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Generational Tensions in the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire*

Jeanne Maddox Toungara

> I am man of the transition [because] of my age and my ideas.... I have one foot in with the elders because I have learned from them, and the other with the young....The massive entry of young people [into the party] symbolizes the success of continuity.
>
> Laurent Dona Fologo, *Fraternité Matin*, 19 April 1991

The theme of the Ninth Congress of the PDCI, which opened 1 October 1990 in the president's village of Yamoussoukro, was "renovation and continuity" (*Fraternité Hebdo*, 4 October 1990). With three thousand activists taking part, it was the most widely attended congress ever held. Earlier that year, the leader of the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire*, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny (deceased 7 December 1994), had announced an end to one-party rule. The goal of the congress, then, was to revamp the PDCI so that it could compete effectively against the electoral challenge it would now face from opposition parties. Ten commissions were organized to restructure the PDCI and formulate a platform to deal with the political and economic problems plaguing the nation. When the delegates emerged, five days later, the party had been reorganized. Among other things, it now included a broader representation of generations, professions and interest groups in each of the party organs and committees.

Not surprisingly, differences of opinion have emerged within PDCI ranks as to how an open, efficient, "new and improved" party should function. Far from entering this new era of Ivoirian politics as a monolithic entity, as victorious election figures might suggest,[1] the PDCI came rife with tensions between loyal members. In local commentary and the print media, as well as in informal conversation, the differences of opinion have been viewed within a fourfold classification. The *anciens* represented the oldest and most conservative wing of the party and generally wish to maintain the status quo; the reformers favored moderate change; the renovators supported a complete revamping of party organs; and the radicals, or *jeune loups* (literally, the "young wolves," or, in English idiom, the Young Turks), were seeking to ensure their entry into the party leadership. These differences not only revealed continuities with

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preindependence political alignments within Côte d'Ivoire but reflected more widespread African attitudes toward leadership, to which the notion of gerontocracy is fundamental (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940).

Identifying Generational Cohorts

Modern political attitudes in Africa have tended to reflect deeper, historically formulated political and social arrangements. Traditionally, lineage patriarchs who controlled the distribution of labor, wealth, food and wives dominated a wide range of dependents—younger men, women and children. Their status as village elders assured them an advisory role on village and provincial councils, where they assisted chiefs and kings in adjudication as well as formulating policies that were usually based on consensus. Solidarity within the age-grades—gender-specific groups of individuals born around the same time, who together underwent rites of passage, assumed increasing degrees of responsibility within the village and looked forward to gains in authority and status as they advanced in age—contributed significantly to the stability of their communities (Bohannon and Curtin 1988, 151-2). Consequently, as Bohannon and Curtin state, many urban Africans "tend to keep the foci of loyalty they had in the village—loyalty often based on age and kinship, secondly on common language and common standards of behavior" (1988, 386). In short, in modern politics Africans continue to support their lineages and respect the birthright of party patriarchs.

When one looks at generational divisions within the PDCI, questions naturally arise as to whether younger and older generations differ systematically in their political beliefs. For the most part, Ivoirian politico-administrative elites have been divided into two basic age categories: the old (*les anciens)* and the young (*les jeunes*). The dividing line between the two has tended to waver according to the whims of elder politicians, for whom the twofold classification has often provided a useful means easily to eliminate competitive younger men, who can conveniently be dismissed as "too young" to assume any of the scarce positions available within the class of political elites.[2] For the analytical objectives of researchers, moreover, such simplifications have facilitated the explanation of generational tensions (Amon d'Aby 1951; Morgenthau 1964; Zolberg 1969; Campbell 1974). The two categories have thus remained broad and poorly defined: they do not reflect significant, functional distinctions between generational cohorts as perceived by members of the PDCI politico-administrative elite themselves.

Even Bakary-Akin's threefold classification of political elites, based on age and profession, into "teens," "betweens" and "has-beens"

does not adequately elaborate generational differences (1984, 39-40; 1991, 105-18). The "teens," who entered the class of politco-administrative elites around 1980, actually range in age from twenty-three to forty-six years, although Bakary-Akin separates the experience of baby boomers born in the 1940s from the "children of independence" born in the mid-1950s. The "betweens" (born between 1920 and 1940) range in age from forty-six to their mid-sixties and entered politics around 1957. The "has beens" are over sixty-five years old and constitute the first generation of PDCI elites.

In this classification, however, each component appears as a static, unchanging cohort. To what extent, for example, might differences between baby boomers and "children of independence" affect political alignments? These labels also mask processes of maturation that have almost certainly occurred within each group; for example, members of an entering class may not maintain the same political attitudes throughout their political careers. Although four classes of political elites had in fact emerged by the 1980s, the Bakary-Akin classification collapses them into three, overlooking in the process some of the distinctions pertinent to the emergence and transformation of each.

Here I propose a fivefold classification of Ivoirian political elites that derives in part from numerous interviews with Ivoirians. It is founded on two main considerations: the period during which a given group first emerged onto the national political scene and Ivoirians' own perceptions of who their age-mates are.[3] Each generation is historically defined by the period of its entrance onto the political scene as active members of the politico-administrative elite.

The first generation came to power after World War II, directed the anticolonial struggle until independence was won in 1960, and subsequently filled the most important positions as party bosses. The second generation, educated for the most part abroad, entered the political realm during the 1960s in time to assume high-level positions as technocrats. The third generation entered political life in the 1970s, also fresh from education overseas, and were assigned managerial posts in the public and private sector during a period of economic growth and expansion. The fourth generation, more numerous and largely a product of the national university and professional schools, entered the scene in the 1980s during a worldwide economic recession, only to find their opportunities for advancement within the politico-administrative elite extremely curtailed by high unemployment. The fifth generation is in the process of emerging in the midst of political upheaval, as Côte d'Ivoire struggles through the transition to multiparty democracy; none of its members, many of whom are still in school, has yet held a high-level leadership position. During the transition to a multiparty democracy, the political alignments that emerged within the PDCI

corresponded somewhat with generational divisions. Generally, the *anciens* were members of the first generation; the reformers included most members of the second generation and a large majority of the third generation; the renovators, a vocal minority, also emerged from within the third generation; and the radicals were most numerous among the fourth generation.

The majority of Ivoirian political elites have been men. They typically received a Western education and went on to pursue professional occupations in the public or private sector. They generally assumed positions of leadership around the age of forty. As descendants of common folk—devoid of political clout in their home districts and usually without financial backing—they tended to remain largely dependent on Houphouët for political rewards. In the past they queued up, albeit informally, behind PDCI loyalists who could help usher them into fruitful careers (Touré 1982; Woods 1988). On the whole, they have been very much aware of their generational cohort's rank, their upward mobility as a group and their individual competitiveness with other members of their *promotion* (or age-grade) in relation to the political hierarchy.

For his part, Houphouët understood his role as father of the nation, chief of state and gerontocratic figurehead in distinctively Akan terms (Toungara 1990; Weiskel 1980). In 1985, after a five-year search for a power-sharing arrangement to calm anxieties about the succession, Houphouët stated that "wise old men . . . all reminded me that I am by custom the Chief; that we have principles that must be respected" (Houphouët 1985, 8). African clientage—the patron-client relationship—involves reciprocity, which is primarily demonstrated by a patriarch's distribution of resources in return for loyal service (Médard 1982, 166; Levine 1980). With economic resources firmly in his control, Houphouët initially used methods of redistribution, negotiation and reconciliation that would become symbolic of Ivoirian political and economic successes, as well as failures, over the next three decades (Amin 1967; Fauré 1989). Houphouët also created a clientelist state through his control of all party organs and government offices (Sylla 1985; Woods 1988). He extended his influence over organizations such as professional interest groups, workers' unions and associations of women, teachers and students by bringing them all under the umbrella of the PDCI and inviting them to participate, as delegations, in National Council meetings. Those who cooperated reaped the rewards of political or administrative office, investment opportunities or rural development programs (Cohen 1974; 1984). As the numbers of Ivoirian intellectuals increased, however, and as sources of wealth became scarce, Houphouët was no longer able to maintain previous levels of redistribution. The rearrangements in the distribution of benefits, due to the economic crisis of the 1980s, had a differential impact on the

political attitudes of each age-grade depending upon their position in the life-cycle.

According to Jennings and Niemi, the particular traits of a given generation depend on the prevailing "psychohistorical conditions," which form the basis of its "political-cultural consciousness" (1981, 7). As these authors note, "the age range for the creation of a distinctive, self-conscious political generation" seems to be late adolescence and early adulthood, generally when a person is between the ages of seventeen and twenty-six (1981, 7-8). But after a generational consciousness is formed, how are we to account for the continuity or transformation of political attitudes that variously create dissension or provide the grounds for collaboration? Jennings and Niemi propose four patterns of persistence and change in political attitudes to illustrate how transformations may arise within different generations as they move through the life-cycle: 1) The *lifelong persistence model* applies in cases of strong attachment to a political system or a fundamental ideological predisposition; 2) the *lifelong openness model* applies in cases where there is little attachment to preadult learning patterns; 3) the *life-cycle model* applies when change is associated with a particular stage of life yet there is an overarching tendency toward continuity; and 4) the *generational model* applies in cases in which resocialization or a new orientation occurs with lasting effects during a person's formative years (1981, 19-21).

For intergenerational collaboration to occur, generations of politico-administrative elites must either share certain historically similar events or simultaneously undergo a common experience. According to Jennings and Niemi:

> Not only is there a tendency for a new generation to be like the preceding one, but there is a tendency within each generation to maintain attitudes and patterns of behavior once they are established. But just as major political events occurring prior to the advent of maturity can deflect a new generation from the paths set down by the previous one, events can shake up existing generations, including the older members of those generations (1981, 389).

If this is so, then the economic crisis and political upheaval leading up to Houphouët's decision to accept multiparty democracy can be seen as the "cataclysmic and manifestly political events" it took for Ivoirian politico-administrative elites to be jolted out of the political lethargy induced by the single-party regime's repressive tactics and their co-optation into it. Interestingly, not only have intragenerational divisions over political processes emerged within the PDCI, but the entire opposition leadership seems to have emerged from within the third-generation cohort. Only after the specific historical attributes of each generation have been delineated, however, can some analysis of

intergenerational tensions and intragenerational differences be carried out. How, then, might our understanding of African age-grades—when applied along side the Jennings and Niemi models of generational change—help explain the unraveling of PDCI loyalists into groups of *anciens*, reformers, renovators and radicals?

Les "Anciens"

After giving loyal service to Houphouët, the first generation politicos—the *anciens* of the PDCI—had difficulty accepting the challenges proposed in 1990 by younger generations of administrative elites, preferring instead to maintain the gerontocratic top-down ruling style that had characterized all their years of political service. The *anciens*, having reaped the benefits of Houphouëtism for over three decades, favored the continuation of centralized, party control, arguing that it offered the best means to cope with the current crisis; preservation of the status quo was thus their dominant theme during the Ninth Congress.

Indeed, from the beginning of political activism in Côte d'Ivoire, in the 1940s, older generations of patriarchs have formed alliances to protect their interests against those of younger, Western-educated elites seeking to enhance their access to wealth. To take an example: in 1944, in selecting a leader for the newly formed Syndicat Agricole Africain, regional union representatives (many of them chiefs) sought someone who was Western-educated and thus capable of presenting their grievances to the French. But they were also concerned to find someone whose social and economic status was similar to their own, namely, someone who possessed both personal wealth and traditional prestige. As a graduate of the Ecole William Ponty, a medical doctor employed by the colonial administration, a successful planter and a chief of the Akoués (a Baulé subgroup), Houphouët was well qualified on both counts (Anoma 1977; Gastellu and Yapi 1982). Many young intellectuals, however, felt alienated from the older, plantation-owning administrative elites who were the original founders of the union: the elders jealously guarded the administration of the SAA, seeking to keep the organization firmly within their control. As Amon d'Aby pointed out, "No serious effort was attempted to initiate the youth to the economic life of the country; but [these youth] were very impatient and, like the elders, wanted to acquire the economic power they needed to realize their aspirations" (1951, 113). In reaction to this exclusion, a group of younger Western-educated elites, led by a young lawyer, Kouamé Binzème, attempted to organize herders and the remaining planters who had not joined the SAA.[4] But their effectiveness was limited. Unlike the SAA, this group lacked sufficient connection to traditional leaders, who were able to supply plantations

with voluntary laborers, and they were unable to gain French administrative support and access to major French-controlled distribution networks.

Houphouët went on to found the PDCI in April 1946, using his SAA supporters, among others, as a political base. Later that same year he proposed and was subsequently elected president of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), a coalition of African parties that Houphouët hoped could present a united front in French parliamentary debates (Amon d'Aby 1951, 57-61; Morgenthau 1964, 83-90). Many of the first generation of political elites were, like Houphouët, founding members of the PDCI—party loyalists, who often held government offices or positions within the PDCI. Then, in 1950, Houphouët renounced the PDCI's link with the Communists and effected a reconciliation with the French government. Many members of this first generation of politicos who had objected to the PDCI's affiliation with the French Communist party and had consequently formed opposition parties—backed by the colonial administration—were eventually appeased, deserted the opposition and followed the PDCI leader (Zolberg 1969, 129-46; see the appendix). Others held out in defense of pluralism until independence in 1960, when their opposition parties—rife with ethnic and regional factionalism—succumbed to PDCI monolithic control (Amondji 1984 and 1986; Gbagbo 1986, 12-23; Loucou 1992, 100-23). By default they reluctantly joined the PDCI ranks bringing with them conservative political attitudes and expecting loyally to serve and thus reap financial rewards from the regime. In the meantime, Houphouët, the chief of state and the modern equivalent of a patriarchal ruler, redistributed wealth and commanded his troops by consensus; but no one had successfully contested his top-down ruling style until the 1990s (LeVine 1980; Weiskel 1980; Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 145-52; Médard 1982; Toungara 1990). In fact, at the Ninth Congress the surviving members of the first generation of politico-administrative elites adamantly opposed efforts to widen the decision-making base within the party. The *anciens* were fully aware that any changes in party structures initiated by the younger cohorts could infringe upon their perceived authority as elder politicians, an authority which they were quite unwilling to forfeit.

Reformers

The reformers, many of whom are now serious contenders for power because of their experience in administration and elective offices, countered their conservative elders with proposals for moderate reforms within the party. Now that they have advanced in age and gained the status associated with patriarchal rule, it would be unrealistic for them not to seek to maintain some control within the

party on that basis. Those who perceived themselves as serious contenders for power and authority in the post-Houphouët era have cultivated a string of clients among the younger generations of administrative elites upon whom they are basing their support (Sylla 1985; Leconte 1989). In tune with Ivoirian demands for change, they advocated opening party organs to a more diverse selection of the population and consequently hoped to gain broader support from a wider audience.

Most of the second-generation elites—who were educated abroad (usually in Senegal, France, or the United States) during the 1950s and 1960s—periods marked by student unrest and protest against imperialism around the world—seemed receptive to change and hence joined the ranks of reformers. They had been co-opted into Houphouët's one-party regime upon their return to Côte d'Ivoire where, after a brief struggle, they complied with the exigencies of the single-party state. As students they had embraced freedom of speech, democratic rule and self-determination in government. But, in the light of strong PDCI repression and the party's resistance to change, coupled with their own need to meet personal responsibilities as heads of households, second-generation elites compromised their idealism and accepted their subordination to political patriarchs (Loucou 1992, 119-22). They were integrated into the regime as technocrats, leaving the weightier decisions, such as the formulation of the national political agenda and social policy, to the president and his council of elder politicos (Lloyd 1966; Zolberg 1969).

While abroad the second generation of PDCI elites had generally supported the RDA and the struggle against colonialism. But following Houphouët's "tactical retreat"—as his disavowal of communism was called—matters changed. Houphouët's new spirit of collaboration with the French was highly unpopular among these students, imbued as they were with leftist ideas and radical sentiments. Many separated from the RDA to create the Association des Etudiants de Côte d'Ivoire en France (AECIF), a branch of the Fédération des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France, itself affiliated with a Communist-led organization, the International Union of Students. In 1956 the AECIF joined with youth groups based in Côte d'Ivoire to form the Union Générale des Etudiants de Côte d'Ivoire. Rejecting the terms of the 1956 *loi cadre* reforms of the French Community, in which Houphouët had played a major role in seeing that francophone African countries were made semiautonomous but not accorded full independence, the students continued to support the struggle against French domination.

Upon returning from abroad, however, these university students found themselves dependent on Houphouët and the PDCI to secure their economic and political futures—for which they would have to pay a price. The PDCI leadership, made up of members of the old guard,

preferred that young activists rise—on the basis of individual merit—slowly up through the party ranks. As a result, "youth organizers encountered much hostility among the secretaries of the PDCI *sous-sections*, who were loath to share their authority with newcomers" (Zolberg 1969, 307). Likewise, it was with great reluctance that, in 1958, Houphouët finally accepted their new organization, the Jeunesse RDA de la Côte d'Ivoire (JRDACI), as the youth wing of the party—a recommendation that had been made at the RDA Congress in Bamako a year earlier. The JRDACI perceived itself as a friendly opposition group operating within the PDCI, but it was obliged to cooperate closely with the PDCI leadership in order even to exist. The JRDACI was, for example, forced to incorporate the Ligue des Originaires de Côte d'Ivoire, a group of young, Abidjan-based white-collar workers that had led attacks against Dahomeans in 1958 to protest rising unemployment—the PDCI leadership hoping to use the JRDACI to bring the workers under their control (Skinner 1963). In terms of its organization, the JRDACI was expected to imitate its parent, election to the JRDACI's executive committee, for example, taking place on the basis of preselected slates of candidates, rather than by individual competition (Zolberg 1969, 308-14).

Despite the roadblocks placed in its way by party elders, though, the JRDACI did manage certain accomplishments. At the PDCI's Third Congress, in 1959, JRDACI activists proposed the creation of the Political Bureau, a suggestion the party leadership accepted. The Political Bureau was intended to advise the president and serve as a policy-making organ for the party. Fifteen members were appointed to the newly formed bureau, among whom were three JRDACI officials. JRDACI representation on the Political Bureau gave it a national forum for presenting its ideas, confirmed its institutional strength, and acknowledged the legitimacy of its membership by admitting some of its members to the highest echelons of the party hierarchy. Moreover, in 1959 and 1960, of the nineteen members of the JRDACI's executive committee, only three were not named to positions of responsibility in the government, as parliamentarians, ministers, ambassadors or assistants in ministerial cabinets.

But the JRDACI's fortunes were short-lived. Even while the JRDACI was gradually being brought into line with PDCI directives, the party's general secretaries attempted to repress the partial autonomy of its local divisions. What was worse, Houphouët himself found it difficult to accept the dynamism of these younger intellectuals. He therefore sought to have the JRDACI dismantled. In the aftermath of the "bogus plot" of 1963—a piece of treachery fabricated by Houphouët in order to rid himself of overly ambitious party members—six of the nineteen members of the JRDACI's executive committee and several former student leaders were arrested and the JRDACI itself was

formally dissolved (Baulin 1982, 99-105, 134-46). Moreover, some eight years later, at a meeting of reconciliation between the president and those who had been implicated in the plot, Houphouët publicly stated that younger generations would, in essence, be excluded from Ivoirian political life: "Leaving political positions to the elders, it's up to you, young people, [to assume] the technical positions" (Baulin 1982, 149).

The exclusion of the second generation of politico-administrative elites from high-level positions in the party was assuaged by their appointment as diplomats and high-ranking government officers. The three strongest ministerial portfolios in the late 1960s and early 1970s were held by technocrats of the second generation: Bedié in Finance, Diawara in Planning and Sawadogo in Agriculture. (See the appendix for additional second-generation administrative elites.) Having held office during the most productive years of the postcolonial economy, Bedié, Diawara and Sawadogo initiated the period of economic expansion that created a number of state-owned companies and resulted in the illusory image of the country's development known as the "Ivoirian Miracle" (Amir 1967). True, their extended honeymoon as managers of the national interest ended when they were dismissed in 1977 for their role in the selection of several overbudgeted sugar factories (Mytelka 1984, 169-72; Gbagbo 1983, 145). Nonetheless, having gained entry into the highest policy-making positions in the nation, these second-generation elites had made an effective transition from their positions as outspoken critics of the regime during their formative years to the mature status of PDCI loyalists. They understood that their economic and political futures depended on their ability to fall into line behind elder politicians. Yet most had not forgotten their early struggle to implement change and appeared sympathetic to current demands for party reform. The political and financial gains made while they were at the height of their careers were ample enough for many among them to sustain their own circle of supporters from within the younger age-grades.

Henri Konan Bédié—who as president of the National Assembly succeeded Houphouët as chief of state in accordance with the terms of Article 11 of the constitution—was catapulted to the office of PDCI president by acclamation during a special convocation of the party congress on 30 April 1994, an act in defiance of reformist tendencies toward democratization within the party. Seemingly, his basis of support stemmed from old alliances he had formed with first, second and third generation elites—men and women who felt that his leadership would guarantee their political and financial well-being in the post-Houphouët era and who were anxious to impose his candidacy by any means, including the overriding of precious gains toward democratic procedures achieved during the Ninth Congress.[5] As expected, Bédié did not contest the illegal procedure, but acquiesced—

in the words on one PDCI enthusiast, "to the realities of our political culture"—and, consequently, condoned a practice that recalled the heavy-handed PDCI strategies of Houphouët's era (*Jeune Afrique*, no. 1740, 12-18 May 1994). One might speculate that Bédié's ruling style may not differ widely from that of his predecessors of the first generation: He will protect the elders' privileges and invoke the birthright of his age-grade in order to achieve his political goals.

Among the third generation, coming of age in the political climate of the 1960s, radical ideals were also far from dead, but neither did they dominate the political consciousness of this generation. We see third generation politicos distributed along a political spectrum from the most conservative to the most radical. (Today PDCI reformers embrace many of the ideals expounded by the second generation in the late 1950s.) They entered the national scene between 1970 and 1979, and the expectations of third-generation appointees remained the same as those of the second-generation of administrative elites: in return for their loyalty and service to the party, they would be (and were) allowed to make personal gains by taking advantage of the fruits of their offices (Crook 1989; Fauré 1989; Touré 1981, 206-48). Euphemistically called "JCDs," an acronym for *jeunes cadres dynamiques*, many of these third-generation, Western-educated elites were assigned to important positions in state-owned industries. Not unlike the preceding generation, the JCDs were also interested in material gain, for which they were prepared to work within the system. However, this generation was destined to be politically alienated and financially immobilized, at least temporarily. The members of the second and third generations who embrace the conservative reform agenda differ in approach and style from the renovators whose cutting realism demanded such a strict application of democratic principles in party dealings that elder statesmen feared they would be deprived of the not-so-subtle influence they held over younger generations of activists.

Renovators

Various groups among the third generation, despite their common experiences abroad, seem to be charting their own directions on the sea of political transformation. Salient distinctions emerged among third-generation PDCI elites, who aligned themselves with the reformers or the renovators, depending on their personal experiences with the PDCI in the past and the types of changes they wished to see undertaken by the party. They were not unlike the so-called baby boomers elsewhere, whose homogenous image masked divisions within their cohort. Their image as liberal, problem-solving, upwardly mobile, career-oriented, self-confident leaders of a new class ready "to bear the burdens of social

responsibility" has been shown to be less accurate a representation of their generation than had previously been thought (Siegel 1984, 392). Perhaps the task of the PDCI is most crucial among this generation because, more than any other generation, it embodies the hope not only for a revitalized PDCI leadership capable of sustaining power. Moreover, members of this generation constitute the core leadership among opposition parties (Loucou 1992, 185-87).

Where the reformers were firmly committed to the PDCI and more willing to accept compromises based on the inevitability of change due to the natural attrition of their elders, the renovators held tenaciously to their demands for immediate implementation of strict party discipline. They have been more vocal and less tolerant of the "council of elders" than the reformers. Many of their demands for openness and strict application of the rules regardless of one's age and status in the party resemble demands made by opposition groups, with whom they carry on a lively, sympathetic dialogue.

Led by Djèny Kobina, the renovators opposed several attempts by elder party officials to bypass openly democratic procedures or resort to top-down strategies of the past. Although their allegiance was being courted by opposition groups, the renovators succeeded in imposing on the PDCI some of their demands for clarity in the formulation of policies and guidelines at the Ninth Congress, thus making it possible for the renovators to remain committed to the PDCI at that time (*Le Regard*, no.5, 23 April 1991). Although it was clear that the renovators preferred to ride out the transition with experienced technocrats, diplomats and administrators who, for the most part, had been educated on government scholarships and trained by the state (Crook 1989, 205-28; Bloch-Lemoine 1978), their ideas placed them considerably to the left of the reformers, and Kobina's actions were regarded with suspicion by Houphouët and others on the right.

Regrettably, the PDCI has proven incapable of maintaining a loyal opposition within its ranks. In the aftermath of the deplorable circumstances leading to Bédié's domination of the PDCI, Kobina and several of his PDCI supporters withdrew from the party. The *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR), with Kobina as secretary-general, has requested recognition as an independent party (*Notre Temps*, no. 165, 29 June 1994). One can only speculate about the future goals of the RDR. As its name suggests, it may follow past RDA tactics by choosing to support a coalition of candidates from several parties whose only requirement might be their rigor in practicing democratic principles. For the moment, it is not clear how many renovators among PDCI supporters will follow the RDR's exit from the party.

That the third generation's experiences with government, both as students and administrative elites, have been inconsistent may account for the lack of homogeneity in their attitudes toward the regime.

When student resistance abroad continued among the third generation, the government responded by terminating scholarships to AECIF members and inviting students to join a new government organization, the Union Nationale des Etudiants et Elèves de Côte d'Ivoire (UNEECI). In order to continue to receive their scholarships, some two-thirds of the students in Sénégal and France in fact joined UNEECI (Zolberg 1969, 307-13). But these same students continued to protest against Houphouët's regime, at least when they were abroad, and many were involved in the Paris students' revolt in 1968. Houphouët accordingly dissolved UNEECI, replacing it in 1969 with a new youth wing of the party, the Mouvement des Etudiants et Elèves de Côte d'Ivoire (MEECI). This time, however, the majority of Ivoirian students (future third-generation elites) dissociated themselves from the new organization, perceiving it as a government tool. These students characterized MEECI representatives as sellouts and as spoiled children of the regime.

Even so, this generation has on the whole been willing to cooperate with the government. Nonetheless, they had not been invulnerable to Houphouët's private agenda. At the party's Seventh Congress in 1980, in a volte-face from his previous exclusionary attitude toward the younger generations, Houphouët stated that it was time to extend political rewards to all people who had proven their loyalty to the PDCI. Houphouët accordingly skipped over certain members of the third generation in order to assign a number of young, devoted MEECIists, mostly fourth-generation administrators who had not been involved in protests abroad, to key positions of leadership; appointments that, in 1980, appeared to meet the immediate needs of the party for fresh leadership during the difficult period of the recession. (Unpopular demands on the population to tighten their belts could not easily be made by those leaders whose very presence raised questions with regard to the legitimacy of the regime—given that several had been implicated in the mismanagement of portions of the national budget and others had conspicuously accumulated personal wealth while in public office.) Five former MEECI members thus entered the president's cabinet—the first ministers to be named from the fourth generation of administrative elites; some of these were children of old-guard activists (Toungara 1986; see also the appendix). In addition, a new political body consisting of nine members, the Executive Committee, was created to act as a special advisory board to the president. Between 1980 and 1985, about one-third of those appointed to the committee were former MEECI members and held cabinet posts as ministers. Indeed, the newly founded Executive Committee to some extent eclipsed the prestige of the Political Bureau, which was dominated by the old guard.

As a result of Houphouët's sudden decision to integrate this fourth generation into government leadership, however, many competent technocrats of the third generation were passed over. Given that many of them were in advanced stages of their formal education when MEECI was created in 1969, they understandably resented their lack of MEECI membership as the basis for their exclusion from appointments. Nonetheless, their entry into positions of leadership was effectively interrupted by Houphouët's decision, during the 1980s, to reward political pedigree over technical expertise.

The third generation suffered a further blow when declining returns from coffee and cocoa sales and the implementation of the first World Bank structural adjustment program, which called for the elimination of several state-owned companies, caused Houphouët to readjust his ruling style to cope with the decrease in revenues (Duruflé 1988). In addition, Fauré (1989) suggests that, by cooperating with World Bank reforms, Houphouët had found a means quietly to eliminate powerful administrative elites. Many second and third generation elites, who as managers of state-owned companies had controlled substantial budgets, had created their own patron-client relations and consequently had developed political followings outside of the party machine.[6] Many third-generation elites perceived Houphouët's measures as more than a simple slap on the hand against guilty parties—elites who had too perfectly imitated his model—but felt instead that everyone, guilty or not, had been completely shut out from future opportunities for advancement within the system. In response, Houphouët enacted several political reforms in 1980, establishing direct suffrage in legislative and municipal elections, to keep ambitious cadres and administrative elites occupied with the business of the party and the state. Several new faces appeared as candidates for elective office; many had been either affected by the massive layoffs or overlooked by party leaders and not included on any previous electoral lists (Toungara 1986).

In the age of change, the volatility of the third generation increased with the regime's inability to guarantee their progression toward leadership positions in the party and the government, so that opportunities for leadership in opposition parties seemed appealing. However, the renovators, though only a small minority within the PDCI, have edged the party closer to democratic idealism than any other faction. The renovators' insistence on fairness and openness in the distribution of offices and political rewards, in addition to accusations of mismanagement from the opposition, has had a salutary effect on governance at the administrative level. Thus, most third-generation politicos who have in many ways benefitted from the regime saw their own ascension through the ranks of the PDCI, which was after all the dominant party, as the best means to ensure their futures. In fact, owing

to the protracted economic recession and the severity of attacks against Houphouët's regime (including the MEEClists), third-generation elites were called upon again. As prime minister, Alassane Ouattara rehabilitated the third-generation administrative elite. Ouattara, the quintessential technocrat, is an economist with experience as head of the Bank of West African States and Africa Director at the International Monetary Fund, and he set about the task of restoring some confidence in the regime's ability to manage the economic crisis. Under his leadership, and to the relief of third-generation PDCI loyalists, Houphouët's system of political reward at the cabinet level was replaced by a merit system. Thus, the members of Ouattara's cabinet were appointed not merely because they were known PDCI loyalists (most of them were reformers), but also because of their competence. Using logic similar to Houphouët's, Ouattara himself had commented:

> The average age of these [ministers] has descended from over fifty to the forties. This is important because young people are in the majority in this country. And then, after managing during a long period of prosperity, it is difficult to have the right reflexes to cope with austerity. You need new people who can adapt to new circumstances...and react quickly (*Jeune Afrique*, no. 1585, 15 May 1991).

However, as a result of the demise of the reward system, these ministers did not have access to the same opportunities for personal gain as their predecessors (Fauré and Médard 1982). They were expected to manage larger portfolios with smaller budgets, and to do so with *transparence et rigeur*, to quote Ouattara's slogan for economic recovery.

Perhaps for the first time in Ivoirian postindependence history, then, the prestige of holding office—founded on a minister's sense of civic duty and social responsibility—had out-distanced the attraction of personal gain that the earlier Ivoirian mode of accumulation encouraged (Duruflé 1988). Nonetheless, despite having had to wait until the end of the 1980s, members of the third generation had finally regained some measure of recognition. Their loyalty to the PDCI regime was expressed in their conservatism in the age of change. As reformers they showed respect for the patriarchs of the *ancien* regime; as renovators they push steadily for change. Bédié has also selected most of his ministers from the third generation of administrative elites, many of whom started their careers in the government or a state corporation under his tutelage. Although Bédié has dismissed several ministers from the previous cabinet, he appointed as his first prime minister Daniel Kablan Duncan, who had served as Minister of Economy, Finance, and Planning under Ouattara.

Hence, the reforms of the Ninth Congress represented a battle of wills not only between age-grades, but also within political generations. The age-grade model in historical perspective sheds light on Karl Mannheim's observation that people of the same generation may respond differently to similar stimuli: "Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation, while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways constitute separate generation-units" (Jennings and Niemi 1981, 332). In the case of the PDCI, such intragenerational differences were unveiled at the Ninth Congress where a heretofore invisible underclass supported renovator's demands for greater inclusion of all ethnic groups and distribution of responsibilities among unprivileged elites.

Radicals from Within: The Fourth Generation

Several of the commissions at the 1991 PDCI congress were headed by the members of the third generation (*Fraternité Hebdo*, 4 October 1990). However, they were to some extent overshadowed by a fourth generation of political activists. The radicals led by Ahmed Bassam and sponsored by Ghoulem Berrah (a naturalized Ivoirian PDCI loyalist of the third generation, and assigned to the president's office as an advisor) were seeking a more equitable distribution of representation within party ranks that would allow the younger generation some input in policy-making and give them some organizing responsibilities. Much to the annoyance of party loyalists, they have also tended to be outspoken critics of PDCI failures (*Liberté*, no. 14, 4 June 1991; *Nouvel Horizon*, no. 23, 25 February 1991). These are the "young wolves"—serious young professionals who rejected exclusive membership in MEECI while they were students because of its image as an ineffective, diluted party organ. Unlike the few ministers that Houphouët chose from fourth-generation MEECI members, these young elites are not sons of old party loyalists, nor have they been afforded any other opportunities to prove their party loyalty. A new orientation to governance and economic self-sufficiency has been imposed upon them by the drastic changes in political and socioeconomic fabric of the nation. They have seen their political ambitions and prospects for employment dwindle as a consequence of administrative failures by the *ancien régime*. Their sense of alienation derives from the combined pressures of political instability and economic insecurity of the 1980s and 1990s, unprecedented circumstances in the history of the Côte d'Ivoire since independence. Moreover, the country's weakened economic condition has led to the disintegration of clientelism at the national level and to massive unemployment. Whereas second- and

third-generation elites returning from their education abroad were in high demand and quickly absorbed into the economic structure owing to the scarcity of Western-educated Ivoirian nationals in the years following independence, the fourth generation has matriculated from local institutions only to face a saturated job market and dismal prospects for advancement into the politico-administrative elite within the next decade or so (especially since the rehabilitation of the third generation of administrative elites).

The young wolves have also been perceived as the most impressionable segment of the party and thus the group most likely to be swayed by the opposition. Granted, Houphouët had, somewhat belatedly, recognized the importance of youth groups excluded from the political process. Over a decade ago, he had cited de Gaulle's experience with the 1968 students' revolt as an example of what can happen if young people are left out. He pointed to his acceptance of direct suffrage in the 1980 legislative elections as an attempt to broaden opportunities so that younger generations of political activists could enter politics and advised his peers that "we must not break the chain of generations" (*Jeune Afrique*, 4 February 1981, no. 1048), meaning that it was up to the elder politicos to assimilate the younger generations into the fold of PDCI propaganda.

Despite such attempts at co-optation, the fourth generation proved to have a substantial impact on the 1991 congress proceedings, voicing their concerns about the PDCI's decisions with regard to procedures and about the methods whereby a PDCI member could acquire status within the party. Like their JRDACI predecessors of the second generation, the fourth generation wanted autonomy within the party. Although they were prepared to maintain PDCI discipline, they wanted to be free of paternal domination from their elders (*Fraternité Matin*, 11 July 1991). They had aligned themselves with the PDCI in the hopes of fulfilling their dreams for economic stability and enhanced opportunities.

In my opinion, their allegiance to the PDCI would be greatly jeopardized if highly experienced political elites and internationally recognized technocrats—who have the potential to bring back the "miracles" of times past—should leave the party. For example, Yacé has been extremely popular among this generation and could probably attract them to his side—if he were to choose a political base outside of the PDCI and align himself with someone who could deliver the economic goods. In fact, the RDR's departure from the PDCI was not only against the violation of democratic principles, but was partially linked to their disappointment that Philip Yacé, PDCI Secretary General until his removal in 1980, was not considered for the party's presidency and that Alassane Ouattara and his ministers had not been given the recognition they deserved for having served loyally

Houphouët's regime until the end (*Jeune Afrique*, no. 1738-1739, 28 April to 11 May 1994: 22-23). The RDR's dissociation from the PDCI—when considered in the light of existing interests within generational units and among age-grades—could signal the beginning of the end of the PDCI theme of "unity within diversity," a hallmark of single-party politics.

The Fifth Generation: Coming of Age during the Transition

There is, in addition, a fifth generation, composed of students, which remains largely "uncaptured" by party rhetoric. By 1991, however, competition for student support emerged in the form of a large independent union that had already become popular among students: the Fédération Scolaire et Estudiantine de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI), led by Martial Ahipeaud, himself a student heavily influenced by opposition groups. In a fashion that recalled the student activism of each generational cohort, the students of FESCI protested against the unfair distribution of both scholarships and dormitory rooms and led several marches to demand education reforms, also calling for openness and forthright comportment among educational administrators (*Tribune*, no. 19, April 1991). FESCI also organized massive protests following a nocturnal raid by the military on 17 May 1991, in which students were attacked and sexually assaulted at the national university's Yopougon dorms.

The union also objected strenuously to the use of *loubards*, toughs supposedly employed by the government, to intimidate students on campuses. Houphouët had repeatedly denied that the government used such tactics, but his denials tended to fall on deaf ears, especially after one of these toughs, Thierry Zebié, was killed on 17 June 1991—an opposition newspaper reporting that, a month before, Zebié had sabotaged a student forum at the university by blocking entrance to it on the grounds that the forum was anti-Houphouët and antigovernment. In the same article the newspaper claimed that Houphouët had maintained a contingent of six hundred *loubards*, each of whom was being paid 50,000 francs CFA per month (*Nouvel Horizon*, no. 40, 20 June 1991). Although the PDCI regime had consistently refuted the hiring of these young men, the faculty union—the Syndicat National de la Recherche et de l'Enseignement Supérieures—supported FESCI and joined in the protests. After this incident, the government dissolved FESCI, alleging that it was being manipulated by one of the opposition parties, and later jailed Ahipeaud. Prime Minister Ouattara ordered the university faculty back to work, but they refused to return until the government complied with their request for a nonpartisan commission to investigate the Yopougon incident (*Fraternité Matin*, 8 October 1991).

As the parallels between earlier generations and the fifth generation suggest, student protest is a persistent factor that should be taken seriously. And yet once again the government is doing its best to suppress it. However, circumstances have changed: members of the fifth generation are completing their education during a period of economic hardship, and the PDCI cannot guarantee them job placement. Perhaps more important, they will reach political maturity in the post-Houphouët era and so will not necessarily feel any loyalty to the PDCI or the legacy of its founder. If their elders—second- and third-generation elites—continue in the familiar pattern, refusing to give younger generations a voice in PDCI policy, these students may very well lend their allegiance to opposition parties. The future of the PDCI thus depends on its ability to capture the loyalty of this generation before any of several opposition parties gains its trust.

To combat defection from among the ranks of this generation, the congress proposed an ad hoc committee that would focus on younger PDCI-RDA members. The goal of the committee was to organize all youth—not just students, but everyone between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five—along lines similar to the JRDACI model, with youth wings attached to each PDCI section. Such a system would not only bring a large number of younger party members formally under the PDCI umbrella but, ideally, would dilute the spirit of radicalism, in that the presence of somewhat older "youth" might well temper the activism of the students. In 1991 the new organization, the Jeunesse PDCI, was formed, bringing together both students and young people just entering the work force. Leadership in the Jeunesse PDCI fell to the latter, young professionals and tradesmen, hence assuring their visibility and providing them with opportunities to serve the party. Consequently, these fourth generation activists have become brother's-keeper-style guardians of the fifth generation: students and school leavers too young to organize on their own yet too old to be left unattended, given their past history of "educational crises." The decision to put these young professionals in charge of the younger cohort possibly derived from the fourth generation's own recent experiences with student protest and government repression in Côte d'Ivoire (Daddieh 1988; Bloch-Lemoine 1978).

The New PDCI: The Ninth-Congress Reforms

The reforms effected by the PDCI's Ninth Congress were reached by consensus. Delegates expressed a desire for openness and explicit rules regarding membership, elections and procedures for advancement into party leadership (*Fraternité Matin*, 8 October 1990). Preexisting institutions, deemed too exclusive, were dissolved.[7] Party organs were restructured so as to represent a cross-section of the population by class,

occupation and ethnicity.[8] All five generations were present at the 1990 Ninth Congress, seeking to incorporate their goals into the party's overall platform and to defend their interests, with each of the four main groups within the PDCI—*anciens*, reformers, renovators and radicals—promoting their opinions regarding the direction in which the party should move.

In the short term, the PDCI was able to accommodate the needs of the various factions well enough to secure a massive victory in the first multiparty elections to be held since independence. In an effort to counter these divisions and meet the needs of the PDCI's younger members—which the old stalwarts insist on referring to as "the youth"—Houphouët made a large number of new appointments to each of the party's governing bodies. He named only one hundred elders but three hundred "youth" to the Political Bureau, and, while he allowed thirty members to return to the more powerful Central Committee, he selected fifty new members. The elders were said to represent the ten regions of the country; the "youth" were intended to represent the entire range of social and professional groups (*Le Regard*, no. 5, 23 April 1991).

After the presidential elections, the spirit of the PDCI quest for clarity and openness in party dealings was carried through in changes to the Constitution. The infamous Article 11, which deals with succession, was amended (for the fifth time since independence) to allow the head of the National Assembly to complete the president's mandate, instead of assuming leadership for a three-month interim to organize elections. To cope with the more immediate problem of management through the economic crisis, Articles 12 and 24, which permit the president to nominate and delegate powers to a prime minister, were added to the Constitution. The formula still conformed, however, to the Houphouët's refusal to "share power," especially with someone capable of gaining mass support: the prime minister, although a member of the PDCI, is solely a presidential appointee and a manager of the government, without any powers derived from a political or ethnic base. Ouattara fulfilled Houphouët's agenda because, although he is a native-born Ivoirian, he was educated during his early years in Burkina Faso and had been a citizen of that country. He had sojourned abroad for the majority of his professional career and thus arrived laying no claim to a regional constituency, although he now seems to be amassing significant support.

A Man of the Transition: The Frustration of Reform

Before his death, Houphouët attempted to force a reconciliation of generations, regions and ethnics by imposing Laurent Dona Fologo, a Senufo from the north and member of the third generation, as secretary general of the PDCI at a special session on 12 April 1991. For reasons

that remain obscure, just prior to the meeting Houphouët forced the three Baulé contenders to withdraw from the competition. Kobina, the renovator, learned of Houphouët's intentions and likewise withdrew—presumably in disgust, since he claimed that no one put pressure on him (*Le Regard*, no. 5, 23 April 1991). The only person left was Fologo, the president's hand-picked choice. Whether it was out of respect for the presidency, or his position as elder Baulé chief, the PDCI activists closed their eyes to Houphouët's arm-twisting tactics and voted for Fologo—who was, after all, the sole candidate. Once again, the PDCI's efforts to move in a more democratic direction were thwarted by the president, which raised new doubts about the inability of the *ancien régime* to cooperate in effecting positive and lasting party reforms.

Fologo, however, viewed his nomination as pivotal to the success of PDCI solidarity. This was certainly not the first time that Fologo was being called upon to assume a difficult task. Indeed, Fologo had served as Houphouët's point man several times before, accepting problematic ministerial portfolios and unpopular missions. He was the first Ivoirian official to go to South Africa, carrying a message of reconciliation and dialogue despite the continent-wide boycott and international embargo against South Africa. His loyalty to the PDCI having been proven may times, Fologo rose to the occasion once again, emphasizing his qualities as a third-generation technocrat, experienced in administration and politics and ready to work toward the reconciliation of the factions that had emerged within the PDCI.

In contrast, Fologo's peers viewed his appointment as yet another instance in which Houphouët refused to let democratic processes take their course. Fologo was by no means the most popular candidate. Having lost in the legislative elections in his region, Sinematiali, he could boast neither regional nor ethnic support. He had been passed over in the selection of ministers to the Ouattara cabinet, perhaps because he had spoken out against the return to a multiparty system. He is generally perceived as someone out-of-touch with current needs; his capacity to motivate the leadership and mobilize the masses during the transition is considered doubtful at best (*Le Regard*, no. 5, 23 April 1991). His refusal to allow delegates to engage in a healthy exchange of views or "dialogue" during the special congress in April 1994—he did not allow Kobina the opportunity to speak—does not bode well for the future of the PDCI.

Conclusion: After Houphouët

This paper has examined five generations of PDCI politico-administrative elites in the light of the local terminology used to explain their political alignment within the party. As we have seen, the country's weakened economic condition led to the disintegration of

clientelism at the national level. Even so, it took a severe economic recession, international pressure and citizens' demands for more participation to force the transition to multiparty democracy. Jennings and Niemi suggest that "the real genius of political leadership may be in stimulating enough small changes that radical transformations are rarely felt to be necessary" (1981, 391). Houphouët had seemingly applied those tactics sparingly throughout the last three decades of his rule, the most notable instance prior to the transition to multiparty democracy being the return in 1980 to popular suffrage in legislative and municipal elections. Yet the struggle for control between older generations of patriarchs—the *anciens*—and the younger generations of political elites seeking to advance themselves both materially and politically is still a factor to be negotiated. Supporters of *ancien regime*—Houphouëtists and the PDCI—remain divided over the pace, depth and nature of reform. This in turn has caused younger generations of Ivoirians to question the PDCI's legitimacy and to become more demanding of its leadership.

Is there, then, a "successor generation" preparing to chart a new course for the PDCI in the post-Houphouët era, and, if so, who are they and what might we expect of them? The above discussion of the Côte d'Ivoire case lends credence to Russell Dalton's argument that "political elites are changing, and that younger elites possess a new set of values and a new orientation toward the political process" (1987, 977). Moreover, as these examples indicate, "it seems reasonable to assume that these sharply different historical experiences have left their mark on the beliefs of politicians" (1987, 1983). Older generations of political elites in Côte d'Ivoire experienced economic deprivation during their formative years and thus usually favored material development and sought material goals. The older generation's experience with colonialism contrasts sharply with the next two generations, who benefitted from the first fruits of independence and the period of economic expansion described as the "Ivoirian Miracle."

The younger generation of PDCI elites are turning away from the consensual politics of their forefathers—in contrast the their European counterparts who have turned to an ideology of consensual politics—to embrace individual accountability coupled with political and administrative ethics (viz., honesty in government) to gain grass-roots support and to redress the errors of the past. When Alassane Ouattara returned to Côte d'Ivoire in 1990 to coordinate an interministerial committee for economic reform, he reversed government plans for wage cutbacks and proposed a recovery program that streamlined the administration, eliminated tax exemptions and decreased expenditures (*Fraternité Matin*, 6 June 1990). His slogan for the recovery, "*transparence et rigeur*", symbolized the hopes and aspirations of many Ivoirians who were demanding honest and capable leadership. The

gains made by the Ouattara government, and the continuation of "Ouattara-style" management by third generation technocrats serving under Bédié, may indicate that the Ivoirian successor generation may well be the third generation.

The generational model used here might be applied to other African countries, such as Senegal and Kenya, which have had similar political experiences. All have maintained fairly stable political regimes since independence, and have made the transition to multiparty democracy; the chiefs of state are each second-generation politicos and appear to preside over a battery of well-trained, third-generation administrative elites. Furthermore, each is attempting to regain the loyalty of younger, and disgruntled generations of political activists, who have yet to serve in positions of leadership and might be lured in by the opposition.

In the Côte d'Ivoire case, the younger generations—especially the fourth and fifth—are forthrightly demanding integration into a "new and improved" party structure, where they too might exercise their self-determination. As educated urban dwellers, they may be less inclined to kowtow to traditional notions of gerontocracy, at least when it comes to politics. In lean economic times, they have less to lose by not cooperating with the PDCI if it continues to be dominated by gerontocratic ideas of the *ancien régime*. If the PDCI is to remain politically vital, the successor generation—presumably the third—will have to come to terms not only with the fourth generation's discontent, but also prepare for the political integration of the fifth.

Appendix:

Generations of political elites, showing name, ethnic affiliation and political posts held since independence. Selection limited to ministers. Lists are not exhaustive.

1st Generation: 1945 - 1950s

Mamadou Coulibaly: Malinké (died 1985)
Economic and Social Council President, Political Bureau,
PDCI Treasurer, Councillor in the French Union, UN Ambassador

Bernard Dadié: Agni
Minister of Culture
imprisoned at Grand Bassam (1949)

Auguste Denise: Baulé (died 1991)
Secretary General of the PDCI, parliamentarian, Minister of State

Mathieu Ekra: Abouré
Colonial administrator (1956), Minister of Information, Minister of State, imprisoned at Grand Bassam (1949)

Germain Coffi Gadeau: Baulé
Secretary of founder's meeting (1946), Minister of the Interior, Grand Chancelier de l'Ordre National, imprisoned at Grand Bassam (1949)

Jean Baptiste Mockey: Apollo (died 1981)
Secretary General of the PDCI, Vice-Prime Minister (Community), Minister of the Interior, Minister of Agriculture, parliamentarian, Mayor of Grand Bassam, President of the Court for State Security, Ambassador to Israel, imprisoned at Grand Bassam (1949)

Philippe Yacé: Alladian
General Councillor (1952), PDCI Secretary General
National Assembly President, Economic and Social Council President

2nd Generation: 1960s

Camille Alliali , Baulé	Minister of Justice
Lambert Amon-Tanoh, Agni	UGTAN, Minister of Education
Kacou Aoulou , Agni	Minister of Construction and Town-Planning
Jean Konan Banny , Baulé	Minister of Defense
Henri Konan Bédié, Baulé	Minister of Finance, National Assembly President
M'Bahia Blé, Baulé	Minister of Defense
Ernest Boka , Abe	Minister of Education, Minister of Civil Service, President of Supreme Court
Joachim Bony, Baulé	Minister of National Education
Lanzeni Coulibaly, Senufo	Minister of Justice
Lamine Diabaté, Malinké	Minister of State
Mohamed Diawara, Jula	Minister of Planning
Charles Donwahi , Bété	Minister of Agriculture
Jeanne Gervais, Baulé	Minister of Women's Condition,AFI President
Léon Konan Koffi, Baulé	Prefect, Minister of Interior, Minister of Defense
Aoussou Koffi, Baulé	Minister of Mines, Minister of Transport
Amadou Koné, Malinké	Minister of Health
Abdoulaye Sawadogo, Mossi	Minister of Agriculture
Amadou ThiamWolof, Senegal	Minister of Information, Ambassador
Assouan Usher, Apollo	Minister of Foreign Affairs,Mayor of Cocody

3rd Generation: 1970s

Simeon Aké, Ngbato (Ebrié)	Minister of Foreign Affairs
M. Thérèse Aka-Anghui, Agni	Minister of Women's Condition Mayor of Port Bouët
Kei Bouguinard, Guéré	Minister of State, President of the Supreme Court
Lamine Fadika, Malinké	Minister of Maritime Affairs, Mayor of Touba

Laurent Dona Fologo, Senufo	Minister of Information, Minister of Youth and Sports,Secretary General of the PDCI
Seri Gnoleba , Bété	Minister of Commerce, Minister of State
Paul Gui-Dibo, Guéré	Minister of Mines, Minister of State
Denis Bra Kanon , Bété	Minister of Agriculture
Akoto Yao, Baulé	Minister of Education, Mayor of Cocody

3rd Generation: late 1980s

Ezan Akele, Agni	Minister of Environment
Yed Angoran, Abidji	Minister of Mines and Energy
Kouame Agoran, Agni	Minister of Commerce and Industry
Vamoussa Bamba, Malinké	Minister of Education
Constant Bombet, Guéré	Minister of Interior
Adama Coulibaly , Senufo	Minister of Supply, Transport and Tourism
Henriette Diabaté, Alladian	Minister of Culture
Réné Djedjemel Diby , Adioukrou	Minister of Youth and Sports
Alain Ekra , Agni	Minister of Health
Amara Essy , Jula	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Alain Gauze , Bété	Minister Delegate to the PM
Claire Thérèse Grah, Kru	Minister of Women's Promotion
Daniel Kablan-Duncan, Apollo	Minister Delegate to the PM
Yao Nicolas Kouassi-Akon, Agni	Minister of Posts and Telecom.
Patrice Kouame, Baulé	Minister of Civil Service
Lambert Kouassi Konan, Baulé	Minister of Agriculture
Auguste Miremont, Yacouba	Minister of Communication
Alassane N'Diaye, Jula	Minister of Scientific Research
Jacqueline Lohouès Oble, Adioukrou	Minister of Justice
Lassana Palenfo, Lobi	Minister of Security

4th Generation: 1980s

Jean-Jacques Béchio, Attié	Minister of Civil Service
Bernard Ehui, Agni	Minister of Industry, Minister of Youth and Sports
Balla Keïta , Malinké	Minister of Education
Gilles Laubhouet, Dida	Minister of Subsistence Agriculture
Alphonse Djèdjé Mady, Bété	Minister of Health

Notes

1. Although the PDCI has been effectively challenged, their candidates have dominated all elections held since the 30 April 1990 announcement of the return to multiparty democracy. Although more than forty parties have been recognized, it was the coalition between the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), led by Laurent Gbagbo, the Union des Sociaux-Démocrates, led by Bernard Zadi, the Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), led by Francis Wodié, and the Parti Socialiste Ivoirien (PSI), led by Moriféré Bamba, that brought Laurent Gbagbo 18.3 percent of the vote in his bid for the presidency . In legislative elections, non-PDCI candidates won twelve out of the 175 seats (the FPI nine, the PIT one, independent candidates two). Three FPI deputies (one vice president and two secretaries) were named as officers to the thirty-six-member National Assembly Bureau (*Fraternité Matin*, 23 April 1991).

Opposition candidates were less successful in municipal elections, winning in only six out of 135 cities.

2. Bernard Zadi commented to the effect that a generation of *jeunes* is now coming to power (*Le Regard*, no. 5, 23 April 1991). He was named Minister of Culture by Bédié.

3. Observations for the study were made over a fifteen-year period while I was resident in Côte d'Ivoire, supplemented by two subsequent research trips in 1992 (four months) and 1993 (three months), funded by a Fulbright grant. See the appendix for a breakdown of high-level administrative elites by generation, corresponding to the period of their entry onto the national political scene.

4. The goals of the SAA were to track market fluctuations, to eliminate unnecessary intermediaries, and to provide for the direct sale of agricultural products and livestock to buyers through a Paris-based agricultural confederation, the Société Commerciale Ouest Africaine. The SAA was thus assured of effective and prompt distribution of its products, whereas the new cooperative, created under Tidiane Dem and cyprien Quoiho, was not able to gain access to French-controlled distribution networks. For further discussion, see Amon d'Aby 1951:112-15.

5. Article 24 of PDCI by-laws state explicitly that the president must be elected by a majority of the congress voting by secret ballot.

6. Several of the state-owned companies had also been mismanaged, had acquired huge debts that were guaranteed by the state, and were having difficulty meeting their financial obligations. However, the demise of these companies did more than eliminate a potential political threat. Given the overall decline in financial resources, Houphouët needed to regain control of the national budget in order to reestablish his domination over the redistribution of wealth. After all, he still had his own pet projects to finance, such as the construction of the Basilica of Our Lady of Peace at Yamoussoukro, which, when completed, cost more than 150 million US dollars (*Ebony*, December 1990:116).

7. The executive committee, the *comité directeur*, the national council, the mouvement des étudiants et élèves de la Côte d'Ivoire (MEECI) and the Association des Femmes Ivoiriennes (AFI), were dissolved (Fraternité Hebdo, 11 October 1990).

8. The new PDCI structure: At the head of the party as a whole are its president and its general secretary, as well as the eighty-member Central committee, which serves as a steering committee, and the Political Bureau, a deliberative body of four hundred members. Responsible to the president is his advisory board, the political council. Each of the party's sections is presided over by a general secretary, aided by assistants (the national secretaries) and by political commissioners, who serve as chairs on committees, and by the one-hundred-member comités de base. The Fédération Départemental is responsible for coordination within prefectures, and the Délégation Régionale for regional coordination. The National Convention, which is open to all, is intended to provide a forum for open discussion.

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