




THE STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS					
 Stocks are not the main funding source, bonds are more important 					
 Marketable securities (stocks/bonds) altogether, too (except for few large and financially strong corporations) 					
 Indirect finance is more important than direct finance, especially through banks 					
 Financial markets, institutions and products are heavily regulated 					
 Debt financing often involves collateral and extensive covenants 					
 Underdeveloped financial systems lead to lower economic development and growth 					
WHY?					
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
RATIONALE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS				
Transaction costs				
 Fees and commissions to enter markets can be substantial, especially for small volumes of funds 				
 Small amounts exclude markets with higher minimum denominations or prevent diversification 				
• Solutions:				
 Economies of scale: pool resources of many to reduce costs' incidence on individual investors, allowing diversification 				
 Expertise/economies of scope: multiple services can rely on the same information, as well as focus leads to know-how 				
 Liquidity services: allow easy/cheap/quick entry/exit from investments 				
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




	MORAL HAZARD	
n debt c	contracts:	
	ncipal-agent problem : borrowers could be incentivated in undertaking risky jects that increase the likelihood of default by having a greater expected return	
• Solu	utions:	
•	Collateral : also implicit in equity, have borrowers risk more from undertaking risky projects	
•	Monitoring through covenants : discouraging undesired (f.i. M&A) or encouraging desired behaviour (f.i. borrower's life insurance), safekeeping collateral (f.i. fire insurance on mortgages), requiring disclosures	
•	Free-riding is not avoided and enforcement is costly and difficult	
• Fina	ancial intermediaries help:	
•	Issuing private non-marketable loans avoids free-riding, allowing for monitoring and enforcing covenants	
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Examples							
 Consider the following example: Your house is worth 200,000 € and is subject to river floods. A moderate event would destroy it completely and is a 1-in-50-years event. By building a protection (seawall, worth 10,000), destruction will occur only for exceptional floods (1-in-200-years event). What would be a fair insurance premium under full insurance in both cases? What if coverage occurs only for 75% of the house's value? 							
		Without seawall (p=2%)	With seawall (p=0.5%)				
	Full insurance	Exposure: 200,000 Premium: 4,000 Retained loss: 0	Exposure: 210,000 Premium: 1,050 Retained loss: 0				
	Coinsurance 75%	Exposure: 150,000 Premium: 3,000 Retained loss: 50,000	Exposure: 157,500 Premium: 787.50 Retained loss: 52,500				
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Examples	
lssues:	
 Collusion between very few banks: expressing an opinion with no responsibility/accountability 	
- Profits/losses on own trading and lending are heavily dependent on Libor	
 Low levels of Libor make banks show lower liabilities, banks' own debt often referred to Libor 	
- Huge leverage on derivatives can produce billions in earnings by small IR changes	
- Several large banks already fined: Barclays for 0.4bln\$, UBS for 1.5bln\$, DB for 2.5bln\$,	
- Courts are starting to sentence individuals: the first is a UBS trader for 14y	
 Something similar in the Forex: online chats between traders disclosing volumes and prices of trades before daily fixing and cartels over the 60s window around it 	
 And the Euribor, where the survey asks "a rate suitable for a transaction between prime banks"? 	
- Institutions involved are the same fines and jail time are raining.	
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