one could result in a severe beating by members of the Youth Brigade. They held regular U.N.I.P.-checking campaigns and would

¹ *United National Independence Party: Handbook for Financial Organization* (Kitwe, 1966).

² William Tordoff, ‘Provincial and District Government in Zambia, Part I: at Provincial Level’, in *Journal of Administration Overseas* (London), vii, 3, July 1968, p. 426.

TABLE I
Amounts Remitted by Provinces to National Headquarters,
April 1965–December 1969¹

Provinces	Kwacha ^a				
	April– December 1965 ^b	January– December 1966 ^b	February– July 1967	1968	1969
Central	1,256	1,804	6,576	9,343	16,764
Copperbelt	2,498	238	13,864	47,258 ^c	48,156
Eastern	1,522	512	2,738	2,378	13,687
Luapula	788	620	4,084	1,270	9,704
Northern	884	424	2,372	8,313	7,988
North- Western	202	45	4,020	946	3,098
Southern	180	1,624	2,450	14,620 ^c	2,350
Western	82	6	1,872	12 ^d	3,463

^a The Kwacha was introduced as the unit of currency in January 1968 (100 Ngwee = one Kwacha), when two Kwacha were the equivalent of £1. Since then its value has varied considerably: it was worth 54p in December 1971, 70p in May 1972, and fell again to 53p in February 1974.

^b The first two columns have been calculated from regional returns to the centre; the total amounts remitted for April–December 1965 and for 1966 were incorrectly presented in the Report and have been adjusted.

^c These figures include substantial donations made to U.N.I.P. for the 1968 election campaign. The amounts raised from the sale of party cards were K26,658 and K1,600 for the Copperbelt and Southern Provinces, respectively.

^d This figure is an indication of the extent of the collapse of U.N.I.P. in the Western Province following the formation of the United Party; it evoked angry comment from delegates from other Provinces at a National Council meeting in March 1969.

display captured or surrendered A.N.C. cards to the media with all the enthusiasm of triumphant scalp-hunters. This new annual U.N.I.P. document became a form of social insurance without which it might prove dangerous to visit the market or travel the roads. Or even, as local civil servants in Serenje discovered, to work in their offices; as the Regional Youth Secretary stated in a circular:

You know very well that there is a bill which gives us power to ask you peacefully for a Political Card. . . Dear citizen peacefully we want to know you as whether you are an enemy or a citizen.²

The new system placed pressure on the regions to sell cards – pressure which was in turn transferred to the community in the form of vigorous card-checking campaigns – and it was coupled with greater central

¹ Sources: 'General Financial Report to the Mulungushi Conference of 25 August 1967', and 'Report of the Auditors upon the [UNIP] Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December 1969'.

² Youth Regional Secretary to Serenje Boma, 6 October 1971, UNIP SR2/1.

TABLE 2

U.N.I.P. Income Account for the Year Ended 31 December 1969¹

Kwacha

1968	Income	1969
94,139	Collections—Provincial	105,209.65
354,951	Donations	6,634.60
—	Functions	9,000.00
316,590	Investments	480,000.00
13,480	Parliamentarians ^a	28,118.85
7,618	Rentals	5,984.80
2,217	Royalties and Sundries	980.88
788,995	Total	636,928.78

^a The standing orders of the 1967 U.N.I.P. constitution provided that monthly contributions should be made by Ministers, Ambassadors, and High Commissioners (K40), Ministers of State and Parliamentary Secretaries (K30), M.P.s and other Zambian diplomats (K20). Assistants to Ministers of State paid K30 per month, and Political Assistants K2 per month. The 1971 U.N.I.P. constitution, however, simply states that 'Members of the Party holding political posts of Ministers, Ambassadors, High Commissioners, Ministers of State, Members of Parliament, Diplomats, District Governors, shall pay contributions equal or equivalent to 5% of their salary exclusive of allowances.'

control which produced, as Table 1 shows, a startling improvement in party fortunes. Money remitted to the centre between February and July 1967 was three times as much as that collected in the previous 21 months. And, in the first 10 months of 1968, the Copperbelt remitted, from the sale of party cards alone, more than double that collected from the entire country between April 1965 and December 1966.²

The reorganisation of the mode of collection in the regions was accompanied by greater efforts by the headquarters to swell party coffers from donations and from returns on investments. By 1968, revenue from the regions was more than matched by funds obtained by the centre. Money remitted from the regions in that year amounted to 12 per cent of total party revenue although this was, in part, a result of the large donations made to the 1968 election campaign. Even in the more typical year of 1969, however, local-level contributions amounted to only 17 per cent of party income. Central sources of revenue were mainly derived from party investments in construction firms and in Freedom House, the multi-storied U.N.I.P. building erected in Lusaka after independence. It is not clear where the Party obtained the money

¹ Source: *ibid.*

² 'Western Province [Copperbelt] Report to the National Council of UNIP, 9-11 November, 1968', Kitwe, mimeographed.

TABLE 3
U.N.I.P. Expenditure Account for the Year
Ended 31 December 1969¹

Kwacha

1968	Expenditure	1969
3,754	Accountancy and Audit Fees	4,200.00
10,924	Bank Cheques and Interest	1,829.73
82	Caucus Expenses	20.00
35,295	Conference Expenses	14,559.58
—	Constitutional Committee Expenses	11,912.25
97,454	Election Expenses	19,286.76
—	Functions and Recreation	7,107.45
5,998	Legal Costs	38,974.40
240	Maintenance: equipment	117.45
1,868	Maintenance: premises	4,577.44
695	Medical Expenses	419.00
7,052	Office Rentals	11,946.59
—	Office Services	414.91
9,602	Printing and Stationery	14,289.60
175,153	Staff Allowances and Assistance	204,886.31
25,180	Housing and Services	28,396.13
1,934	Telephones and Postage	6,569.56
8,022	Transport and Travel	22,729.56
77,379	Vehicle Operations and Repairs	136,936.74
—	Depreciation on Vehicles	143,708.75
Excess		
328,363	Revenue Deficit for Year	35,953.43
788,995		672,882.21

to invest in the first place, but it seems possible that banks and some construction firms allowed U.N.I.P. very generous terms. These investments provided a return of some K316,590 in 1968 and, as Table 2 shows, were increasingly profitable in 1969.² Further major sources of income were the deductions – provided for in the 1967 party constitution – from the salaries of Ministers, Members of Parliament, and Ambassadors, as well as various donations.

This increase in revenue undoubtedly tempted the Party to indulge in large expenditures. It budgeted a sum of K25,000 for the 1968 general election – although, as Table 3 shows, it spent under K98,000 – promised better accommodation for regional officials, bought many new vehicles – on the basis of one Land Rover for each region, as well as motorcycles for some organisers – and doubled the salaries of regional

¹ Source: *ibid.*

² 'Report of the Auditors...for the Year Ended 31 December 1969'.

officials, already its largest expenditure, in October 1971. Plans were made for an extensive new party headquarters, and a K12,000 deposit for land in central Lusaka was made for that purpose.¹ There was little concern for budgetary constraints on central expenditure, as the auditors noted in 1969:

The financial position of the Party is most precarious there being an excess of Current Liabilities over Current Assets over the year. . . The Party still has no Financial Operational Plan or Budget and the control of both Income and Expenditure remains completely inadequate.²

Thus, although revenue derived from investments was greatly increased over the pre-1968 figures, and in relation to required contributions, local-level remittances to the centre were still an important source of income and a subject of major concern at Freedom House.

With the strengthening of the party bureaucracy in 1969, this concern began to be reflected in circulars sent out by U.N.I.P. headquarters and by Provincial Ministers of State and District Governors. One such circular from the Central Provincial Finance Officer in April 1969 indicated that there were still serious difficulties in collection:

It has come to my notice that money is not forthcoming to my office and yet you have cards within your areas. May I know your problems? I am submitting my monthly report soon and it may shock you to find that a lot of you have not sent even a Ngwee since March 1969. I intend to visit your areas for a check fairly soon.³

But although the introduction of stricter central and regional procedures resulted in better returns from local branches, Freedom House was still not satisfied with the situation, and in April 1970 a circular instructed the principal U.N.I.P. official in each region to send party funds directly to the headquarters, prohibited regional officials from opening bank accounts, and called for more checks by provincial finance officers in the regions.⁴

Even these measures did not produce the tight financial controls that Freedom House desired and, in January 1971, a modified system of collecting party funds and regulating the methods of remittance was introduced. Noting that 'a curious and disturbing degree of negligence has sprung into being within the ranks of all UNIP workers with regard to the collection and accountability of Party funds',⁵ the U.N.I.P.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Provincial Financial Officer, Central Province, to all District Governors, 29 April 1969.

⁴ Secretary for Finance, Freedom House, to all Regional Secretaries, Finance Division Circular No. 1 of 1971, 12 January 1971.

⁵ Ibid.

Secretary for Finance laid down new procedures which were to be followed throughout the country. Ministers of State were to be issued quarterly with membership cards (which by 1971 cost 50n), and these were to be passed down through the regions, constituencies, and branches, while a strict record of their numbers was to be maintained at every stage. All remittances were to be made on new forms provided for that purpose. Party members were not allowed to collect donations without written authorisation from their District Governors who, after 1969, were the principal government and party officials in the regions. Finally, reiterating the sentiments of all his predecessors, the Secretary for Finance noted that 'Freedom House hopes that in 1971 every member's efforts will be directed toward the improvement of the financial position of UNIP'.¹

THE CENTRE AND THE LOCAL ORGANISATIONS

These increasing pressures from the centre after 1967 had considerable impact on regional officials who, with the support of District Governors, took firmer measures than in the past to prevent the misuse or misappropriation of party funds at the sub-regional level. The problems of collecting money, however, still remained. As the Regional Secretary for Serenje pointed out to his constituency officials:

My appeal to you on sale of the Membership Cards of this year 1970 has not been followed up according to the instructions given from this office and no one bothered to bring with him cash collected before the end of each month. No monthly return has been submitted to the...office.²

In the urban centres, immediate sanctions could be brought to bear on local officials, but in the rural areas, where communications were difficult, there were perennial problems in maintaining, let alone increasing, the number of paid-up U.N.I.P. members, further exacerbated by the unrealistic expectations of the centre. For example, in the first half of 1969, Mumbwa region in the Central Province was issued with more cards (10,000) than the number of U.N.I.P. voters in the 1968 general election;³ very few were sold and only K389 was remitted to the headquarters during the period. Similarly in the first quarter of 1971, Freedom House issued 257,000 cards to the regions with an expected return of K128,500, an amount considerably greater than

¹ Ibid.

² Regional Secretary, Serenje, to all Constituency Secretaries, 4 March 1970, UNIP/SR/1/1.

³ 'Financial Report from Central Province to the National Council of UNIP, 11-14 August 1969', mimeographed.

that collected during the whole of 1969.¹ Despite various central and provincial efforts, some regional secretaries found that they were still unable to sell their quota of membership cards because of insufficient party support.

Regional officials did somewhat better in organising collections and donations from civil servants and businessmen. Here, particularly in the rural areas, both groups were vulnerable to party pressure, and demands were made in unequivocal terms. In one such fund-raising drive, a regional secretary, in a letter to all civil servants, noted that such persons [civil servants, teachers, and traders] may be said to have benefited directly from the work of the Party and they will be asked to show their appreciation by becoming contributors and will be required to pay a regular monthly sum to the Party... The minimum contribution acceptable will be, £1.²

One headmaster initially refused to contribute to the drive unless instructed to do so by his superior, but quickly complied when the latter indicated that he was disgusted with such an attitude to party donations.³

The gradual improvements which had been made in the operation of the financial system were largely lost by the end of 1972. Factional disputes and inter-party rivalries affected morale in many regions, and the local organisations became much less concerned about the sale of party cards. Party property and equipment, particularly Land Rovers, were often badly maintained and expensive to repair or replace, while officials in headquarters showed a continuing inclination to spend beyond their means.

By 1973, as Table 4 shows, U.N.I.P. was essentially insolvent, its income having dropped from K636,928 in 1969 to only K174,225. Of this, K28,179 – an average of K530 per region – came from local collections in comparison with K105,209 in 1969. The return on investments fell from K480,000 in 1969 to only K100,000 in 1973, and there was no appreciable increase in the amount from the party levy on Ministers, M.P.s, and diplomats. Expenditure at K648,274 was slightly down from the 1969 figure of K672,882, largely because less was allowed for vehicle depreciation and repairs. By 1973, many of the Land Rovers bought for the 1968 election were off the road, and these were not replaced until the end of 1974. The salaries of party officials constituted the biggest item of expenditure: between 1969 and 1973 they

¹ UNIP/SR/1/1, and 'Report of the Auditors... for the Year Ended 31 December 1969'. Also Regional Secretary, UNIP, to all Heads of Department, 15 March 1967, UNIP/SR/4/11.

² File SR/ADM/24/8.

³ Ibid.

TABLE 4
U.N.I.P. Income and Expenditure Account for the Year
Ended 21 November 1973¹

		Kwacha
INCOME		
Collections-Provinces	28,179.74	
Donations	15,877.67	
Investments	100,000.00	
Parliamentary Contributions	29,028.99	
Sale of Chitenge	1,138.86	
		174,225.26
EXPENDITURE		
Accountancy and Audit Fees	6,600.00	
Bank Charges and Interest	14,718.65	
Conferences and Seminars	71,684.94	
Donations	250.00	
Election Expenses	24,185.40	
Legal Charges	5,646.26	
Light and Water	198.00	
Motor Vehicle Expenses	106,623.84	
Office Rent	7,802.77	
Postage and Telephones	17,539.90	
Printing and Stationery	2,434.20	
Publicity	4,650.00	
Salaries and Assistance	313,684.00	
Staff Housing and Services	25,957.85	
Sundry Expenses	4,200.00	
Travelling Expenses	5,995.84	
Depreciation		
Motor Vehicles	32,660.92	
Equipment	4,041.57	
		36,702.49
		648,274.14
Excess of Expenditure over Income		474,048.88

rose by about one-third and accounted for nearly one-half of the total. U.N.I.P. had a deficit of K474,048 for the financial year ending November 1973, with an excess of liabilities over assets of some K939,105.²

U.N.I.P. was now rescued by a subsidy (later a grant) of K1,000,000 from the Government,³ but as a consequence the Party relinquished responsibility for its own finances to the Cabinet Office. However, in May 1975, for reasons which are not entirely clear – those cited include

¹ Source: 'Deliberations, Proceedings, and Resolutions of the Fourth National Council of UNIP, 20-25 April 1974', Lusaka, mimeographed.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

problems of direct financial control, internal audit, and local accountability – U.N.I.P. again became autonomous in its financial dealings. Its response was to issue yet another detailed manual on financial organisation, with considerable stress on the duties and procedures to be followed by local officials.¹

Although the centre was anxious to extract as much revenue as possible from the regions, there were few, if any, incentives to respond positively; as all funds collected had to be remitted as quickly as possible to headquarters, there were no immediate tangible benefits for the regions. In 1974 party officials in the Copperbelt, which continued to remit more money than other provinces to headquarters, proposed that the system should be more decentralised;² 25 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of party cards should once again be retained by the branches and constituencies for their own expenditure, and bank accounts should be opened at the provincial level to settle local bills. Neither proposal was incorporated in the new financial procedures laid down by Freedom House in July 1975.

An additional source of local discontent stemmed from the decision of U.N.I.P. headquarters to ban drives by the Youth Brigade to sell party cards, mainly because many persons had been intimidated and often compelled to purchase cards. Under a participatory democracy where there was no opposition, the centre argued that all Zambians should seek to join U.N.I.P. voluntarily and should themselves approach the organisation to become members. In consequence, there was a predictable and sizeable drop in the number of card-carrying members. On the Copperbelt alone, membership declined from about 25 per cent of the population in 1968 to around 8 per cent in 1974, and dropped even further in subsequent years. In the eight Copperbelt regions in 1974, membership ranged from 5.3 per cent of the population in Ndola Urban to a high of 11.7 per cent in Kalulushi.³ In Chililabombwe the paid-up members constituted 8.6 per cent of the population in 1974, but by 1976 had dropped to 3.3 per cent, or only some 2,000 members. Similar declines appear to have been reported in most parts of the country.⁴

Although in most cases the District Governors and regional party officials seem to have complied with central instructions about renewal

¹ *Manual on Party Organisation, Financial Control and Development Administration* (Lusaka, 1975).

² 'Deliberations, Proceedings, and Resolutions of the Fourth National Council of UNIP, 20–25 April 1974', p. 18.

³ 'Report of Seminar on Humanism: Part Two', Kitwe, University of Zambia, mimeographed; also *Times of Zambia* (Lusaka), April 1976.

⁴ *Sunday Times of Zambia* (Lusaka), 12 September 1976.

of membership, they were not happy about doing so. The ban on card-selling drives and the drop in card-carrying members meant that they lost their most effective instrument of social control. In the strongly pro-U.N.I.P. regions card checks in the market-place – and, sometimes, on a house-to-house basis – had provided the Party with a sanction which could be used, for example, to prevent those without cards from buying food. The regional officials also resented the effect that the ban had on party strength, and the loss of a gauge of the effectiveness of their own organising abilities. In January 1975, for example, regional officials in the Copperbelt complained to a visiting member of the Central Committee that the ban was adversely affecting their organisation.¹ Below the regional level it proved even more difficult to motivate party workers to collect funds and to sell cards. U.N.I.P. officials in branches and constituencies had frequently pressed Freedom House to provide their salaries or, at least, some allowances.

In December 1975 Kaunda ‘sounded a serious warning’ at a National Council meeting ‘against introducing Constituency and Branch leaders to money...such a move would kill the spirit of voluntary work which had characterised the Party ever since it was founded’.² The local officials clearly did not share this view. The Eastern Province Political Committee argued that branch and constituency officials should be given some remuneration: ‘this lack of incentive among these local leaders created a major weakness in the organisation of the Party’.³ The Secretary-General, Grey Zulu, again reiterated the centre’s position in 1976 when he said that ‘the Party could not afford to pay the allowances because the *Government* had no money’.⁴ Whether this was the case or not, it was adding insult to injury to expect an enthusiastic response to pleas to constituencies and branches to remit more money from the sale of party cards. Many local officials felt that the cash collected should go into their own pockets.

Despite this widespread disillusionment at the local level, Freedom House still expected the regions to provide a portion of party revenue. Kaunda reminded the National Council in December 1975 of the importance of raising funds and selling cards:

The strength of UNIP must... be measured by the number of its card carrying members. The masses of the Zambian people support the Party and are committed to its objectives but the card carrying members are obviously few. Our task is to increase this aspect of UNIP strength. I am not saying we should

¹ ‘Report of Seminar on Humanism, Part Two.’

² U.N.I.P., 7th National Council Meeting, 1975.

³ Ibid. submission by the Eastern Province Political Committee.

⁴ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 28 March 1976; my emphasis.

force people into the Party... A strong and well organised Party must be self-reliant. A Party dependent on external sources of finance enjoys less independence of action and to that extent sacrifices the interests of the masses whom it serves.¹

Under the July 1975 rules, revenues to be collected locally would come from entrance fees, annual subscriptions, and donations.² The entrance fee was set at K1, and it was provided that the annual subscription could vary as specified from time to time by the Central Committee. Other sources of party revenue were to be the levies on Ministers, M.P.s, and diplomats, the affiliation fees paid by organisations such as the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, and schemes which the party might sponsor. No mention was made of government subventions or of returns from party investments. On the expenditure side, U.N.I.P. committed itself to providing salaries and house rents for its full-time officials. It also approved expenditure for the purchase, maintenance, and repair of motor vehicles and other party property, for education and business grants, for travelling allowances, and for legal and audit fees.

The system introduced in July 1975 provided for highly centralised control over party funds.³ No credit purchasing was permitted except by Freedom House, and the latitude allowed to the provincial and regional levels was reduced to a minimum. All provincial expenditure was to be covered by an operating budget prepared by the Provincial Political Secretary. At headquarters, U.N.I.P.'s Administrative Secretary was responsible for the day-to-day administration of funds, assisted by a chief accountant who was to prepare a central operating budget that incorporated provincial income and expenditure. At least in theory, this was also an improvement over previous party practice, which had been to engage in *ad hoc* expenditure without reference to a budget. Freedom House was to carry out regular half-yearly checks of all party property, and there was to be an annual audit of accounts. Any funds voted to U.N.I.P. by the National Assembly were subject to audit by the Government Auditor-General; for all its financial transactions, the Party was to adopt the accounting system of the Government.



It is difficult to assess how successful this system has been. Like the preceding financial arrangements introduced by the Party, it depended on factors beyond the control of Freedom House, notably a fluctuating

¹ U.N.I.P., 7th National Council, pp. 53–4.

² *Manual on Party Organisation*, p. 19.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 18–20.

revenue base which made the compilation of a detailed budget very difficult. U.N.I.P. could rely on an annual grant from the Government, but apathy at the regional level and the confused state of party investments still made it difficult to establish revenue targets. In addition, the system introduced in July 1975 required that local officials should have some elementary knowledge of book-keeping and accountancy practices. In most cases, this was an unjustified assumption. Neither was it entirely certain that the headquarters itself had abandoned its earlier free-spending habits. In his 1975 annual report, the Secretary-General, Grey Zulu, drew particular attention to the fact that as much as K700,654 had been spent on transport and related matters – a figure that exceeded the entire expenditure for 1973 – including K255,524 for the purchase of 50 Land Rovers and 14 cars, as well as K206,063 for the hire of vehicles and K46,495 for air travel.¹ Spending beyond U.N.I.P.'s means – and engaging in expenditure which conspicuously benefited the central bureaucracy – could not but help to have a detrimental effect on the morale of local party officials.

CONCLUSIONS

Within the limits of their own local organisations and support, it is fair to say that U.N.I.P. officials in the regions generally proved responsive to demands from Freedom House for more accurate accounting and collection of party funds. They did so partly because they knew that the publication of financial returns in reports to the National Council could jeopardise their future careers should they fail to fulfil the minimum expectations of headquarters. In addition, particularly before the establishment of the one-party state in 1973, regional officials responded positively to central calls for increased card sales because this enhanced local party prerogatives. In many regions, the sale of party cards was followed up by vigorous checks conducted by the Youth Brigade, and these helped to mobilise the local organisations, to identify areas of weakness, and to demonstrate that the Party was in effective control of the region. Below these levels, the U.N.I.P. organisation responded more erratically to calls to collect funds.

During the 1960s enthusiasm ran high, but local officials had difficulties in following accounting procedures and were sometimes guilty of misusing party property and misappropriating funds. After the introduction of the one-party state, there were virtually no incentives for

¹ *UNIP Annual Report, 1975* (Lusaka, Government Printer, 1976), p. 11.

the collection of local funds. Since it was prohibited to compel people to buy cards, and since local officials were not permitted to keep any of the money collected, it is not surprising that revenue dropped considerably. This is an important factor in explaining the general decline of the organisation of U.N.I.P. under the one-party state.

Although, until 1973, the purposes of the centre and the local branches in fund-raising were rather different, the net effect was to maintain the strength of the party organisation in many areas of Zambia. After 1973 the acquisition of political money from the Government reduced the relative significance of the rôle of U.N.I.P. branches and constituencies from the standpoint of Freedom House. The tension between central and local officials over political money which had existed prior to 1973 was overcome at the expense of a viable local-level party organisation.