Economic Reform in a Democratizing Africa

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The spread of the "third wave" of democratization to sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s represented the most significant political change in the continent since the independence period three decades earlier. Throughout the continent a more or less free press, as well as opposition parties and a multitude of independent civic organizations, emerged. Between 1990 and 1994 twenty-nine out of forty-eight states in the region convened the first multiparty elections in over a generation.[1] In some of these countries the elections were free and fair and resulted in the defeat and removal of the authoritarian head of state.

Has the new, more open political climate helped or hindered economic reform in sub-Saharan Africa? Most of the region's economies had been in seemingly inexorable decline since the first oil crisis. Throughout the 1980s attempts to promote policy reform and renew growth were mostly frustrated. Most observers concluded that political obstacles undermined reform.[2] By 1989 even the World Bank admitted that Africa's crisis was rooted in a "crisis of governance" and agreed that economic liberalization and privatization were unlikely to be implemented by governments that held tenuously on to power by systematic patronage and rent-seeking.[3] These analysts, particularly in the policy community, were optimistic that democratization would help address Africa's economic crisis.

Yet, when the wave of democratization reached sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, most academic observers were pessimistic about the prospects of successful dual transitions that combined economic and political reform. The most common view was that "all good things" did not go together and that one reform process would undermine the other.[4] This pessimism was based on three assumptions. First, democratization would increase social pressures on governmental decision making. Africanists were echoing the view in other regions of the world that democratization sharply increased political participation. As Haggard and Kaufman summed it up, "new democratic governments face exceptionally strong distributive pressures, both from groups reentering the political arena after long periods of repression and from established interests demanding reassurance."[5] Second, by redistributing power from the executive to the more populist legislative branch of government, democratization would weaken the executive's autonomy to design and implement policy and thus undermine the prospects for macroeconomic stabilization. For example, Jeffries argued that democratic politics would further weaken the already tottering African state and "exacerbate...problems of corruption, wastefulness and shortsighted economic policy formulation."[6] Third, western donors would be agents of rapid political and economic change throughout the continent. The desirability of the changes imposed by the donors was much debated. For many, structural adjustment programs weakened governments and precipitated transitions.[7] For others, the donors represented the most powerful, if not the only, agent of political reform in the continent.[8] Diamond suggested, in contrast, that the donors had been "divided...and tentative" in their commitment to democratization and called on them to promote democratic consolidation by engaging in more creative forms of political conditionality.[9] These disparate views shared the belief that the donors were undermining the economic and political status quo in Africa.

These three assumptions all suggested that sub-Saharan African's wave of democratization in the early 1990s would cause a sharp historical discontinuity. This paper will assess the economic consequences of democratization in Africa. Such an assessment has been made for other regions affected by the third wave of democratization.[10] My data will suggest that political liberalization has had little effect on economic performance in Africa. Most analysts overestimated the degree of discontinuity in African politics following the transitions. Nonetheless, the economic record of the new democracies has varied significantly. Analysis of the thirteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa that underwent a full transition in the early 1990s will explain this variation. First, the nature, timing, and outcome of the political transition show that contingent political factors influenced the extent to which the new democratic regimes were able to address pressing economic problems. Second, differences in the political institutions that emerged during the transition, in particular the emerging party system, were influential. In sum, institutional factors and contingent and path-dependent dynamics shaped the capacity and willingness of governments to sustain sound macroeconomic policy reform.

Three theoretical lessons can be drawn about the relationship between economic and political transitions. First, scholars have tended to conflate the short-term impact of democratization on economic decision making with the long-term impact of democracy. To understand the impact of democratization on economic policymaking in Africa, it is important not to assume that the political transitions of the 1990s will quickly result in mature western-style democracies with extensive political participation and competition ensured by a panoply of well-organized and representative interest groups and civic and media associations. Democratization has brought new civil and political rights to Africa; it has created imperfect but meaningful multiparty politics, in most countries for the first time in the postcolonial era. It has not, however, created complete participatory democracy, which can only develop in the fullness of time.[11] The uncertainty and volatility of the process of democratization itself almost certainly disrupt economic policymaking and discourage investment, depending on the dynamics of the political transition.

Second, much of the literature on the relationship between political and economic reform is excessively sociological. It views the impact of political reform on economic reform almost entirely through the prism of interest group theory and the degree of state autonomy vis-à-vis social forces. Even when it admits that interest groups have had little impact on reform, it still assumes that they have a powerful impact on decision making.[12] The power of interest groups helps determine whether or not politically difficult policies will be implemented. In the low income countries of Africa, where most interest groups are organizationally weak, participatory pressures will likely remain weak following democratization.

Third, it is misleading to call these episodes dual transitions. Economic and political transitions are almost necessarily not simultaneous. Particularly in low income, low capacity economies the power vacuum that characterizes the period of political transition precludes difficult economic policy decisions. Indeed, in Africa political transitions have been devastating for routine administration of the economy because tax collection and expenditure controls have broken down. In political systems with more state capacity the permanent administration might be less affected by the absence of political leadership; in middle income countries basic macroeconomic stability might be more likely to be preserved. Nonetheless, insofar as structural economic reform has significant political implications, it can not be initiated without the support of the main political players and can not be sustained without effective leadership.

It is more useful to think of political and economic transitions as being sequential, not in the sense that success depends on a specific and fixed sequence, but rather that they follow each other and the nature of one process conditions the other. Politics and economic policy did not begin at the time of the transition. Political transitions are conditioned by the legacy of past economic decision making and in turn have an impact on economic policymaking following democratization. In much the same way, long-standing political practices, such as rent-seeking and patronage, shape the ability and willingness of governments to undertake reform, both before and after the political transition.

Comparing Economic and Policy Performance

For the economic record of African states during the late 1980s and early 1990s the data set of forty-eight African states has been adjusted to allow for rigorous before and after analysis, with and without "democracy" comparisons. Countries that were already multiparty democracies in 1989—Botswana, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe—were excluded. Countries in which past civil war and/or political strife would have precluded normal economic policymaking—Liberia, Sudan, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Mozambique—were also excluded. Several of these states have achieved good economic performance in the 1990s, but it is far more related to the return of peace than to regime characteristics. In addition, Burundi was excluded; its democratic transition was reversed within four months by a military coup, too soon to allow a meaningful before and after comparison.

Thirty-two countries are left in the sample. Twenty-nine of them convened founding elections between November 11, 1989, and December 31, 1994.[13] In these elections the head of government was openly contested following a period during which multiparty political competition had been denied. For many countries, they were the first elections in over a decade, and for most the first multiparty elections since the immediate postindependence period. Of these thirty-two remaining states, Namibia and South Africa are excluded because the presence of an economic boycott before their transition makes a "before and after" comparison misleading, while Djibouti is excluded because of the absence of adequate data. Twenty-nine states remain in the core data set.

The performance of the new democratic regimes is compared with those countries that did not engage in a full transition. Of the twenty-nine countries, thirteen could claim to have passed a relatively stringent test of democratization: a transition election was widely viewed, including by international observers, as free and fair, and the loser publicly accepted the results.[14] Such a minimal, procedural definition of democracy helps to distinguish these states from the others in the data set, in which the degree of political liberalization fell short of a complete transition to democracy despite the convening of elections.

It is unfortunately difficult to distinguish clearly the democratic cases from the others. Most of the nondemocratic states can legitimately claim some significant political liberalization during this period, while even the most successful transitions have been marred by setbacks and evidence of shaky consolidation. Rather than rely entirely on what some readers will view as questionable judgments, the comparison between new democracies and nondemocracies is complemented with a comparison across time. Regardless of the exact nature of the regime, liberalization has been sufficient in all of them since the onset of elections in 1989 to have had an impact on economic decision making. Thus, the economic performance of all twenty-nine states is compared before and after 1991 to determine the economic impact of this new political climate.

Economic performance is measured by two standard indicators, GDP growth and inflation. The economic record for 1986–1988, the last three years before the onset of democratization, is compared with the first three years after the founding election of the emerging democracy.[15] Table 1 compares new and non democracies with the five old democracies. The table provides estimates for the slightly longer periods

1986–1991 and 1991–1996 to lessen the impact of single year data points, as well as the average annual growth rates over the entire ten year period, 1986–1996. The estimates are based on data of sometimes dubious quality.[16] No single pattern emerges from them. Old and new democracies have slightly outperformed the nondemocracies, both before and after the transition period, but this differential is too small to be significant in statistical terms, given the high degree of variance within each category of states. Indeed, exclusion of Zaire, an extremely poor performer, from the sample of nondemocracies eliminates the differences between the three sets of countries entirely. From this small number of observations it is not possible to say either that there were significant differences in growth performance before and after the transition period or that the sample of new democracies performed better or worse than the nondemocracies.

Much the same conclusion emerges from a comparison of inflation rates, also reported in Table 1. The jump in inflation rates in the new democracies is entirely due to the effect of the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc on prices in the six former French colonies among the new democracies. After years of low inflation, the devaluation spurred a sharp rise in inflation in 1994–95 that confounds the comparison between regime types. Otherwise, the data do not suggest significant differences in inflation levels.

Table 1 also reports on the evolution of the external terms of trade during this period. The data suggest a significantly greater average deterioration in the terms of trade for the new democracies during the 1990s. This finding places the economic performance of the new democracies in a more favorable light, even if the quality of the data urges cautious conclusions. For example, during the first three years following its transition, Zambia's terms of trade underwent a 40 percent decline as copper prices tumbled. In sum, these data provide no evidence that increases in political competition and participation in the 1990s can be associated with significant changes in performance.

Economic growth and inflation are outcome variables and are influenced by many factors other than the actions of governments. Moreover, improved performance may lag behind policy reform by several years. To judge the economic impact of democratization on Africa in the 1990s, it is thus appropriate also to examine government policies. One standard measure of government policy performance is the size of the fiscal deficit, as it is widely accepted that large deficits precipitated the crisis and must be reduced for sustained growth to reemerge. Table 1 compares the evolution of the size of fiscal deficits before and after the transition period. The data include estimates of the deficit both with and without the contribution of grants, most of which consist of external resource flows. Democratization has had little impact on the size of the fiscal deficit.

Interestingly, these data appear to show substantially higher average levels of deficits among the new democracies both before and after the transitions. These

Table 1 Economic and Policy Performance, before and after Transition Election

	1986-91	1991-96*	1986-96*	Period Around Transition 1986-88	3 Years After
New Democracies					
Annual GDP Growth[i]	3.3	2.4	3.0	3.7	2.9
Average Inflation Rate	14.8	24.5	19.4	12.5	26.1
Average Terms of Trade[ii]	94.9	87.2	91.7	99.1	82.4
		(As a percentage of GDP)			
Fiscal Balance (exc. grants)	-15.6	-16.7	-16.2	-14.2	-15.6
Fiscal Balance (inc. grants)	-6.9	-7.7	-7.2	-6.4	-6.7
Government Consumption	19.0	17.4	18.7	19.7	17.6
Investment	23.4	28.4	25.9	22.2	27.8
Non Democracies					
Annual GDP Growth[i]	2.6	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.7
Average Inflation Rate[iii]	16.7	20.0	19.6	21.7	19.1
Average Terms of Trade[ii]	101.8	95.3	98.8	103.0	94.0
		(As a percentage of GDP)			
Fiscal Balance (exc. grants)	-8.4	-8.9	-8.5	-8.2	-10.1
Fiscal Balance (inc. grants)	-3.3	-5.0	-4.0	-1.9	-5.9
Government Consumption	15.5	15.1	15.1	15.7	16.2
Investment	19.7	18.3	18.9	19.8	17.5
Old Democracies					
Annual GDP Growth[i]	5.2	3.1	4.3	5.9	2.3
Average Inflation Rate	10.5	12.9	11.5	11.1	12.4
Average Terms of Trade[ii]	104.3	87.3	92.2	105.5	85.5
		(As a percentage of GDP)			
Fiscal Balance (exc. grants)	-6.6	-4.3	-5.6	-7.8	-6.2
Fiscal Balance (inc. grants)	-2.6	-3.4	-2.6	-1.6	-3.8
Government Consumption	20.3	16.9	19.6	20.6	18.6
Investment	21.9	23.2	22.2	18.8	21.9

Source: Calculated from The World Bank, *African Economic Indicators, 1997*; Not all of the estimates are based on the same number of data points, as coverage varies by indicator.
Notes: New Democracies category includes Benin, Cape Verde, CAR, Congo-Brazza, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Zambia; Non Democracies category includes Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Eq. Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire; Old Democracies category includes Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, Zimbabwe.
*. Data for inflation and terms of trade only go through 1995; i. in Constant 1987 US dollars; ii. 1987 = 100; iii. Inflation estimates for Non democracies do not include Zaire, a clear outlier, with inflation rates of 337% from 1988-91 and 3,074% from 1992-1995.

differentials turn out not to be statistically significant, however, given large variations within each group of states. The observed difference is due largely to the presence of several highly aid dependent small states in the sample. In particular, the extraordinarily high deficits in Sao Tome, Cape Verde, and Guinea Bissau average between a third and a half of GDP during this period and are entirely sustained by foreign aid.

Finally, Table 1 reports data on the share of government consumption and investment in GDP, two other standard measures of governmental policy performance. Since a standard objective of reform programs has been to slim down the state and to reorient expenditures towards investment, they are good measures of the progress of reform. Again, there is little evidence of a distinct break between the time periods around the transition. The share of both government consumption and investment in GDP appears systematically higher in the new democracies, but this differential is not significant and largely disappears when the microstates of Sao Tome, Cape Verde, and Guinea Bissau are excluded from the data set.

The evidence presented so far suggests that the democratization of African politics in the early 1990s has not had the kind of dramatic effect on economic performance and government policymaking predicted by many observers in the early 1990s. If there is any trend in the data, it is towards economic improvement, although it is faint so far and does not appear solely related to regime type. Other, largely exogenous factors, such as the evolution in the terms of trade and the French imposed devaluation of the CFA franc, appear to have exerted as powerful an influence on economic conditions.

Institutional Continuities

To understand the reasons why democratization has not had a systematic impact on economic performance, it is necessary to examine the three assumptions that typically undergird the view that democratization negatively affects economic reform and performance.

A Participatory Explosion? The prediction that participation would explode because of democratization has proven to be fanciful for several reasons. First, compared to the more mature democracies of the West, African civil society is poorly organized and nonrepresentative. In most countries, with several notable exceptions, nongovernmental actors that could channel and mobilize participation following the political liberalization of the early 1990s were typically only recently formed and had shaky finances and small memberships. Their clout was undermined by their fragmentation, often along ethnoregional lines.[17]

In general, the new democracies have had low participation rates and fairly autonomous state decision making. After the enthusiasm of the founding election, often less than a quarter of the adult population voted in subsequent elections.[18] A lively printed press has emerged, but its circulation is low, and surveys suggest it reaches no more than a small proportion of the urban population. Overwhelmingly, radio remains the medium by which Africans receive their news, and it typically remains in government hands.[19] Similarly, a small active opposition may conduct well-publicized protests in the parliament or outside the presidential palace, but it can not rely on the support of large segments of the population, particularly outside of the capital, and does not regularly mobilize large crowds. The increase in participation since transition has been no more than modest.

A Weakened Executive? It was predicted that democratization would weaken executive authority and worsen the prospects for sound economic policies. During the transition prodemocracy forces in a number of African countries indeed voiced the ambition to weaken the institutional power of the presidency in order to reduce the abuses of power of the *ancien régime*. Consequently, checks on executive power were instituted in a number of countries. In some states in which the president does not enjoy a clear legislative majority (discussed below), parliaments have used this new power significantly to impede presidential action.

Nonetheless, in all these states executive dominance of the policymaking process remains patent. Not a single country has moved from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government as a result of democratization. The formal mechanisms of accountability and transparency that have been adopted are likely to be overshadowed by a state apparatus that retains an authoritarian lineage going back to the colonial state.[20] Administrations have functioned with few external constraints for too long to change quickly. Parliaments usually lack the technical expertise and administrative savvy to exercise whatever new powers of control they have gained over executive decision making. Judiciaries, suffering from legacies of inadequate resources and political interference, also need time to assert their prerogatives.

Finally, the state of the civil service also promotes continuity. In eastern Europe the new democratic governments have at their disposal a reasonably professional and effective civil service to carry out a set of new policies. In sub-Saharan Africa three decades of economic crisis have devastated the civil service's professionalism, resources, and infrastructure and sapped its capacity and morale.[21] In many countries the state barely functions and is capable of only the simplest administrative tasks. A significant reorientation of policy may not be possible in the short to medium term. The main constraints on state action continue to be self-induced, rather than imposed by external participatory pressures or institutional counterweights to executive dominance.

The result might be called *democradura*. Scholars of Latin America have analyzed the coexistence of occasional multiparty elections with day-to-day authoritarian practices following democratic transitions.[22] Even more than in Latin America, the onset of multiparty electoral politics left unchanged many of the defining characteristics of African politics, notably neopatrimonial presidential rule in the context of pervasive rent-seeking and clientelism.[23]

The Aid Regime Democratization in Africa has not been sustained by extraordinarily generous external financial support.[24] While donors rewarded Chiluba's government in Zambia by almost doubling aid after the 1991 founding election, overall numbers on foreign aid tell a different story.[25]

Most donors do not use political criteria consistently to allocate aid. In fact, France, the biggest bilateral donor to the region, clearly favored authoritarian regimes like Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Togo with sharp increases in aid in the early 1990s; it was seemingly intent on helping vulnerable leaders survive the democratization wave.[26] Despite much support for the general principle of democratization, aid volumes during the 1990s have apparently changed more because of the increasing willingness of the leading donors selectively to reward countries that follow their economic policy prescriptions. Thus, World Bank support to democratic Zambia sharply increased after 1991, but so did its support of authoritarian reform regimes in Uganda and Ghana.

How, then, should one think about the role of the donors? During this period donors still provided sub-Saharan Africa with U.S.$18 billion a year in aid, a huge sum given the small size of African economies. Adjustment lending, debt rescheduling, and debt forgiveness have sustained African states, despite consistently high levels of fiscal stress. In exchange for this support the donors have demanded and received a substantial role in economic decision making. It is true that donors have countenanced repeated governmental policy reversals, prevarication, and obfuscation but have kept the spigot of aid open long after governments' lack of commitment to reform could no longer be doubted.[27] Certainly, the statistics presented above on government deficits and consumption levels provide further evidence of a lack of real progress on reform despite donor conditionality. Nonetheless, the inability of most African states to attract private capital has provided western donors considerable leverage over domestic economic decision making.[28] Essentially bankrupt governments have not been able frontally to reject the donors' advice. They have undertaken instead various forms of passive resistance. Ultimately, the reform agenda has achieved only limited sustained progress, but donor presence and influence have grown within certain parts of the economic decision-making apparatus.[29]

Donor micromanagement of broad areas of policy formulation has, moreover, undermined the development of domestic support for reform before and after political transitions. For the last decade a small number of technocrats, typically based in the presidency and central bank, in collaboration with officials from the international financial institutions, has made economic policy. The donor staff in Washington has largely designed and prepared reform programs; perhaps no more than a handful of local officials actually reads and debates the documents before governments sign off on them. National debate on economic policy issues has been in some cases actively discouraged. It has been far more politically expedient for governments to present the reform program as something externally imposed by the donors, so that they are not blamed for the resulting austerity. Thus, reform programs are poorly understood and eventually undermined by lack of support. Little policy learning, in which the polity might come to appreciate the key trade-offs of alternative policies and the realm of the possible, takes place.[30]

The donors have therefore promoted continuity. The donor-government relationship changes little following a transition. After a brief honeymoon, despite perhaps a short spurt of larger aid volumes, the donors return to their curious brand of toothless conditionality and micromanagement, while governments go back to passive resistance and accommodation of donor pressures in a context of endemic fiscal crisis.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that few of the democratic governments reached power with a mandate to implement a specific set of economic policies. Studies have sometimes wrongly portrayed the democratic movements as motivated largely by opposition to structural adjustment.[31] Indeed, the dynamics that propelled the transition process forward often had little to do with economic policy issues. Transition politics were more typically concerned with such issues as reining in executive or military abuses of power and ensuring ethnoregional balance through new constitutional arrangements. Although many of the protests that initiated the process of democratization expressed the economic grievances of groups like civil servants and a general anger about corruption and mismanagement, economic policy choices rarely featured prominently in national conferences or in the elections that marked the end of the transition. Instead, the democratic forces typically came to power with little more than vague promises to improve living conditions and reduce corruption.

Once in power, harsh budgetary realities and persuasive experts from international financial institutions, as well as their own technocrats, convinced most governments against drastic policy changes. Ideational continuities were reinforced by the similarity of the political personnel that came to power with the new democratic governments with the outgoing political personnel. Not only did governments invariably retain virtually all the ministerial permanent secretaries, but many cabinet members had ministerial experience in the *ancien régime*.

Differences across the New Democracies

Economic performance among the new African democracies has in fact varied significantly, as suggested by the right hand column in Table 2. On the upper end, Benin, Lesotho, and Mali are above average, while the Seychelles, Zambia, Congo, and the Central African Republic have been clear laggards. In several of the latter countries, economic conditions have recently worsened sharply, and the survival of the democratic order must be in some doubt. Indeed, in Congo the elected Lissouba government was toppled in a violent coup in mid 1997. How can we predict the performance of the different new democracies? Which economies will stabilize and begin to lay the groundwork for sustained growth? Serendipity, in the form of the level of rainfall or the emergence of particularly effective leadership, will play a role. In addition, though, two sets of political factors help predict which of the new democracies are more likely to overcome their economic crisis.

Initial Conditions and Path Dependencies A first set of factors differentiates the new democracies according to the initial conditions and path dependencies imposed on the new regime. Studies of the adjustment have emphasized two circumstances that make economic reform more likely. First, reform is easier for new governments because they are less likely to be tied to old policies and constituencies.[32] Second, the severity of the economic crisis in large part determines the commitment of governments to implement economic reform programs.[33] The harsher the crisis is, the more likely governments will risk tough austerity measures.

Africa presents a number of paradoxical cases, since dreadful economic crisis has not spurred much reform. In Africa, as elsewhere, the persistence of economic crisis freed the hands of the new democratic governments to undertake reform. Civil service retrenchment and the termination of subsidies are easier when government employment and subsidies have lost much of their real value to inflation, scarcity, and government bankruptcy. Civil servants will not fight as strenuously for their positions when they have lost 95 percent of their real salaries, as in a number of Anglophone states.[34] At the same time, inflation, the least politically palatable symptom of economic crisis, did not reach the crisis levels in other developing regions. The small proportion of the population in formal employment and the large proportion remaining in the countryside, as well as the persistence of traditional self-help and family welfare mechanisms, helped limit the political impact of crises. Moreover, in low income countries with little industrialized base, poor infrastructure, and little government capacity, the difficulties of navigating through the adjustment process are much more significant than in the middle income countries of Latin America and eastern Europe. As demonstrated by countries like Uganda and Ghana, which have relatively little to show for years of orthodox macroeconomic management, the supply response of these economies to policy reform is slow and uncertain. Thus, while the new democratic leaders faced low short-term political costs in undertaking reform, they typically also could not count on major benefits from reform.

The constraints on new leaders following the transition can be elucidated through circumstancial and sequential issues. The status of the reform program at the time of

Table 2 The Transition and Adjustment

Country	Transition Period	Founding Election*	Average Annual Fiscal deficit 1988-1991 (As% of GDP)	Ongoing IMF Loan suspended	IMF Aid resumed	GDP Growth, 3 Yrs after Transition
Benin	2/89 - 5/91	3/24/91	7.5%	9/90 (SAF)	7/91 (SAF) 1/93 (ESAF)	4.0
Cape Verde	12/88 - 4/91	2/17/91	16.0%	--	-	3.0
CAR	10/90 - 10/93	8/22/93	12.0%	--	3/94 (SBA)	2.7**
Congo	10/90 - 10/93	8/17/92	12.5%	10/91	5/94 (SBA)	-1.4
Guinea Biss.	5/91 - 8/94	8/7/94	36.8%	10/91 (SAF)	8/95 (ESAF)	5.2***
Lesotho	5/91	3/28/94	--	--	5/91 (ESAF) 1994 (SBA)	10.3
Madagascar	5/90 - 8/93	2/10/93	4.5%	5/91	-	1.3
Malawi	6/92 - 5/94	5/17/94	7.0%	5/92	10/95 (ESAF) 12/94 (SBA)	5.6***
Mali	1/91 - 6/92	4/26/92	10.2%	--	8/92 (ESAF)	2.6
Niger	12/90 - 4/93	3/27/93	10.3%	late 1991	3/94 (SBA) 6/96 (ESAF)	2.9
Sao Tome	10/87 - 3/91	3/3/91	50.5%	6/90	6/92 (SAF)	1.1
Seychelles	1/92 - 8/93	7/23/93	--	--	-	0.8
Zambia	2/89 - 12/91	10/31/91	11.5%	10/91	6/95 (SAF)	-0.8

Notes: IMF policy reform loans include Standby Agreements (SBA), Structural Adjustment Facility Loans (SAF), Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility loans (ESAF); Length of transition: months between the onset of political protests and the formal end of the transition. When no protests took place, the beginning of liberalization was used; Growth rate: See Table 1. *: presidential elections unless otherwise noted. **: average growth rate for 1994-1996 only; ***: one year growth rate for 1995-96.
Sources: Bratton and van de Walle (1997) for data on transition periods; *African Research Bulletin* (Various years), *Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports* (various countries, years) and *Europa* (Various editions) for data on IMF lending.; The World Bank, *African Economic Indicators, 1997* for data on growth.

the transition is important. If the previous government was associated in the public consciousness with aggressively following the policies of the international financial institutions, the new democratic government could not quickly backtrack from its campaign rhetoric and embrace reform. Zafy's government in Madagascar faced this problem. At the other extreme, reform in Zambia benefited from Kaunda's long and very public squabbles with the international financial institutions. These institutions, moreover, were all too happy to deal with a more sympathetic government and moved quickly to offer new lending in support of the reform program. Chiluba had discussions with the World Bank and IMF even before his government was voted into office, while Zafy's government had to work its way through a shadow program with the IMF for several years before lending resumed.[35] In intermediate cases like Benin and Mali new reformist governments could pick and choose among reforms to distinguish themselves from the previous governments, while remaining on good terms with the international financial institutions. They achieved some progress on restoring macro stability but much less on the more intractable institutional reforms.

The status of the reform program at the time of the transition varied significantly across the countries. Table 2 provides data on the size of the fiscal deficit at the beginning of the transition. It reveals sharp differences. Countries with deficits above 10 percent of GDP were in effect not in full control of policymaking, even before the interregnum of the transition exerted further fiscal pressures. Everything else being equal, their democratic successors might have had greater public support for drastic measures, but they also needed to move quickly to normalize a seriously deteriorated situation. In the absence of extraordinary support from the donors, notably in the form of debt relief, intense fiscal pressure precluded any policy innovation other than immediate and thankless austerity. In Congo, for example, the hole dug by the old government was so deep that the new government had few options; the previous government had already sold the next five years' worth of the country's oil resources, its primary source of revenue.[36]

The status of the reform program also interacted with the length of the transition to determine which paths were open to the new government. Table 2 provides estimates of the length of the African transitions. Transitions were defined as starting with the emergence of the first serious political protests and ending with the entry into power of a government following competitive elections. According to the standard wisdom of the literature on democratization, long transitions improve the likelihood of political stability and democratic consolidation by giving the main protagonists time to reach political compromises.[37] However, the economic costs of long, uncertain transitions are negative, particularly in countries with low administrative capacity. In countries like the Central African Republic and Madagascar the long period of uncertainty, interspersed with outbreaks of violence and institutional chaos, had a very negative economic impact. During this interregnum macroeconomic policy was allowed to drift, and the government lost control over its own expenditure and revenue levels. In some countries public enterprise managers stripped assets; there was extensive capital flight; and corruption increased.

During this period of chaos and drift the usually indulgent donors lost patience and put their lending programs on hold, further increasing the drift. Table 2 provides data on the status of IMF lending operations around the period of the transition. The presence of an IMF stand-by agreement, structural adjustment facility, or extended structural adjustment facility provides a useful if imperfect proxy for the extent to which the government was undertaking sound macroeconomic policies. An IMF loan provides a signal to the other donors and to private capital about the soundness of the economy, a primary reason that governments seek to remain in good standing with the IMF. It is thus remarkable that Lesotho and Mali are the only countries in which an ongoing IMF stabilization facility was not suspended because of noncompliance during the political transition. Even during the transition in these two countries the IMF repeatedly threatened suspension, and the World Bank suspended its adjustment operations in Mali.

Moreover, the IMF agreed to no new loans during the transition. Since renewed lending from the IMF signals a new impetus to the reform process, the long delays in new lending revealed by Table 2 suggest the extent to which economic policy reform was at best put on hold while the political system worked its way through political transition.

In sum, the shorter the transition period is, the lower its economic cost will be, and the likelier the incoming government will bring economic decision making under control without too much damage. Governments in countries with long and costly transitions were less likely to benefit from the "honeymoon" voters accorded them to make progress on economic reform. Instead, they spent political capital and precious time to restore a normal planning and budgeting process. By the time they had returned to normalcy, the "glow" of the transition often had worn off, and it had become much harder to blame austerity on the previous government. In many countries, by that time, party politics also militated against progress on macroeconomic management.

Differences in Party Systems The nature of party systems also differentiates the new democracies' ability to promote economic reform. Haggard and Kaufman have argued for Latin America and Asia that "fragmented and polarized party systems have posed major impediments to sustained implementation of reform." In contrast, dominant party systems, in which the majority party can engage in "broad social mobilization," are more likely to be able to initiate and sustain reform.[38] This insight is extremely useful in the African cases. In comparative terms, almost all African parties have been characterized by weak mobilizational capacity. Unlike new parties in eastern Europe and Latin America, political parties in Africa could not rely on significant organizational or ideological resources accrued during previous democratic episodes.

Even the strongest single parties that emerged in the early years of independence became coteries of notables held together by state funding and clientelism.[39] The relatively strong parties that survived the reintroduction of electoral politics, most notably in Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Senegal, have never been used by their leaders to mobilize support for policy reform. On the contrary, as the primary vehicle through which state discretionary resources were spent, party apparatchiks have generally felt threatened by reform. For instance, the privatization campaign in Ivory Coast in the late 1980s was part of an attempt by Houphouët-Boigny to recentralize power in the presidency and away from the barons who controlled the PDCI.[40]

The dynamics are different following democratization, since the new parties take time to penetrate the state apparatus and control patronage networks. Initially, the move to multiparty politics may actually improve decision making. The new government party is more critical of rent-seeking it does not benefit from. However, these new parties are typically weak organizationally; they are more often than not coalitions of factions cobbled together in support of an individual candidate or unified by little more than the objective of ridding the country of the old authoritarian ruler. Such parties lack a programmatic orientation, have few if any dues paying members, and may not have any activities between elections. Their weakness will eventually make the practices of the old single party more appealing to parties in government, as a way to consolidate their position and sustain support.

Although most African parties follow this broad set of patterns, it is possible to differentiate the continent's emerging party systems. Table 3 provides data on the number of parties represented in the legislature and the share of seats going to the largest party in 1997. In some countries a dominant party appears to be emerging, following the first and second elections. It may owe its dominance to ethnic reasons or superior leadership. It wins a solid majority of seats in parliament and seems impervious to the inevitable fractionalization of the democratic alliance that spearheaded the transition. Thus, the MMD in Zambia retained its solid legislative majority in the 1996 elections, despite the progressive defection to the opposition of most of its original tenors.

Table 3 provides data on the kind of electoral regime that has emerged following democratization. First-past-the-post plurality systems, list proportional representation, and two round majority systems are all in evidence. The majority of the highly fractionalized systems have come about in proportional representation systems, as the literature has long predicted, although the correlation is not perfect. In Africa, choice of the electoral regime was clearly often endogenous to the success of the transition, as it was negotiated among the main political actors, typically at a national conference.[41] In ethnically diverse societies, consensual approaches to political representation may have been a precondition for a successful transition. Nonetheless, one of the consequences appears to have been legislative instability, marked by ethnically driven party competition.[42]

Table 3 Party System in the New Democracies

Country	Electoral System (1997)	Party System # of Parties in Legislature	Party System Share of Seats Largest Party
Benin	List PR	12	19%
Cape verde	list PR	3	69%
CAR	TRS Majority	13	40%
Congo	TRS Majority	7	38%[i]
Guinea Bissau	List PR	5	64%
Lesotho	FPTP	1	100%
Madagascar	List PR	23	33%
Malawi	FPTP	3	47%
Mali	TRS Majority	10	66%
Niger	Par. FPTP	9	35%
Sao Tome	List PR	3	49%
Seychelles	Par. FPTP	3	85%
Zambia	FPTP	2	83%

Notes: Electoral Systems: FPTP: First past the post plurality system; TRS: Two round system in majority system; List PR: Proportional representation in Multi-member districts. Par. FPTP: mixed system with both FPTP and PR seats.
Source: International IDEA, *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. (Stockholm: IDEA, 1997). Party Systems: Electoral data based on legislature, following first election after transition. Data from latest *Europa* (various years); [i]: data for the National Assembly only.

In contrast, the well-known effects of majoritarian rules in first-past-the-post plurality systems are almost certainly heightened in the African context. "The superior organizational, material and symbolic resources of the governing party" are likely to result in the emergence of a dominant party system.[43] On balance, stable legislative majorities advance the prospects of policy reform. A commanding legislative majority may not provide reform the needed mobilizational support, but at least the legislature will not be turned into a platform for antireform activism. Some governments, of course, are themselves ambivalent about reform, but the executive branch is likely to contain the biggest constituencies for reform, notably the technocrats in institutions like the central bank and the ministry of finance, and the executive branch is the direct recipient of donor pressures. Thus, in Zambia substantial progress on reform was made during the early period of MMD rule, spurred by Chiluba's proreform cabinet and the promise of substantial donor support.[44] The danger for reform in such countries is that the dominant party will take over the old patronage networks left by their predecessors and come to oppose reform for the same reasons single parties did before them. For example, after 1994 Chiluba progressively rid his government of its reformist elements and brought back old second republic politicians prior to the 1996 elections.[45]

The combination of presidentialism and a polarized party system can have particularly negative implications for decision making.[46] In the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Congo, Benin, and Niger, in which a weak government party did not command a clear majority following the transition, the opposition parties used the legislature to complicate economic policymaking. Table 3 probably understates the degree of fractionalization, since many of these parties are in fact expedient alliances of smaller parties without a common organization and with divergent objectives. Shifting alliances and defections have added to the instability. In none of these countries except the Central African Republic did the party that won a legislative majority during the founding election retain it by 1997; in the Central African Republic the much weakened Patassé barely survived repeated military mutinies only thanks to French intervention. Military interventions ended the democracies in Congo and Niger, while opposition parties won nominal control of parliaments following second elections in Madagascar and Benin, albeit with no more impressive a majority.

In the endless parliamentary squabbling that resulted in these countries following the transition, it was difficult to sustain progress on economic reform. In Benin, for instance, President Soglo and the parliamentary opposition sparred for most of 1992–1994 over the extent of presidential policymaking prerogatives. Lacking a solid majority in the legislature, Soglo had difficulty even passing his 1994 budget.[47] The deadlock was eventually overcome through the intervention of the supreme court, but not before it paralyzed reform for many months and compromised the government's ability to undertake policy. Did political participation explode with the emergence of multiparty politics? Factional infighting appears instead to have been restricted within a fairly narrow political class acting on its own behalf. Unions and student organizations were actually weakened by the single party's demise. Weak and competing unions and student organizations multiplied, and corporatist arrangements between privileged single peak organizations and government ended.

Dominant executive leaders may of course be opposed to reform, so a stable majority is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of reform. However, the prospects of policy reform and improved economic management appear to be strongest in dominant party systems.

Concluding Remarks

It is useful to remind ourselves that the biggest single determinant of economic growth in most of low income Africa remains the level of annual rainfall.[48] The links between economic and political reform will necessarily be tenuous as long as Africa's economies remain primarily rural, with extremely low productivity and weak infrastructure. Clearly, many nonpolitical factors have conditioned performance in the new democracies. Nonetheless, to understand economic policy outcomes in the context of democratization, it is important to focus on institutional factors, especially the nature of political authority, the weak capacities of African governments, and the relationship to the international donors. Also, the new democratic actors emanate from essentially the same social coalition as the one that dominated the *ancien régime* and are no more predisposed to support economic reform. These factors interact with conjunctural factors around the transition and the nature of the emerging political system to condition the prospects for economic policy reform. Decision making has changed in the new democracies. The end of single party domination and the emerging party systems, in particular, alter decision making. But many of the old patterns of the *ancien régime* persist, and the political transition itself exacts a significant cost on the economy, which the new governments must address.

This analysis has confirmed the finding of many studies that the largest improvements in economic management are likeliest right after the transition, before the weight of the past reasserts itself and while some of the reformist ambitions of the transition survive. This pattern was notable in Zambia and Benin. In a few other countries the policy reform achieved by the previous regime protected the new democratic regime. In Mali, for instance, the donors sought to protect the progress achieved by Traoré's regime by maintaining support for the democratic government after 1991. In a few of these democracies the relationship between the two transitions allows us to look to the future with guarded optimism. In more countries, however, early and rapid progress was undermined by the conditions of the transition and the advanced state of economic crisis it left behind. In these states, greater political pluralism does not necessarily worsen the prospects for reform, but it can hardly be said to help them, while the process of political change itself is unambiguously disruptive. In these countries the negative synergy between economic crisis and political decay may well continue to haunt the citizenry for years to come.

NOTES

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1. In addition, Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe had conducted regular multiparty elections during the 1970s and 1980s, and Senegal since 1979.

2. Jeffrey Herbst, "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa," *World Development*, 18 (July

1990), 949–58; Richard Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

3. World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989).

4. See Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (October 1996); Thomas Callaghy, "Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa," in Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 463–519; Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura, and Arve Ofstad, eds., *Authoritarianism and Democracy and Adjustment* (Uddevalla: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1992); Jennifer Widner, ed., *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). For less pessimistic accounts, see John Healey and Mark Robinson, *Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1992); Peter Lewis, "Economic Reform and Political Transition in Africa: The Quest for a Politics of Development," *World Politics*, 49 (October 1996), 92–129.

5. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 152; also, Marc Lindenberg and Shantayanan Devarajan, "Prescribing Strong Economic Medicine: Revisiting the Myths about Structural Adjustment, Democracy, and Economic Performance in Developing Countries," *Comparative Politics*, 25 (1993), 169–83.

6. Richard Jeffries, "The State, Structural Adjustment and Good Governance in Africa," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 31 (March 1993), 20–35. Jeffries concluded his analysis, p. 34, by arguing that the donors should promote "the development of more efficient and capable government bureaucracies" rather than democratization.

7. Bienen and Herbst.

8. Samuel Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa," *African Affairs*, 91 (January 1992), 7–35; Tom Young, "Elections and Electoral Politics in Africa," *Africa*, 63 (1993), 299–312.

9. Larry Diamond, *Prospects for Democratic Development in Africa* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1997), p. 36.

10. See Karen Remmer, "Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience," *World Politics*, 42 (April 1990), 315–35; Haggard and Kaufman; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

11. Richard Sklar, "Toward a Theory of Developmental Democracy," in Adrian Leftwich, ed., *Democracy and Development* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) pp. 25–45.

12. See, for instance, Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, "Generalizations Arising from the Country Studies," in Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), pp. 444–72. They attribute the failure of interest groups to undermine policy reform to their ambivalence about reform rather than to their lack of influence over policy.

13. The Namibian elections were held on November 11, 1989, a handy starting point for this wave of democratization in Africa. December 31, 1989, is a more arbitrary date but allows at least two points of economic data following the transition.

14. See Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), for a complete justification of this classification.

15. If no founding election could be identified, I used data for 1993–1995, since the modal year for founding elections was 1992.

16. Unless otherwise indicated, all the data used in this study are from World Bank, *African*

Development Indicators, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), the most comprehensive single source of data available. On the poor quality of African data, see Alexander J. Yeats, "On the Accuracy of Africa Observations: Do Sub-Saharan Trade Statistics Mean Anything?," *World Bank Economic Review*, 4 (May 1990), 135–56.

17. See René Lemarchand, "Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30 (1992), 177–91; also, Thomas Callaghy, "Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: A Dissenting Opinion about Resurgent Societies," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 231–54.

18. Michael Bratton and Daniel Posner, "A First Look at Second Elections in Africa, with Illustration from Zambia," in Richard Joseph, ed., *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 377–408.

19. A survey of rural southern Cameroon in 1994, for instance, estimated that .2 percent of rural households read newspapers on a regular basis, while 44 percent listened to the radio. Georges Courade and Véronique Alary, "Les Planteurs Camerounais ont-ils été réévalués?," *Politique Africaine*, 54 (1994), 80.

20. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

21. Deborah Bräutigam, "State Capacity and Effective Governance," in Benno Ndulu and Nicolas van de Walle, eds., *Agenda for Africa's Economic Renewal* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1996), pp. 81–108.

22. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (January 1994), 55–69; Frances Hagopian, "Traditional Power Structures and Democratic Governance in Latin America," in Jorge I. Dominguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s—Themes and Issues* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 64–86.

23. Bratton and van de Walle, ch. 7.

24. See Decalo; Jeffries.

25. The new democracies received more aid per capita than the nondemocracies, both before and after the transition, but this difference is largely an artifact of the small country bias of aid, resulting in very high totals going to such microstates as Cape Verde and the Seychelles. Comparison of the average level of aid during 1990–1995 with the average for 1985–1990 yields an average increase of 37 percent in ODA for the nondemocracies and 33 percent for the new democracies. Comparison of the shorter periods of 1992–95 and 1988–1991 yields an average increase of 6 percent for the new democracies and a decline of 3 percent for the nondemocracies. See World Bank, *African Economic Indicators, 1997*.

26. Thus, Clestin Monga, "Eight Problems with African Politics," *Journal of Democracy*, 8 (July 1997), 156–70, argues that the donors have a prodictatorship bias in their aid. Only for France, however, do the data clearly bear him out. See Richard Banégas and Patrick Quantin, "Orientations et Limites de l'Aide Française au Développement Démocratique," *Revue Canadienne d'Etudes du Développement*, special issue (1996).

27. Paul Collier, "The Failure of Conditionality," in Catherine Gwin and Joan M. Nelson, eds., *Perspectives on Aid and Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press for the Overseas Development Council, 1997). pp. 51–78.

28. Nicolas van de Walle, "Globalization and African Democracy," in Joseph, ed., pp. 95–118.

29. Callaghy and Ravenhill, eds.

30. David Gordon, "Debt, Conditionality and Reform: The International Relations of Economic Policy Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Callaghy and Ravenhill, eds., pp. 90–129.

31. For example, Gibbon, Bangura, and Ofstad, eds. See Bratton and van de Walle.

32. Haggard and Kaufman.

33. For example, Merilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas, *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

34. This argument was first made by Barbara Grosh, "Through the Structural Adjustment Minefield: Politics in an Era of Political Liberalization," in Jennifer Widner, ed., *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). On civil service salaries, see Ian Lienert and Jitendra Modi, "A Decade of Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa" (International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/97/179, Fiscal Affairs Department, December 1997).

35. Van de Walle.

36. See Patrick Quantin, "Congo: Les Origines Politiques de la Décomposition d'un Processus de Libéralisation," and B. Blancq, "Congo: Corruption et Résistance au Changement," both in *L'Afrique Politique, 1994: Vue sur la Démocratisation à Marée Basse* (Paris: Karthala, 1994). These fiscal deficits would have been considerably higher in the absence of extremely generous donor support, with debt reschedulings in 1988 and 1989. France was particularly helpful, with 169 million dollars in assistance in 1990 alone, the year before the transition.

37. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

38. Haggard and Kaufman, p. 370.

39. Ruth Collier, *Regimes in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

40. Bernard Contamin and Yves-A. Fauré, *La Bataille des Entreprises Publiques en Côte d'Ivoire: L'Histoire d'un Ajustement Interne* (Paris: Karthala, 1990).

41. Bratton and van de Walle, pp. 172–75.

42. See Philippe Frank, "Ethnie et Partis: Le Cas du Congo," *Afrique Contemporaine*, 182 (1997), 3–15.

43. Oda Van Cranenburgh, "Tanzania's 1995 Multi-Party Elections: The Emerging Party System," *Party Politics*, 2 (December 1996), 545.

44. Nicolas van de Walle and Dennis Chiwele, "Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia" (Lusaka: Zambia Democratic Governance Project Monitoring and Evaluations Studies, Report Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development, September 1994).

45. Lise Rackner, "Reform as a Matter of Political Survival: Political and Economic Liberalization in Zambia, 1991–1996" (Ph.D. diss., University of Bergen, November 1998).

46. See Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26 (July 1996), 198–228.

47. See Bruce Magnusson, "Benin: Legitimating Democracy: New Institutions and the Historical Problem of Economic Crisis," *L'Afrique Politique 1996: Démocratisation: Arrêts sur Images* (Paris: Karthala, 1996), pp. 33–54.

48. Christopher Delgado, "Agricultural Transformation: The Key to Broad-Based Growth and Poverty Alleviation in Africa," in Ndulu and van de Walle, eds., pp. 151–77.