

The background of the slide features a large, semi-transparent NATO logo, which is a four-pointed star with a circle in the center, set against a dark blue, textured background that resembles a flag.

NATO and Ukraine: Deterrence and Defense

Andrea Gilli, PhD


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- BA, UoTurin
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- PhD, EUI
- Pre/Post-doc: Johns Hopkins, Columbia, Harvard, Stanford
- Work experience: NATO, Pentagon, Italian Air Force, Italian MFA




PART I: WHAT IS NATO





Source: Public Twitter profiles



The Organization (NATO) executes the Political Alliance (Atlantic)

NATO DOES **NOT** DECIDE.

NATO EXECUTES.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE POLITICAL ALLIANCE DECIDE,
BY CONSENSUS, WHAT THE ORGANIZATION SHOULD OR
SHOULD NOT DO.



North Atlantic Council, like UNSC, no permanent members, no veto but consensus.



UN: law
IMF: finance
GATT: trade
ECC: trade & law
NATO: defense

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.

TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Les Etats Parties au présent Traité,

Réaffirmant leur foi dans les buts et les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et leur désir de vivre en paix avec tous les peuples et tous les gouvernements,

Déterminés à sauvegarder la liberté de leurs peuples, leur héritage commun et leur civilisation, fondée sur les principes de la démocratie, les libertés individuelles et le règne du droit,

Desireux de favoriser dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord le bien-être et la stabilité,

Se sont unis par leurs efforts pour leur défense collective et pour la préservation de la paix et de la sécurité,

Se sont mis d'accord sur le présent Traité de l'Atlantique Nord:

Washington Treaty

Attention to Article 5, but relevant part is the principles

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

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TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Les Etats Parties au présent Traité,

Réaffirmant leur foi dans les buts et les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et leur désir de vivre en paix avec tous les peuples et tous les gouvernements,

Déterminés à sauvegarder la liberté de leurs peuples, leur héritage commun et leur civilisation, fondée sur les principes de la démocratie, les libertés individuelles et le règne du droit,

Goucheux de favoriser dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord le bien-être et la stabilité,

Résolus à unir leurs efforts pour leur défense collective et pour la préservation de la paix et de la sécurité,

Se sont mis d'accord sur le présent Traité de l'Atlantique Nord:

*They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of **democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.** They seek to promote **stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.***

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.

Déterminés à sauvegarder la liberté de leurs peuples, leur héritage commun, leur civilisation, fondée sur les principes de la démocratie, les libertés individuelles et le règne du droit,

Desireux de favoriser dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord le bien-être et la stabilité,

Résolus à unir leurs efforts pour leur défense collective et pour la préservation de la paix et de la sécurité,


Se sont mis d'accord sur le présent Traité de l'Atlantique Nord:

The deterrence of values


and

the value of deterrence

Values and principles are, inherently, indivisible.




A value-based Alliances is inherently more solid.





Palmerston, UK neither permanent allies nor friends, just permanent interests.

If interests underpins an Alliance, there could always be a compromise between an Ally and an outsider undermining it.




“Defense is superior to
Opulence”





NATO purpose was to defend liberal-democratic market-based political systems based on individual rights from autocratic command economic systems.

Military spending in North America and Western Europe 1950–2015



AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ALLIANCES*

Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser

I Introduction


THIS ARTICLE outlines a model that attempts to explain the workings of international organizations, and tests this model against the experience of some existing international institutions. Though the model is relevant to any international organization that independent nations establish to further their common interests, this article emphasizes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, since it involves larger amounts of resources than any other international organization, yet illustrates the model most simply. The United Nations and the provision of foreign aid through the Development Assistance Committee are discussed more briefly.


There are some important respects in which many observers in the United States and in some other countries are disappointed in NATO and other ventures in international cooperation. For one thing, it is often argued that the United States and some of the other larger members are bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of the common defense of the NATO countries,¹

and it is at least true that the smaller members of NATO devote smaller percentages of their incomes to defense than do larger members.² There is also some concern about the fact that the NATO alliance has systematically failed to provide the number of divisions that the NATO nations themselves have proclaimed (rightly or wrongly) are necessary or optimal.³ Similarly, many nations, especially smaller nations, have failed to fulfill their quotas for U.N. contributions with the result that the United States contribution rises to a degree that threatens the independence of the organization. The meager level of total support for the U.N. and the mean and haphazard state of its finances are also sources of concern.

Some suppose that the apparent disproportion in the support for international undertakings is due largely to an alleged American moral superiority, and that the poverty of international organizations is due to a want of responsibility on the part of some other nations. But before resorting to any such explanations, it would seem necessary to ask whether the different sized contributions of different countries could be explained in terms of their national interests. Why would it be in the interest of some countries to contribute a larger proportion of their total resources to group undertakings than other countries? The European members of NATO are much nearer the front line than the United States, and they are less able to defend themselves alone.

* Both the RAND Corporation and the Center of International Studies at Princeton University supported this study, and the authors are most thankful to both institutions. They also appreciate the generous efforts of their many helpful critics, especially Malcolm Hoag and James Schlesinger of The RAND Corporation, and Richard Musgrave of Harvard University. Most particularly, the authors thank Professor Klaus Knorr of Princeton University and Professor Thomas C. Schelling of Harvard University, who have offered especially numerous and penetrating criticisms of the present study.






NATO: Open Door Warsaw Pact: Berlin Wall

PART II: WHAT DOES NATO DO?

NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT



- Deterrence and defense (Collective defense)
- Crisis management *and prevention*
- Cooperative security

SHAPE HISTORY

1958

~~NATO SECRET~~

~~NATO CONFIDENTIAL~~

is of 225 pages.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Protecting the airspace of the Baltic states

Location

Estonia Latvia Lithuania

Contributing nations

Germany (Ariete, Estonia) (until end April 2017)
 Spain (Ariete, Estonia) (as of May 2017)
 The Netherlands (Suzuki, Lithuania) (until end April 2017)
 Poland (Suzuki, Lithuania) (as of May 2017)

Support and Assurance for Turkey

Mission

Reinforcing Turkey's air defences

Location

Turkey

Contributing nations & NATO assets

Spain (Adena, Turkey) - Surface to air missile batteries
 Italy (Kuhnamaniray, Turkey) - Surface-to-air missile batteries
 NATO - AWACS aircraft

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Mission

Supporting decision-makers with timely information and intelligence

Location

Italy Germany United Kingdom

NATO assets

NATO - AOS Global Hawk (2017-2018) - AWACS aircraft

Standing Naval Forces

Mission

Providing the Alliance with a continuous naval presence

Location

The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea

NATO assets

NATO - The Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGT & 2), the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMGT & 2)

AWACS patrols over eastern Europe

Mission

Patrolling the skies over eastern Europe

Contributing nations & NATO assets

France Turkey United Kingdom
 NATO - AWACS aircraft

Ballistic Missile Defence

Mission

Protecting NATO's populations, territory and forces

Location

Germany Romania Poland Spain
 Turkey

Contributing nations & NATO assets

United States (Rosa, Spain) - US Aegis BMD capable ships
 United States (Dorcas, Romania) - Aegis ashore
 United States (Kareick, Turkey) - BMD tracking sensor
 United States (Redzikow, Poland) - Aegis ashore (2018)
 NATO (Rammstein, Germany) - NATO Command Centre

Enhanced NATO Response Force / Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

Mission

Ready to deploy at short notice for crisis management or collective defence

Location

Joint Force Command Naples (e-NRF 2017)
 United Kingdom (JTF lead nation 2017)

Contributing nations

Enhanced NATO Response Force (e-NRF) - 26 Allies
 Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) - 14 Allies

NATO's Forward Presence

Mission

Strengthening NATO's defence and deterrence

Location

Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Bulgaria

Contributing nations

ESTONIA Framework nation: United Kingdom
 Denmark (as of 2018) France (2017 only)

LATVIA Framework nation: Canada
 Albania Italy Poland Slovenia Spain

LITHUANIA Framework nation: Germany
 Belgium Croatia (as of 2018) Czech Rep. (as of 2018)
 France (as of 2018) Luxembourg The Netherlands Norway

POLAND Framework nation: United States
 Romania United Kingdom

BULGARIA, ROMANIA, AND BLACK SEA Framework nation: Bulgaria Canada Germany Hungary
 Luxembourg The Netherlands Poland Portugal
 Romania Spain Turkey United States
 United Kingdom

NATO members

NATO partners

Map data as of 7 March 2017

0 500 km



NATO Operations and Missions

1995-2004

Bosnia and Herzegovina

2001-2003

the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia

06/1999

Kosovo

08/2003

Afghanistan

10/2001

Monitoring the
Mediterranean Sea

06 2004

NATO Training
Mission in Iraq

10/2005 - 02/2006

Pakistan earthquake
relief operation

06/2005

Supporting the
African Union

04/2009-06/2009

10/2008-12/2008

Counter-piracy
Gulf of Aden


9 COOPERATIVE SECURITY



10 THINGS YOU NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT NATO.

Who partners with NATO?

■ NATO countries ■ Global partners ■ Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
■ Mediterranean Dialogue ■ Partnership for Peace



Subscribe to our global politics newsletter Signal at gzeromedia.com

Source: NATO

GZERO

Deterrence and Defense

Contributing nations

Belgium (Sauloi, Lithuania)
Canada (Miral Kogalniceanu, Romania)
France (Anari, Estonia)
Germany (Anari, Estonia)
Italy (Sauloi, Lithuania)
Poland (Anari, Estonia)
Portugal (Molker, Poland)
Spain (Sauloi, Lithuania)
United Kingdom (Sauloi, Lithuania)
United States (Ignatovo, Bulgaria)

Support and Assurance for Turkey

Mission

Reinforcing air defences and providing tailored assurance measures for Turkey

Location

Turkey

Contributing nations

Spain (Atara, Turkey) - Surface-to-air missile batteries

NATO assets

NATO (Konya, Turkey) - AWACS surveillance aircraft
Allies also contribute through increased Standing Naval Forces port calls, participation in exercises and intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance activities.

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Mission

Supporting decision-makers with timely information and intelligence

Contributing nations and NATO assets

Denmark Portugal United States
NATO - AGS, AWACS aircraft

Standing Naval Forces

Mission

Providing the Alliance with a continuous naval presence

Location

The Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean and North Seas

NATO assets

NATO - Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGT 1 & 2),
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG 1 & 2)

AWACS patrols over Eastern Europe

Mission

Patrolling the skies over Eastern Europe

Contributing nations and NATO assets

France Turkey
United Kingdom
AWACS aircraft

Framework for the South: Regional Hub for the South

Mission

Improving regional understanding and anticipation of threats emanating from the south

Location

Joint Force Command Naples

Contributing nations

22 Allies contribute with Voluntary National Contributions and

Contributing nations

Italy Norway
United States

Facilitating the rapid deployment of NATO forces

Location

Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Latvia
Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia

Contributing nations

27 Allies and partner nations

Enhanced NATO Response Force / Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

Mission

Ready to deploy at short notice for crisis management or collective defence

Location

Joint Force Command Brindisi (JRCF 2018)
Poland Spain United Kingdom

Contributing nations

Enhanced NATO Response Force (ENRF): 26 Allies
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF): 26 Allies

NATO's Forward Presence

Mission

Strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence

Location

Baltic states: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania

Location

Central Europe: United Kingdom

Location

Denmark Iceland

Location

Framework nations: Canada

Location

Albania Czech Republic Italy Montenegro

Location

Poland Slovakia Slovenia Spain

Location

Framework nations: Germany

Location

Belgium Croatia Czech Republic France

Location

Iceland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway

Location

Framework nations: United States

Location

Croatia Romania United Kingdom

Location

Black Sea: Bulgaria Canada France Germany

Location

Bulgaria and Hungary Italy Luxembourg Poland

Location

Portugal Romania Spain Turkey

NATO members

NATO partners


Key NATO and Allied multinational exercises

0 500 km

N



Deterrence by punishment

The book cover features a dark, atmospheric night sky. A bright, glowing light source, possibly the moon or a distant star, is positioned in the upper left. A brilliant, diagonal streak of light, resembling a meteor or a rocket trail, cuts across the sky from the bottom left towards the upper right. The sky is filled with wispy, illuminated clouds. The title 'DETERRENCE by DENIAL' is centered in a large, white, sans-serif font. Below the title, the subtitle 'Theory and Practice' is written in a smaller, white, sans-serif font. In the bottom right corner, the editors' names are listed in a small, white, sans-serif font.

DETERRENCE by DENIAL

Theory and Practice

edited by
ALEX S. WILNER and
ANDREAS WEGNER




Deterrence by reinforcement

CORE TASKS, DEFENSE POSTURE AND FORCE STRUCTURE



Deterrence and defense

- High-end capabilities in all domains.
- Air-defenses
- Heavy armor
- Counter-battery fire
- In-area logistics
- SW and ASW
- Coastal artillery



Crisis prevention and management


- Out-of-area logistics
- Light land forces, air-lift and CAS from air forces, sea-lift from naval forces. Heavy ISR and reconstruction.



Capacity-building:
training.
Diplomatic
engagement.
Intelligence-sharing
Operational Support.




NATO Operations and Missions



Who partners with NATO?

- NATO countries
- Global partners
- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
- Mediterranean Dialogue
- Partnership for Peace



PART III: WHAT IS NATO ADDED VALUE?

Here we talked about different missions/contexts/force packages.
Then, where's NATO?

transaction costs





WHAT ARE TRANSACTION COSTS?

transaction costs



© Study.com

NATO

An architecture to reduce transaction costs in a market without prices characterized by sovereign nations

How to make sure that different national forces work together thus reducing the individual cost of national defense and achieve collective superior punch-weight than the sum of individual efforts.


NATO HQ

- Political representation (Diplomatic Missions)
- Bureaucratic core: SECRETARY general, not CHIEF EXECUTIVE, sits at HQ overseeing a bureaucratic structure.



Civilian structure

- NATO Headquarters
- Permanent Representatives and National Delegations
- International Staff (IS)
- **Private Office (PO)**
 - Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security
- **Political Affairs and Security Policy Division**
 - NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Georgia
 - Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-proliferation Centre (ACDC)
 - Partnership for Peace Documentation Centre
- **Operations Division**
 - Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)
 - NATO Situation Centre
 - NATO Advisory and Liaison Team (NALT)
- **Innovative, Hybrid and Cyber (IHC) Division**
 - Science for Peace and Security
 - Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAAT POW)
- **Defence Policy and Planning Division**
 - Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC)
 - Logistics Committee (LC)
 - Resilience Committee (RC)
 - Civil Emergency Planning
- **Defence Investment Division**
 - The Conference of National Armaments Directors (ACDSD)
 - Group of National Directors on Certification (AC/135)
 - NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAAG) (AC/141)
 - NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG) (AC/224)
 - The Joint Capability Group Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JCGISR)
 - NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAAG) (AC/225)
 - Alliance Future Surveillance and Control Project Group (AFSC PG)
 - Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
 - CNAO Ammunition Safety Group (AC/325)
 - Life Cycle Management Group (LC/327)
 - NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG)
 - C-IED Activities
 - Industry Relations
 - NATO Naval Force Sensor and Weapons Accuracy Check Sites (FORACS)
 - Air and Missile Defence Committee (AMDC) (AC/336)
 - Aviation Committee (AVC) (AC/33)
 - Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)
- **Public Diplomacy Division**
 - NATO Press Office
 - NATO Multimedia Portal
 - Co-sponsorship grants
 - NATO Information and Documentation Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine
 - (closed) NATO Information Office in Moscow (archive in Russian)
 - NATO Contact Point Embassies in partner countries
- **Executive Management**
 - Archives
 - NATO Internship Programme
 - NATO Multimedia Library
 - Recruitment Service
- Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JIS)
 - NATO Office of Security (NOS)
- Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO)
- Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
- Internal Oversight Service (IOS)
- Office of the Financial Controller (FinCon)
- NATO Office of Resources (NOR)
- NATO Digital Staff
- Office of the Chairman of the Senior Resource Board (SRB)
- Office of the Chairman of the Civil and Military Budget Committees (C/MBC)
- International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN)
- NATO Administrative Tribunal
- NATO Production and Logistics Organizations (NPRO)



NATO

Defence planning

EU

Strategic foresight analysis (SFA)
2013 - update 2015 - 2017
Framework for Future Alliance
Operations (FFAO) 2015 -2018

NATO Treaty 1949
NATO Strategic Concept 2010-11
NATO Summits : Wales 2014 -
Warsaw 2016 - Brussels 2018

Political guidances 2015-06

Minimum Capability Requirements
Defence Planning Capability Survey
Capability Report 2016-06

Capability Target packages
(‘Blue Book’) 2017-06

Facilitate cooperation between
Allies all along the cycle

Capability Report 2018-06

What are the global trends?

What are the military consequences?

What is our role in the world?

What are our defence objectives?

What do we want to be able to do militarily?

What do we need to do so?

How to acquire those capabilities?

How do we ensure capability development?

Have we made progress towards our objectives?

“The EU in a changing global
environment” 2015-06 SEAE

Long Term Capability Assessment -
2018 EDA

TEU Title V 2007
EU Global Strategy 2016-06

EUGS Implementation plan
Council conclusions 2016-11

Headline Goals 2003
revised 2017

Requirement Catalogue 2017
Force Catalogue 2017
Progress Catalogue 2017
CARD 2018

Capability Development
plan 2018

EDA/OCCAR/EDF/National
defence planning

Coordinated Annual Review on
Defence 2020

White
Book ?

CDM/
CARD

CDP

PESCO ?

CARD


Defence investment

- Armaments
- Standardization
- Cooperation
- Common capabilities



Intelligence-sharing

• JISD



Military structure

The Military Committee

International Military Staff

- Intelligence (INT)
- Operations and Plans (OP&P)
- Policy and Capabilities (P&C)
- Cooperative Security (CS)
- Logistics and Resources (L&R)
- NATO Digital Staff
- NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN)

Allied Command Operations (ACO)


- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) - Mons, BE
- Joint Force Command Brunssum - Brunssum, NL
 - Readiness Support
- Joint Force Command Naples - Naples, IT
 - NATO Military Liaison Office Belgrade
 - NATO Headquarters Sarajevo (NHQSa) - Sarajevo, BA
 - NATO Headquarters Skopje (NHQSk) - Skopje, North Macedonia
- Joint Force Command - Norfolk, Virginia, US
- Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) - Ulm, Germany
- Headquarters Allied Maritime Command (HQ MARCOM) - Northwood, GB
 - Standing NATO Maritime Groups
 - NATO Shipping Centre
- Headquarters Allied Air Command (HQ AIRCOM) - Ramstein, DE
 - Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) Torrejón
 - Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) Uedem
 - Deployable Air Command and Control Centre (DACCQ)
- Headquarters Allied Land Command (HQ LANDCOM) - Izmir, TR
- The NATO CIS Group
- Rapidly Deployable Corps Headquarters
 - Headquarters Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARCC) - Innsworth-Gloucester, UK
 - Headquarters EUROCCORPS in Strasbourg, FR
 - Multinational Corps Northeast - Szczecin, PL
 - Multinational Corps South-East - Sibiu, Romania
 - Headquarters Rapid Deployable Corps Italy - Milan, IT
 - Headquarters Rapid Deployable Corps Turkey - Istanbul, TR
 - Headquarters Rapid Deployable German-Netherlands Corps - Münster, DE
 - Headquarters Rapid Deployable Corps Spain - Valencia, ES
 - Headquarters Rapid Deployable Corps France in Lille, FR
 - Headquarters Rapid Deployable Corps Greece in Thessaloniki, GR
- Other Staffs and Commands Responsible to SACEUR
 - Immediate Reaction Forces (Maritime)
 - Naval Strike and Support Forces - STOKFORNATO - Lisbon, PT
 - NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (HQ NAEW&C Force 60)

Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

- Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT) - Norfolk, US
- Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) - Stavanger, NO
- NATO Training Group
 - NATO Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) - Bydgoszcz, PL
 - NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMOTC) - Souda Naval Base, Crete, GR
 - NATO School - Oberammergau, DE
 - Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) - Lisbon, PT

Other NATO Command & Staff Organizations

- Canada-US Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG)
- Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) - Mons, BE





From WWII **SHAEF** (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) to NATO **SHAPE** (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe):

- Training, Exercises and Operations.
- From ACE to ACO.
- JFC
- LAND/MAR/AIR-COM.
- No Cyber/Space-COM





PART IV: DETERRENCE AFTER UKRAINE

A

Elements of NATO's Deterrence and Defence

Baltic Air Policing mission

Mission

Protecting the airspace of the Baltic States

Location

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland

Contributing nations

Belgium (Scaud, Lithuania) Autumn/Winter
Denmark (Scaud, Lithuania) Winter/Spring
France (Amst, Estonia) Spring/Summer
Germany (Amst, Estonia) Autumn/Winter
Italy (Amst, Estonia) Winter/Spring
Portugal (Scaud, Lithuania) Spring/Summer
Spain (Scaud, Lithuania or Malork, Poland) Spring/Summer

Support and Assurance for Turkey

Mission

Reinforcing Turkey's air defences

Location

Turkey

Contributing nations

Italy (Fahrmannweg, Turkey) - Surface-to-air missile batteries
Spain (Adena, Turkey) - Surface-to-air missile batteries
NATO - AWACS aircraft

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Mission

Supporting decision-makers with timely information and intelligence

Location

Germany, Italy, United Kingdom

NATO assets

NATO - AGS Global Hawk, AWACS aircraft

Standing Naval Forces

Mission

Providing the Alliance with a continuous naval presence

Location

The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea

NATO assets

NATO - Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGT 1 & 2), Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG 1 & 2)

AWACS patrols over Eastern Europe

Mission

Patrolling the skies over Eastern Europe

Contributing nations & NATO assets

France, Greece, Turkey
United Kingdom
NATO - AWACS aircraft

Framework for the South regional Hub for the South

Mission

Improving regional understanding and anticipation of threats emanating from the south

Location

Joint Force Command Naples

Contributing nations

21 Allies contribute with Voluntary National Contributions and Resigned JFC Naples staff

Ballistic Missile Defence

Mission

Protecting NATO's populations, territory and forces

Location

Germany, Romania, Poland, Spain, Turkey

NATO assets

United States (Pola, Spain) - US Aegis BMD-capable ships
United States (Dewick, Romania) - Aegis ashore
United States (Kureck, Turkey) - BMD tracking sensor
United States (Piedcowa, Poland) - Aegis ashore (2025)
NATO (Kanslein, Germany) - Allied Air Command

Iceland Peacetime Preparedness

Mission

Protecting Iceland's airspace

Location

Iceland, Keflavik

Contributing nations

Denmark (Winter/Spring)
Italy (Autumn/Winter)
United States (Spring/Summer)

Enhanced NATO Response Force / Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

Mission

Ready to deploy at short notice for crisis management or collective defence

Location

Joint Force Command Brunsum (JNRF 2018)
Italy (VJTF lead nation 2018)

Contributing nations

Enhanced NATO Response Force (JNRF): 27 Allies
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF): 22 Allies

NATO's Forward Presence

Mission

Strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence

Location

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria

Contributing nations

ESTONIA: Framework nation: United Kingdom
LATVIA: Framework nation: Canada
LITHUANIA: Framework nation: Germany
POLAND: Framework nation: United States
BULGARIA: Framework nation: United Kingdom
ROMANIA: Framework nation: United States
AND BLACK SEA: Framework nation: United States

NATO members

NATO partners

Map data as at December 2018

0 500 km



All maps are based on commercial data. Digital Map Data (© Collins Bartholomew LTD 2018). The boundaries and names shown and the designations used do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by NATO. Due to size limitations, some maps may have been added to the maps to include other geographical areas. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Aegean area is not yet determined.



ALLIANCE MODERNISATION

COMMAND STRUCTURE

- + Joint Forces Command for the Atlantic 
- + Enablement Command for Logistics 
- + Cyber Operation Centre 
- + Cyber Rapid Reaction Teams
- + Counter Hybrid Support Teams

READINESS INITIATIVE

-  30 Air Squadrons
-  30 Combat Ships
-  30 Battalions
-  in 30 Days

MILITARY MOBILITY



Working with the EU

COMMAND STRUCTURE




NORFOLK



ULM



#NATOSUMMIT





European
Commission



#EUdefence

DEFENDING EUROPE:


*Improving Military Mobility within
and beyond the European Union*

European transport infrastructure: strategic interconnections

Europe's strategic interconnections abound. While rail networks are particularly dense in Central and parts of Eastern Europe, the concentration of airports is higher in the centre and the north, and ports are plentiful in those member states with higher numbers of islands. Varying levels of efficiency in clearing customs add further complexity to the matter.

Key

- Airport
- Seaport
- Railway




Efficiency of customs clearance process



Data: EU Commission, Natural Earth, World Bank.

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Differences in levels of efficiency in
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EXISTING BARRIERS TO MILITARY MOBILITY



Infrastructure not suitable for the weight or size of military assets

Insufficient height of road tunnels or load capacity of bridges, different gauges or insufficient load capacity of railways. Improving the transport infrastructure will also contribute to its safer and more secure and effective use for commercial purposes.



Regulatory and procedural issues

Lengthy and complex procedures for cross-border and movement in national territory, including customs formalities related to military operations, diverging national rules on the transport of dangerous goods in the military domain.



Shortcomings in the military domain

Lack of coordination structures, movement plans and training and exercises; the need to foster resilience in countering hybrid threats and to ensure access to transport assets, as well as preparedness regarding environmental challenges.

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Shortcomings in the military domain


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reinforcement

Figure 1: **NATO's New Force Model**



Historic reinforcement of **NATO's deterrence and defence**

- New regional defence plans; New NATO Force Model & adapted Command Structure
- Re-focus on multi-domain collective defence
- 300,000 troops on higher readiness, including substantial air and naval combat power
- New Defence Investment Pledge; at least 2% of GDP



NATO

OTAN

VILNIUS

SUMMIT | SOMMET

11-12 VII 2023



From SACLANT TO ACT to
return of SLOC defense



The New Battle for the ATLANTIC

Emerging Naval Competition
with Russia in the Far North



MAGNUS NORDENMAN

FOREWORD BY ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN (RET.)

SLOC defense

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPER

The Third Battle of the Atlantic

Innovation in the U.S. Navy
with Soviet Submarine




Owen R. Cote, Jr.
Associate Director, MIT Sea Grant



NATO's defence and deterrence

Ballistic Missile Defence

Part 9 of 9 - we are highlighting each part of defence and deterrence separately - stay tuned for more, or go to <http://bit.ly/NATOD2> to get the whole picture.



European Defence Industrial Strategy #EDIS

#EUDefenceIndustry




PART IV: DETERRENCE AFTER UKRAINE

B

From Joint to MDO



From Joint to MDO: parallel computing/avoid single points of failure



	Operational Support Area	Tactical Support Area	Close Area	Deep Maneuver Area	Operational Deep Fires Area	Strategic Deep Fires Area
	Friendly area: where friendly operational forces gain their combat power, sustain operations and project power into the Support, Close, and Deep Areas	Friendly area: Where friendly tactical forces gain their combat power, sustain operations and project power into the Close and Deep Areas	Friendly areas in the competitor's "near abroad", the focus of their strategic aims which U.S. forces and allies must protect, defend, and liberate, when necessary. Ground forces operate here.		Competitor's non-permissive area where all-domain fires originate, targetable by friendly; only special operations forces (SOF) ground forces operate here	Competitor's non-permissive, policy-restricted area where all-domain fires originate
	1500s+ km	500s+ km	200s+ km		500s+ km	1000s+ km

Illustrative depths of expanded space




Figure 2-1. MDO framework



Multi-Domain Battle: Achieving Cross-Domain Synergy



Maneuver to positions of relative advantage and project power across all domains to ensure freedom of action.

Integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities to create windows of domain superiority and preserve Joint Force freedom of maneuver.


Exploit temporary domain superiority by synchronizing cross-domain fire and maneuver to achieve physical, temporal, positional, and psychological advantages.





MDO challenges

1) C2 & RMF




MDO challenges


3) Digitalization & EDTs.

MDO challenges



2) Capabilities
development
and integration.





PART IV: DETERRENCE AFTER UKRAINE

C




US Defense Planning: 2MTW




Defense Planning in a Time of Conflict

A Comparative Analysis of the
2001–2014 Quadrennial Defense
Reviews, and Implications for the Army—
Executive Summary

Eric V. Larson, Derek Eator, Michael E. Linick, John E. Peters,
Agnas Gereben Schaefer, Keith Walters, Stephanie Young,
H. G. Massey, Michelle Darrah Ziegler



Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, March 2021; IISS Military Balance, 2021; CRS; The Washington Post



TANKS A LOT